State Of Washington, Resp. v. Daniel R. Bartels, App. ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                    20I^S£P29 AHIhOb
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                  No. 70303-0-1
    Respondent,                      DIVISION ONE
    v.
    DANIEL ROSS BARTELS,                                  UNPUBLISHED
    Appellant.                       FILED: September 29. 2014
    Cox, J. - Daniel Bartels appeals his conviction for first degree robbery,
    arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the jury's request
    to rehear a stipulation between the parties. The court's decision was within "the
    range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard."1
    And Bartels's claims asserted in his statement of additional grounds do not
    warrant relief. We affirm.
    Bartels arranged to buy one pound of marijuana from Keith Blaisdell. He
    told his codefendants about the deal and kept them informed about when
    Blaisdell would arrive.
    Blaisdell testified that while he was negotiating the deal with Bartels, one
    of Bartels's codefendants approached and pointed a gun at him. He also
    testified that Bartels and the codefendant then took items from his pocket and
    1 State v. Dye. 
    178 Wash. 2d 541
    , 548, 
    309 P.3d 1192
    (2013) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    No. 70303-0-1/2
    marijuana from his car. Bartels's codefendant then shot Blaisdell, before running
    away with Bartels and a third codefendant.
    The State charged Bartels and two codefendants with first degree robbery.
    Bartels's codefendants pleaded guilty.
    At trial, Bartels argued his codefendants acted alone. As part of this
    argument, Bartels wanted the jury to know that both of Bartels's codefendants
    had pleaded guilty. The parties stipulated to this fact. Bartels asked the court to
    read the stipulation before the jury listened to opening statements. The State
    agreed, and the court informed the jury that Bartels's codefendants "were
    previously adjudicated guilty."
    Neither party either marked the stipulation as an exhibit or introduced it as
    evidence during the trial.
    During deliberations, the jury asked to hear the stipulation again. The
    court declined this request. The jury found Bartels guilty.
    Bartels appeals.
    DECLINING TO REPEAT STIPULATED EVIDENCE
    Bartels argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the
    jury's request to hear the stipulation again. We disagree.
    Trial courts have discretion in determining whether to grant a jury's
    request to hear evidence again.2 Under CrR 6.15(f)(1), when a deliberating jury
    asks to rehear evidence "the court may grant a jury's request to rehear or replay
    CrR 6.15(f)(1).
    No. 70303-0-1/3
    evidence."3 If the court grants the request, it must avoid placing undue weight on
    the evidence.4
    This court reviews a decision on a jury's request to rehear evidence for
    abuse of discretion.5 A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is
    manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.6 A decision
    is manifestly unreasonable when it "falls outside the range of acceptable choices,
    given the facts and the applicable legal standard."7 A decision is based on
    untenable grounds when the record does not support the court's factual findings.8
    A decision is based on untenable reasons when it is based on an incorrect legal
    standard, or a misapplication of a correct standard.9
    Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to reread the
    stipulation to the jury. The trial court declined to reread the evidence for two
    reasons.
    First, the court determined that the jury did not need the stipulation to
    decide the case. It stated "[the court] is not convinced that it's imperative, and I
    3 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    4JU
    5 State v. Morqensen, 
    148 Wash. App. 81
    , 86, 
    197 P.3d 715
    (2008).
    6 Dye, 178Wn.2dat548.
    7 ]d_. (internal quotation marks omitted).
    *\±
    9 
    Id. No. 70303-0-1/4
    don't see that it's the crux of the case or that it really aids the jury in maintaining
    its direction in addressing the matter before it concerning Mr. Bartels."
    Second, the court believed it was procedurally improper to reread the
    stipulation. The court noted that while the parties had filed the stipulation, neither
    party either marked it as an exhibit or moved to admit it.
    The trial court properly exercised its discretion for the first reason.
    Bartels was charged with robbery. He argued that his codefendants acted
    alone, while the State argued that he was an accomplice in the robbery.
    Whether Bartels's codefendants had pleaded guilty had little relevance to the
    question the jury needed to answer—whether Bartels had acted as their
    accomplice.
    When a court decides whether to grant the jury's request to rehear a piece
    of evidence, it must avoid unduly emphasizing that evidence.10 When a jury
    hears evidence for a second time late in a trial, it may place undue emphasis on
    that evidence.11
    Ifthe trial court had allowed the jury to hear the stipulation again, it could
    have risked allowing the jury to place undue emphasis on the stipulation. Given
    that the stipulation was not directly relevant to the issues before the jury, it was
    proper for the trial court to decline reading the stipulation again. Rereading the
    stipulation may have unintentionally signaled to the jury that the stipulation was
    an important piece of evidence for them to consider.
    10 CrR 6.15(f)(1).
    11 
    Morqensen, 148 Wash. App. at 87
    .
    No. 70303-0-1/5
    The court's decision was within "the range of acceptable choices, given
    the facts and the applicable legal standard."12 Thus, the trial court did not abuse
    its discretion.
    Because the court's first reason for exercising its discretion supports its
    decision, we need not address the second.
    Bartels argues that the trial court "deprived the jury of the opportunity to
    decide the case based on all the evidence" by failing to reread the stipulation.
    This argument fails for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the stipulation
    had little, if any, relevance to the question before the jury.
    Second, the court did not refuse to read the stipulation, it merely refused
    to read the stipulation again. Bartels does not cite any authority for the
    proposition that failing to reread evidence to the jury prevents the jury from
    deciding the case based on all of the evidence. Thus, Bartels's argument is
    unpersuasive.
    STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS
    In his Statement of Additional Grounds, Bartels alleges two errors.
    Neither requires reversal.
    First, Bartels argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a
    firearm enhancement to his sentence.
    Evidence is sufficient when any rational trier of fact could find the essential
    elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.13 An appellate court
    12 Dye, 178Wn.2dat548.
    13 State v. Green, 
    94 Wash. 2d 216
    , 221, 
    616 P.2d 628
    (1980).
    No. 70303-0-1/6
    considering a sufficiency challenge must defer to the jury's determination as to
    the weight and credibility of the evidence.14
    In order to support a firearm enhancement, the jury must find that "the
    offender or an accomplice was armed with a firearm."15
    At trial, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that
    either Bartels or his accomplice used a firearm. Specifically, the victim testified
    that Bartels's accomplice pointed a gun at him during the robbery and then shot
    him. Additionally, the emergency room doctor who treated the victim testified
    that the victim had a wound consistent with a gun shot. This evidence was
    sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accomplice was
    armed with a firearm, supporting imposition of the firearm enhancement by the
    court.
    Second, Bartels argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
    when his attorney agreed to stipulate that Bartels's alleged accomplices had
    pleaded guilty.
    To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
    must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced his trial.16 The
    reasonableness inquiry presumes effective representation and requires the
    14 State v. Thomas, 
    150 Wash. 2d 821
    , 874-75, 
    83 P.3d 970
    (2004).
    15 RCW 9.94A.533(3).
    16 Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d
    674 (1984); State v. McFarland. 
    127 Wash. 2d 322
    , 334-35, 
    899 P.2d 1251
    (1995).
    6
    No. 70303-0-1/7
    defendant to show the absence of legitimate strategic or tactical reasons for the
    challenged conduct.17 If one of the two prongs of the test is absent, we need not
    inquire further.18
    Here, Bartels's attorney had a strategic reason for stipulating that Bartels's
    alleged accomplices had pleaded guilty. As explained previously in this opinion,
    the defense theory of the case was that Bartels's alleged accomplices acted
    alone. Bartels's attorney believed that the stipulation would help the jury
    understand his theory of the case. Informing the jury that Bartels's codefendants
    pleaded guilty was a legitimate strategic decision.
    Accordingly, because Bartels's counsel did not perform deficiently, we
    need not address prejudice.
    We affirm the judgment and sentence.
    ^TX.sJ.
    CyJX
    WE CONCUR:
    17 
    McFarland. 127 Wash. 2d at 336
    .
    18 
    Strickland. 466 U.S. at 697
    ; State v. Foster, 
    140 Wash. App. 266
    , 273, 
    166 P.3d 726
    (2007).
    7