Janice Rios-negron v. Pedro Gadiel Figueroa Varagas ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
No. 78251-7-I
JANICE RIOS-NEGRON,
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and
PEDRO FIGUEROA-VARGAS,
Appellant. FILED: August 12, 2019
APPELWICK, C.J. — Rios-Negron and Figueroa-Vargas had a parenting plan
under which the parties’ child resided with the mother a majority of the time. The
parties did not follow the plan closely. The mother served the father with a notice
of intent to relocate pursuant to the child relocation act.1 The father objected,
arguing that the parents in reality had equal residential time, and therefore the
mother could not benefit from the statutory presumption allowing relocation. The
trial court found that the child, in fact, spent the majority of time with the mother,
and granted the relocation. We affirm.
FACTS
Janice Rios-Negron and Pedro Figueroa-Vargas are the parents of
daughter J.F-R. The parties dissolved their marriage in 2009. The mother moved
with J.F-R to Arizona before the dissolution was final. Under the parenting plan,
J.F-R lived a majority of the time with her mother, and resided with her father every
1 RCW 26.09.405-.560.
No. 78251-7-1/2
other weekend. They moved back to Washington in 2010. The parties continued
to follow the schedule of the parenting plan, even though it was based on the
mother and daughter living in Arizona.
In 2013, the court entered a new parenting plan in which J.F-R resided with
her father every other week from Thursday after school through Monday morning,
and with her father from Wednesday after school through Thursday morning on
the alternate week. The parties did not follow this plan closely. Instead, during
cross-examination, the mother testified,
Q. [Isn’t it true that you and] Pedro agreed approximately 4 1/2
years ago to disregard the parenting plan?
A. We agreed that he could have her extra days.
Q. Yes. And isn’t it true that the extra days--and you’re using your
phrase really amounted to an alternating week schedule with
--
[J.F-R] changing residences on Fridays?
A. Correct.
Q. And isn’t it true that the two of you followed that schedule for
approximately four years until this past May?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Tell me when during the four years that you did not follow
that schedule.
A. Like I mentioned before, you know, he will not pick her up right
after school. He would show up seven, eight, nine p.m., so it’s
not a complete 50/50 parenting plan because she will still come
home. I will have to do homework. I would have to feed her. I
will have to take her to school. And, basically, only she’s going
to his house to sleep, so I wouldn’t consider that a 50/50 plan.
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No. 78251-7-1/3
The parents argued about J.F-R’s residential schedule. In 2016, the parties
disagreed about the father traveling with J.F-R to Puerto Rico for Christmas and
the Puerto Rican celebration of Three Kings Day. They went to arbitration.
In June 2017, the mother served the father with a notice of intent of
relocation, stating that she intended to move with J.F-R to North Carolina in August
2017. On July 19, 2017, the father filed an objection to the relocation. The court
entered an order allowing the relocation and a temporary parenting plan. After a
trial in December 2017, the court entered a final order, again granting the mother’s
relocation. The father moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion
for reconsideration as to the father’s objection to relocation. But, the court granted
the motion for reconsideration as to certain sections of its order, and entered an
amended final order. The father appeals.
DISCUSSION
The father makes essentially two arguments and challenges a number of
the trial court’s factual findings.2 First, he argues that the trial court erred in
applying the child relocation act (CRA), RCW 26.09.405-.560,~ asserting that,
because the parents shared equal residential time, neither parent was entitled to
2 There are also a number of assignments of error in the father’s opening
brief that are unsupported by argument. When an assignment of error is “neither
argued nor briefed,” the reviewing court deems it waived. Kadoranian v.
Bellingham Police Dep’t, 119 Wash. 2d 178, 191, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992).
~ RCW26.09.405 and .510 have been amended by Laws of 2019, ch. 46, §
5021 and § 5022 respectively. RCW 26.09.410, .430, and .520 have been
amended by Laws of 2019, ch. 79, § 4, § 2, and § 3 respectively. The legislature
also added a new section to the statute, defining “substantially equal residential
time.” LAWS OF 2019, ch. 79 § 1. These amendments are effective July 28, 2019.
LAWS OF 2019, at ii (see (5)(a) setting out the effective date). They do not change
the disposition of this case.
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No. 78251-7-1/4
the statutory presumption allowing relocation. Second, he argues that the trial
court erred in failing to consider and grant his petition for modification of the
parenting plan. Last, we address the father’s challenges to the trial court’s findings
of fact.
I. Standard of Review
This court reviews a trial court’s relocation decision for abuse of discretion.
In re Marriage of Jackson, 4 Wash. App. 2d 212, 217, 421 P.3d 477 (2018). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it makes a manifestly unreasonable decision or
bases its decision on untenable grounds or reasons. In re Marriage of Homer, 151
Wash. 2d 884, 893, 93 P.3d 124 (2004). The trial court’s findings of fact are treated
as verities on appeal, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. In
re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wash. 2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014).
Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Estate of Jones, 152
Wash. 2d 1, 8, 93 P.3d 147 (2004). ‘Substantial evidence” is evidence sufficient to
persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted. j..ç~
II. CRA
The CRA sets forth notice requirements and standards applicable to certain
child relocation requests. RCW 26.09.430 provides, ‘[A] person with whom the
child resides a majority of the time shall notify every other person entitled to
residential time or visitation with the child under a court order if the person intends
to relocate.”4 If an interested person objects, the trial court must then conduct a
~ As amended, the statute will also apply to “a person with substantially
equal residential time.” LAWS OF 2019, ch. 79 § 2.
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No. 7825 1-7-1/5
fact-finding hearing. Jackson, 4 Wash. App. 2d at 218. The CRA also provides “a
rebuttable presumption that the intended relocation of the child will be permitted.”
RCW 26.09.520. The objecting person may rebut this presumption by showing
that “the detrimental effect of the relocation outweighs the benefit of the change to
the child and the relocating person, based upon [11] factors.” Id.
Here, the father asserts that the CRA presumption in favor of relocation
does not apply. Relying on Jackson, the father asserts that the presumption
permitting relocation applies only to a person with whom the child in fact resides a
majority of the time. He contends that, in line with Jackson, where the child
resides, rather than where she is scheduled to reside under the parenting plan, is
the factual question that must be answered. 4 Wash. App. 2d at 220. And, he argues
here that “the parties shared equal residential time . . . for more than [four] years.
As a matter of fact, there was no ‘majority parent.” Finally, he asserts that the
court erred in concluding that any factor under the CRA analysis deemed neutral
must be resolved ih favor of the relocating parent.
In regards to the informal parenting arrangement, the trial court found,
5. At some point the parties agreed to informally try a 50-50
parenting plan, where the child was to live with each parent for a
week. The majority of the time, even during the father’s “week,”
the mother picked up the child from school or daycare, helped
with homework and fed the child dinner, and then the father
would pick the child up after dinner for overnight at his residence.
When the father had the child overnight, he would drop her off in
the morning at the mother’s apartment, and the child would catch
the school bus from there. Despite the purportedly equal
residential time, it appears that overall, the father was not as
involved with the child’s day-to-day activities as the mother.
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No. 78251-7-116
6. The theoretical week on I week off schedule continued until May
2017. At that time, the parties had a disagreement over the
father’s involvement and returned to the 2013 parenting plan
provision of the father having every other weekend with the child.
The mother had previously used threats of returning to the 2013
parenting plan to control behavior by the father of which she did
not approve.
The father challenges the trial court’s finding “that the father was not as
involved with the child’s day-to-day activities as the mother.” This court will reverse
the challenged finding of fact only if it is not supported by substantial evidence. In
re Marriage of Griswold, 112 Wash. App. 333, 339, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002).
After the court entered a new parenting plan in 2013, the parties informally
switched to a different arrangement. The mother testified,
A. So we started with the parenting plan, and then he he did ask
--
if he could have extra days. So, you know, I was like, [o]h, okay.
You know, we can work that out. The problem is that he he --
wouldn’t do exactly what he said.
So, for example, like on Thursdays, he wouldn’t be able to
pick her up because he play[s] I don’t know if it’s Frisbee or
--
dodgeball. I think it is one of those. He plays games on
Thursday in Seattle, so he would come about nine p.m. to pick
her up.
So at that point, I said, [f]orget about Thursday because you
come so late to pick her up.
And then he said, [o]kay. That’s fine, so, you know, it was
betterforherto stay with me.
And then the rest of the days, she was always the one I --
was always the one picking her up, you know, and then she will
come home from when she started middle school, then she
--
would come home from the bus.
Like I say, I have my schedule so that I can get home as
soon as she gets home, or between half an hour, an hour at the
most, so I will spend all the afternoons with her. I will feed her,
do homework, and then he would show up at random times.
Sometimes he will show up at seven, eight, nine, whenever, and
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No. 78251-7-1/7
then he would pick her up on his days. And then sometimes he
would be, [ojh, I cannot take care of her this day, so it wasn’t
consistent.
I mean and so he will pick her up at, like I say, it could be
--
seven, eight, or nine. So by the time he will pick her up, she had
already been fed, she had already had homework done, she had
already went [sic] to her activities, so basically, she was going to
bed. Then she will wake up and he will bring her to my house to
ride [the] bus to go to school.
Q. Okay. So even when he had her overnight, he would bring her
back to your apartment in the morning?
A. Yeah, and then she will ride the bus, and then she comes back
home. So she was mainly at home. Like I said, she would leave
late in the night, and then just go to bed. So they wouldn’t do
anything in the afternoon. She was still having dinner with me
every day. Doing homework with me every day. Doing, you
know, all her activities with me every day.
The father disagreed with the mother’s recitation of their informal parenting
schedule. He testified,
A. Particularly during elementary school, [J.F-R] was enrolled in
before- and after-school. Janice would drop [J.F-R] off in the
mornings, on her time, and then she would pick [J.F-R] up either
right after school or at day care. Actually, she would pick her up
at at you know, after-school day care, because you have to
-- --
sign out for it many times. And I would pick her up at day care
after school. And the day care was until 6[:00] p.m., so I would
have to leave work at 5:00 so that I could make it before to -- --
before 6[:00] p.m. to pick her up. So and, particularly, when
--
she was at day care, I could go pick her up directly from school.
Q. Now, there came a point in time when [J.F-R] started
participating in activities like gymnastics and dance. . .
Q. Did would Janice pick up
-- -- take [J.F-R] to a dance class or a
gymnastics class?
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No. 78251-7-1/8
A. She would sometimes, yes. I’m not denying that.
Q. Okay. And would you pick [J.F-Rj up when she was finished?
A. I would pick her up sometimes from when from the sorry,
-- --
from the dance or gymnastics class afterwards on occasions,
yes.
The father points to additional testimony. First, he mentions Jossymar
Lamar, the mother’s friend, who agreed that the mother and father followed a
“week-on, week-off schedule” after 2014. The father also discusses testimony
from his mother, Mayra Pritchard. Pritchard testified that, during her last visit in
November 2016, the parenting schedule was one week with the mother and one
week with the father. The father additionally mentions testimony from his father,
Pedro Figueroa, Sr. Figueroa testified that his son “had been telling me for the last
years [sic] that [J.F-R] was one week with him and one week with Janice and that’s
a matter of fact.” And, the father recounts testimony from his girlfriend Kelsey
Henan. During Henan’s testimony, counsel asked,
Q. Before these legal proceedings started that we’re in court for
now, did Pedro ever discuss with you a desire to change the
parenting plan that he had with Janice?
A. He did.
Q. And what did he tell you?
A. He wanted to make the 50/50 permanent.
Q. Do you have a sense of how long he and Janice had been
following the 50/50 plan?
A. Almost since the last time they went to mediation and restated
the parenting plan. When that time was, it wasn’t long after that
they had a handshake agreement to say, “We’re going to go
50/50.”
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No. 78251-7-1/9
Q. Did from your perspective, did Pedro live up to his end of the
--
bargain on the 50/50? Did he care for [J.F-RJ 50 percent of the
time?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Were there times when Pedro would care for [J.F-Rj on days
other than his residential time?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall the circumstances of that?
A. There were some occasions where her mom was traveling, and
so Pedro would take her for a few of those or the time when
--
her mom was gone, and then they would sort out, you know, the
days, kind of shift the schedule back.
Q. Do you recall was there a time when Janice and Pedro went
-- -
-changed the 50/50 plan they had been following and went back
to the written terms of the parenting plan?
A. Yeah, that happened around the May/June time frame.
As long as substantial evidence supports a finding, it does not matter that
other evidence may contradict it. In re Marriage of Burrill, 113 Wash. App. 863, 868,
56 P.3d 993 (2002). This court does not review the trial courts credibility
determinations, nor can it weigh conflicting evidence. In re Marriage of Rich, 80
Wash. App. 252, 259, 907 P.2d 1234 (1996).
The mother testified that, even when the parents had an informal
arrangement to alternate weeks with J.F-R, she did the majority of the parenting
and was with J.F-R more than 50 percent of the time. Substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that, “Despite the purportedly equal residential
time, it appears that overall, the father was not as involved with the child’s day-to
day activities as the mother.”
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No. 78251-7-1/10
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the CRA
presumption in favor of relocating applied to the mother.
III. Modification of Parenting Plan
The father also argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider his
petition to modify the parenting plan. He contends that, “[b]ecause the CRA does
not apply, the court should have applied the criteria applicable to modification of
[a] parenting plan.” He further asserts that the trial court erred by considering the
relocating parent’s interest. The father relies on In re Marriage of Worthley, 198
Wash. App. 419, 424, 393 P.3d 859 (2017).
But, Worthley does not apply. In Worthley, the court held that “the CRA
does not apply when the child’s residential time is designated equal or substantially
equal in the parenting plan and when the proposed relocation would result in a
modification of this designation.” 198 Wash. App. at 424. Because the mother had
J.F-R for the majority of the time, under the parenting plan and in practice, the CRA
applies here.
The father did not file a petition to modify the parenting plan until after the
mother had served the father with a notice of her intent to relocate with J.F-R. The
trial court properly analyzed the mother’s intent to move as a relocation case. The
trial court had the authority under the CRA to modify the parenting plan as part of
the relocation action. Having done so, the trial court did not need to separately
consider Pedro’s modification petition. All issues were properly within the scope
of the earlier filed CRA proceeding.
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No. 78251-7-I/il
The trial court did not err in declining to grant the father’s petition to modify
the parenting plan.
IV. Challenged Findings of Fact
The father makes a number of challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact.
The trial court’s findings of fact are treated as verities on appeal, so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence. Chandola, 180 Wash. 2d at 642.
“Substantial evidence” is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of
the truth of the matter asserted. ki. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on
appeal. Jones, 152 Wash. 2d at 8.
A. Factor 4.a—Relationships
The father first challenges three separate portions of the court’s findings
under the factor “Relationships: The children’s relationships with each parent, any
siblings, and other important people in the children’s life.”
In analyzing this factor, the trial court found,
The child has a strong relationship with both parents, but appears to
have a stronger attachment to the mother. The child is more
emotionally reliant on the mother than she is on the father. The child
and mother talk and text constantly. They sleep together. The child
has no siblings. She spends a significant amount of time with
relatives in North Carolina. She is in frequent contact with her aunt
and uncle, and her grandparents lived temporarily with the child and
her mother. The child spent substantially less time with her maternal
uncle when living in Washington than she does with her maternal
relatives while living in North Carolina. The child’s relationship with
the father’s girlfriend, Kelsey, is not a strong relationship, although it
is improving.
This factor favors relocation.
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No. 78251-7-1/12
The father disputes the portion of the finding, “[The child] appears to have
a stronger attachment to the mother. The child is more emotionally reliant on the
mother than she is on the father.” He asserts that “there is no evidentiary basis
for this finding.” He argues that this finding contradicts another finding, “The court
is concerned about the mother’s use of corporal punishment on a child this age,
about her belief that her child is simply a ‘liar’ rather than one who may need
emotional help, and about her use of demeaning language toward the child.” And,
he claims that this finding is at odds with testimonies of witnesses who attested to
the strong bond between the father and J.F-R.
The two findings do not contradict one another. In an unchallenged finding,
the court stated, “The child and her mother are very close, appearing to be more
so than is typical for a child [J.F-R]’s age. They appear to be in constant contact
during the day.” Based on an analysis of cell phone records, the mother testified
that the daughter called and texted her more than she did the father. She
explained that the daughter sent her text messages about “[p]retty much
everything. I mean, even like she’s always letting me know, like, Hey, I got to
school. I’m coming back. How you [sic] doing? I love you. You know, like how’s
work? Just -- yeah. We talk about pretty much everything.” The finding that the
child has a closer attachment to the mother is not incongruous with testimony that
the child has a close relationship with her father. Both can be true. Substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the child is more emotionally reliant
on the mother than the father.
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No. 78251-7-1/13
The father challenges second the portion of the finding that “her
grandparents lived temporarily with the child and her mother.” The father
concedes that the grandparents were temporarily in the mother’s house with J.F
R. But, he argues that, because they were there only temporarily, it should not
have been a factor upon which relocation was based.
There is nothing factually inaccurate about the trial court’s statement that
the grandparents lived temporarily with the mother and child. It is one sentence in
a long paragraph analyzing many different relationships between the child and
others. The father’s argument fails.
The father challenges third the portion of the finding, “{T]he child spent
substantially less time with her maternal uncle when living in Washington.” He
asserts, “Prior to relocation, [J.F-R] spent far more time with her uncle in
Washington compared to the time spent with her mother’s aunt and uncle in North
Ca ro Ii n a.”
The mother testified that she saw her brother four times in the year before
she moved. The mother’s uncle, J.F-R’s great uncle, testified that, in North
Carolina, he and his wife see J.F-R twice a week for visits. The court found, “[The
child] spends a significant amount of time with relatives in North Carolina. She is
in frequent contact with her aunt and uncle, and her grandparents lived temporarily
with the child and her mother. The child spent substantially less time with her
maternal uncle when living in Washington.” This statement appears to compare
the amount of time J.F-R spent with her uncle in Washington to the amount of time
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No. 78251-7-1/14
she spends with her great uncle, great aunt, and other family after moving to North
Carolina.
Substantial evidence supports the finding.
B. Factor 4.c—Contact
Next, the father disputes a portion of the trial court’s finding under the
“[c]ontact” factor. He argues that the court’s statement, “Even when in
Washington, the child’s contact with her father [over the years] was somewhat
sporadic and for shorter periods” is unsupported by evidence.
The trial court found,
Disrupting the children’s contact with the moving parent would be
more harmful to them than disrupting their contact with the non-
moving parent.
As noted, the court finds the child is unusually emotionally connected
to the mother. Even when in Washington, the child’s contact with her
father over the years was somewhat sporadic and for shorter
periods. Disrupting the contact between her mother and the child
would be more harmful than disrupting the contact with her father.
This factor favors relocation.
The father argues that the parties followed a “50/50” residential schedule
prior to the mother’s notice of intent to relocate, and that his contact was not
“somewhat sporadic’ or drastically shorter.” The mother testified,
I have my schedule so that I can get home as soon as she gets home,
or between half an hour, an hour at the most, so I will spend all the
afternoons with her. I will feed her, do homework, and then he would
show up at random times. Sometimes he will show up at seven,
eight, nine, whenever, and then he would pick her up on his days.
And then sometimes he would be, [o]h, I cannot take care of her this
day, so it wasn’t consistent.
Testimony from the record supports the trial court’s finding.
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No. 78251-7-1/15
C. Factor 4.e—Reasons for Moving
The father challenges a portion of the trial court’s finding under the factor,
“Reasons for moving.”
The trial court found,
The reasons for moving were given in good faith.
The mother’s Notice of Relocation was filed soon after a serious
falling out with the father. This is a concern given the timing and the
mother’s previous use of the 2013 parenting plan as a manipulative
weapon against the father. There is evidence the mother had
thought about moving for some time, however. She stated she
wanted “a better life,” lower cost of living, and to be near her relatives
in North Carolina. She represented to the court that she was buying
a home that, in fact, was not available for sale. She spent money on
trips and a car rather than saving for a house down payment.
However, she drained her retirement savings and was able to
purchase a different house in North Carolina. She clearly could not
afford to buy an acceptable home in Washington, close to the father,
and she is in fact nearer her relatives and sees them often. In total,
the court finds the mother acted in good faith.
The father disagrees with the statement, “She clearly could not afford to
buy an[] acceptable home in Washington, close to the father.” Citing two of his
exhibits, the father argues that he offered evidence of homes that the mother could
have afforded in his neighborhood.
Regarding the first home the father offered, the mother testified that, when
she looked at the home, she saw that it was a doublewide manufactured home in
a neighborhood of mobile homes. She does not want to live in that type of home.
She additionally testified about a house in Snoqualmie that the father offered,
which was 890 square feet and cost $370,000. And, she testified about another
house that the father offered, which was foreclosed and in an area that was
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No. 78251-7-1/16
“completely devastated,” for the price of $358,000. While there may have been
houses the mother could have potentially afforded, she did not find them
acceptable.
In contrast, the mother purchased her home in North Carolina for $230,000.
It is almost 2,200 square feet. Her mortgage payment is $1,526.87 per month.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the mother could
not afford to buy an acceptable home in Washington, close to the father.
D. Factor 4.cj—Children
Next, the father challenges two findings under the factor the trial court
labeled ‘Children.” First, he disputes the finding, “The data — including the child’s
home environment, the extended family in North Carolina, the relationships with
her extended family in North Carolina, and how she is doing in school and her
extracurricular activities — indicate the move has been positive for the child.” The
father contends that there is “scant evidence” to support this finding.
The father asserts that, since the move, J.F-R’s grades in school have
declined. Her more recent progress reports show a couple of her grades that are
below a B. But, she also had a grade below a B before the move. The mother
testified,
She’s about the same. Like here, she got a C. You know, right now
she got [sic] a 78 in math, and I know math she has struggled with it
on the past. But other than that, you know, her grades are like A[s]
and Bs, so it’s kind of about the same.
As for the home environment and extracurricular activities, the trial court
stated in an unchallenged finding, “In North Carolina, the child lives with her mother
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No. 78251-7-1/17
in a house with a backyard. She is active in sports and activities in North Carolina,
as she was in Washington.” Above, we discussed the strength of the child’s
relationships with her family in North Carolina. Given the totality of this data, the
trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Second, the father challenges the trial court’s finding,
The child has become embedded in Fayetteville, North Carolina.
She has made friends, in both school and her extra activities. She
has her own bedroom and play space in her home. She is now used
to visiting her mother’s relatives and hanging out at her aunt and
uncle’s house, where there is a pool. Moving back to Washington
would involve living with her father and his girlfriend, about whom
she is ambivalent, in pleasant surroundings but leaving her friends
and activities in Fayetteville. She did have friends and activities in
Washington when she lived in Washington.
These scenarios both have positive and negative aspects. The
factor is therefore neutral as to relocation.
The father asserts that “[t]here is no evidence to support [the] statement as
to how the child can become embedded in only 3 1/2 months in North Carolina as
compared to nearly 10 years in Washington.” His challenge to the finding focuses
on J.F-R’s living situation with her father and the activities she could resume if she
returned to Washington. His argument does not dispute the fact that the court
found that the child is doing well in North Carolina. The mother testified about J.F
R’s activities, including dance class and gymnastics, and the friends that she has
made in North Carolina.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding.
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No. 78251-7-1/18
E. Factor 4.1—Other Arrangements
The father challenges the trial court’s finding, “The father has already
traveled twice to North Carolina on a monthly basis, and has the finances and
some flexibility to do so.” The trial court also found, “He has usable vacation time,
although the trip to North Carolina uses up four or five days at a time. He has a
flexible work schedule and can do work on the plane or in North Carolina.” The
father argues that he does not have enough vacation time for all of the monthly
visits, and that it is a burden for him to travel every month.
Testimony supports the trial court’s finding that, at the time of trial, the father
had visited J.F-R twice since she moved. To support his assertion that he does
not have enough vacation time for the monthly visits, the father cites three exhibits
which are not in the record before this court. The father has a long-term job with
Microsoft. While it is plausible that traveling is a significant burden, the trial court
also found, “The child talks to her father frequently. There are no limitations on
her talking with her father. [lit is possible for the father to keep a strong relationship
with the child, [albeit with] less in-person visitation time.”
Substantial evidence supports this finding.
F. Factor 4.i—Alternatives
The father challenges the trial court’s finding, “The mother has relocated
and essentially has no savings.” The father argues that the mother purchased a
home before the motion for relocation was settled, and that the mother’s risk in
doing so should not be a factor favoring relocation.
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Under this finding, the court stated, “This factor disfavors relocation.” It is
not clear what the trial court means. It might mean, as it says, that the factor
disfavors the mother’s relocation. Or, it might mean that, because the mother had
already relocated, this weighed in her favor and against her relocating back to
Washington. Pursuant to RCW 26.09.520, there is a rebuttable presumption that
the mother’s relocation would be permitted. The trial court had previously granted
the temporary relocation.
This factor should not have weighed in the mother’s favor. On appeal, we
cannot conclude that the trial court determined that this was in the mother’s favor,
because the order states otherwise.
G. Factor 4.k—Financial
Finally, the father argues that the trial court erred in finding that the financial
impact of moving “[d]oes not apply.”
The trial court found that the financial impact and logistics of moving was a
factor that did not apply because the move had already occurred. The father
asserts that the factor should have disfavored relocation because “{t]he court failed
to evaluate the adverse financial impact from relocation.” The mother testified
about the positive impact the move had on her finances, explaining that she is
saving $1,000 a month by living in North Carolina. The father’s argument in that
regard fails. Additionally, the father argues that the mother should not gain an
advantage for purchasing a home before the issue of relocation had been resolved.
But, the trial court did not give her an advantage on this factor. It found, “This
factor is neutral.”
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The trial court did not err in finding that the factor did not affect its analysis
because the move had already occurred.
V. Attorney Fees
The mother requests attorney fees on appeal “based on need and ability to
pay an amount to be decided by the court.” She fails to cite authority supporting
her request, contrary to RAP 18.1(b). RAP 18.1(b) requires argument and citation
to authority to advise us of the appropriate grounds for an award of attorney fees
and costs. Osborne v. Seymour, 164 Wash. App. 820, 866, 265 P.3d 917 (2011).
This requirement is mandatory. j.çj~. This requirement also demands more than a
bald request for attorney fees on appeal. ki. Thus, we deny the mother’s request
for attorney fees on appeal based on her failure to comply with the RAP.
We affirm.
~2.
WE CONCUR:
I
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