State of Washington v. Ryan Michael Weigant ( 2014 )

FILED
SEPTEMBER 11, 2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 32296-3-III
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Respondent, )
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v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
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RYAN MICHAEL WEIGANT, )
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Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. - Ryan Michael Weigant appeals from his convictions
for second degree burglary and taking a motor vehicle without permission, arguing that
(1) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the second degree burglary
conviction and, (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to request a cautionary accomplice
testimony instruction based on 11 Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal
(WPIC) 6.05. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
Around 8: 15 p.m. on August 31, 2012, Timothy Summers, a manager at a fish
hatchery in Mossyrock, Washington, received a telephone call from a co-worker
informing him that the hatchery's all-terrain vehicle (ATV or quad), which was stored in
No. 32296-3-II1
State v. Weigant
the hatchery's garage, was missing. As he walked through the hatchery, Mr. Summers
noticed that a moped had also been taken. About one week after the break-in, Tara Ann
Watson contacted the Lewis County Sheriffs Office and told Detective William
Adkisson that Benjamin Monk and Mr. Weigant had taken the quad and the moped.
Detective Adkisson subsequently interviewed Mr. Monk, who admitted that he and Mr.
Weigant had taken the quad and moped from the hatchery. The State charged Mr.
Weigant with second degree burglary and taking a motor vehicle without permission.
At trial, Ms. Watson testified that she, Mr. Monk, and Mr. Weigant went to the
fish hatchery at least two times in late August to fish at a public access area. Ms. Watson
stated that on the second night, Mr. Monk and Mr. Weigant went for a walk after building
a fire at the public access area. Ms. Watson became tired while waiting for the men to
return and took a nap in the passenger seat of her car. When Mr. Monk and Mr. Weigant
returned, they had a moped and a quad with them. The moped was placed in the trunk of
Ms. Watson's car and the quad was towed. Mr. Weigant drove the car that towed the
quad.
Detective Adkisson testified that after his initial interview with Mr. Monk, in
which Mr. Monk reported that Mr. Weigant assisted him with the burglary, the
prosecutor's office informed him that Mr. Monk was planning on testifying that Mr.
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No. 32296-3-111
State v. Weigant
Weigant had not helped with the burglary. When Detective Adkisson interviewed Mr.
Monk a second time, Mr. Monk denied that Mr. Weigant had helped him with the
burglary. The detective testified, "Ben Monk told me that he was going to take the rap
for the burglary because that was the truth." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 172.
When called to testify for the State, Mr. Monk denied initially telling Detective
Adkisson that Mr. Weigant participated in the burglary. He stated that Ms. Watson, not
Mr. Weigant, had helped him with the burglary. Mr. Monk stated that he was familiar
with the fish hatchery and knew the quad was inside the hatchery. According to Mr.
Monk, Ms. Watson agreed to help him take the quad from the building and that she held
up a rolling door for him while he pushed the quad out of the building. He explained,
"[Ms. Watson] held the door. It was a rolling door. 1 couldn't have done it by myself'
RP at 132.
At the close of the State's case, Mr. Weigant moved to dismiss the burglary
charge, arguing there was no evidence Mr. Weigant entered the building or that he
possessed the intent to commit a crime inside the building. The court denied the motion.
Shandra Cook, Mr. Weigant's stepmother, testified for Mr. Weigant. She claimed
that Mr. Weigant was visiting her at the end of August and was in her house on the night
of August 30,2012.
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No. 32296-3-111
State v. Weigant
The jury found Mr. Weigant guilty as charged.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Weigant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for
second degree burglary because it "only supports a conclusion that the defendant was in
possession of property taken in a recent burglary." Br. of Appellant at 1. He contends
that "[w]hile it is possible that he and Benjamin Monk entered the garage together and
stole the ATV, it is equally as possible that Benjamin stole the vehicle himself and the
defendant only became aware of his actions after the fact." Br. of Appellant at 8-9.
Standard ofReview. Sufficient evidence supports a conviction if, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the State, "any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d
1, 8, 133 P.3d 936 (2006). We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor
of the State and interpret them most strongly against the defendant. Id. In the sufficiency
context, we consider circumstantial evidence as probative as direct evidence. State v.
Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 781,83 P.3d 410 (2004). We defer to the fact finder on issues
of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and persuasiveness of the evidence. State v.
Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004), abrogated in part on other grounds
by Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).
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No. 32296-3-III
State v. Weigant
Su(ticiency ofthe Evidence. A person is guilty of second degree burglary if, "with
intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains
unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling." RCW 9A.52.030(1). A
defendant may also be guilty as an accomplice if, with knowledge that it will promote or
facilitate the crime, he either (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another
person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or
committing the crime. RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a). To be culpable as an accomplice, the
defendant need not participate in the crime, have specific knowledge of every element of
the crime, or share the same mental state as the principal. State v. Berube, 150 Wn.2d
498, 511, 79 PJd 1144 (2003). Finally, RCW 9A.52.040 provides that "[i]n any
prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may
be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property
therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to
the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent."
Citing State v. Mace, 97 Wn.2d 840,650 P.2d 217 (1982), Mr. Weigant contends
that, at most, the evidence establishes that he was an accomplice to possessing stolen
property, but that it did not establish that he entered a building and stole the quad. In
Mace, however, the evidence established that the defendant may have possessed and used
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No. 32296-3-111
State v. Weigant
stolen bank cards shortly after they were stolen from a home, but no evidence other than
possession of the cards linked him to the burglary. Id. at 841-42. Our Supreme Court
held that, standing alone, the inference that Mr. Mace possessed the stolen bank cards
after the burglary was insufficient to support his conviction for the burglary itself. Id. at
845.
In contrast, the evidence here establishes that Mr. Weigant was, at a minimum, an
accomplice to the burglary. Ms. Watson testified that she observed Mr. Weigant and Mr.
Monk go for a walk in the vicinity of the fish hatchery and later return with a moped and
a quad. According to Ms. Watson, Mr. Weigant drove the car that towed the quad, while
Mr. Monk steered the quad. Detective Adkisson testified that Mr. Monk initially told him
that Mr. Weigant helped him remove the quad from the hatchery and that Mr. Monk did
not implicate anyone else in the burglary.
The evidence also established that the burglary could not have been committed by
one person. Mr. Monk testified that he needed the assistance of another person to hold up
the garage door while he removed the quad from the building. Mr. Summers testified that
the garage doors were heavy and that if they were not opened all the way up, the doors
would slam closed.
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No. 32296-3-III
State v. We igant
Mr. Weigant argues that a fact finder might have inferred from the evidence that
Mr. Monk removed the quad from the building by himself and that Mr. Weigant only
became aware of the burglary after the fact. But when there are "hypothetically rational
alternative conclusions to be drawn from the proven facts," the fact finder may discard a
possible inference when it concludes such inference unreasonable under the
circumstances. State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 708, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). Here,
although Mr. Monk later denied that Mr. Weigant assisted him and Mr. Weigant's
stepmother provided an alibi, the jury was free to reject their testimony as lacking
credibility. Under the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could have found, and
did find, the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Considering the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the State, we
hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Weigant of second degree burglary.
Ineffective Assistance ofCounsel. Mr. Weigant contends that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to propose WPIC 6.05, which would have told
the jury to view the testimony of accomplices with caution. To succeed on a challenge of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his attorney's performance
was deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668,
705-06,940 P.2d 1239 (1997). Counsel's performance is deficient when it falls below an
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No. 32296-3-111
State v. Weigant
objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 705. Prejudice occurs when, but for the
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
differed. Id. at 706. We maintain a strong presumption that defense counsel's
performance was within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
Mr. Weigant contends that his attorney should have requested an instruction based
on 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 6.05 at 184
(3d ed. 2008), which provides as follows:
Testimony of an accomplice, given on behalf of the [State] [City]
[County], should be subjected to careful examination in the light of other
evidence in the case, and should be acted upon with great caution. You
should not find the defendant guilty upon such testimony alone unless, after
carefully considering the testimony, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt of its truth.
The committee's note following this instruction advises: "Use this instruction, if
requested by the defense, in every case in which the State relies upon the testimony of an
accomplice. Do not use this instruction ifan accomplice or codefendant testifies for the
defendant." WPIC 6.05 (Note on Use) (emphasis added). Defense counsel's failure to
request a cautionary accomplice instruction was sound trial strategy. As the State points
out, although Mr. Monk testified for the State, his testimony helped Mr. Weigant: Mr.
Monk took the blame for the burglary; denied that Mr. Weigant participated; and
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No. 32296-3-111
State v. Weigant
identified Ms. Watson, not Mr. Weigant, as his accomplice. In view of this testimony, it
was a legitimate tactical decision to forgo the instruction. Defense counsel would not
want to undennine Mr. Monk's testimony by adding a cautionary instruction regarding his
testimony. We reject Mr. Weigant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Weigant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to offer WPIC 6.05.
We affinn.
A majority of the panel has detennined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
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Siddoway, C.J.
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