Estate of David Wheat v. Fairwood Park Homeowners Ass'n ( 2018 )

FILED
APRIL 5, 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
THE ESTATE OF DAVID N. WHEAT ) No. 35047-9-III
BY TENA M. WHEAT, in her capacity as )
Personal Representative of the Estate;
)
TENA M. WHEAT, individually as the )
widow of the deceased; ZACHARY N. )
WHEAT, individually as the son of the)
deceased; and CASSIDY D. WHEAT, )
individually as the daughter of the )
deceased, )
)
Appellants, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
v. )
)
FAIRWOOD PARK HOMEOWNERS )
ASSOCIATION, a Washington )
corporation; FAIRWOOD PARK I )
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a )
Washington corporation; and FAIRWOOD )
PARK II HOMEOWNERS )
ASSOCIATION, a Washington )
corporation, )
)
Respondents. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — The Estate of David Wheat (Estate) appeals from the
summary judgment dismissal of its negligence claims against Fairwood Park
No. 35047-9-III
Estate of Wheat v. Fairwood
Homeowners Association, Fairwood Park I Homeowners Association, Fairwood Park II
Homeowners Association (collectively the HOA), and Spokane County (County). In
general, the Estate argues that Mr. Wheat was a licensee, not a trespasser, and that its
claims should proceed forward against the HOA and the County. Even if we deem Mr.
Wheat a licensee, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact can only find that the HOA
and the County did not breach any duty to Mr. Wheat. We therefore affirm the trial
court’s summary dismissal of the Estate’s claims.
FACTS
The HOA owns and maintains a private park that consists of a swimming pool and
other amenities for HOA members and their guests. A road runs east and west through
the private park. East of the road is Fairwood Drive, a public road. West of the road is a
private housing development that leads to the back entrance of the golf course formerly
known as the Spokane Country Club. The County has an easement to use the HOA’s
road and uses the road to maintain a pump station near the pool. Both sides of the road
are gated. In recent years, the west gate was always closed but unlocked while the east
gate was often open and rarely locked. The fatal injury occurred at the east gate.
Photograph 1 shows the east gate from Fairwood Drive. Br. of Resp’t HOA, at
App. 2; Clerk’s Paper (CP) at 97.
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Photograph 1
The east gate consists of a pair of tubular arms meeting in the middle when closed. We
will refer to the arms as the south arm and the north arm.
Photograph 1 shows the road with the gate in the closed position and a sign on the
south arm. Photograph 2 shows a closeup view of the sign. Br. of Resp’t HOA, at App.
4; CP at 90. Photograph 3 shows the sleeve mechanism that permits the two arms to be
locked. Br. of Resp’t HOA, at App. 3; CP at 98. The County had a key to its lock, on the
south arm, but not to the HOA lock, on the north arm. For the gate to be locked closed,
the County would have to unlock its lock and remove a pin so that the metal sleeve could
be slid to the left to cover both arms. A pin could then be inserted and locked to lock the
gate closed.
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Photograph 2 Photograph 3
The south arm and the north arm are on hinges and swing open freely. The arms
were designed so they could be secured open by snapping into stationary posts buried in
the ground on either side of the HOA’s road. For two years prior to the accident, the
posts were in disrepair, and the arms could not be secured open.
Ryan Simpson, a member of the Fairwood Park I Homeowners Association and a
homeowner near the east gate, stated in a declaration:
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Over the years I have observed many people using that roadway that goes to
the pool area and beyond. I have seen walkers, with and without dogs,
joggers, runners including cross country teams from Mead High School,
bicyclists, skate boarders, and all types of motorized vehicles, including
golf carts, cars, and trucks.
CP at 300.
Mr. Wheat was one of many non-HOA members who used the road. For more
than two years prior to the fatal accident, Mr. Wheat had driven his golf cart between his
home and the Spokane Country Club several times a week. His route included a shortcut,
using the HOA’s road through its park. Mr. Wheat drove his golf cart on the HOA’s road
approximately 400 times. There is no evidence that anyone ever asked Mr. Wheat to not
drive on the HOA’s road.
The last time that Mr. Wheat drove his golf cart on the HOA’s road was the
afternoon of May 17, 2014. After golfing that day, he traveled east on his way home. As
Mr. Wheat approached the east gate, the north arm was open parallel to the road, but the
south arm was partly closed so that the tip of that arm pierced the passenger side edge of
the golf cart’s front window. The momentum of the golf cart carried it forward, causing
the arm to close somewhat, which also caused the tip of the arm to penetrate further. See
Photograph 4, Br. of Resp’t Spokane County, at App. 4; CP at 222. The tip struck Mr.
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Wheat in his ribs and sternum with such force that it propelled him out of his cart. Mr.
Wheat died of his injuries.
Photograph 4
The Estate filed suit, alleging negligence against the HOA and the County. After
completion of discovery, the HOA and the County filed summary judgment motions. The
trial court granted the motions and dismissed the Estate’s claims.
The Estate appealed.
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ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment Standard
“When reviewing dismissal of a case on summary judgment, we employ the same
inquiry as the trial court under CR 56(c).” Ducote v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 167
Wash. 2d 697, 701, 222 P.3d 785 (2009). Summary judgment is appropriate only if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.
CR 56(c). A material fact is one the outcome of the litigation depends on, in whole or in
part. Coggle v. Snow, 56 Wash. App. 499, 509, 784 P.2d 554 (1990). “On a motion for
summary judgment, all facts submitted and reasonable inferences therefrom must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” SentinelC3, Inc. v. Hunt, 181
Wash. 2d 127, 140, 331 P.3d 40 (2014). Summary judgment is appropriate only if
reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion from all the evidence. Coggle, 56 Wn.
App. at 509.
Negligence Standards for Landowners
“A cause of action for negligence requires the plaintiff to establish (1) the
existence of a duty owed, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) a
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proximate cause between the breach and the injury.” Tavai v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 176
Wash. App. 122, 127, 307 P.3d 811 (2013).
The legal duty owed by a landowner to a person entering the premises depends on
whether the entrant falls under the common law category of business invitee, licensee, or
trespasser. Iwai v. State, 129 Wash. 2d 84, 90-91, 915 P.2d 1089 (1996) (plurality opinion).
The highest duty is owed to a business invitee, a lesser duty is owed to a licensee, and still
a lesser duty is owed to a trespasser. Botka v. Estate of Hoerr, 105 Wash. App. 974, 983,
21 P.3d 723 (2001).
A business invitee is one who is expressly or impliedly invited on the premises for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with the business dealings of the owner or
occupier. Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 176 Wash. 2d 460, 467, 296 P.3d 800 (2013). A licensee
is a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the express or
implied consent of the owner or occupier. Id.; see also Botka, 105 Wash. App. at 983. A
trespasser is one who enters the premises of another without express or implied
permission, but rather goes for his own purpose or convenience. Botka, 105 Wash. App. at
983.
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A. CLAIMS AGAINST THE HOA
1. The HOA did not owe Mr. Wheat the duty of a business invitee
Mr. Wheat was not a business invitee. Mr. Wheat was not invited on the HOA’s
property by an HOA member for any HOA purpose.
2. The HOA did not violate the duty it owed Mr. Wheat as a trespasser
Mr. Wheat was probably a trespasser. Mr. Wheat used the HOA’s road for his
own purpose as a shortcut to and from the Spokane Country Club. The Estate argues that
the HOA is liable to Mr. Wheat even if he was a trespasser because the HOA’s east gate
could not be locked closed or secured open. We disagree.
A trespasser enters the premises of another at his peril. Winter v. Mackner, 68
Wash. 2d 943, 945, 416 P.2d 453 (1966). A possessor of land owes a duty to a trespasser to
refrain from causing willful or wanton injury to him. Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91
Wash. 2d 514, 518, 588 P.2d 1351 (1979). In order to constitute “willful and wanton,” the
act producing the injury must have been committed knowingly and intentionally, or must
have been committed under such circumstances as to evince a reckless disregard for
safety of the person injured. Bidlake v. Youell, Inc., 51 Wash. 2d 59, 62-63, 315 P.2d 644
(1957). In addition, the standard requires “‘that a reasonable [person] would know, or
have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in
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substantial harm to another.’” Johnson v. Schafer, 110 Wash. 2d 546, 549, 756 P.2d 134
(1988) (quoting Adkisson v. City of Seattle, 42 Wash. 2d 676, 687, 258 P.2d 461 (1953)).
From the evidence, a reasonable trier of fact can reach only one conclusion: the HOA had
no reason to know that unlocked or unsecured gates presented a high probability of injury
to another. The evidence therefore does not permit a reasonable trier of fact to find
liability under this standard.
3. The HOA did not violate any other duty potentially owed to Mr.
Wheat
The Estate posits two arguments why the HOA owed Mr. Wheat a duty higher than
the duty owed a trespasser.
a. Apparent public road
Citing Zuniga v. Pay Less Drug Stores, N.W., 82 Wash. App. 12, 917 P.2d 584
(1996), Rogers v. Bray, 16 Wash. App. 494, 557 P.2d 28 (1976), and secondary authorities,
the Estate argues that an owner of a private road owes a duty of reasonable care if persons
might mistakenly believe that the private road is a public road. The Estate reads the rule
too broadly. The two cases stand for the proposition that a duty of reasonable care is
owed where “‘the trespasser is negligently led into believing that a private road is a
public road.’” Zuniga, 82 Wash. App. at 15 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. Schafer,
47 Wash. App. 405, 408, 735 P.2d 419 (1987), rev’d on other grounds, 110 Wash. 2d 546; see
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also Rogers, 16 Wash. App. at 496 (“If Rogers was misled,” then a heightened duty was
owed.).
Here, there is no evidence that the HOA negligently led Mr. Wheat into believing
that the HOA’s road was a public road. First, Mr. Wheat had to cross a sidewalk to enter
the HOA’s road. Second, the HOA’s road is narrow and does not have any painted lines
on it. Third, the HOA’s road is gated at both ends, and the west gate is always closed.
Fourth, when the east gate was closed, the sign on that gate plainly advised people of the
private nature of the park and road. These plain visual cues would lead a reasonable
person to believe that the road was private. In addition, Mr. Wheat would have observed
these visual cues approximately 400 times over a period of two years. A reasonable trier
of fact can reach only one conclusion: the HOA did not negligently mislead Mr. Wheat
into believing that its road was a public road.
b. Licensee by acquiescence
The Estate argues that Mr. Wheat and other non-HOA persons routinely used the
HOA road without objection by HOA members. Citing Rogers v. Bray, 16 Wash. App.
494, the Estate argues that this unobjected use ripened into a license to use the road.
Even if this were true, we do not believe that the Estate has presented sufficient evidence
for a reasonable trier of fact to find the HOA liable to licensees.
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In Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wash. 2d 685, 538 P.2d 517 (1975), the court adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 342 (1965), which establishes the duty owed by owners
or occupiers of land to licensees:
“A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, and
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or
to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition
and the risk involved.”
Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
Here, the risk of harm was that the tip of one arm might protrude into the HOA
road just enough that it would not be seen by a user of the road and spear him. Here, had
the south arm been a bit more open, Mr. Wheat’s golf cart would not have hit it. Had the
south arm been a bit more closed, the arm would have bounced off the golf cart’s front
window. This was a highly unusual accident. We determine that a reasonable trier of fact
can reach only one conclusion: the remote risk of harm to licensees was not an
unreasonable risk of harm.
Were we to describe the risk of harm more broadly, our conclusion would not
change. For instance, the risk of harm to a licensee might be that one of the two arms
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would be partially closed so a user might collide into it. Describing the risk of harm
broadly, we would note that each arm is comprised of two silver bars coming together
into a single bar, making each side of the gate a highly visible structure. In addition, a
sign is attached to the south arm that gives an additional visual cue to persons
approaching it. The size and thickness of the bars, especially coupled with the sign, give
ample warning to persons approaching the east gate. Mr. Wheat, who had passed through
the east gate approximately 400 times in the two years preceding the accident, was well
aware of the arms. In addition, because it had been two years since the arms could be
secured open, Mr. Wheat also knew that the arms sometimes were partially closed. We
determine that a reasonable trier of fact could reach only one conclusion: Mr. Wheat had
reason to know of the risk of harm posed by the arms that could not be secured opened.
B. CLAIMS AGAINST THE COUNTY
For the first time on appeal, the Estate claims that the County was negligent under
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 386 (1965). We consider only those issues called to
the trial court’s attention. RAP 9.12. We decline to address this new theory of liability.
The Estate next argues that the County is liable on the same bases as the HOA.
We disagree. The duties discussed above apply only to owners or occupiers of land.
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Although the County used the HOA’s road daily, this does not make it an occupier of the
road.
The Estate finally cites Palin v. General Construction Co., 47 Wash. 2d 246, 287
P.2d 325 (1955). Palin stands for the proposition that a nonowner, doing work on land,
can be liable for negligence when he or she creates a condition that permits a third person
to foreseeably cause damages. Palin, 47 Wash. 2d at 250. In Palin, the defendant
construction company contracted to fill areas on property owned by King County. Id. at
248. Plaintiff had the right to the oil contained in a large tank on the property. Id.
During the course of its work, the construction company damaged a valve on the tank. Id.
at 249. The construction company made a temporary fix and left the worksite. Id. That
evening, an unknown person came onto the land and vandalized the temporary fix,
causing large amounts of oil to leak. Id. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff
for the value of the lost oil. Id. The construction company appealed. Id. The Palin court
affirmed, reasoning that the construction company had a duty to lock the valve or inform
the owner of the situation. Id. at 250.
Relying on Palin, the Estate argues that the County’s inability to lock the east gate
foreseeably allowed someone to open the gate at a dangerous angle. However, there is no
evidence that the County knew or should have known of a dangerous condition that
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created a duty to remedy the situation or inform the HOA of the condition. Therefore, we
hold that the rationale for potential liability in Palin is inapplicable to the present case.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
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Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. ·
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WE CONCUR:
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