State Of Washington v. Kenneth Youngblood ( 2013 )

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S fM' P01 IS10 T8 -S
a OF APPEAI
2013 N011,
13 AA 11: 17
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHIN
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 42635 -8 -II
Respondent,
V.
KENNETH RAY YOUNGBLOOD, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
11
WORSWICK, C. J. — A jury found Kenneth Youngblood guilty of first degree manslaughter.
Youngblood appeals his conviction, asserting that ( 1) the State presented insufficient evidence to
prove the recklessness and causation elements of first degree manslaughter and ( 2) the trial
court' s reasonable doubt instruction misled the jury on the State' s burden of proof. Because the
State presented insufficient evidence to prove the recklessness element of first degree
manslaughter, we reverse Youngblood' s conviction and remand for dismissal with prejudice.
FACTS
On December 18, 2009, Mark Davis went to an Aberdeen, Washington bar after
attending a memorial service for a friend who had committed suicide. Youngblood was also at
the bar that evening. While at the bar, Davis appeared to be intoxicated. Davis slurred his
speech, cried over the death of his friend, and repeatedly stated that he wanted to kill himself.
No. 42635 -8 -II
Youngblood was speaking with Davis outside the bar when Youngblood' s daughter,
Katherine Youngblood, and Katherine' s friend, Emily Brisby, arrived.' The four made plans to
meet at Youngblood' s home. When they arrived at Youngblood' s home, the four began drinking
and talking. Shortly thereafter, Davis became upset and suicidal. After Davis became
distraught, Youngblood offered him between 10 and 20 pills to calm him down. According to
Brisby, Youngblood handed Davis 10 to 20 pills but, when asked, refused to tell Davis what kind
of pills they were, stating only that " they were to calm him down." Report of Proceedings ( RP)
at 109.
Shorty after ingesting the pills, Davis became " spac[ e] y" and appeared to be " heavily
sedated." RP at 110. After approximately 20 minutes, Davis tried to go to the bathroom but was
too intoxicated to walk and had to be carried to the bathroom by Youngblood and Katherine. For
the next few hours, Brisby frequently checked the bathroom to see if Davis was okay. She saw
that Davis had fallen from the toilet with his head resting on the side of the bathtub and that he
was still breathing. Brisby stated that she wanted to call 911, but Youngblood told her not to call
911 because he had taken that amount of the medication before and knew that Davis would be
okay. Before leaving Youngblood' s home at around 3: 30 to 4: 00 AM, Brisby checked on Davis
and saw that he was still breathing. The following day, medics were called to Youngblood' s
home and found that Davis had died on the bathroom floor.
Youngblood told police officers that he had an illness that made it difficult " for him to
remember things, particularly when he has been taking his medication or been drinking." RP at
33. Youngblood stated to the officers that he had hosted an after -hours party at his house with
1
For clarity, we refer to Katherine Youngblood by her first name, intending no disrespect.
2
No. 42635 -8 -II
Davis, Katherine, and Brisby. Youngblood also told officers about his prescribed medications
after the officers noticed several prescription bottles around his home. Officers collected several
prescription bottles as evidence, including a half filled bottle
- of Seroquel. 2 The State charged
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Youngblood with first degree manslaughter and controlled substances homicide.
At trial; forensic toxicologist Brianne O' Reilly testified that she had tested a sample of
Davis' s blood, which test revealed Davis had a blood alcohol level of 0. 230 to 0. 235. O' Reilly' s
test of Davis' s blood sample also revealed the presence of Seroquel and clonazepam, an anti-
seizure medication. O' Reilly stated that the presence of Seroquel in Davis' s blood sample
exceeded the therapeutic dosage associated with the drug. But O' Reilly was unwilling to opine
that the Seroquel in Davis' s system caused his death. O' Reilly stated that she had trouble
determining a fatal toxicity level for Seroquel because it is " in general considered a pretty safe
medication." RP at 70.
Forensic pathologist Emmanuel Lacsina testified that he had performed Davis' s autopsy,
which revealed that Davis had high levels of alcohol and Seroquel in his system when he died.
Lacsina stated his opinion that the combination of Seroquel and alcohol caused Davis' s death.
Lacsina also testified that this was the first case that he had examined where Seroquel was a
factor in a person' s death.
2
According to the trial trial testimony, Seroquel is a brand name for the
drug" quetiapine," an
anti- psychotic medication generally used in the treatment of schizophrenia or bipolar mania."
RP at 69.
3 Before trial, the trial court granted the State' s motion to dismiss the controlled substances
homicide charge. Thus, we do not address whether sufficient evidence would have supported
that charge.
No. 42635 -8 -II
The jury returned a verdict finding Youngblood guilty of first degree manslaughter.
Youngblood timely appeals his conviction.
ANALYSIS
Youngblood argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his first
degree manslaughter conviction. Specifically, Youngblood contends that the State' s evidence
was insufficient to support the recklessness element of first degree manslaughter. We agree.
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 ( 1992). All
reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted
most strongly against the defendant." Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d at 201. " A claim of insufficiency
admits the truth of the State' s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn
therefrom." Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d at 201. Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are
deemed equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wash. 2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 ( 1980).
Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and cannot be reviewed on appeal." State v.
Camarillo, 115 Wash. 2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 ( 1990). To convict Youngblood for first degree
manslaughter, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of former
RCW 9A.32. 060 ( 1997), which provided in relevant part, " A person is guilty of manslaughter in
the first degree when ... [ h] e recklessly causes the death of another person." Thus, to sustain
Youngblood' s first degree manslaughter conviction.on appeal, the State' s evidence must have
been sufficient to prove that he acted recklessly.
El
No. 42635 -8 -II
RCW 9A.08. 010( c) provides, " A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she
knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard
of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise
in the same situation." RCW 9A.08. 010( c)' s definition of recklessness contains both subjective
and objective components, such that it requires the jury to determine " both what the defendant
knew and how a reasonable person would have acted knowing these facts." State v. R. H.
S., 94
Wn. App. 844, 847, 974 P.2d 1253 ( 1999). When determining whether a defendant acted
recklessly under this definition, the trier of fact " is permitted to find actual subjective knowledge
if there is sufficient information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that a fact exists."
R. KS, 94 Wash. App. at 847.
Youngblood contends that the State failed to present any evidence that he had actual
knowledge of the substantial risk of death created by providing 10 to 20 Seroquel pills to a
highly intoxicated Davis. In response, the State does not point to any evidence in the record
supporting the jury finding that Youngblood had specific knowledge of a substantial risk of death
that could occur by providing Seroquel to Davis, but instead asserts that it is a matter of
common knowledge" that mixing prescription medication with alcohol could have adverse side
effects, including death. Br. of Respondent at 6. But, even accepting the State' s argument that a
reasonable person in Youngblood' s position would believe that giving a large quantity of
prescription medication to an intoxicated person could result in adverse side effects, including
the possibility of death, here the State was required to prove that Youngblood knew of and
disregarded a substantial risk that death would occur by providing an intoxicated Davis with
Seroquel pills. RCW 9A.08. 010( c). We hold that the State failed to meet this burden.
No. 42635 -8 -II
The State did not present any evidence that Youngblood had actual knowledge of the
risks associated with combining Seroquel with alcohol, let alone a substantial risk of death. For
example, the State did not present any testimony from a physician or pharmacist stating that they
typically caution patients against mixing Seroquel and alcohol due to the risk of death, nor did
the State present any documentary evidence, such as text from a warning label on the
prescription bottle or physician' s note. And the State did not present the half filled prescription
-
bottle of Seroquel that police had collected from Youngblood' s apartment.
The State' s evidence also failed to establish that a reasonable person would believe that
giving Seroquel to an intoxicated person would likely result in the person' s death. Although
forensic toxicologist O' Reilly testified that the manufacturers of Seroquel warn against mixing
the drug with alcohol, she did not testify that such manufacturers' warnings included information
about a substantial risk of death associated with combining Seroquel and alcohol. And O' Reilly
did not opine that Seroquel was the cause of Davis' s death, testifying instead that Seroquel is " in
general considered a pretty safe medication." RP at 70.
Forensic pathologist Lacsina' s testimony similarly failed to establish knowledge of a
substantial risk of death associated with providing Seroquel to an intoxicated person. Although
Lacsina concluded that the combination of Seroquel and alcohol caused Davis' s death, he
admitted that this was the first case he had examined in which Seroquel was a factor in causing
someone' s death. In light of the State' s own expert witnesses' testimony that Seroquel is
generally considered a safe medication ( O' Reilly) and that this was the only case examined by
the witness where Seroquel was a factor in death ( Lacsina), we cannot accept the State' s claim
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No. 42635 -8 -II
that the substantial risk of death associated with combining Seroquel and alcohol is a matter of
common knowledge."
Because the State' s evidence was insufficient to prove that Youngblood knew, or that a
reasonable person in Youngblood' s position would know, of a substantial risk of death
associated with providing Seroquel to a person under the effects of alcohol, it failed to establish
the element of recklessness required to sustain a first degree manslaughter conviction.
Accordingly, we reverse Youngblood' s first degree manslaughter conviction and remand for
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dismissal with prejudice.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, C. J.
4
Because we reverse Youngblood' s conviction based on the insufficiency of the State' s
evidence, we need not address his remaining issues.
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