Percash Ramnath v. Ling D. Wang ( 2016 )


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    2016 OCT-3 PMI2--55
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    In the Matter of the Marriage of
    No. 74743-6-1
    PERCASH RAMNATH,
    DIVISION ONE
    Appellant,
    and
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    LING D. WANG,
    Respondent.                 FILED: October 3, 2016
    Leach, J. — Percash Ramnath appeals several trial court orders in this
    dissolution action. The Supreme Court's decision that Ramnath's appeal was
    timely only as to the December 2014 writs of garnishment precludes our
    consideration of his challenge to other trial court actions. And because Ramnath
    fails to support his challenge to those writs with any citation to legal authority or
    reference to the record in assigning error to those writs, we do not consider that
    challenge either. We affirm. Because Wang did not file a financial declaration as
    required by court rule, we deny her attorney fee request.
    Background
    Ramnath and Ling Wang separated in 2013 after 20 years of marriage.
    The two signed a CR 2A settlement agreement in May 2014.              Earlier, the trial
    court granted Ramnath's request to continue the trial date from May 12 to August
    26, 2014, so that the parties could attend the settlement conference that resulted
    No. 74743-6-1 / 2
    in this agreement.     Wang prepared the documents needed to finalize the
    dissolution based on the CR 2A agreement.              Ramnath disputed certain
    provisions in those documents.       As required by the settlement agreement,
    Ramnath and Wang participated in binding arbitration.       The arbitrator ordered
    Ramnath to pay Wang $130,000.1 On July 16, 2014, Ramnath filed a notice that
    he would be absent from July 31 to December 31, 2014.               Wang provided
    Ramnath with notice of a trial court hearing on July 30, 2014, to consider her
    motion to enter final dissolution documents.    Ramnath did not attend.    The trial
    court denied her request.
    The trial court held a short trial on the scheduled date, August 26. It found
    that Ramnath's reasons for not appearing were "transparent" and his absence
    not excusable. It entered a decree of dissolution. In September 2014, the trial
    court found that Ramnath had violated temporary restraining orders by selling
    assets from a joint account.    Because the settlement agreement and decree
    awarded these assets to Wang, the trial court ordered him to pay Wang
    $155,339.10 plus fees and costs. In December 2014, the trial court issued writs
    of garnishment directed to two of Ramnath's banks.
    Analysis
    Ramnath presents no cogent argument for relief on appeal.
    1 A week after the arbitrator issued his decision, Ramnath's counsel
    withdrew, effective June 29.
    No. 74743-6-1 / 3
    The law does not distinguish between litigants who elect to proceed pro se
    and those who seek assistance of counsel.2 Both must comply with applicable
    procedural rules, and failure to do so may preclude review.3 This court generally
    will not consider arguments a party does not support with pertinent authority,
    references to the record, or meaningful analysis.4 The appellant has the burden
    to provide a record sufficient to review the issues raised on appeal.5
    Ramnath did not comply with these requirements. His briefing contains no
    citations to authority, no description of the applicable standards of review, and no
    meaningful legal analysis.    To the extent he makes factual assertions, they
    consist primarily of accusations of misconduct by Wang's counsel. Ramnath fails
    to cite any evidence from the record supporting his accusations, and we find
    none. These deficiencies prevent our consideration of the merits of Ramnath's
    appeal. Nevertheless, we address the essence of his claims as best we can.
    First, Ramnath challenges the decree of dissolution the trial court entered
    August 26, 2014, and the contempt order and judgment it entered a month later.
    The Supreme Court has already ruled that this challenge is time barred.
    Ramnath filed a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court in January 2015.
    The Supreme Court clerk ruled that Ramnath's appeal was timely only with
    2 In re Marriage of Olson, 
    69 Wn. App. 621
    , 626, 
    850 P.2d 527
     (1993).
    3 Olson, 
    69 Wn. App. at 626
    ; State v. Marintorres, 
    93 Wn. App. 442
    , 452,
    969P.2d501 (1999).
    4 Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev, 
    118 Wn.2d 801
    , 809, 
    828 P.2d 549
     (1992) (arguments not supported by authority); State v. Camarillo, 
    54 Wn. App. 821
    , 829, 
    776 P.2d 176
     (1989) (no references to the record), affd, 
    115 Wn.2d 60
    , 
    794 P.2d 850
     (1990); RAP 10.3(a).
    5 Story v. Shelter Bay Co., 
    52 Wn. App. 334
    , 345, 
    760 P.2d 368
     (1988).
    -3-
    No. 74743-6-1/4
    respect to writs of garnishment the trial court entered in December 2014.
    Because Ramnath appealed more than 30 days after the August and September
    decisions, the clerk decided that his appeal of those decisions was time barred
    unless the Supreme Court granted him a motion for extension of time to file a
    notice of appeal. Ramnath made this motion, and the court denied it.
    Thus, the Supreme Court already decided that Ramnath waived his
    appeal of all trial court decisions except the orders authorizing the court clerk to
    issue writs of garnishment to Wells Fargo Bank and JP Morgan Chase Bank.
    This court cannot review Supreme Court decisions.
    Ramnath offers no basis for his challenge to those writs of garnishment
    other than the challenges he waived.
    Garnishment is a statutory remedy to enforce the obligations of debtors.6
    It "requires strict adherence to the procedures expressly authorized by statute."7
    Garnishment involves three parties: a judgment creditor, a judgment debtor, and
    a garnishee, which holds property belonging to the debtor.
    The garnishment statute, ch. 6.27 RCW, permits garnishment of the
    debtor's property if the creditor serves "'a writ of garnishment on a party who is
    indebted to the [judgment] debtor at the time of service.'"8 "[U]pon a proper
    showing by a creditor, a court must enter either a default judgment against, or a
    6 Watkins v. Peterson Enters.. Inc.. 
    137 Wn.2d 632
    , 638, 
    973 P.2d 1037
    (1999).
    7 Watkins, 
    137 Wn.2d at 640
    .
    8 Seven Sales LLC v. Otterbein, 
    189 Wn. App. 204
    , 211, 
    356 P.3d 248
    (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Calloway Ross, Inc.,
    
    133 Wn. App. 621
    , 624, 
    137 P.3d 879
     (2006)); RCW6.27.250(1)(a).
    No. 74743-6-1 / 5
    judgment in the amount held by a garnishee."9 A writ of garnishment directs the
    garnishee not to deliver the debtor's property but to appear and answerthe writ.10
    Ramnath appears to base his challenge to the writs of garnishment solely
    on challenges to the underlying judgment against him, not on any failure to
    satisfy the garnishment statute's requirements. These are the arguments that
    the Supreme Court found Ramnath waived by failing to appeal those orders
    within 30 days.
    Wang requests attorney fees on appeal. RAP 18.1 allows this court to
    award attorney fees when applicable law authorizes them. RCW 26.09.140 gives
    this court discretion to award attorney fees on appeal.          In exercising this
    discretion, we consider the arguable merit of the issues on appeal and the
    parties' financial resources.11 "A party must timely file a financial declaration for
    his or her resources to be considered."12 Because Wang did not file a financial
    declaration with this court, we deny her fee request.
    9 Watkins, 
    137 Wn.2d at 645
    ; RCW 6.27.250(1 )(a).
    10 Sadler v. Wagner, 
    3 Wn. App. 353
    , 355, 
    475 P.2d 901
     (1970).
    11 In re Marriage of Raskob, 
    183 Wn. App. 503
    , 520, 
    334 P.3d 30
     (2014).
    12 Raskob, 183 Wn. App. at 520; RAP 18.1(c).
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    No. 74743-6-1 / 6
    Conclusion
    Because Ramnath waived any challenge to the dissolution decree,
    contempt order, or judgment against him and offers no basis for challenging the
    writs of garnishment, we affirm.
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    WE CONCUR:
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