Bncc, Inc. v. Access Electric Supply, Inc. ( 2013 )


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  • IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    ACCESS ELECTRIC SUPPLY, INC.,                   No. 68738-7-1
    a Washington corporation,
    Respondent/Third Party                    DIVISION ONE
    Defendant,
    c.
    BNCC, INC., a Washington corporation,
    and KELLY ELECTRIC, INC. a
    Washington corporation,
    -J   r= —"
    Appellant/Third-Party
    Plaintiff                                                            CO
    cn
    BNCC, INC., a Washington corporation,                                      CO
    Third-Party Plaintiff
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    SOUTH COUNTY BUILDERS, INC.,
    d/b/a KELLY ELECTRIC, a Washington
    corporation,
    Third Party-Defendant.
    FILED: June 17. 2013
    Spearman, A.C.J. — BNCC, Inc. appeals summary judgment orders
    denying its claim for attorney fees following its successful defense of the claims
    alleged by Access Electric Supply, Inc. Because the trial court properly
    determined that BNCC was not entitled to attorney fees as a matter of law, we
    affirm. We also deny BNCC's request for fees on appeal.
    No. 68738-7-1/2
    FACTS
    BNCC entered into a contract with the Issaquah School District to build a
    school. BNCC entered a subcontract with Kelly Electric, Inc., to perform
    electrical work at the school. The subcontract includes an addendum in which
    the subcontractor, Kelly, agrees to indemnify the contractor, BNCC, against all
    claims by third parties connected with work performed by sub-tier subcontractors
    and suppliers. [CP 40] The indemnification addendum indicates that the
    contractor may recover defense costs, including attorney fees, arising from such
    claims.
    Kelly ordered electrical equipment from Access Electric Supply, Inc., for
    the school project. Access delivered $49,866 of equipment but did not receive
    payment.
    Access filed a suit against BNCC and Kelly, alleging unjust enrichment of
    BNCC, and claiming entitlement to a constructive trust on the amounts paid to
    BNCC by the school district. Access also claimed it was entitled to enforce the
    subcontract between BNCC and Kelly as a third party beneficiary. Finally,
    Access claimed damages for Kelly's breach of contract.1
    BNCC filed an answer with affirmative defenses, cross claims, counter
    claims, and a third party complaint against Kelly. BNCC filed a motion for
    summary judgment dismissal of all Access's claims against BNCC, arguing that
    Access had no privity of contract with BNCC and failed to provide preclaim notice
    as required by RCW 39.08.065. At a hearing on BNCC's motion for summary
    judgment, Access argued that the preclaim notice provisions applied only to
    1Kelly is nota party to this appeal.
    No. 68738-7-1/3
    claims against a bond, not claims against the contractor. The trial court granted
    BNCC's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Access's claims as barred
    by RCW 39.08.065. [VRP 11/16/11 25]
    BNCC then filed a motion for summary judgment on its counter claim
    against Access for an award of attorney fees, costs, and interest under CR 11
    and RCW 4.84.185 and the indemnification addendum to its subcontract with
    Kelly. The trial court denied the motion. Access then filed a motion for summary
    judgment dismissal of BNCC's claims for fees. The trial court granted the motion
    and dismissed the case.
    BNCC appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    We review summary judgments de novo. Michael v. Mosquera-Lacv. 
    165 Wn.2d 595
    , 601, 
    200 P.3d 695
     (2009). '"Summary judgment is appropriate when
    'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is
    entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" 
    Id.
     (quoting Locke v. City of Seattle.
    
    162 Wn.2d 474
    , 483, 
    172 P.3d 705
     (2007))and CR 56(c).
    Under CR 11, the trial court may impose sanctions, including attorney fees,
    if an attorney, without reasonable inquiry, brings a claim that is not "well
    grounded in fact and ... warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
    the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of
    new law, . .." Under RCW 4.84.185, the trial court may award attorney fees to
    the prevailing party "upon written findings by the judge that the action... was
    frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause." Appellate courts review a
    No. 68738-7-1/4
    trial court's denial of fees under RCW 4.84.185 and sanctions under CR 11 for an
    abuse of discretion. Fluke Capital & Mat. Serv. Co. v. Richmond. 
    106 Wn.2d 614
    ,
    625, 
    724 P.2d 356
     (1986); Biggs v. Vail. 
    119 Wn.2d 129
    , 137, 
    830 P.2d 350
    (1992); Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp.. 
    122 Wn.2d 299
    , 338, 
    858 P.2d 1054
     (1993).
    Despite acknowledging the discretion generally exercised by the trial court
    in determining the basis for fees under RCW 4.84.185 and sanctions under CR
    11, BNCC contends that it was entitled to summary judgment on its claim for fees
    and sanctions here as a matter of law. In the alternative, BNCC claims that the
    trial court failed to appropriately analyze the legal basis for an award of fees and
    sanctions.
    The trial court did not enter written findings that Access's claims against
    BNCC were frivolous or not well grounded in fact, not warranted by law, and filed
    without reasonable inquiry. In the absence of such findings, BNCC was not
    entitled to an award of fees as a matter of law and the trial court properly denied
    BNCC's motion for summary judgment. And the trial court is "not required to
    enter negative findings or findings that a certain fact has not been established."
    Gen. Indus., Inc.. v. Eriksson. 
    2 Wn. App. 228
    , 229, 
    467 P.2d 321
     (1970)
    (quoting Miller v. Geranios. 
    54 Wn.2d 917
    , 
    338 P.2d 763
     (1959)). In opposing
    Access's motion for summary judgment on BNCC's claims for fees and sanctions,
    BNCC agreed that the parties did not dispute the facts and argued only that it
    was entitled to fees as a matter of law. Given the lack of a written finding that
    Access's suit was frivolous and the lack of findings as to a violation of CR 11, the
    No. 68738-7-1/5
    trial court properly granted Access's motion for summary judgment dismissal of
    BNCC's claims for fees under RCW 4.84.185 and sanctions under CR 11.
    BNCC also contends that the trial court erred by denying an award of fees
    based on the indemnification agreement in BNCC's subcontract with Kelly and
    RCW 4.84.330. Relying on Herzog Aluminum. Inc. v. General American Window
    Corp.. 
    39 Wn. App. 188
    , 
    692 P.2d 867
     (1984) (purchase order with unilateral
    attorney fee provision) and Deep Water Brewing. LLC v. Fairway Resources Ltd..
    
    152 Wn. App. 229
    , 
    215 P.3d 990
     (2009) (easement and right-of-way agreements
    with expansive attorney fee and costs provisions), BNCC argues that Access
    would have been entitled to contractual attorney fees as a third party beneficiary
    to the subcontract had it prevailed against BNCC and RCW 4.84.330 requires
    reciprocal application of such a fee award. Neither of the cases BNCC cites
    involved an indemnification agreement and BNCC provides no relevant authority
    or cogent argument to support such a result.
    The indemnification addendum is limited on its face to Kelly's agreement
    to pay BNCC's fees and costs spent defending against third party claims, such
    as Access's lawsuit. The addendum does not provide terms granting BNCC a
    right to fees for enforcing its right to indemnification. In the absence of express
    terms providing for such fees, "an indemnitee may not recover legal fees incurred
    in establishing his right to indemnification." Jones v. Strom Constr. Co.. 
    84 Wn.2d 518
    , 523, 
    527 P.2d 1115
     (1974).
    RCW 4.84.330 applies where a contract specifically provides that one of
    the parties shall be awarded attorney fees that "are incurred to enforce the
    No. 68738-7-1/6
    provisions of such contract    " RCW 4.84.330. In such cases, the statute
    imposes reciprocal treatment ifthe other party prevails. Because the addendum
    does not provide for an award of fees for enforcing its provisions, RCW 4.84.330
    does not apply. The trial court properly dismissed BNCC's claim for attorney
    fees on the basis of the indemnification addendum.
    BNCC requests attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.1 and the
    indemnification addendum. Because the addendum does not provide for such an
    award, BNCC is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
    Affirmed.
    >«ft~.   . /a,
    WE CONCUR:
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