In Re The Marriage Of: Teresa G. Harkenrider v. Christopher A. Wodja ( 2014 )

FILE
COIRT
r APPEALS
DIVISION II
2061
rUG2G VII: 36
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHING
DIVISION II
In re the Marriage of: No. 43660 - -II
4
consolidated with
TERESA GERETTE HARKENRIDER, No. 44504 - -II
2
Respondent,
and UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHRISTOPHER ALAN WODJA,
Appellant.
MELNICK, J. — Christopher A. Wodja appeals the entry of several orders filed in this
dissolution
post - proceeding. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering
these post- decree orders. We affirm and grant Teresa Harkenrider' s request for attorney fees on
appeal.
FACTS
Wodja and Harkenrider were married in 2004 and had two children before they divorced
in December 2011. After a four -
week trial in which more than 30 witnesses testified, the trial
court granted Harkenrider primary residential custody of the children and denied Wodja all
residential time until he completed one year of psychotherapy and an anger management course.
On December 16, 2011, the court entered findings of fact supporting the dissolution and
the parenting plan. These findings stated that it was in the children' s best interest that the court
retain exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the parties. The court then cited Wodja' s
intransigence throughout the case, including a misleading phone call to police about his family
and a frivolous contempt motion, and added that he increased the cost of litigation by lying about
Harkenrider' s alcohol consumption. This intransigence offset any award of attorney fees based
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on need and ability to pay. The court rejected a finding that Harkenrider was alcohol dependent
but, because she had occasionally consumed alcohol to excess, required her to undergo random
urinalysis testing once or twice monthly until the anticipated April 27, 2012 review hearing.
With regard to Wodja' s need for treatment, the court found as follows:
Dr. Whitehill, who was called as [ Wodja' s] witness, does not recommend
Wodja' s] contact with the children until it can be determined that [ Wodja] can
correct his parental deficiencies which are difficult Axis II disorders and traits.
Entire sections of [Wodja' s] psychological testing were invalid due to [ Wodja' s]
defensiveness and attempts to portray himself in a [ positive] light. Therefore, the
court finds that [ Wodj a] will have no visits, residential, or contact with the
children pending further order of the Court as specifically set forth in the
Parenting Plan.
Wodja] failed to disclose numerous criminal incidents to both Dr. Judd
and Dr. Whitehill which were arguably of a sexual nature, which were not taken
into in the preparation of either expert' s reports. Both experts
consideration
testified to [ Wodja' s] minimalization of incidents related to allegations of
attempted rape, assault, kidnapping, and drugging of women.
The Court finds Dr. Whitehill persuasive with respect to most of
Wodja' s] disorders and The court also finds that it is more likely
conditions.
than not that [ Wodja] has a sexual deviancy[.]
Clerk' s Papers ( CP) ( 43660 -4 -II) at 26. The court entered this finding regarding Wodja' s
credibility:
The court finds that the testimony of [Wodja] was not credible in many respects.
It is a manifestation of [ Wodja' s] disorders that he cannot accept rules and
requirements The way that [ Wodja' s] mind perverts reality and his
of others.
pathological lying, mostly in failed attempts to place himself in the best light, was
evident throughout the trial and his actions during litigation.
CP ( 43660 -4 -II) at 27.
Wodja made handwritten changes to the court' s initial findings, which resulted in the
entry of corrected findings and an award of attorney fees to Harkenrider. Wodj a did not appeal
any of the dissolution orders, including the parenting plan.
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In February 2012, the trial court entered an order setting forth the parameters for
selecting Wodja' s psychotherapist and the prerequisites for his treatment. The order also
provided that
any treatment provider for [ Wodj a] shall be provided ... expert reports, guardian
ad litem information, criminal records related to [ Wodja' s] history, Department of
Health records, and declarations of individuals setting forth allegations of abuse,
sexual deviance, and other evidence provided to the court as a basis for
restrictions [ on Wodja' s contact with Harkenrider and the children]. This must
occur prior to commencement of any treatment for it to be acceptable to the
Court.
CP ( 43660 -4 -II) at 32.
On March 16, the trial court entered an order finding that Wodja had intentionally
misrepresented material facts to the court with regard to his alleged treatment with one provider.
This misrepresentation is perjurious and warrants specific note in the file, and [ is] part of a
repeated pattern of behavior on the part of [ Wodja]." CP ( 43660 -4 -II) at 47. That order also
dismissed an anger management provider whom Wodja had consulted without providing the
required background information, appointed a .different provider, and awarded attorney fees to
Harkenrider for Wodja' s intransigence. The court denied Wodja' s motion for reconsideration
and awarded additional fees to Harkenrider.
At the April 27 review hearing, Harkenrider informed the court that Wodja had obtained
show cause orders from three court commissioners in an attempt, to bring contempt motions
against her. Consequently, the court entered an order intended to alert other judicial officers that,
pursuant to its findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on December 16, 2011, the trial
judge retained exclusive jurisdiction to hear all future matters concerning this case and family.
During the same April hearing, the trial court reviewed the issue of Harkenrider' s
ongoing requirement to submit to random urinalysis testing. The court relieved Harkenrider of
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4 2
that obligation after finding that she did not inappropriately miss any tests and that her absences
were related to the fact that she was scheduled for urinalysis testing at another facility. The court
then ruled that Paula van Pul and Bill Kohlmeyer would be counseling Wodja. On May 11,
2012, the court entered an order clarifying that van Pul could address domestic violence issues
raised in an earlier evaluation and stating that a new anger management provider was necessary
due to Kohlmeyer' s withdrawal.
On June 8, 2012, the trial court heard Wodja' s motion for reconsideration of its April 27
order. The court refused to consider the new materials that Wodja filed the day before the
hearing. The court denied Wodja' s motion for reconsideration, found that the motion was made
in bad faith, and awarded Harkenrider $2, 500 in attorney fees.
On June 15, 2012, the trial court heard argument on Wodja' s motion for clarification of
the dissolution decree so that it would include the vehicle identification number ( VIN) of a car
that had been awarded to him. Harkenrider argued that the motion was unnecessary and part of
Wodja' s constant efforts to harass her. She stated that Wodja did not need the VIN to obtain title
but that she would have signed a proposed order disclosing the VIN. She added:
all of the fees we have requested up until now have been related to intransigence
and the fact that [ Wodja] does everything within his power to make this matter
more difficult than it already is.
Report of Proceedings ( RP) ( June 15, 2012) at 35. The trial court issued an order designating
Wodj a as the title owner of the vehicle and awarding Harkenrider $500 in attorney fees.
At the the trial its ruling on Harkenrider' s" Motion and
same hearing, court reserved
Declaration for Vexatious Litigation/ Restraints /Sanctions & Fees." CP ( 43660 -4 -I1)
Finding of
at 293. Harkenrider stated in an accompanying memorandum that Wodja' s abuse of the court
process had cost her more than $16, 000 in attorney fees since entry of the dissolution decree.
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4 2
On June 21, 2012, the trial court issued an order concluding that Wodja had engaged in
vexatious litigation. The order included extensive findings of fact and required Wodja to seek
leave of the court before submitting any new pro se filings other than those seeking modification
of the parenting plan. The order also barred Wodja from filing future pleadings concerning
Harkenrider' s alleged issues with alcohol or drugs based on events that preceded the April 27
order. Finally, the order imposed an additional $ 2, 000 in attorney fees against Wodj a for bad
faith not previously sanctioned.
On June 22, 2012, the court entered an order appointing Diane Shepard to serve as
Wodj a' s anger management provider. On August 3, 2012, Wodj a brought a motion for visitation
in which he argued that he had complied with all court- ordered requirements. Harkenrider
opposed the motion, and on September 12, 2012, the trial court entered an order finding that
there had not yet been a substantial change of circumstances that gave the court adequate cause
to modify the parenting plan. The order reasserted that the court would retain jurisdiction over
the children and the parties until the children were emancipated.
On October 12, the court denied Wodja' s motion for reconsideration. On November 29,
the court sent the parties a letter stating that a November 30 hearing on Wodja' s motion to
reinstate an earlier hearing on his motion for reconsideration would be stricken and that the
court' s orders of September 12 and October 12 were the final orders in the matter.
Wodja now appeals several of these post- decree orders.
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ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We begin our review by observing that trial court decisions in dissolution proceedings
will seldom be changed on appeal. In re Marriage of Booth ( Griffin), 114 Wash. 2d 772, 776, 791
P.2d 519 ( 1990); In re Parentage of Jannot, 110 Wn. App. 16, 21, 37 P.3d 1265 ( 2002),
affirmed, 149 Wash. 2d 123, 65 P.3d 664 ( 2003). The spouse who challenges such decisions bears
the heavy burden of showing a manifest abuse of discretion.. In re Marriage of Landry, 103
Wash. 2d 807, 809, 699 P.2d 214 ( 1985). We will affirm the trial court' s decision unless no
reasonable judge would have reached the same conclusion. Landry, 103 Wash. 2d at 809 -10.
II. ORDER ELIMINATING URINALYSIS TESTING
Wodja challenges the trial court' s April 27 decision terminating the requirement that
1
Harkenrider submit to random urinalysis testing. Harkenrider requested termination after
explaining that she had passed all testing and had missed two tests in Washington only because
she had moved to Massachusetts and had forgotten to inform the Washington testing facility.
She also explained that one sample tested as diluted because it was taken late in the day after she
had consumed large quantities of water and caffeine. Harkenrider argued that there was no
evidence that she had abused alcohol in any way and that Wodja' s arguments to the contrary
were outrageous. After Wodja insisted that Harkenrider was an alcoholic who needed further
testing, the court found that she had relieved the court of its concerns about her alcohol use and
that she was no longer required to take random urinalysis tests.
1 Wodja' s timely appeal of the denial of his motion to reconsider the April 27 order brings the
order itself before us for review. RAP 2. 4( c); 2A K. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES
PRACTICE, RAP 2. 4, at 215 ( 7th ed. 2011). Consequently, we reject Harkenrider' s procedural
challenge to this aspect of Wodja' s appeal.
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Wodja now argues that the trial court ignored declarations from experts who maintained
that additional urinalysis testing was in order. The trial court did not consider these declarations
because they constituted new evidence that was filed with Wodja' s reply brief the day before the
reconsideration hearing. Two of the declarations were based on selective information that Wodja
had provided, with the third describing standard urinalysis testing procedures. We see no abuse
of discretion in the trial court' s decision. See CR 59( c) ( court may permit reply affidavits).
Wodj a also argues that this decision and the others under challenge show that the trial
court was biased against him. A court is biased against a person' s case if it has a preconceived
adverse opinion with reference to the case, without just grounds or before sufficient knowledge.
In re Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 722, 359 P.2d 789 ( 1961). We presume that the trial court
performed its functions without bias or prejudice. In re Welfare of R. S. G., 174 Wash. App. 410,
430, 299 P.3d 26 ( 2013). The fact that the trial judge ruled adversely does not demonstrate
prejudice. See In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wash. 2d 647, 692, 101 P.3d 1 ( 2004) ( judicial
rulings alone almost never constitute showing of bias); Rhinehart v. The Seattle Times Co., 51
Wn. App. 561, 579 -80, 754 P.2d 1243 ( 1998) ( judge' s prior adverse rulings did not demonstrate
necessary prejudice for recusal of judge). We see no evidence of bias or prejudice on the record
before us.
III. ORDER CLARIFYING TREATMENT
The trial court' s order of May 11, 2012, clarified the type of domestic violence treatment
that Wodj a needed and described the procedures for selecting a new anger management provider
after the previous provider' s withdrawal. - Wodja does not address this order in his opening brief
and argues for the first time in his reply brief that he is actually challenging the court' s earlier
dismissal of a different anger management counselor. We do not address arguments raised for
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4
the first time in a reply brief, particularly when they lack any citation to pertinent authority.
Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosely, 118 Wash. 2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 ( 1992).
IV. ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS
Wodja challenges the court' s awards of attorney fees to Harkenrider on June 8, 2012, and
June 15, 2012. He argues that the awards were erroneously made without a showing of
Harkenrider' s need or his ability to pay.
We review an award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Bay v. Jensen, 147 Wn.
App. 641, 659, 196 P.3d 753 ( 2008). When determining whether to award attorney fees, the trial
court generally must balance the needs of.the spouse requesting them against the ability of the
other spouse to pay. In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wash. App. 545, 563, 918 P.2d 954 ( 1996).
The court also may consider the extent to which one party' s intransigence has caused the other
party to incur additional legal services. In re Marriage of Foley, 84 Wash. App. 839, 846, 930
P.2d 929 ( 1997). Intransigent conduct includes obstructionist behavior, repetitive or unnecessary
motions, and attempts to make the proceeding unduly difficult with increased legal costs. In re
Marriage of Greenlee, 65 Wn. App. 703, 708, 829 P.2d 1120 ( 1992). If intransigence is
established, the financial resources of the spouse seeking fees are irrelevant. In re Marriage of
Morrow, 53 Wash. App. 579, 590, 770 P.2d 197 ( 1989).
On June 8, the court heard argument on Wodja' s motion for reconsideration of its April
27 order. After Harkenrider objected to the new materials that Wodj a had filed, the court ruled
that it would consider only the materials before it on April 27, together with the arguments and
information in Wodja' s motion for reconsideration and his reply brief. Wodja then complained
that Harkenrider had interfered with his choice of a treatment provider and that she had
substance abuse problems. Harkenrider' s attorney responded:
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This motion was not properly brought before the Court on any legitimate
legal factual basis. This is the fourth such motion filed by Mr. Wodja which
or
follows this pattern. He has repeatedly attempted to shift the focus of the Court to
issues kind of as a diversionary tactic to get the focus off of him.
He should be required to pay attorney' s fees and costs in the amount of
2, 500 related to this action. There should be a finding that he intentionally did
not confirm his motions in order to file additional materials which eventually the
Court did not consider, but it did substantially delay hearing in this matter and
exorbitantly increased the cost.
And although the Court is not considering the post -filed pleadings, I have
to point out that, because of the materials that Mr. Wodja filed, Ms. Harkenrider
was placed in the position of either remaining silent, which would no doubt be
interpreted as some sort of consent or agreement with what was filed, or to
attempt to set the record straight. That took a great deal of time and effort.
It never should have happened. New pleadings are never to be filed on
reconsideration, but she was caught in 22.
a catch - And so her attorney' s fees,
once again, have gone through the roof. Although prior orders for fees have been
granted, none have been paid, and she is the one who pays the price each time
these matters are delayed and have to come before the Court again.
RP ( June 8, 2012) at 29 -31.
The trial court agreed and entered an order denying reconsideration and requiring Wodj a
to pay $2, 500 in attorney fees. The order stated in part as follows:
There was no proper basis for reconsideration of this matter. The Court was
satisfied and remains satisfied that Ms. Harkenrider is properly relieved of any
ongoing requirement for UAs. The Court finds that Mr. Wodja' s motion was not
brought in good faith.... The supplemental pleadings filed by Mr. Wodja were
not procedurally or substantively proper.
CP ( 43660 -4 -II) at 323 -25. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court' s decision to award
Harkenrider attorney fees based on' Wodja' s bad faith and intransigence in filing this motion.
On June 15, the parties again appeared before the court on Wodja' s motion for
clarification of the decree. Wodja argued that the decree needed to include the VIN of a vehicle
he had been awarded so that he could assume title. Harkenrider argued that the VIN was not
if it the matter have been by
necessary to transfer title and that even was, could resolved a
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proposed order without a hearing. She argued that the current motion was one more example of
Wodja' s vexatious litigation.
As we stand here today, there are two more notes for motion calendar that
he has filed for next week. There was no need for this motion. We didn' t have a
choice but to reply. If I would have received a proposed order, assuming all it did
was add a VIN number, it could have quite easily been signed, but it' s not my job
to create an order for him, and we know that it would have been opposed had I
created an order for him.
RP ( June 15, 2012) at 5. At the end of the hearing, Harkenrider requested attorney fees:
This was a completely unnecessary motion. Had Mr. Wodja proposed
such an order, even without filing a motion, it would have been signed. Had he
filed a proposed order as required by local rule along with his motion, this could
have been avoided. He misrepresented the facts about what is necessary to
transfer the title. Ms. Harkenrider showed what she did, and that her response
was unnecessary and it does warrant an award of attorney fees.
RP ( June 15, 2012) at 33 -34. The court awarded Harkenrider $500 in attorney fees.
Wodj a now complains that the court did not explain the basis for its award, but the record
makes that basis clear. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court' s decision to award
Harkenrider $500 in attorney fees following the June 15 hearing.
V. VEXATIOUS LITIGATION ORDER
On June 21, 2012, the court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order
regarding Wodja' s vexatious litigation. Wodja now argues that the court' s findings were not
supported by substantial evidence.
We review a trial court' s order limiting a party' s access to the court for an abuse of
discretion. Bay, 147 Wn. App. at 657. A trial court has the power to provide for the orderly
conduct of proceedings before it. RCW 2. 28. 010( 3). A court may enjoin a party from engaging
in litigation upon a "` specific and detailed showing of a pattern of abusive and frivolous
litigation. ' Yurtis v. Phipps, 143 Wash. App. 680, 693, 181 P.3d 849 ( 2008) ( quoting Whatcom
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County v. Kane, 31 Wn. App. 250, 253, 640 P.2d 1075 ( 1981)). Proof of mere litigiousness is
insufficient to warrant limiting a party' s access to the court. Yurtis, 143 Wash. App. at 693.
Although trial courts may place reasonable restrictions on litigants who abuse the judicial
process, courts must be careful not to issue a more comprehensive injunction than necessary.
Yurtis, 143 Wn. App. at 693. We review a trial court' s findings of fact for substantial evidence.
In re Marriage ofSkarbek, 100 Wash. App. 444, 447, 997 P.2d 447 ( 2000).
The court found that Wodja' s intent in filing untimely, unresponsive, and unfounded
pleadings was to create expense for Harkenrider and constituted harassment. Support for this
finding included Wodja' s actions in changing court orders in a manner that required their re-
drafting and re- presentment; obtaining a treatment provider without court authorization and
without disclosing the appropriate background materials; pursuing contempt orders .before the
commissioner' s court despite knowing that the trial court had retained jurisdiction over all
matters for this family; offering ex parte communication to the court and improperly providing
parts of e -mails from Harkenrider' s attorney to third parties and the court; seeking
reconsideration of the March 16 order without providing new information or any legal basis for
reconsideration; seeking CR 11 sanctions against Harkenrider; failing to consolidate a renoted
motion for reconsideration with the already existing April 27 review hearing, resulting in a
separate hearing on April 20; responding to Harkenrider' s pleadings concerning the April 27
hearing with numerous false hearsay statements; seeking reconsideration of specific findings
made on April 27 with no proper factual basis; creating confusion over the type of treatment
required; proposing a treatment provider to which Harkenrider had agreed without circulating an
agreed order; and noting a motion on June 15 for inclusion of a VIN number without submitting
an agreed order. The court also found that Wodja had not paid any of the $ 5, 870 in attorney fees
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previously assessed against him; this assessment " has not been effective as a sanction to the bad
faith conduct of Mr. Wodja." CP ( 43660 -4 -II) at 392.
In its conclusions of law, the trial court imposed an additional $ 2,000 in attorney fees
against Wodj a and ordered him to seek leave before filing any new pro se motions other than a
motion to modify the parenting plan. The court' s order barred Wodja from filing further motions
concerning Harkenrider' s alleged issues with alcohol and /or drugs based on history or events that
predated the April 27 order, and it prohibited him from engaging in ex parte contact with the
court or court staff.
The record documents Wodja' s actions and provides ample support for the trial court' s
findings regarding his vexatious litigation. The court restricted but did not completely enjoin
Wodja' s access to the courts, and we see no abuse of discretion in the restrictions it imposed.
See In re Marriage of Giordano, 57 Wn. App. 74, 77, 787 P.2d 51 ( 1990) ( there is no unlimited
right of access to courts; all that is required is a reasonable opportunity to be heard).
VI. ORDER APPOINTING ANGER MANAGEMENT COUNSELOR
On June 22, 2012, the court issued an order appointing Diane Shepard as Wodja' s anger
management counselor. Wodja challenges this order for the first time in his reply brief without
We further. Cowiche Canyon
citing any legal authority. need not consider this claim of error
Conservancy, 118 Wash. 2d at 809.
VII. ORDER ON MOTION FOR VISITATION
On September 12, 2012, the trial court entered an order finding that there was no
adequate cause and no substantial change in circumstances that warranted modifying the
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parenting plan to allow Wodja visitation rights. Wodja argues that this order is untenable and
constitutes an abuse of discretion.2
One of Wodja' s objections to the order concerns the court' s explanation that it would
retain jurisdiction over the parties and their children until the children reached emancipation.
Wodja objects to this retention of jurisdiction for the first time, even though the trial court
included similar statements in the findings supporting the dissolution decree and its April 27
order. Wodja appears to argue that this retention of jurisdiction is improper because the children
now live in Massachusetts. Having made the initial custody determination, the Pierce County
Superior Court retains jurisdiction over further custody determinations in this case while Wodj a
continues to reside in Washington. RCW 26. 27. 211( 1)( b). And, given the complex history of
this case, we see no abuse of discretion in the court' s decision to retain exclusive jurisdiction
over future custody proceedings. RCW 2. 28. 010( 3).
As for the court' s substantive ruling, the parenting plan stated that the court would be
to modify due to a substantial change in circumstances, " i.e., an
willing to review a petition
improvement in [ Wodja' s] condition through progress in his treatment and behavior that would
allow a change in the no contact with the children provision that is the result of trial." CP 5; see
RCW 26. 09. 260 ( setting forth requirements for major and minor modifications of parenting
plans); RCW 26. 09. 270 ( explaining that petitioner must file affidavits establishing that adequate
cause for modification exists to warrant hearing).
2 Wodja also takes issue with a .declaration that Harkenrider' s attorney filed in response to his
motion for visitation. The trial court struck the improper legal argument from that declaration;
we see no error and no cause to discharge the attorney from this case.
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In finding no change that would justify visitation between Wodja and his children, the
court first observed that many declarations Wodj a had offered were not relevant, either because
they were disclosed during trial or were the result of selective information Wodja had provided.
The court emphasized that its prior rulings were final with respect to past history and that it
would modify the parenting plan based only on substantial changes of circumstances occurring
since the final order. " Mr. Wodja' s continued attempts to change the court' s final rulings
Ms. Harkenrider are seriously misguided and further evidence of Mr. Wodja' s
regarding
unhealthy personality traits which give the court concern for the children." CP ( 44504 -2 -II) at
97.
The court then observed that the key evidence before it was provided by Diane Shepard
and Paula van Pul, Wodja' s two treatment providers. Shepard reported that Wodja had learned
what was necessary to manage his anger and that it was up to him to appropriately apply what he
had learned. Paula van Pul reported that Wodja had been in counseling for four months and had
begun to make progress. Although she initially submitted a letter without any recommendation,
she filed a second letter supporting visitation. The court' s review of van Pul' s progress notes
and letters revealed that " the changes hoped for are just now beginning to be made." CP ( 44504 -
2 -II) at 99.
The court noted that it had observed very little change in Wodja' s ability to manage his
anger or change his focus about issues involving the children and proper parenting since entry of
the final parenting plan. The court also noted that it would be extremely detrimental to attempt
reconciliation and a resumption of visitation only to have " prior behaviors, attitudes and actions
again cause an interruption of the child -
parent bond, because Mr. Wodj a was unable to sustain a
change to sometimes immutable personality characteristics." CP ( 44504 -2 -II) at 100. The court
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2
concluded that Wodj a had " just begun to indicate that he can manage his anger. The best the
court can discern from the evidence, from the relevant experts, and from the court record with
the court' s prior rulings, [ is that] Mr. Wodja has at most a few weeks, if that, of making
appropriate choices despite his anger and self - focus." CP ( 44504 -2 -II) at 100. Although Wodja
had made " a modicum of progress," the court declined to enter a temporary order allowing
visitation. CP ( 44504 -2 -II) at 96. The court added that if Wodja' s progress continued, sufficient
to constitute a substantial change in circumstances, he should submit a petition to modify the
parenting plan and note the adequate cause hearing.
We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court' s determination that there was not yet
adequate cause to modify the parenting plan and to allow Wodja visitation. Nor do we see any
abuse of discretion in the October 12, 2012 order denying Wodja' s motion for reconsideration. 2
CP 148. In seeking reconsideration, Wodja submitted another letter from van Pul in which she
recommended limited visitation based on her review of the court' s decision. 2 CP 124. The
court was not bound by this recommendation. In re Marriage of Swanson, 88 Wash. App. 128,
138, 944 P.2d 6 ( 1997) ( quoting McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 312 -13, 738 P.2d 254
1987)); In re Marriage ofPilant, 42 Wn. App. 173, 180, 709 P.2d 1241 ( 1985). Finally, we see
no error in the court' s decision to strike a subsequent hearing on Wodja' s motion for
reconsideration after it had already denied reconsideration.
VIII. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Harkenrider seeks an award of attorney fees based on Wodja' s filing of a frivolous
appeal. RAP 18. 9. An appeal is frivolous if it presents no debatable issues on which reasonable
minds might differ and is so totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of
reversal. Reid v. Dalton, 124 Wn. App. 113, 128, 100 P.3d 349 ( 2004) ( quoting Fay v. Nw.
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Airlines, 115 Wash. 2d 194, 200 -01, 796 P.2d 412 ( 1990)). Finding all of Wodja' s issues devoid of
merit, we award Harkenrider attorney fees under RAP 18. 9.
We affirm and award Harkenrider attorney fees on appeal.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06.040, it is so ordered.
We concur:
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