Esse M. Wolf, App. v. David L. Wolf, Res. ( 2013 )

:OURT Or APPilALS DiV
STATE OF V/ASHiNGTOr
2013 APR 22 AH 8:5b
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In re the Marriage of: No. 66478-6-1
ESSE M. WOLF, DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
and
DAVID L. WOLF, UNPUBLISHED
Respondent. FILED: April 22. 2013
Cox, J.— Esse Wolf appeals the trial court orders dissolving her marriage
to David Wolf and providing for the care and support of their child. Because her
briefs and the incomplete record on appeal are substantial obstacles to our
review of her appeal, and for the additional reasons set forth below, we affirm.
The parties signed a written prenuptial agreement1 in September 2005
and married in March 2006. They had one child in September 2008 and
separated in June 2009. The trial court entered various temporary orders,
including a restraining order based on Esse's allegations of domestic violence by
David.2 After a five-day trial in October and November 2010, the trial court made
a comprehensive oral ruling on November 3. On November 30, 2010, the trial
court entered final orders incorporating its oral ruling by reference and attaching
1The prenuptial agreement does not appear in the record on appeal.
2These orders do not appear in the record on appeal.
No. 66478-6-1/2
a transcript of that ruling as an exhibit to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
The trial court found David to be a credible witness but found Esse to be a
"persistent and calculated liar." The court also found that Esse's actions after the
parties' separation "prevented this Court from making proper disposition of the
community property." The trial court determined that Esse's share of the
community property would consist of the property she took or sold in violation of
the trial court's order entered at the parties' separation. The trial court
determined that the prenuptial agreement was enforceable, and awarded David
his separate property as well as a judgment against Esse for certain distributions
of David's separate property she received during the separation. Despite the
language in the prenuptial agreement precluding any award of maintenance, the
court ordered David to pay Esse undifferentiated family support for two years "in
light of the evidence regarding the Husband's resources and the Wife's lack of
income other than what she receives from the Husband."
The trial court also dissolved the protection order, finding Esse's testimony
regarding the underlying incident "ludicrous" and a "lie." The trial court ordered
the couple's child to reside a majority of the time with Esse, but allowed for time
with David Thursday through Monday every other week. The trial court did not
impose geographic restrictions despite the fact that Esse lives in Spokane
County and David lives near the Washington Coast.
Esse appeals.
No. 66478-6-1/3
The law does not distinguish between litigants who elect to proceed pro se
and those who seek assistance of counsel.3 Both must comply with applicable
procedural rules, and failure to do so may preclude review.4 This court generally
will not consider arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority,
references to the record, or meaningful analysis.5 It is also the appellant's
burden to provide a record sufficient to review the issues raised on appeal.6
With few exceptions, Esse has failed to comply with these requirements.
She has not provided any transcripts of the five-day trial and has designated no
trial exhibits for review. She lists 25 assignments of error, only 18 of which refer
to a particular paragraph or section of the orders in the record. But Esse has
attached to her briefing 34 "exhibits," the majority of which do not appear in the
clerk's papers, were not considered by the trial court, or involve matters occurring
after trial. Referring to these exhibits rather than the clerk's papers, Esse
devotes her entire "argument" in her opening brief to a discussion of David's
credibility. Esse's briefing contains no citation to authority, no discussion of the
applicable standard of review, and no meaningful legal analysis. In sum, these
deficiencies are substantial obstacles to our consideration of Esse's appeal.
Nevertheless, to the extent possible, we have addressed the essence of her
claims.
3 In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993).
4Id. at 626; State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 452, 969 P.2d 501 (1999).
5 Cowiche Canvon Conservancy v. Boslev. 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992)
(arguments not supported by authority); State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990)
(insufficient argument); Saunders v. Lloyd's ofLondon. 113 Wn.2d 330, 345, 779 P.2d 249 (1989)
(issues unsupported by adequate argument and authority); State v. Camarillo, 54Wn. App. 821,
829, 776 P.2d 176(1989) (no references to the record), affd, 115Wn.2d60, 794 P.2d 850(1990); RAP 10.3(a).
6 Story v. Shelter Bay Co.. 52 Wn. App. 334, 345, 760 P.2d 368 (1988).
No. 66478-6-1/4
Esse first complains about matters occurring at trial that we cannot review
without a proper and complete record of the trial proceedings. Esse also claims
that David's attorney included incorrect and unnecessary provisions when
drafting the final orders, but she does not identify or establish any particular error.
Esse next challenges the trial court's decision to dissolve the protection
order restraining David from contacting her and placing restrictions on his time
with their daughter. Whether to grant, modify, renew, or terminate a protection
order is a matter ofjudicial discretion.7 Thus, the trial court's decision "will not be
disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is,
discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for
untenable reasons."8
Esse assigns error to the following finding in the trial court's oral ruling:
On thorough review, Esse's testimony on the fruit stand
incident is ludicrous. David never threw the fruit stand at her
and it never came anywhere near [their child], but Esse took this
lie, magnified it, and it became the foundation upon which the
extreme restrictions on visitation by David with [their child] were
imposed.[9]
To demonstrate the claimed error, Esse refers to her own transcription of certain
voicemail messages from David around the time ofthe incident. However, Esse
does not claim or establish that the voicemail recordings or her transcript were
admitted at trial or considered by the trial court. In order to properly challenge
findings of fact on appeal, Esse must demonstrate "why specific findings of the
trial court are not supported by the evidence and [must] cite to the record to
7 In re Marriage of Freeman, 169 Wn.2d 664, 671, 239 P.3d 557 (2010); RCW
26.50.060(1), (2), (3); RCW 26.50.130(1).
8 State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
9 Clerk's Papers at 39.
No. 66478-6-1/5
support that argument."10 Because Esse has failed to properly support her claim
of error with argument based on evidence in the trial record, the challenged
finding must be treated as a verity. Considering the fact that the trial court did
not believe Esse's version of events leading to the original issuance of the
protection order, we conclude that the court's decision to dissolve the protection
order was not an abuse of discretion.
Esse next claims that the trial court failed to properly divide all the parties'
property and debt. RCW 26.09.080 authorizes trial courts to dispose of marital
property in whatever manner "shall appear just and equitable after considering all
relevant factors . . . ." Relevant factors include the duration of the marriage, the
economic circumstances of the parties, the need for maintenance, and the
dissipation or wasting of marital assets.11 The trial court is in the best position to
determine what is fair and equitable and has broad discretion in distributing the
property and liabilities in dissolution proceedings.12 We will not reverse a trial
court's property distribution on appeal absent a showing of manifest abuse of
discretion.13
Again, Esse's failure to provide the complete record or properly support
her factual challenges substantially prevent our review of her claims. The trial
10 In re Estate of Lint. i^Wn?HRifl 53? QS7 P ?d 755 M998V In re Estate of Palmer.
145 Wn. App. 249, 264-65, 187 P.3d 758 (2008).
11 RCW 26.09.080; In re Marriage of Williams. 84 Wn. App. 263, 267-71, 927 P.2d 679(1996) (courts consider duration ofmarriage, parties' financial resources, ability to meet their
needs independently, and conduct depleting marital assets); In re Marriage ofWallace, 111 Wn.
App. 697, 708, 45 P.3d 1131 (2002) (trial court may consider party's waste ofassets); ln_re
Marriage of Steadman, 63 Wn. App. 523, 528, 821 P.2d 59 (1991) (trial court may consider one
spouse's "gross fiscal improvidence" or"squandering of marital assets"); In re Marriage of Rink,
18Wn. App. 549, 553, 571 P.2d 210 (1977) (court may consider maintenance in dividing
property).
12 In re Marriage of Brewer. 137 Wn.2d 756, 769, 976 P.2d 102 (1999).
13 Id.No. 66478-6-1/6
court found that (1) the parties signed an enforceable prenuptial agreement
listing the separate property of each party; (2) David had substantial separate
property; (3) Esse had little separate property; (4) the community property
consisted of personal property and vehicles purchased with David's separate
property and gifted to the community; (5) Esse violated orders entered at the
parties' separation regarding maintenance and disposition of certain property; (6)
Esse received $35,000 from the sale of David's separate property after the
parties' separation in violation of the prenuptial agreement; (7) the prenuptial
agreement prohibits any award of maintenance; and (8) Esse had no income
other than what she received from David. We conclude that these findings
adequately support the court's division of the property.
Esse also assigns error to the provisions of the parenting plan allowing
David residential time with their child without the restrictions recommended by
the parenting evaluator. We review a trial court's parenting plan for an abuse of
discretion.14 Esse fails to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the trial court's
decision. The trial court found that the parenting evaluator relied on Esse's
statements and the existing protection orders to make her recommendations.
However, the trial court found that Esse was not credible and "[t]he imposition of
supervised visitation in this case was completely unnecessary and unwarranted."
In light ofthese findings, Esse fails to demonstrate any abuse ofdiscretion in the
trial court's decision to allow David unrestricted residential time.
Finally, Esse claims that the trial court made various errors in the order of
child support and worksheets. Because the substance of these claims involve
14 In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 (1993).
No. 66478-6-1/7
events that may occur in the future or that occurred after the November 30, 2010
entry of the orders before this court on appeal, we do not address them.
We affirm.
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WE CONCUR:
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