Race Track, Llc v. King County ( 2014 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
RACE TRACK, LLC, a Washington No. 70553-9-
limited liability company; PACIFIC
GRAND PRIX, LLC, a Washington DIVISION ONE
limited liability company; and PACIFIC
RIM PERFORMANCE, INC. d/b/a
PROFORMANCE RACING SCHOOL, a
Washington corporation,
Appellants,
v.
KING COUNTY, a political subdivision UNPUBLISHED
of Washington State,
FILED: September 2. 2014
Respondent.
Cox, J. — Activities conducted at Pacific Raceways in King County must
comply with the terms and conditions of the conditional use permit (CUP) for that
property. Pursuant to the County's zoning ordinances, the King County
Department of Development and Environmental Services (DDES) issued a notice
of code violation and order of abatement based on alleged violations of the CUP.
A hearing examiner denied a timely appeal of this notice and order. And a
superior courtjudge substantially affirmed the decision of the hearing examiner in
this Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) proceeding that followed.
The owners of Pacific Raceways and the operators of businesses on that
property substantially fail to sustain their burdens under LUPA to show that the
No. 70553-9-1/2
hearing examiner's decision was incorrect. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand to the hearing examiner to consider certain modifications to his decision.
Race Track LLC owns the property known as Pacific Raceways, a vehicle-
related sports and recreation facility. Race Track leases its facilities, including
the road course, drag strip, and kart track, to Pacific Grand Prix LLC (PGP) and
Pacific Rim ProFormance Inc. (ProFormance). PGP is primarily engaged in shift
kart racing. ProFormance Racing School provides high performance driving
instruction. We refer to Race Track LLC, Pacific Grand Prix LLC, and Pacific
Rim ProFormance Inc. collectively as "Race Track and Lessees."
There is a history of ownership changes, changed uses of the property,
and litigation that we need not describe in detail in this overview. It is sufficient to
say that a CUP for this property was originally issued on June 27, 1972, affirmed
on February 26, 1982 following a 1981 modification, and reinstated on April 30,
1984 following a procedural matter that we need not describe further. The
current CUP is based on the April 30, 1984 reinstatement.
The CUP Conditions that are relevant to this appeal are:
1. The hours of tract operation shall be limited to 9:00 a.m. to
5:30 p.m., for both testing and racing with the following exceptions:
a. [Pacific Raceways] will be closed to all race testing and
racing on Monday and Tuesday year-round, provided that
these days may be used for racing when a rained out event
could not be scheduled for the following weekend, or when a
holiday which has a major event associated within it falls on
a Monday or Tuesday. Race testing is not meant to exclude
police and emergency vehicle testing and training, or other
non-race related testing functions that are quiet, non-
impacting.
No. 70553-9-1/3
b. [Pacific Raceways] shall provide a minimum of one quiet
weekend day (Saturday or Sunday) per month during the
May through September racing season. [Pacific Raceways]
shall notify Building and Land Development in writing of the
five designated quiet days prior to May 1st each year.
[Pacific Raceways] should notify interested community
representatives in the interest of community relations.
3. This permit and the conditions imposed herein authorize this use
on this property and shall be binding on any future owners or
operators of this facility, as well as the current parties.11!
In 2003, Race Track and PGP sought to relocate the "go cart track" on the
property. They asserted that the request to move the track was not a change in
use or modification of the CUP conditions that would trigger the need for an
amended CUP. DDES agreed that the request would be acted upon as a
grading permit application. The new track opened in June 2009.
In recent years, physical changes to the subject property as well as use
and equipment changes for activities on the property resulted in a "new wave of
complaints" to the County about the race track from surrounding community
members. In January 2011, the County issued a notice of violation and order of
abatement (Notice and Order).2 The Notice and Order found that Race Track
and Lessees violated conditions of the CUP and the King County Code. It listed
the following violations:
1. Failure to comply with the conditions of King County
Conditional Use (CUP) Permit A-71-0-81, April 30, 1984 Rules and
1 Administrative Record/SC at 20.
2 SC at 235-37.
No. 70553-9-1/4
Procedures, and violation of Sections 21A.02.040(A), 21A.08.100,
and 21 A.42.190(A), of King County Code (K.C.C.). Specifically.
A. Use of primary Race Track for race-related functions on
required quiet days in violation of permit conditions 1A and
B, including but not limited to operation of ProFormance
Racing School and use of the track by private vehicles for
"lapping". DDES alleges that Race Track LLC knowingly
permits uses on required quiet days which are race-related,
are not quiet, and are not "non-impacting" in violation of the
plain language of [the CUP].
B. Use of shift kart track by vehicles other than shift karts,
including but not limited to motorcycles and street legal
automobiles in violation of permit condition 15 requiring all
improvements and uses to be conducted in accordance with
the pre-March 31, 1984 plot plan.
. . . .[3]
It ordered the following abatement to bring the property into compliance:
1. Comply with all conditions of [the CUP] including:
A. Cease all racing and performance driving school
operations and any other race-related functions, including
any and all racing, lapping, or similar uses of private vehicles
on required quiet days by February 21, 2011.
B. Cease all non-shift kart use of the shift kart track by
February 21,2011.
[4]
Race Track and Lessees timely appealed the Notice and Order. After
considering over 140 exhibits and receiving evidence from 24 witnesses over 9
days, a hearing examiner denied the appeals. He also modified the Notice and
Order in a way that we describe in more detail later in this opinion.
3 jd, at 236.
4 Id.
No. 70553-9-1/5
Race Track and Lessees timely commenced this LUPA proceeding. The
superior court substantially affirmed the decision of the hearing examiner. But it
reversed a portion of the decision and amended the Notice and Order in ways we
also describe later in this opinion.
This timely appeal by Race Track and Lessees followed.
LUPA CLAIMS
Race Track and Lessees argue that the hearing examiner's decision is
incorrect for several reasons under LUPA. For the most part, we disagree.
LUPA is the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions.5
RCW 36.70C.130 outlines the standards in order for the superior court to grant
relief requested by a LUPA petitioner.6 Relief is granted only if the party seeking
relief establishes that the hearing examiner erred under one of six standards.7
"An appellate court stands in the same shoes as the superior court and
reviews the administrative record."8 Alleged errors of law are reviewed de novo
and questions of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence.9 When reviewing a
decision under LUPA, an appellate court must give substantial deference to both
5 RCW 36.70C.030.
6RCW36.70C.130(1).
7 Durland v. San Juan County, 174Wn. App. 1, 11, 298 P.3d 757 (2012).
8 Dep't of Dev. and Envtl. Servs. v. King County, 177 Wn.2d 636, 643, 305
P.3d 240 (2013).
9 Id.No. 70553-9-1/6
the legal and factual determinations of a hearing examiner as the local authority
with expertise in land use regulations.10
Race Track and Lessees argue that four of the six standards in RCW
36.70C.130 warrant relief in this case. They specifically rely on the standards set
forth in the following subsections:
(b) The land use decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law,
after allowing for such deference as is due the construction of a law
by a local jurisdiction with expertise;
(c) The land use decision is not supported by evidence that is
substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court;
(d) The land use decision is a clearly erroneous application of the
law to the facts;
(f) The land use decision violates the constitutional rights of the
party seeking relief.1111
We address each argument in turn.
RCW 36.70C.130(1)(b)
Race Track and Lessees argue that the hearing examiner's decision is an
erroneous interpretation of the law because "use of the track by ProFormance
complies with CUP Condition 1(a)." For the most part, we disagree.
We note that the County does not challenge in its briefing whether this
argument properly is one under RCW 36.70C.130(1)(b). Accordingly, we will
analyze this and the remaining claims as presented in the briefing of the parties.
10 Durland, 174 Wn. App. at 12.
11 RCW 36.70C. 130(1).
No. 70553-9-1/7
RCW 36.70C.130(1)(b) provides that the superior court may grant relief if
"the land use decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law, after allowing for
such deference as is due the construction of a law by a local jurisdiction with
expertise." Whether a decision reflects an erroneous interpretation of the law
under this standard is a question of law that the court reviews de novo.12
Here, CUP Condition 1(a) states:
1. The hours of tract operation shall be limited to 9:00 a.m. to
5:30 p.m., for both testing and racing with the following exceptions:
a. [Pacific Raceways] will be closed to all race testing and
racing on Monday and Tuesday year-round, provided that
these days may be used for racing when a rained out event
could not be scheduled for the following weekend, or when a
holiday which has a major event associated within it falls on
a Monday or Tuesday. Race testing is not meant to
exclude police and emergency vehicle testing and
training, or other non-race related testing functions that
are quiet, non-impactingP3]
As stated earlier, the Notice and Order found a violation for the following:
A. Use of primary Race Track for race-related functions on
required quiet days in violation of permit conditions 1A and B,
including but not limited to operation of ProFormance Racing
School and use of the track by private vehicles for "lapping". DDES
alleges that Race Track LLC knowingly permits uses on required
quiet days which are race-related, are not quiet, and are not
"non-impacting" in violation of the plain language of [the CUP].[14]
To bring the property into compliance, the Notice and Order required Race
Track and Lessees to:
12 Dep't of Ecology v. City of Spokane Valley, 167 Wn. App. 952, 961, 275
P.3d 367, review denied, 175 Wn.2d 1015 (2012).
13 SC at 20 (emphasis added).
14 jd at 236 (emphasis added).
No. 70553-9-1/8
A. Cease all racing and performance driving school
operations and any other race-related functions, including any and
all racing, lapping, or similar uses of private vehicles on required
quiet days by February 21, 2011 .[15]
On appeal of the Notice and Order, the hearing examiner concluded:
10. The provision of Operating Condition No. 1 of the CUP
is structured to control the hours of track operation. The general
statement of hours was from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., "for both
testing and racing, with the following exceptions ..." The first
exception is that the track "will be closed to all race testing and
racing on Monday and Tuesday year-round ...", but that, "Race
testing is not meant to exclude police and emergency vehicle
testing and training, or other non-race related testing functions that
are quiet, non-impacting." There is no reasonable way that the
foregoing language can be read as authorizing driver training
for persons who are not police or emergency vehicle drivers
on Mondays and Tuesdays at Pacific Raceways (SIR). If the
language of the CUP is ambiguous in other respects, it does not
create or harbor any ambiguity on the question in issue. It does
not authorize the operation of a driving school on Monday or
Tuesday, or on weekend quiet daysP6]
The superior court reached the opposite conclusion when reviewing the
hearing examiner's decision:
ProFormance Racing maintains that its schools and clinics
do not race or race test on Mondays, Tuesdays, or the required
quiet summer weekend days. If they are correct, nothing in the
CUP prohibits non-racing and non-race testing activities that
are quiet and non-impacting. Under the plain language of the
CUP, it is not the existence of a driver education school that
violates the CUP; it is only a use that is not quiet and that is
impacting that contravenes the permits
15 ]d
16 ]d. at 2542 (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
17 Clerk's Papers at 35 (emphasis added).
8
No. 70553-9-1/9
We agree with the superior court that the language of this condition does
not, by its terms, prohibit a driver education and training school. But this is
subject to an important proviso: the activities of such a school must be "quiet"
and "non-impacting." To the extent such activities violate these conditions, they
are prohibited. Like the superior court, we conclude that the hearing examiner
erroneously concluded that a driver training school is not permitted under the
CUP.
But we nonetheless agree with the hearing examiner's ultimate
conclusion that there was a violation of the CUP. The hearing examiner also
concluded that even if a driving school was permitted, the activities by
ProFormance still did not comply because of noise:
Even if one could interpret the CUP as authorizing a driving
school on Mondays and Tuesdays, as King County did for a lengthy
period of time, the training done by ProFormance Racing
School has not been "quiet" and "non-impacting", as those
words are commonly understood. The noise heard at nearby
residential properties has been substantial, and the residents on
some of those properties have been impacted.f18]
We previously stated in this opinion that the plain words of the CUP
require that activities on the property must be both "quiet, [and] non-impacting."
To the extent they are not, they violate the CUP. Thus, the hearing examiner
was ultimately correct in deciding that Race Track and Lessees violated this
condition. We consider later in this opinion whether there is substantial evidence
in this record to support the finding that noise violated the CUP as the Notice and
Order stated.
18 SC at 2542 (emphasis added).
No. 70553-9-1/10
In sum, Race Track and Lessees fail in their burden to show that the
hearing examiner's decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law to the
extent it is based on the requirement that activities on the property must be
"quiet" and "non-impacting." To the extent the decision rests solely on the view
that the CUP bans a driving school outright, it is incorrect. We discuss later in
this opinion the proper remedy for this error.
Race Track and Lessees also argue that the hearing examiner's decision
is erroneous for a different reason. They claim that "the County has consistently
defined 'non-impacting' to include the use of street-legal, muffled vehicles—not
just within ambient levels." They argue that the superior court failed "to confirm
that the words 'quiet, non-impacting' means within ambient noise levels."
Because these arguments are not clearly and persuasively made, we do not
address them any further.
RCW 36.70C.130(1)(c)
Race Track and Lessees next argue that the hearing examiner's decision
is incorrect because there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the
hearing examiner's determination that Race Track and Lessees permitted
activities that were neither "quiet" nor "non-impacting" in violation of the CUP.
They also contend that there was no evidence in the record to support the
hearing examiner's determination that in 1989 the County's interpretation of the
CUP "evolved" and "expanded." We disagree with both assertions.
Under the substantial evidence standard, there must be a "sufficient
quantum of evidence in the record to persuade a reasonable person that the
10
No. 70553-9-1/11
declared premise is true."19 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence under this standard, a court views facts and inferences in a light most
favorable to the party that prevailed in the highest forum exercising fact-finding
authority.20 Doing so "'necessarily entails accepting] the factfinder's views
regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given reasonable but
competing inferences.'"21
Here, the County prevailed before the highest fact-finding authority: the
hearing examiner. Accordingly, all facts and inferences are viewed in a light
most favorable to the County. Applying this standard, there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the challenged determinations.
First, there is substantial evidence that Race Track and Lessees permitted
activities that were neither "quiet" nor "non-impacting," in violation of CUP
Condition 1(a).
As discussed earlier, the hearing examiner determined, "[T]he training
done by ProFormance Racing School has not been 'quiet' and non-impacting', as
those words are commonly understood. The noise heard at nearby residential
19 Phoenix Dev., Inc. v. City of Woodinville, 171 Wn.2d 820, 829, 256 P.3d
1150(2011).
20 Id, at 828-29.
21 Spokane County v. Eastern Wash. Growth Mqmt. Hearings Bd., 176
Wn. App. 555, 565, 309 P.3d 673 (2013) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Lige & Wm. B. Dickson Co. v. County of
Pierce, 65 Wn. App. 614, 618, 829 P.2d 217 (1992)), review denied, 179 Wn.2d
1015(2014).
11
No. 70553-9-1/12
properties has been substantial, and the residents on some of those properties
have been impacted."22
The hearing examiner looked to dictionaries for the definition of "quiet" and
stated that the ordinary meaning is '"still; calm; motionless ... not noisy; hushed .
.. or 'making no noise; silent... free of noise; hushed .. ."23 This was proper.
Additionally, in one of the hearing examiner's unchallenged findings, he
pointed to specific evidence to support this determination:
21. The preponderance of evidence at the hearing
established that noise from vehicles operating at Pacific Raceways
could be heard at nearby residential properties on Mondays and
Tuesdays and on designated weekend quiet days. The audibility of
this off-site noise was testified to by the expert witnesses called by
both King County and the appellants. The experts called by King
County and the appellants measured noise levels using different
standards, and offered different interpretations of "ambient noise
levels". They also differed in their assessments of the degree of
"impact" on persons hearing the noise. However, there was no
substantial disagreement that the noise could be heard by
surrounding residents.
Exhibit 61, p. 7, Figures 6 and 7, provides a dramatic depiction of
the noise differential at one nearby residence on Monday, August
15, 2011, between times when noise events were and were not
observed emanating from Pacific Raceways. Although the noise
level averages, identified as 30 minutes Leq, are moved by only 2.9
dBA (from 50.5 dBA to 53.4 dBA), the number and amplitude of
peak noise events during the raceway activity are changed
dramatically, with numerous events during raceway activity that are
10 dBA and more in excess of the 30 minute Leq without raceway
activity.
22 SC at 2542.
23 id. at 2535 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Webster's New World
Dictionary 612 (2d ed. 1975); American Heritage Dictionary 1016 (2d ed.
1985)).
12
No. 70553-9-1/13
In addition, there was substantial testimony offered by King County
that the noise heard on Mondays, Tuesdays and weekend quiet
days was disturbing to some community residents. The testimony
by other community residents, that they did not hear or were not
bothered by noise from the race track, is credible, but does not
detract from the fact that other residents did hear the noise and
were bothered by it, and that the impact on some was
substantial.'24]
The record also supports this determination. Many neighborhood
witnesses testified about the loud activities at Pacific Raceways on "quiet days."
Several testified that more noise reaches their homes now than in the past or the
noise has been getting louder. Generally, they described distinct noises coming
from the race track and described the impact of the noise on their lives. For
example, they testified that the track noise interfered with their ability to talk with
others, hold social gatherings, or concentrate on work.
Race Track and Lessees argue that the hearing examiner's determination
is not supported by substantial evidence because it is based on testimony of
"only some local community members" and these community members are
biased and lack credibility. Specifically, Race Track and Lessees assert that: (1)
the majority of these community members did not report CUP violations, (2)
these community members' testimony identifies significant environmental noise
sources surrounding the track, (3) "[s]ubjective 'annoyance' with sound from
Pacific Raceways does not equate to a violation of the CUP"; (4) these
community members' testimony lacks credibility; and (5) a majority of these
community members "demonstrated that they cannot discern the difference
24 jcL at 2538.
13
No. 70553-9-1/14
between the ProFormance School and police training." Additionally, Race Track
and Lessees argue that these community members' testimony is "further
undercut by the testimony from [other community members] who are not biased
against the track."
None of these arguments are persuasive. The controlling rule is that this
appellate court views facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the County,
as the prevailing party below.25 Appellants fail to cite any persuasive rule to the
contrary. In following the controlling rule, we accept the factfinder's views
regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given reasonable but
competing inferences.26 In this case, the hearing examiner (the fact-finder)
expressly stated that testimony from other community residents "does not detract
from the fact that other residents did hear the noise and were bothered by it, and
that the impact on some was substantial."
Second, there is substantial evidence to support the examiner's
determination that in 1989, the County's interpretation of the CUP evolved and
activities allowed under the CUP expanded.
We first note that even if there was no substantial evidence to support this
finding, Race Track and Lessees fail to explain how this would require reversal of
the hearing examiner's decision. This finding regarding evolving interpretation by
the County is not material to the outcome.
25 See Phoenix Dev., Inc., 171 Wn.2d at 828-29.
26 Eastern Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 176 Wn. App. at 565.
14
No. 70553-9-1/15
In any event, this argument overlooks one of the hearing examiner's other
findings. This other finding details correspondence between the permit
administrator and the track manager in 1989, when the administrator affirmatively
responded that a driver's training school was permitted under the CUP. This
evidence supports the finding that the activities evolved and expanded in 1989.
In sum, there is substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's
factual determinations and its decision. We reject the arguments to the contrary.
RCW 36.70C.130(1)(d)
Race Track and Lessees argue that the hearing examiner's decision is
incorrect because the doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches bar
enforcement of the CUP. We disagree.
Under LUPA, a land use decision is a clearly erroneous application of the
law to the facts if "the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed."27 But the hearing examiner did not have the
authority to decide claims based on either equitable estoppel or laches.
Nevertheless, the parties presented evidence on these issues during the
proceedings before the hearing examiner. The superior court considered these
doctrines and rejected application of both doctrines in this LUPA proceeding. So
do we.
First, Race Track and Lessees argue that the County is estopped from
"reversing its continuous, decades-long interpretations of the CUP Conditions."
27 Citizens to Preserve Pioneer Park LLC v. City of Mercer Island, 106 Wn.
App. 461, 473, 24 P.3d 1079 (2001).
15
No. 70553-9-1/16
"Equitable estoppel prevents a party from taking a position inconsistent
with a previous one where inequitable consequences would result to a party who
has justifiably and in good faith relied."28 When equitable estoppel is asserted
against the government, the party asserting estoppel must establish five
elements by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Those elements are: "(1) a
statement, admission, or act by the party to be estopped, which is inconsistent
with its later claims; (2) the asserting party acted in reliance upon the statement
or action; (3) injury would result to the asserting party if the other party were
allowed to repudiate its prior statement or action; (4) estoppel is 'necessary to
prevent a manifest injustice'; and (5) estoppel will not impair governmental
functions."29 "The evidence must present unmistakable justification for imposition
of the doctrine when a municipality has acted in its governmental capacity."30
Application of the doctrine against the government is "not favored."31
We start our consideration of this argument with evaluation whether there
is the required level of proof for the fifth element—whether estoppel will not
28 Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 159 Wn.2d 868, 887, 154
P.3d 891 (2007).
29IU (quoting Kramarevckv v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.. 122 Wn.2d
738, 743, 863 P.2d 535 (1993)).
30 City of Mercer Island v. Steinmann, 9 Wn. App. 479, 482, 513 P.2d 80(1973).
31 Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 20, 43 P.3d
4 (2002).
16
No. 70553-9-1/17
impair governmental functions. The level of proof required is clear, cogent, and
convincing.32
In City of Mercer Island v. Steinmann, this court noted that equitable
estoppel will not apply to a governmental entity "where its application would
interfere with the discharge of governmental duties ... ."33 It stated that estoppel
may be applied equitably against a governmental entity acting in a proprietary
capacity but stated that "the bar of the doctrine is less likely to be applied" when it
acts in a governmental capacity.34 It then quoted authorities that established that
zoning ordinances constitute a governmental function.35
In concluding that the municipality was not precluded from enforcing
zoning regulations in that case, this court stated, "The governmental zoning
power may not be forfeited by the action of local officers in disregard of the
statute and the ordinance. The public has an interest in zoning that cannot thus
be set at naught."36
Here, Race Track and Lessees seek to avoid the requirements of an
important governmental function: enforcement of a CUP promulgated under
County zoning laws. Their attempt to do so conflicts with the principles stated in
32 Lvbbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d29, 35, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000).
33 9 Wn. App. 479, 481, 513 P.2d 80 (1973).
34 lU at 482.
35 See id at 482-83.
36 id at 483.
17
No. 70553-9-1/18
Steinmann. In short, they fail to fulfill the fifth element of equitable estoppel
against a governmental entity.
Race Track and Lessees attempt to distinguish Steinmann. They argue
that the unlawful use was clearly prohibited under the zoning code in that case,
and here, there is no plain mandate under the CUP that prohibits driving schools.
This is not a material distinction. While Race Track and Lessees could not have
known driving schools were prohibited, the plain language of the CUP provides
fair notice that any activities had to be "quiet, non-impacting." Activities that did
not meet these requirements were clearly prohibited.
We next consider the fourth element—that estoppel is necessary to
prevent manifest injustice. Race Track and Lessees also do not persuasively
establish this element. This is particularly so given that the hearing examiner
properly concluded that they violated CUP Condition 1(a) for permitting activities
that were not quiet and non-impacting.
More importantly, "A 'conditional use permit' is a permitted exception to
zoning ordinances; it allows a property owner to use his or her property in a
manner that the zoning regulations expressly permit under conditions specified in
the regulations."37 "But it is not a 'regularly permitted' use; it is permitted only
upon the grant of a 'conditional use permit'. .. ."38
37 Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 95 Wn. App. 883, 885 n.1, 976 P.2d
1279(1999).
3817 William B. Stoebuck & John W. Weaver, Washington Practice:
Real Estate: Property Law § 4.22 (2d ed.).
18
No. 70553-9-1/19
Here, the race track may operate only under the CUP. Its activities are
not authorized for the area without conforming to the conditions. Accordingly,
estoppel is not necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. Rather, enforcement
of the CUP is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice, namely, permitting
continued noise from the track in this neighborhood. Accordingly, Race Track
also fails to prove this element.
Additionally, Race Track and Lessees cannot establish the first element—
a statement, admission, or act by the County, which is inconsistent with its later
claims. They argue generally that the issuance of the Notice and Order was
contrary to "the County's 21-years of consistent interpretations allowing driving
schools for street-legal, muffled vehicles on 'quiet days' and Mondays and
Tuesdays."
It is true that the County took inconsistent positions on whether driving
schools were allowed under the CUP. But the violation was not based solely on
the fact that Race Track and Lessees permitted driving schools. Rather, the
Notice and Order found a violation based on the fact that Race Track permitted
activities that "are race-related, are not quiet, and are not 'non-impacting."39
And this material portion of this finding is not inconsistent with the
County's prior statements. As the superior court correctly pointed out, the
County consistently represented that such activities were permitted as long as
they were quiet and non-impacting.
39 SC at 236 (emphasis added).
19
No. 70553-9-1/20
For example, a 1992 letter from the county to the track manager
expressed concern "regarding noise on quiet days" and said that several sources
stated that it was "not quiet at the track." The letter further stated:
The type of activities which have been previously approved .
.. namely filming or video taping, instructional driving schools and
track maintenance work are all acceptable 'quiet day' activities
provided they are non-spectator events, use non-impacting
(muffled) vehicles, create no noise above ambient levels, and
create no traffic impacts outside the track.[40]
Additionally, a 2005 letter from DDES stated, "Mon/Tues: Track is closed
to 'racing' events. Training or driving courses involving 'street legal' cars are
allowed as long as the activity is 'quiet and non-impacting.'"41
Race Track and Lessees fail to show that the County's statements are
inconsistent with its later claims that Race Track violated CUP Condition 1(a) by
permitting activities that were not quiet and non-impacting. Rather, the County
consistently maintained that activities on "quiet days" were subject to noise
restrictions.
In arguing that equitable estoppel applies, Race Track and Lessees point
to the following finding made by the hearing examiner:
31. Pacific Raceway's officials and King County DDES
employees, including management, have agreed over the years
that the use of the track on Mondays and Tuesdays for emergency
vehicle testing and training, driver training, car clubs, and similar
events that operate street legal (licensed) vehicles in a non-racing
venue, have generally met CUP requirements for those events on
40 SC at 91 (emphasis added).
41 id at 129 (emphasis added).
20
No. 70553-9-1/21
Mondays and Tuesdays and on quiet weekend days to be 'quiet
and non-impacting'.[42]
But the County's statements that such activities "generally meet CUP
requirements is not a statement that these activities would always be permitted.
In short, Race Track fails to show inconsistent statements by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence.
Race Track relies on Silverstreak Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries
to support its estoppel claim.43 That reliance is misplaced.
There, the supreme court held that the Department of Labor and
Industries was estopped from enforcing a violation order, because the
Department's present position on the applicability of the prevailing wage act was
inconsistent with the position it adopted in an earlier policy memorandum.44
Silversteak is distinguishable from this case. Unlike this case, that case
did not involve enforcement of permit conditions or city code, and it did not
involve the public and community members who have an interest in zoning.
Importantly, in that case, the court explained that precluding the Department from
applying its new policy position "does not impair any legitimate department
functions."45
42 id at 2541.
43 Opening Brief of Appellants at 23-24 (citing Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 159 Wn.2d 868, 887, 154 P.3d 891 (2007)).
44 Silverstreak, 159 Wn.2d at 876.
45 Id. at 891.
21
No. 70553-9-1/22
Here, in contrast, for reasons already discussed, governmental functions
would be impaired. Specifically, precluding the County from enforcing the CUP
impairs zoning laws. Additionally, unlike Silverstreak, no manifest injustice would
occur. This conditional use is not authorized for the area without conforming to
the negotiated conditions of the CUP. Accordingly, Race Track and Lessees'
reliance on this case is not persuasive.
In sum, Race Track and Lessees fail to show that equitable estoppel bars
enforcement of the CUP condition in this case.
Second, Race Track and Lessees' argument that the doctrine of laches
prevents the County from changing its interpretations of the CUP conditions is
also not persuasive.
"Laches applies if three conditions exist: '(1) knowledge or reasonable
opportunity to discover on the part of a potential plaintiff that he has a cause of
action against a defendant; (2) an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in
commencing that cause of action; [and] (3) damage to defendant resulting from
the unreasonable delay.'"46 "'[I]t is generally held that in respect of the
enforcement of zoning ordinances, neither laches nor estoppel applies.'"47
Here, laches does not apply because the County did not unreasonably
delay enforcing the CUP. As the superior court correctly stated, "[T]he factual
46 Citizens for Responsible Gov't v. Kitsap County, 52 Wn. App. 236, 240,
758 P.2d 1009 (1988) (guoting Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80Wn.2d518, 522,
495P.2d 1358(1972)).
47 Steinmann, 9 Wn. App. at 482 (quoting 3 C. Rathkopf, The Law of
Zoning and Planning § 2 (3d ed. 1972)).
22
No. 70553-9-1/23
record established before the Hearing Examiner defeats [Race Track and
Lessees'] argument that there was an undue delay between the County's
knowledge of CUP violations and the issuance of the Notice and Order."
For example, the record shows that the County received a "new wave of
complaints" about Pacific Raceways in 2010. Additionally, witnesses testified
that the track noise got louder over the years, and became more constant,
especially by 2010. Some witnesses testified that they heard noise every single
day by 2010. Additionally, several witnesses testified that they did not even
know about the CUP until 2010. And some witnesses testified that they did not
make complaints to the County about track noise until 2010.
Race Track and Lessees cite two extra-jurisdictional cases to argue that
laches should apply.48 But in those cases, the governmental entity delayed six
and eight years respectively before commencing action.49 Those cases are
distinguishable based on that fact alone. Further, one of those cases
acknowledged that "a claim of laches in the zoning context is not judicially
favored and is rarely applied 'except in the clearest and most compelling
circumstances."'50 This is not one of those compelling circumstances.
48 Opening Brief of Appellants at 28-29 (citing Wieck v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning
Adjustment, 383 A.2d 7 (D.C. 1978); City of Hancock v. Hueter, 118 Mich. App.
811 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)).
49 See Wieck, 383 A.2d at 11-12; Hancock, 118 Mich. App. at 818.
50 Wieck, 383 A.2d at 11 (emphasis added) (quoting Moore v. Bridqewater
Twp., 69 N.J. Super. 1, 25, 173 A.2d 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1961)).
23
No. 70553-9-1/24
The failure to prove the second element of laches makes it unnecessary
for us to address either of the remaining two elements. Accordingly, we do not
discuss either.
We reject application of the doctrine of laches in this case.
The County also argues that equitable estoppel and laches do not apply
based on RCW 7.48.190. Because of our resolution of these issues in the
manner we already discussed in this opinion, we need not address this
argument.
RCW 36.70C.130(1)(f)
Race Track and Lessees argue that the hearing examiner's decision
violates the constitutional principles of due process and fundamental fairness.
Specifically, they argue the CUP Conditions are unconstitutionally vague as
applied to them because a person of common intelligence cannot determine
which activities are allowed or prohibited. We hold that Race Track and Lessees
fail in their burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is any
constitutional violation.
An ordinance is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging it must
demonstrate that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.51 "An
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague if it does not provide 'fair warning and
nondiscriminatory enforcement.'"52 A statute is void for vagueness if it '"is framed
51 Kitsap County v. Mattress Outlet/Gould, 153 Wn.2d 506, 509, 104 P.3d
1280(2005).
52 Young v. Pierce County, 120 Wn. App. 175, 182, 84 P.3d 927 (2004)
(quoting City of Seattle v. Eze, 45 Wn. App. 744, 748, 727 P.2d 262 (1986)).
24
No. 70553-9-1/25
in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application.'"53 "But the ordinance does not need
to 'meet impossible standards of specificity.'"54 In examining a vagueness
challenge, this court examines the ordinance as applied, not for facial
vagueness.55 An alleged constitutional violation presents a question of law that
this court reviews de novo.56
Here, we review the challenge to the CUP in the same manner as a
challenge to an ordinance or other law. Race Track and Lessees argue
generally that they are being subjected to ad hoc interpretations of the law by
County officials. They contend the County "issued multiple interpretations over a
21-year time period prior to suddenly reversing that interpretation in 2010." And
they argue in their reply brief that the language "non-race related testing
functions that are quiet, non-impacting" is vague.
Whatever lack of clarity that exists in some of the language of the CUP is
clearly outweighed by the express language that states that the activities within
the scope of CUP Condition 1(a) must be "quiet and non-impacting." This is not
vague. It provides fair notice that activities allowed under this condition are
53 id (quoting Mvrick v. Bd. of Pierce County Comm'rs, 102 Wn.2d 698,
707, 677 P.2d 140 (1984)).
54 id (quoting Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 70 Wn. App. 64, 75, 851 P.2d
744(1993)).
55
Id.56 Abbey Road Grp., LLC v. City of Bonnev Lake, 167 Wn.2d 242, 250,
218 P.3d 180 (2009).
25
No. 70553-9-1/26
subject to noise restrictions. The County cited this as a basis for its Notice and
Order. Race Track and Lessees fail to specifically articulate how "quiet and non-
impacting" is vague as applied to them.
Moreover, the CUP does not need to '"meet impossible standards of
specificity.'"57 Thus, even though it does not specifically list the type of activities
that are included within "non-race related testing functions," the condition
nonetheless makes clear that any such activities must be quiet and non-
impacting. Overall, persons of common intelligence would understand the
meaning of this condition, and Race Track and Lessees fail to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that this condition is unconstitutional.
Race Track and Lessees argue that the supreme court's decision in
Burien Bark Supply v. King County "should control the outcome here."58 Their
reliance on that case is misplaced.
There, the supreme court concluded that a zoning ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague in its application to Burien Bark Supply.59 Burien Bark
Supply, a beauty bark business, was trying to bring its activities into compliance
with a zoning statute.60 The zoning ordinance permitted manufacturing and
57 See Young. 120 Wn. App. at 182 (quoting Anderson, 70 Wn. App. at
75).
58 Appellants Opening Brief at 31 (citing Burien Bark Supply v. King
County, 106 Wn.2d 868, 725 P.2d 994 (1986)).
59 Burien Bark Supply, 106 Wn.2d at 868-69.
60 Id.26
No. 70553-9-1/27
processing "in limited degree."61 The supreme court stated:
The code does not explain how a procedure is to be deemed
"limited." We cannot tell, for example, whether one should consider
the number of steps in the process; the percentage of business
time devoted to the process; the extent to which the process is
necessary for the overall business; or the physical size of the
process. The code unconstitutionally leaves to the discretion of
county officials the substance of determining what activities are
prohibited.1621
Here, in contrast, the phrase "quiet and non-impacting" does not leave to
the discretion of the County officials what activities are prohibited. Rather, the
CUP requires activities that are within these commonly understood terms.
Further, as the superior court correctly noted, the language at issue in this
case is not a general zoning ordinance, but rather it is a "specific, negotiated
permit that contains clear, express language ('quiet') that it and the community
both knew it must abide by to be able to conduct business under the permit."
For these reasons, Race Track and Lessees' reliance on this case is not
persuasive.
RCW36.700.130(1)(b), (d), and(f)
Race Track and Lessees argue that the hearing examiner's decision is
incorrect because "vehicles other than karts complies with [the] conditions of the
CUP." Specifically, they argue that the County is barred from prohibiting vehicles
other than karts on the track under "equitable estoppel, laches, and/or
61 id at 869.
62 Id. at 871.
27
No. 70553-9-1/28
constitutional principles of due process and fundamental fairness." These
arguments have no merit.
In general, a party with unclean hands may not assert equitable estoppel
or laches.63 Since these are equitable defenses, they cannot "be urged by those
who withhold information which would have prompted action at an earlier time."64
Although Race Track and Lessees point to several possible grounds for
reversal and cite to the LUPA statute, their arguments appear to be primarily
based on equitable estoppel. Thus, the County argues that Race Track and
Lessees are not entitled to equitable relief because PGP's owner engaged in
willful misconduct in the permit process when he sought to relocate the kart track.
We agree with the County.
Here, as discussed previously in this opinion, in 2003, Race Track and
PGP contacted DDES regarding the relocation of the "go cart track." They
asserted that the request to move the track was not a change in use or
modification of the CUP conditions that would trigger the need for an amended
conditional use permit.
This portion of the Notice and Order alleged a violation for:
B. Use of shift kart track by vehicles other than shift karts,
including but not limited to motorcycles and street legal automobiles
in violation of permit condition 15 requiring all improvements and
uses to be conducted in accordance with the pre-March 31,1984
plot plan.1651
63 Retail Clerks Health & Welfare Trust Funds v. Shopland Supermarket,
Inc., 96 Wn.2d 939, 949, 640 P.2d 1051 (1982).
64 \±
65 SC at 236.
28
No. 70553-9-1/29
To bring the property into compliance, it stated:
B. Cease all non-shift kart use of the shift kart track by
February 21, 2011.1661
The superior court properly concluded that Race Track and PGP's willful
misconduct was a sound basis for King County's violation order and the hearing
examiner's affirmation of the Notice and Order.
The hearing examiner made several findings about PGP's representations
to the County when it sought to relocate the kart track. Specifically, the hearing
examiner focused on PGP's representation that only "karts" would be using the
track:
27. Other significant documents submitted to King
County in 2005 in support of the re-location of the Kart Track
stated or implied that use of the relocated track would be
exclusively by go karts or shift karts. They were the
Environmental Checklist, which stated, "Exhaust and emissions
from karts will continue to occur as a result of kart track operations",
and "Long term effects will be the noise created by the karts during
racing, practice and track operations.. ." (Exh. No. 79, deposition of
[PGP's owner], exh. No. 7, pp. 5 and 9) The noise study requested
by King County and submitted by the applicants analyzed only use
of the new track by karts.
28. When DDES issued its MDNS and Clearing and
Grading Permit for relocation of the kart track, it reasonably
understood from the application documents and other
communications received from the applicants (Race Track and
[PGP]), and from the applicants' engineers, that the use proposed
for the re-located track would be for go karts, shift karts or
performance karts. If the applicants had a different understanding,
based upon industry usage of terms or the applicants' intentions,
they failed to communicate that to King County. Consequently,
use of the relocated Kart Track by other types of vehicles was
not considered by King County when reviewing the proposal
66 id
29
No. 70553-9-1/30
that resulted in the approval of [the] Clearing and Grading
Permit.^
In another finding, the hearing examiner stated:
Based upon the documents presented to King County by the
applicants preceding and throughout the application process, King
County intended, and the applicants either understood or should
have understood, that the description of uses as "shift kart race
events, driver training and track rental," limited all uses on the track
to kartsJ681
These findings are not challenged. Further, they are supported by the
documents referenced by the hearing examiner. They are also supported by
other evidence in the record, for example, Race Track and PGP's 2003 letter to
the County, which stated, "The go cart track needs to be moved in order for it to
be used by shift carts because the frequency of use will increase and create
conflicts with usage of the road course."69
In sum, Race Track and Lessees are not entitled to equitable relief.
Race Track and Lessees argue that "kart track" is an industry term, the
requirements of the CUP are unclear, and they "reasonably believed that those
same activities could continue on the relocated track." They also argue that use
of the track by other vehicles has been the "status quo for years," the County
inspected the track after it was completed, County officials expressly stated that
a wide range of uses are allowed on the track, and they invested substantially in
the track relocation and improvements. But these arguments are equitable in
67 SC at 2539-40 (emphasis added).
68 id at 2540.
69 \_± at 97 (emphasis added).
30
No. 70553-9-1/31
nature. Because Race Track and PGP have unclean hands, these arguments
are not persuasive.
RELIEF
Based on our rejection of most of the challenges based on LUPA, we
substantially affirm the hearing examiner's decision. We reverse the decision
only to the extent of the modification of the Notice and Order by the hearing
examiner.
The question, then, is what must be done to address the portion of the
hearing examiner's decision that was incorrect. As previously discussed, the
language of the CUP does not, by its terms, prohibit a driver education and
training school. But the activities of such a school must be "quiet" and "non-
impacting." Among other things, the Notice and Order requires Race Track and
Lessees to "[c]ease all racing and performance driving school operations...
."70 This modification is too broad.
RCW 36.70C.140 states, "The court may affirm or reverse the land use
decision under review or remand it for modification or further proceedings."71
In our view, this statute does not authorize a reviewing court—either the superior
court or this court—to modify the Notice and Order itself.72 Accordingly, we
remand the decision to the hearing examiner with directions to modify its decision
so that it is not inconsistent with this decision.
70 Id at 236 (emphasis added).
71 (Emphasis added.)
72 See RCW 36.700140.
31
No. 70553-9-1/32
One final point. Race Track and Lessees claim there is a need to address
"defining whether the terms 'quiet and non-impacting' equate to within ambient
noise levels."73 The County does not respond to this argument. And there is no
further clarification of this claim for purposes of this appeal. Accordingly, we do
not further address this assignment of error.
ATTORNEY FEES
The County seeks an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal based
on RCW 4.84.370. Because this statute does not authorize an award of attorney
fees to the County under the circumstances of this case, we deny the request.
RCW 4.84.370 states:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs shall be awarded to the
prevailing party or substantially prevailing party on appeal before
the court of appeals or the supreme court of a decision by a
county, city, or town to issue, condition, or deny a
development permit involving a site-specific rezone, zoning,
plat, conditional use, variance, shoreline permit, building
permit, site plan, or similar land use approval or decision. The
court shall award and determine the amount of reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs under this section if:
(a) The prevailing party on appeal was the prevailing or
substantially prevailing party before the county, city, or town, or in a
decision involving a substantial development permit under chapter
90.58 RCW, the prevailing party on appeal was the prevailing party
or the substantially prevailing party before the shorelinefs] hearings
board; and
(b) The prevailing party on appeal was the prevailing party or
substantially prevailing party in all prior judicial proceedings.
(2) In addition to the prevailing party under subsection (1) of
this section, the county, city, or town whose decision is on appeal is
73 Opening Brief of Appellants at 2.
32
No. 70553-9-1/33
considered a prevailing party if its decision is upheld at superior
court and on appeal.1741
The County initially characterized this case in its briefing as one that
"involvefs] a decision to issue, condition, or deny a conditional use permit." Not
so. As this opinion makes clear, this is a case enforcing violations of a CUP.
Given this mischaracterization of the nature of this proceeding and the lack of
any argument that this proceeding falls within the emphasized language of the
above quotation of the statute, we reject this theory of recovery.
This approach is consistent with Tugwell v. Kittitas County.75 There,
Division Three denied a request for attorney fees on the basis that the case
involved rezoning, not a development permit.76 Thus, RCW 4.84.370 was
inapplicable.
The County supplemented its request for fees by citing Mower v. King
County.77 There, the decision on the LUPA appeal was one to enforce an
alleged code violation arising from dumping fill and debris without obtaining a
permit.78 The County prevailed at the hearing examiner level, the superior court,
and at this court.79 This court awarded fees on appeal to the County. In doing
74 (Emphasis added) (alteration in original).
75 90 Wn. App. 1, 951 P.2d 272 (1997).
76idat15.
77 Statement of Additional Authorities at 2 (citing Mower v. King County,
130 Wn. App. 707, 125 P.3d 148 (2005)).
78 Mower, 130 Wn. App. at 711.
79 id at 710-11.
33
No. 70553-9-1/34
so, this court appears to have relied on subsection 2 of the above statute.80 That
subsection provides for an award of fees to a governmental entity whose
"decision" is upheld by the courts. While stating that the plain language of this
subsection supported the award of fees, this court did not expressly address
whether the "decision" was within the scope of the matters described in
subsection 1. We conclude the types of decisions must be the same. And we
know that the decision before us does not fall within the language of subsection
1. Accordingly, we conclude that Mower is distinguishable.
In sum, the County is not entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees
on appeal in this case.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the hearing examiner for
modification of the decision so that it is not inconsistent with this decision. We
deny the County's request for attorney fees.
Cat^
WE CONCUR:
I f\ CA/X fc Kj ~J rAg"j
80 See id. at 720-21.
34