State Of Washington, V Robert Troy Wheeler ( 2014 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 71642-5-
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROBERT T. WHEELER,
Appellant.
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of
ROBERT T.WHEELER
Petitioner. FILED: June 2, 2014
Appelwick, J. — Wheeler brings a direct appeal challenging the validity of his guilty
plea. He also brings an untimely personal restraint petition arguing that newly discovered
evidence reveals that the State delayed charging him until after his eighteenth birthday.
We affirm Wheeler's direct appeal and dismiss his PRP.
FACTS
On May 4, 2005, the State charged Robert Wheeler with one count of first degree
child rape (Count I) and one count of first degree child molestation (Count II). The charges
arose from an incident that occurred when Wheeler was 13 or 14, but did not come to
No. 71642-5-1/2
light until he was 17 and a half. The State charged him 36 days after his eighteenth
birthday. Wheeler pleaded guilty to both counts.
On April 17, 2006, the trial court sentenced Wheeler under the Special Sex
Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA). The judgment and sentence listed the
maximum sentence for child rape as "20yrs/$50,000" and child molestation as
"10yrs/$20,000." The correct maximum sentence for such class A felonies, however, is
life in prison and/or a $50,000 fine. RCW 9A.20.021(1)(a). The trial court sentenced him
to a 131.75 month standard range sentence for child rape and an 89 month standard
range sentence for child molestation, most of which was suspended.
Wheeler's judgment became final when the trial court filed it in 2006.
On September 11, 2009, the trial court revoked Wheeler's SSOSA sentence for
noncompliance and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in custody.
During the revocation hearing, the trial court stated:
Yeah. I remember this case, Mr. Wheeler, because I remember the
State had waited until you were an adult to charge you. I don't think that
was necessarily the fairest way to treat a 13-year old. Although maybe this
didn't come to light. I think it still came to light when you were a minor.
Wheeler responded, "Yes."
Wheeler subsequently brought a personal restraint petition (PRP) seeking
withdrawal of his guilty plea, because his judgment and sentence misstated the maximum
sentences for both offenses. On July 3, 2012, this court concluded that, despite this error,
the trial court did not exceed its statutory authority in sentencing Wheeler. Order Granting
Pet. In Part, In re Pers. Restraint of Wheeler. No. 40489-3-M (Wash. Ct. App. July 3,
2012). Thus, based on In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173Wn.2d 123, 143, 267 P.3d 324
No. 71642-5-1/3
(2011), Wheeler's judgment and sentence was not facially invalid. Wheeler, No. 40489-
3-II, at 2-3. We accordingly held that Wheeler was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.
]d. at 3. We then remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting the
misstated maximum sentences in Wheeler's judgment and sentence. Id.
On October 12, 2012, the trial court entered an order correcting the judgment and
sentence. The court wrote that "[pjage 2 of the Judgment and Sentence, Section 2.3
reflects the maximum term as 20 years/$50,000 for Count I and 10 years/$20,000 for
Count II and should note a maximum term of Life/$50,000 for Count I and Life/$50,000
for Count II." The court corrected the judgment and sentence accordingly. It further
ordered that "[a]ll other terms and conditions of the original Judgment and Sentence shall
remain in full force and effect."
Wheeler filed a direct appeal from the trial court's order correcting the judgment
and sentence. He also filed a personal restraint petition.1
DISCUSSION
I. Direct Appeal: Validity of Guilty Plea
In his direct appeal, Wheeler argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and invalid,
because he was misinformed about the maximum sentence. He contends that under
RAP 2.5(c)(1), we have discretion to consider this issue on appeal from remand, even
though it was not the subject of an earlier appeal. He requests that we either review the
merits of his claim or remand to the trial court with instructions to consider his claim.
1The direct appeal and the PRP were consolidated in Division II of this court. The
consolidated case was then transferred to Division I.
No. 71642-5-1/4
Contrary to Wheeler's argument, RAP 2.5(c)(1) does not automatically revive
every issue not raised in an earlier appeal. State v. Barberio. 121 Wash. 2d 48, 50, 846 P.2d
519 (1993). Only if the trial court on remand exercised its independent judgment to review
and rule on an issue does the issue become appealable. jU; see also State v. Parmelee.
172 Wash. App. 899, 905, 292 P.3d 799 (2013), review denied. 177 Wash. 2d 1027, 309 P.3d
504 (2013). It is discretionary for the trial court to decide whether to revisit an issue that
was not the subject of appeal. Barberio. 121 Wash. 2d at 51. However, this discretion is
limited by the scope of the appellate court's mandate. State v. Kilqore. 167 Wash. 2d 28,
42, 216 P.3d 393 (2009). For instance, in Barberio. the trial court on remand made only
corrective changes to the amended judgment and sentence. 121 Wash. 2d at 51. Therefore,
there was no issue for the appellate court to review. Id. at 52. This rule promotes judicial
economy and encourages timely appeals. Parmelee. 172 Wash. App. at 906.
In his previous PRP, Wheeler argued that he was entitled to withdraw his plea,
because his judgment and sentence misstated the maximum sentence for both offenses.
Wheeler. No. 40489-3-II, at 1. We held that, because "the trial court did not exceed its
statutory authority in sentencing [Wheeler], despite its error in setting forth the maximum
sentence, his judgment and sentence was not facially invalid."2 id. at 2-3. We concluded
2 Our decision was based on Coats, in which the Washington Supreme Court held
that a judgment and sentence is valid despite misstating the maximum sentence.
Wheeler, No. 40489-3-M, at 2 (citing Coats. 173 Wash. 2d at 125-26); see also In re Pers.
Restraint of Toledo-Sotelo. 176 Wash. 2d 759, 767, 297 P.3d 51 (2013) ("[W]e have held
that where the sentencing court misstated the maximum sentence but actually handed
down a sentence within the SRA-mandated sentencing range, the sentencing court acted
within its statutory authority."). Wheeler does not ask us to reconsider our earlier decision
under RAP 2.5(c)(2).
No. 71642-5-1/5
that Wheeler was thus not entitled to withdraw his plea, but remanded to the trial court to
correct the error. Id. at 3.
On remand, the trial court entered an order solely correcting the identified error in
the judgment and sentence. It took no other actions and considered no other issues. The
trial court's discretion in reviewing new issues was limited by our mandate that the only
purpose of remand was to correct the misstated maximum sentences. Because the trial
court did not independently review and rule on the validity of Wheeler's guilty plea, there
is no issue for us to review here. We therefore do not consider the validity of Wheeler's
guilty plea in his direct appeal.3
II. Personal Restraint Petition: Newly Discovered Evidence
In a consolidated PRP, Wheeler argues that the State either intentionally or
negligently delayed filing charges against him, which resulted in the prejudicial loss of
juvenile jurisdiction. Because Wheeler was only 13 or 14 years old when he committed
the offenses, his case would not have been automatically transferred to superior court
under RCW 13.04.030(1 )(e)(v)(C).
Wheeler's PRP is based on a claim of newly discovered evidence. Specifically, in
2013, Wheeler obtained documents via a public records request showing that the State
originally drafted an information charging him in juvenile court. The State argues in
3 In the alternative, Wheeler argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to ask
the sentencing court to exercise its discretion and consider the voluntariness of his guilty
plea on remand. Defense counsel has no duty to pursue arguments, like the one Wheeler
makes here, that appear unlikely to succeed. State v. Brown. 159 Wash. App. 366, 371,
245 P.3d 776 (2011). As such, Wheeler cannot show deficient performance or prejudice
on remand. Id.
No. 71642-5-1/6
response that Wheeler's claim of preaccusatorial delay should be dismissed as untimely,
because Wheeler failed to act with reasonable diligence in discovering the new evidence.
Generally, RCW 10.73.090 bars any PRP not filed within one year after final
judgment. This one year time limit, however, does not apply to a PRP based solely on
newly discovered evidence, so long as "the defendant acted with reasonable diligence in
discovering the evidence and filing the petition." RCW 10.73.100(1). Under this rule, the
defendant must show that the new evidence (1) will probably change the result of the trial;
(2) was discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial by the
exercise of due diligence; (4) is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.
In re Pers. Restraint of Lord. 123 Wash. 2d 296, 319-20, 868 P.2d 835 (1994). When one
factor is absent, we need not consider whether the other factors are present. State v.
Macon. 128 Wash. 2d 784, 803-04, 911 P.2d 1004 (1996).
Wheeler turned 18 on March 29, 2005. The State then charged him 36 days later,
on May 4, 2005. However, the filed information contained an original typewritten date of
March 26, 2005, three days before Wheeler's birthday. This date was crossed out, with
May 4 handwritten in its place. This should have alerted Wheeler to the possible delay.
Nor does Wheeler assert a change in the Public Records Act, chapter 42.56 RCW, that
made the State's draft juvenile court charging document previously unavailable to him.
This evidence could have been discovered with due diligence before Wheeler pleaded
guilty almost a year later on April 17, 2006.
Furthermore, even if the May 4, 2005 information did not put Wheeler on notice,
his conversation with the judge at the September 11, 2009 SSOSA revocation hearing
should have. Yet, Wheeler did not file his public records request until March 2, 2013,
No. 71642-5-1/7
nearly three and a half years later. Wheeler did not act with reasonable diligence in
discovering the evidence and filing his PRP.
Wheeler fails to demonstrate that his collateral challenge falls within the newly
discovered evidence exception. Therefore, the one year time bar precludes any relief.
We affirm the order of the trial court and dismiss Wheeler's PRP as untimely.
""tr/C
WE CONCUR: