Tracy Helm v. Dept. Of Transportation ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
TRACY HELM and CHRISTOPHER
HELM, husband and wife, MICHAEL No. 71664-6-1
BRADY HELM, a minor, and HAILEY
NICOLE HELM, a minor, DIVISION ONE
Appellants, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CO £
v.
CO
STATE OF WASHINGTON, CD
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
(WSDOT), a division of Washington State
government, and PAULA J. HAMMOND,
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, O O —
Respondents. FILED: October 20, 2014
Appelwick, J. — The jury found the State of Washington not liable for damages
Helm suffered after she collided with a fallen rock on I-90. Helm appeals, arguing that
the trial court erred in allowing the State to present its discretionary immunity defense.
She asserts that the trial court improperly limited her expert testimony. She contends that
the trial court erred in excluding multiple pieces of evidence as unduly prejudicial. We
affirm.
FACTS
On the morning of November 6, 2006, Tracy Helm drove her motorhome
westbound on Interstate 90 (I-90) towards Snoqualmie Pass. She and her children were
returning home to Olympia from a trip to Spokane. As Helm drove along Lake Kecheelus,
she came around a blind corner. Up ahead was a snowshed above the highway. Helm
saw something moving in the road ahead. There was a car in the lane to her left and a
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rock wall to her right. Unable to swerve, Helm laid on her brakes. She could not avoid
the object in the road. She later discovered it was a large fallen rock.
Thomas Norris, a Department of Transportation (Department) worker, was
patrolling the highway in his snow plow that morning. He responded to Helm's accident
at westbound milepost 58.2, just east of the snowshed. Helm told Norris that she hit a
rock. Norris saw several "football- to basketball-size" rocks on the shoulder, which he
threw over the concrete barrier to the right. He then drove Helm and her children to
Snoqualmie Summit to wait for a tow truck and transport home.
Helm sued the Department. On December 17, 2009, she filed an amended
complaint alleging negligence.1 She asserted that the Department failed to properly
maintain I-90 near milepost 58 and failed to warn motorists about rockfall. She alleged
that "[pjroblems and safety concerns regarding this short stretch of I-90 had been
exhaustively identified over 10 years earlier and yet, the necessary upgrades and repairs
had not been made." The Department denied that it was negligent. It asserted
discretionary immunity based on its decision to defer remediation of the slope where
Helm's accident occurred.
The Department uses an unstable slope management system (USMS) to assess,
prioritize, and repair slopes along state highways. Under the USMS, the Department
considers eleven criteria and assigns each criterion a point value ranging from 3 to 81. If
a slope rates 350 points or higher, the Department considers it for repair. In determining
when and whether to repair a slope, the Department considers several factors, such as
funding, environmental issues, and contracting.
The record on appeal does not contain Helm's original complaint.
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The slope along the stretch of 1-90 where Helm's accident occurred is known as
"Slope 1867." Slope 1867 spans from miles 58.38 to 58.15 on the westbound side of I-
90. In 2005, the Department evaluated Slope 1867 as part of the USMS and rated the
slope at 351 points. The Department deferred remediation of Slope 1867 to address
higher priority slopes. It assigned Slope 1867 to an upcoming construction project that
would widen and reroute the highway from mileposts 55 to 61 and blast away the rock
wall in many places.
Based on its decision to defer slope remediation, the Department moved for
summary judgment to dismiss Helm's negligence claims. The trial court found that the
USMS as a system qualified for discretionary immunity. However, it also found that
application of the USMS to defer remediation of this particular slope was fact-dependent.
The court could not determine whether a cost-benefit analysis supported the
Department's decision to defer remediation of Slope 1867. It therefore denied summary
judgment, leaving that question for the jury.
At trial, Helm argued that the Department was negligent based on four different
grounds: it failed to maintain the ditch adjacent to Slope 1867 in a reasonably safe
manner; it had notice of and a reasonable opportunity to remove the fallen rock; it failed
to warn Helm that a rock could be present in the roadway adjacent to Slope 1867; and it
failed to maintain Slope 1867 in a reasonably safe manner.
Helm called Tom Badger, the Department's chief engineering geologist, to testify.
He described the USMS and how the Department determines the method and order of
slope repair. He explained that the Department might fully mitigate a slope or might
implement protective measures that help prevent rocks from reaching the road. These
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protective measures include rockfall fences, rockfall ditches, concrete barriers, cable
nets, and wire mesh draped over the slope.
Helm also sought to call Henry Borden, a civil engineer who previously worked for
the Department, to testify on the adequacy of the Department's protective measures. The
Department moved to limit Borden's testimony, arguing that Borden was not qualified to
opine on matters involving geology. The court ruled that Borden could testify on issues
that pertained to the highway and did not require analysis of the slope. Borden testified
that he believed the Department did not provide an adequate barrier between the slope
and the highway.
The jury found that the Department balanced the risks and advantages of delaying
remediation of Slope 1867 and was not otherwise negligent. Accordingly, the jury decided
that the Department had no liability for Helm's injury and damages. Helm appeals.
DISCUSSION
Helm argues that the trial court erred in presenting the Department's discretionary
immunity defense to the jury, because the defense was inapplicable and misled the jurors.
She also alleges that the court improperly prevented her expert witness from testifying
about the effectiveness of the Department's protective measures at Slope 1867. She
further contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence involving the Department's
slope maintenance as unduly prejudicial. Finally, she asserts that several additional
errors amounted to cumulative error requiring reversal.
I. Discretionary Immunity Defense
Helm argues that the trial court erred in allowing the Department to present its
discretionary immunity defense to the jury. First, she asserts that she did not challenge
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the Department's decision to defer slope remediation and therefore the Department was
not entitled to an instruction on the defense. Second, she argues that the instructions
given were misleading.
A. Discretionary Immunity Defense Was at Issue
Generally, we review the trial court's choice of jury instructions for abuse of
discretion. State v. Douglas. 128 Wn. Add. 555. 561. 116 P.3d 1012 (2005V "Each party
is entitled, when the evidence warrants it, to have his theory of the case submitted to the
jury under appropriate and properly requested instructions." Logue v. Swanson's Food,
Inc., 8 Wn. App. 460, 463, 507 P.2d 1204 (1973).
In her amended complaint, Helm alleged that the Department failed to make the
necessary upgrades and repairs to keep the highway safe at Slope 1867. At no time did
she further amend her complaint to retract this assertion. When the Department moved
for summary judgment based on its discretionary immunity defense, Helm opposed the
motion as to all of her claims. The trial court denied the Department's motion.
Accordingly, her theory that the Department negligently failed to remediate the slope was
still alive at the time of trial.
Helm's arguments at trial were also broad enough to fairly trigger the discretionary
immunity defense. In opening statements, Helm's attorney told the jury that the "ultimate
issue in this case" is whether the Department is "accountable for the accident and ... for
the harm that that crash caused [Helm]." Counsel referred to Slope 1867 as "high-risk"
and discussed interim measures that protect against rockfall in high risk slope areas. He
concluded by saying that the Department "didn't meet the appropriate standard of care in
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putting up at least a temporary fix until they could get around to doing a slope
remediation." (Emphasis added.)
Helm also presented evidence of the Department's alleged negligence, as to both
slope remediation and off-slope measures. For example, Helm testified that there were
no protective measures on the slope where her accident occurred and that she observed
no warning signs about rocks. She also elicited testimony from Badger that Slope 1867
did not meet current design standards. And, she introduced an e-mail Badger wrote prior
to the accident, which recommended that the rockfall ditch below the slope be cleared
out. Helm's expert witness also opined that the Department's protective measures at
Slope 1867 were insufficient.
The Department offered evidence to suggest that it was not negligent in
maintaining the slope. Its employee, Norris, testified that a concrete barrier ran along a
portion of Slope 1867 and explained the process by which the Department keeps rockfall
ditches clean. Badger spoke about protective measures taken by the Department.
Another Department employee testified that the Department uses highway advisory radio
warnings and variable signs along the road to caution drivers about hazards.
The parties also elicited testimony relevant to the Department's discretionary
immunity. Badger explained the USMS and how the Department prioritizes hazards. He
spoke about the Department's budgetary restraints. And, he testified that the Department
prioritized higher-risk slopes and assigned Slope 1867 to the upcoming I-90 construction
project.
In closing, Helm's counsel reiterated that the Department should have "taken
corrective actions to prevent rocks -- that rock in that particular day, but any rocks from
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reaching the roadway to make [Slope 1867] and the highway below it, which is where
we're concerned, safe for motorists to use at that time." He did not specify that Helm's
allegations of negligence pertained only to the Department's failure to take adequate
protective measures. Nor did he concede to the jury that discretionary immunity applied
to the Department's decision about slope remediation.
The Department did not assert that it was entitled to immunity for all activities
involving slopes. It did not raise discretionary immunity in its opening. Instead, it asked
the jury to find that it had insufficient notice of the rockfall, adequately maintained the
slope, and was not negligent. Similarly, in closing, the Department asked the jury to find
two things:
First, the [Department] balanced the risks and advantages of delaying
remediation of the slope, and secondly, the [Department] is not negligent
because we had mere minutes of notice before the rock being present in
the roadway and Mrs. Helm colliding with it, because the ditch was
maintained properly, and lastly because the [Department] managed the
hillside.
Despite the evidence and arguments presented, Helm argues that the
Department's discretionary immunity defense is inapplicable in this case. But, Helm
made several broad allegations that the Department negligently failed to prevent her
accident and keep the roadway safe. She did not differentiate between the Department's
use of interim protective measures and its decision to defer slope remediation. Nor did
she provide or point to guidelines distinguishing between interim and permanent
measures.2 The Department responded to Helm's broad brush approach by disputing
2 Moreover, it is unclear whether the Department would in fact be liable for
decisions it made regarding protective measures at Slope 1867. However, because the
parties do not address the extent of the Department's immunity, we do not consider this
question further.
No. 71664-6-1/8
her allegations of negligence and asserting discretionary immunity with respect to its
decision to defer slope remediation.
The parties' theories of the case necessitated the Department's defense. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the issue of discretionary immunity to the
jury.
B. Jury Instructions Were Not Misleading
We review the adequacy of jury instructions de novo. State v. Brown, 159 Wn.
App. 1, 14, 248 P.3d 518 (2010). Jury instructions are sufficient if they (1) allow both
parties to argue their theory of the case; (2) are not misleading; and (3) when read as a
whole, properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law. Anfinson v. FedEx Ground
Package Svs., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 851, 860, 281 P.3d 289 (2012). An erroneous instruction
is grounds for reversal only if it prejudices a party, jd. If the instruction contains a
misstatement of law, prejudice is presumed. |d_. If the instruction is merely misleading,
prejudice must be demonstrated, jd.
Helm does not allege that the instructions misstated the law. She asserts that the
instructions misled the jury to believe the Department was immune from liability for all
activities involving slopes. In particular, Helm challenges instructions 13 and 27 and the
jury verdict form.
Instruction 13 stated that "the [Department] claims and [Helm] denies the following
affirmative defense: . . . The Department of Transportation exercised policy level
judgment in managing the slopes which included slope 1867." This instruction did not
specify which of the Department's slope management decisions fell within discretionary
immunity.
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No. 71664-6-1/9
However, Instruction 27 explained the defense in more detail and indicated that
discretionary immunity applied to the Department's decision to defer remediation of Slope
1867:
The system for managing slopes along roadways involves a basic
governmental policy of the [Department].
The prioritization was essential to determining how to mitigate
dangers with limited resources.
The prioritization involved the exercise of policy-level judgment.
The [Department] has the authority to make this type of decision.
The [Department] is immune from liability for decisions in which it is
determining basic governmental policy.
(Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the verdict form supplemented the instructions with a step-by-step
process by which the jury would arrive at its verdict. The form asked, "Does the evidence
establish that the [Department] balanced the risks and advantages of delaying
remediation of slope 1867?" If the jury answered "yes," the form asked, "Apart from its
decisions regarding slope remediation, was the [Department] negligent in this case?" If
the answer was again "yes," the verdict form directed the jury to determine the amount of
damages awardable to Helm. This clarified that the Department may be immune with
respect to its decision about deferring slope remediation but may still be liable for
damages if it was otherwise negligent. The jury instructions were not misleading.
Furthermore, the instructions allowed Helm to present her theory of the case.
Instruction 13 enumerated the four grounds upon which Helm alleged negligence.
Instruction 24 said, "The [Department] has a duty to exercise ordinary care in the
maintenance of its public highways to keep them in a reasonably safe condition for
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No. 71664-6-1/10
ordinary travel." Instruction 25 stated, "In order to find the [Department] liable for an
unsafe condition of a road that was not created by its employees, you must find that the
[Department] had notice of the condition and that it had a reasonable opportunity to
correct the condition." In closing, Helm's attorney pointed the jury to instruction 25, which
he said was "the rule in this case." The jury instructions allowed Helm to argue that the
Department negligently failed to keep the highway safe.
The trial court properly presented the issue of discretionary immunity to the jury.
II. Expert Testimony
Helm asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that her expert, Borden, was not
qualified to testify about interim solutions pending the slope's remediation. She argues
that Borden, a highway engineer, was "qualified based upon his knowledge, expertise,
experience, and training to testify about interim safety devices to prevent rockfall from
reaching I-90."
Expert testimony is admissible when (1) the witness qualifies as an expert, (2) the
opinion is based upon an explanatory theory generally recognized in the scientific
community, and (3) if it will be helpful to the trier of fact. ER 702; In re Pers. Restraint of
Morris. 176 Wn.2d 157, 168-69, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012). Practical experience in a given
area can qualify a witness as an expert. See State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584,
597, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973). However, an otherwise qualified witness may not testify to
an issue outside the witness's area of expertise. Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat-
Ins. Co. of Omaha. 126 Wn.2d 50, 103-04, 882 P.2d 703, 891 P.2d 718 (1994). Whether
a person is qualified to express an expert opinion is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. J-R Distribs.. 82 Wn.2d at 597.
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No. 71664-6-1/11
Contrary to Helm's assertion, the trial court did not prevent Borden from testifying
about all interim measures. Instead, it limited Borden's testimony to areas in which he
had expertise. Borden is a civil engineer. His duties include traffic impact studies,
topographic surveying of streets and highways, and roadway safety analysis. He
previously worked for the Department for 25 years. During that time, Borden's primary
focus was highway engineering and monitoring. He has frequently worked with protective
devices along the shoulder of the road, including concrete barriers and catchment ditches.
However, he is not a geologist and possesses no degree in geology.
The court ruled that slope remediation was outside the scope of Borden's
expertise. It defined slope remediation as "work that relates to the slope," including
protective devices such as rock screens and cable netting. Accordingly, it limited his
testimony to issues involving the highway that did not require analysis of the slope. This
was not an abuse of discretion.
During Borden's testimony, the court sustained five objections by the Department
that Borden's answer would go beyond the scope of his expertise. The excluded evidence
pertained to slope maintenance and slope-associated risks—issues the court ruled were
outside the scope of Borden's expertise. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding evidence that fell within the purview of its earlier ruling limiting the testimony.
III. Exclusion of Highway Activity Log
Helm asserts that the trial court improperly excluded a highway activity log that
showed a rockslide occurred at milepost 58 fifteen hours before her accident. She argues
that the court erred in finding that the log was unduly prejudicial.
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No. 71664-6-1/12
Under ER 403, evidence may be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value. The trial court has wide discretion in
balancing the probative value of evidence against its potential prejudicial impact. State
v. Coe. 101 Wn.2d 772, 782, 684 P.2d 668 (1984). A trial court abuses its discretion only
if its decision was manifestly unreasonable, exercised on untenable grounds, or based
on untenable reasons. Gorman v. Pierce County, 176 Wn. App. 63, 84, 307 P.3d 795(2013), review denied, 179Wn.2d 1010, 316 P.3d 495 (2014). An erroneous evidentiary
ruling is grounds for reversal only if it was prejudicial. Brown v. Spokane County Fire
Prot. Dist.No. 1, 100 Wn.2d 188, 196, 668 P.2d 571 (1983).
In pretrial motions in limine, Helm sought to admit the log to show that the
Department had notice of rockfall the night before her accident. The Department
objected, arguing that there was no competent witness to lay foundation for the log and
that the log established only that the rockfall occurred at milepost 58, not specifically at
Slope 1867. The court stated that "without a witness who can clearly place these prior
incidents, it seems to me that the [Department] is then faced with the kind of substantial
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading of the jury that is spelled
out in ER 403." The court excluded the log.
Helm maintains that the log should have been admitted, because prior rockfall so
close in time is probative of notice and a duty to protect and warn motorists. But, as the
court noted, Helm did not demonstrate that the earlier rockfall came from Slope 1867.
The log placed the rockfall at milepost 58. Slope 1867 stretches from only would-be
mileposts 58.15 to 58.38. Three other slopes sit between mileposts 58.00 and 59.00.
Helm offered no other evidence to show that Slope 1867 was the source of the rock she
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No. 71664-6-1/13
hit.3 As a result, the court recognized the "great prejudice to the [Department] in having
the jury consider a rockfall that came from a different slope."
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the highway activity log.
IV. Exclusion of Slope Report
Helm asserts that the trial court erred in excluding a 2005 Department report
assessing slopes along I-90 in Snoqualmie Pass. She argues that the slope report was
relevant to show what protective measures the Department used on other similar slopes
and whether those measures were effective.
We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Cox v.
Spangler. 141 Wn.2d 431, 439, 5 P.3d 1265, 22 P.3d 791 (2000). Atrial court has "broad
discretion in ruling on evidentiary matters and will not be overturned absent manifest
abuse of discretion." Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 131 Wn.2d 640, 662-63, 935 P.2d 555(1997). Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to prove or disprove a fact
that is material to the determination of the action. ER 401. "Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." ER 403.
When Helm moved to admit the slope report, the trial court expressed concern that
it would invite the jury to consider the risk of rockfall across all of Snoqualmie Pass. It
stated that "the issue in question is a particular slope and the risk presented by that
particular slope and the notice to the Department of the risk presented by that particular
3At oral argument, Helm asserted that the rock must have come from Slope 1867,
because the slope to the east was remediated and to the west lay the snowshed and a
concrete barrier. She did not make this offer of proof at the trial level.
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No. 71664-6-1/14
slope, and I don't see information on other parts of the pass as being helpful to the jury in
answering that question." It excluded the report under ER 403, finding that the report's
relevance was "greatly outweighed by the prejudice of confusing the jury, wasting time,
and raising collateral issues."
Helm contests this finding, arguing that the report was useful precisely because it
covered other areas along I-90. But, Helm's desired use of the report is the source of the
court's concern: by comparing protective measures used on other slopes, the jury could
have been confused about whether those measures were necessary or effective at Slope
1867.
The court's concern is well-taken. The report is a 57 page document that evaluates
slopes spanning 32 miles along the I-90 corridor in Snoqualmie Pass. The report makes
several recommendations about approaches to identified hazards. Some of the
recommendations apply to the I-90 corridor generally, and others address specific high-
risk areas. Based on Slope 1867's USMS rating, the report includes the slope in one of
several high-risk areas. The report individually assesses Slope 1867, along with dozens
of other slopes. Thus, the report contains relevant information but also covers a range of
other slopes along a long, mountainous stretch of highway.
Whether a piece of evidence's potential for prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value is within the trial court's discretion. Coe, 101 Wn.2d at 782. The court's
decision here was not untenable. Moreover, Helm was not deprived of the information
relevant to Slope 1867. The court ruled that Badger, who coauthored the report, could
testify about Slope 1867 and explain why certain measures were or were not
implemented. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the slope report.
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No. 71664-6-1/15
Helm further contends that the trial court improperly prevented her from using the
report to refresh Badger's memory. A witness may use a writing to refresh his or her
memory for the purpose of testifying if the opposing party has an opportunity to review
the writing. ER 612; State v. Williams. 137 Wn. App. 736, 750, 154 P.3d 322 (2007).
Whether to allow the use of notes to refresh a witness's memory lies within the trial court's
discretion. State v. Huelett, 92 Wn.2d 967, 969, 603 P.2d 1258 (1979).
The court previously exercised its discretion to exclude the report as unduly
prejudicial. The Department then objected to Helm's use of the report to refresh Badger's
memory on relevance grounds. The court sustained the objection to prevent Helm from
using the report on an irrelevant line of questioning. Specifically, the court sustained
objections to Helm's questions about Badger's grouping of slopes into three geographic
clusters. These questions were not immediately germane to the central issue in this case,
which was whether the Department was negligent in maintaining Slope 1867. Helm
argues without citation that "relevance only applies to the admissibility of a piece of
evidence." But, the trial court has wide discretion over the mode of witness interrogation
and the presentation of evidence. ER 611 (a); see Sanders v. State, 169 Wn.2d 827, 851,
240 P.3d 120 (2010). The court did not bar Helm from further using the report to refresh
Badger's memory on relevant questions. It properly exercised its discretion in limiting her
use of the report.
V. Cumulative Error
Helm argues that the exclusion of the slope report combined with four additional
rulings amounts to cumulative error warranting reversal. She cites no authority for
applying the cumulative error doctrine in a civil case. We find no error in the exclusion of
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No. 71664-6-1/16
the slope report. Helm's additional challenges pertain to proximate cause and damage—
issues that the jury did not reach, because it found no negligence on behalf of the
Department. We find no cumulative error.
The trial court properly presented the issue of discretionary immunity to the jury.
The court did not err in limiting Helm's expert testimony or in excluding unduly prejudicial
evidence. We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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