Personal Restraint Petition Of: Amanda Christine Knight ( 2019 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
March 14, 2019
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In re the Personal Restraint Petition of: No. 49337-3-II
AMANDA CHRISTINE KNIGHT,
Petitioner.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MELNICK, P.J. — Amanda Christine Knight seeks relief from personal restraint. A jury
convicted her of felony murder in the first degree, two counts of robbery in the first degree, two
counts of assault in the second degree, and burglary in the first degree. Knight appealed and we
affirmed her convictions.1
In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Knight claims that one of her robbery convictions
merges with her felony murder conviction because they involve the same victim, James Sanders.
She also argues that because of a change in law since her appeal, her other robbery conviction
merges with one of the assault convictions because they involve the same victim, Charlene
Sanders2. We conclude that the felony murder conviction merges with the robbery conviction.3
1
State v. Knight, 176 Wn. App. 936, 963, 309 P.3d 776 (2013).
2
James Sanders and Charlene Sanders were married and have the same last name. For purposes
of clarity we refer to them by their first names in this opinion. I intend no disrespect.
3
Knight also argues that if we conclude the felony murder and robbery do not merge that
insufficient evidence exists to support the charges. Based on our disposition of this issue, we need
not decide this issue. Similarly, we need not address Knight’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.
49337-3-II
We grant the PRP in part, deny it in part, and remand to the trial court for resentencing consistent
with this opinion.
FACTS4
In April 2010, Knight, Kyoshi Higashi, Joshua Reese, and Clabon Berniard all participated
in a home invasion robbery in Lake Stevens. Not long afterwards, Higashi contacted Knight and
told her that he wanted to commit another robbery.
After finding a Craigslist advertisement for a wedding ring James had posted, Knight called
him from a nontraceable disposable phone and asked if she and her boyfriend could see the ring.
Wanting to arrive after dark, Knight arranged to meet James at the Sanders’ house that evening.
Knight drove Higashi, Berniard, and Reese to the Sanders’ house and parked so they could
make a quick getaway. Higashi possessed Knight’s firearm; Reese and Berniard also possessed
firearms. They had zip ties and masks with them. Reese and Berniard remained in the car. Knight
put on a pair of gloves. Higashi handed her several zip ties.
Knight and Higashi met James outside the house and then walked into the Sanders’ kitchen.
Once inside, James handed an old wedding ring to Knight and Higashi. James then called upstairs
to his wife to come downstairs and help him answer Knight’s and Higashi’s questions about the
ring. The Sanders’ two sons remained upstairs.
Knight told James that she was interested in buying the ring. Higashi revealed a large
amount of cash, but also displayed a gun and threatened James and Charlene. The Sanders told
Higashi and Knight to take whatever they wanted and leave.
Knight zip-tied Charlene’s hands behind her back and Higachi did the same to James.
Knight then removed Charlene’s wedding ring from her finger and either Knight or Higashi
4
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from Knight, 176 Wn. App. 936.
2
49337-3-II
removed James’s wedding ring from his finger. Knight and Higashi ordered James and Charlene
to lie face down on the floor.
Using a Bluetooth device, Knight signaled Reese and Berniard to enter the home. Knight
knew that Reese and Berniard possessed loaded guns and that using these guns was part of the
group’s plan to carry out the Sanders’ home invasion robbery.
Once inside the house, Reese and Berniard went upstairs, and at gunpoint, they forced the
Sanders’ two sons to come downstairs and lie face down near the kitchen entryway. Charlene and
one son watched as Knight and Higashi gathered items from the house. Knight also ransacked the
main upstairs bedroom as she looked for expensive items to steal.
While Knight was upstairs, Berniard held a gun to Charlene’s head, cocked the hammer,
began counting down, and asked, “‘Where is your safe.’” State v. Knight, 176 Wn. App. 936, 963,
309 P.3d 776 (2013) (quoting 5 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 586). When Charlene responded
that they did not own a safe, Berniard kicked her in the head and threatened to kill her and her
children. Believing she was going to die, Charlene eventually admitted that they had a safe in the
garage.
Berniard forced James into the garage. James broke free of his restraints and attacked
Berniard. Berniard shot James in the ear, knocking him unconscious. One of the sons then jumped
on Berniard who threw him off and hit him with the butt of his firearm.
Reese then dragged James’s body through the kitchen and into the adjacent living room,
where they were out of sight. Either Reese or Berniard shot James multiple times, causing fatal
internal bleeding.
Immediately following the gunshots, the four intruders fled. After they left, Charlene
found James on the living room floor and called 911. The police declared James dead at the scene.
3
49337-3-II
The State charged Knight with felony murder in the first degree, two counts of robbery in the first
degree, two counts of assault in the second degree, and one count of burglary in the first degree.
Each count alleged accomplice liability, aggravating factors, and that one of the participants in the
crime was armed with a firearm.
The trial court instructed the jury that to convict Knight of murder in the first degree, the
State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant or an accomplice committed
Robbery in the First Degree [and] . . . the defendant or an accomplice caused the death of James .
. . in the course of or in furtherance of such crime.” PRP, App. A (Instr. 9).
In closing argument, the State argued that the felony murder was based on the robbery of
the rings.
With respect to murder in the first degree, which is Count I in your jury instructions,
again, no issue that this occurred on April 28. Charlene testified that her wedding ring was
stolen, [James’s] wedding ring was stolen. The state has to prove that the defendant or an
accomplice caused the death of someone who is not a participant in the crime. Excuse me.
Higashi shot and killed James . . . in the course of this robbery.
7 RP at 1007
At sentencing, Knight argued that the convictions for the two second degree assaults and
the two robberies should merge, and that the conviction for the assault of James should merge into
the felony murder conviction. She also argued that, for sentencing purposes, all of her convictions
were based on the same criminal conduct and, therefore, she should only be sentenced on the first
degree felony murder conviction. During Knight’s sentencing argument, she confirmed that the
robbery of James was based on “the taking of the ring at gunpoint.” 8 RP at 1076.
In response, the State characterized Knight’s argument as a double jeopardy argument
asserting that the convictions for the two counts of second degree assault should merge into the
convictions for the robberies because the assaults elevated the degree of the robberies to first
4
49337-3-II
degree robberies. During this argument, the State again emphasized that the robberies were
completed “when the rings were removed from Charlene[’s] finger and James[’s] finger,” so that
the robberies could not merge with the later assaults of Charlene and one of the children 8 RP at
1083.
The trial court rejected Knight’s arguments and ruled that
[T]he robbery, that is, of the ring, was completed before the assaults and the murder
occurred. Therefore, although they occurred in the same place, [the first degree
felony murder, the two robberies, and the assault of Charlene, did] not occur at the
same time. The robbery of James[’s ring] was completed, as well as the robbery of
Charlene[‘s], at the time their rings were stolen. And therefore, the murder and the
assaults would not be the same criminal conduct because of that.
In addition, we have a different person involved in the assaults, which is
Clabon Berniard, and therefore, it’s a completely separate criminal act for that
purpose.
8 RP at 1090. Knight appealed her convictions and we affirmed. Knight, 176 Wn. App. 936. We
decided numerous issues including that sufficient evidence supported the two assault convictions,
and that the assault of Charlene did not merge with the robbery of Charlene. A mandate issued on
March 7, 2014. Knight filed this PRP on July 14, 2016.
ANALYSIS
Knight argues that her convictions for the first degree robbery of James and the first degree
felony murder of James violate double jeopardy because the convictions merge. We agree. She
also argues that a change in the law necessitates our reconsidering our prior decision that her
convictions for the first degree robbery of Charlene and the second degree assault of Charlene did
not merge. We disagree.
I. PRP STANDARDS
In a PRP, the petitioner has the initial burden. RAP 16.4; In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 152
Wn.2d 182, 188, 94 P.3d 952 (2004). “A personal restraint petitioner must prove either a (1)
5
49337-3-II
constitutional error that results in actual and substantial prejudice or (2) nonconstitutional error
that ‘constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 160 Wn. App. 479, 488, 251 P.3d 884 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 672, 101 P.3d
1 (2004)). The petitioner must prove the error by a preponderance of the evidence. Lord, 152
Wn.2d at 188. In addition, “[t]he petitioner must support the petition with facts or evidence and
may not rely solely on conclusory allegations.” Monschke, 160 Wn. App. at 488; see RAP
16.7(a)(2)(i).
In evaluating PRPs, we can “(1) dismiss the petition if the petitioner fails to make a prima
facie showing of constitutional or nonconstitutional error, (2) remand for a full hearing if the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing but the merits of the contentions cannot be determined
solely from the record, or (3) grant the PRP without further hearing if the petitioner has proven
actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.” In re Pers. Restraint of Stockwell, 160 Wn. App. 172,
176-77, 248 P.3d 576 (2011).
A PRP is not a substitute for direct appeal and availability of collateral relief is limited. In
re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 328-29, 823 P.2d 492 (1992).
In general, there is a one-year time limit for filing PRPs. RCW 10.73.090(1). PRPs filed
more than one year after a judgement and sentence becomes final are usually time barred unless
an exception applies. RCW 10.73.090, .100. Because Knight filed this PRP more than one year
after the mandate in her appeal issued, her PRP is time barred unless she demonstrates that an
exception applies.
Exceptions to the time bar are contained in RCW 10.73.100, which provides in relevant
part:
6
49337-3-II
The time limit specified in RCW 10.73.090 does not apply to a petition or
motion that is based solely on one or more of the following grounds:
....
(3) The conviction was barred by double jeopardy under Amendment V of
the United States Constitution or Article I, section 9 of the state Constitution;
(4) The defendant pled not guilty and the evidence introduced at trial was
insufficient to support the conviction;
Knight’s judgment and sentence became final on March 7, 2014. Knight filed this petition
in July 2016, more than one year after the direct appeal was final.
Knight’s merger claims implicate double jeopardy and are an exception to the time bar.
RCW 10.73.100(3). Knight’s sufficiency of the evidence claim also falls within an exception.
RCW 10.73.100(4). Because these claims fall under an exception to the one year time bar, we
consider them on the merits.
II. MERGER
Knight argues that her robbery conviction merges with her conviction for felony murder.
She also argues that we should reconsider our prior holding that the first degree robbery of
Charlene and the second degree assault of Charlene convictions did not merge because State v.
Whittaker, 192 Wn. App. 395, 367 P.3d 1092 (2016), changed the merger analysis.
The state and federal double jeopardy clauses prohibit the imposition of multiple
punishments for the same offense. In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 815, 100 P.3d
291 (2004); see U.S. CONST. amend V; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9. Double jeopardy involves
questions of law that we review de novo. State v. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d 765, 770, 108 P.3d 753(2005).
Freeman provided a three-part examination to be used when reviewing double jeopardy
claims. 153 Wn.2d at 771-73. Knight only addresses the third part, which involves the merger
doctrine. This doctrine is another aid used to determine legislative intent, even when the two
7
49337-3-II
crimes at issue have different elements. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772-73; see also State v. Kier,
164 Wn.2d 798, 804, 194 P.3d 212 (2008).
“The merger doctrine, independent of double jeopardy concerns, evaluates whether the
legislature intended multiple crimes to merge into a single crime for punishment purposes. The
merger doctrine applies only when, in order to prove a more serious crime, the State must prove
an act that a statute defines as a separate crime.” State v. Novikoff, 1 Wn. App. 2d 166, 172-73,
404 P.3d 513 (2017) (internal citation omitted) (assault providing factual basis for fourth degree
assault was also element of no contact order violation). “Whether the merger doctrine bars double
punishment is a question of law that we review de novo.” State v. Williams, 131 Wn. App. 488,
498, 128 P.3d 98 (2006), adhered to on remand, 147 Wn. App. 479, 195 P.3d 578 (2008).
“The merger doctrine applies when the legislature clearly indicates that it did not intend to
impose multiple punishments for a single act that violates several statutory provisions.” State v.
Muhammad, 4 Wn. App. 2d 31, 63-64, 419 P.3d 419, review granted, 191 Wn.2d 1019 (2018).
“[W]hen the degree of one offense is raised by conduct separately criminalized by the legislature,
we presume the legislature intended to punish both offenses through a greater sentence for the
greater crime.” Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772-73 (legislature intended to punish assault in the first
degree and robbery in the first degree separately). An exception to merger exists when a predicate
crime results in a separate injury that is not merely incidental to the greater offense, but is distinct
from it. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 778. “Generally a predicate offense will merge into the second
crime, and the court may not punish the predicate crime separately.” Muhammad, 4 Wn. App. 2d
at 63.
If each crime has “an independent purpose or effect” they may be punished separately.
Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 773. “An exception to the merger doctrine lies when the predicate and
8
49337-3-II
charged crimes do not intertwine.” Muhammad, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 63. “Courts apply an exception
to this merger doctrine on a case-by-case basis; it turns on whether the predicate and charged
crimes are sufficiently ‘intertwined’ for merger to apply.” State v. Saunders, 120 Wn. App. 800,
821, 86 P.3d 232 (2004).5
The two crimes “may be punished separately if the defendant’s conduct forming one crime
demonstrates an independent purpose or effect from the second crime.” Muhammad, 4 Wn. App.
2d at 63. “[I]f the predicate crime injures the person or property of the victim or others in a separate
and distinct manner from the crime for which it serves as an element, the crimes do not merge.”
Muhammad, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 64.
We look to the statutory elements of each crime to assess “whether the legislature intended
to impose a single punishment for a homicide committed in furtherance of or in immediate flight
from an armed robbery.” Williams, 131 Wn. App. at 498. “The offenses merge if the essential
elements of the homicide include all the elements of the robbery, such that the facts establishing
one necessarily also establish the other.” Williams, 131 Wn. App. at 498; cf. In re Pers. Restraint
of Schorr, 191 Wn.2d 315, 325-26, 422 P.3d 451 (2018). Here, the robbery was an element of the
felony murder and it was the predicate felony that elevated the crime to murder.
In Schorr, the defendant was convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder.
The court concluded that,
even though first degree felony murder predicated on first degree robbery would
merge with the first degree robbery on which it is predicated, that was not the only
means of first degree murder to which Schorr pleaded guilty. He also pleaded guilty
to the alternative means of premeditated murder. A first degree robbery conviction
certainly does not merge with a first degree premeditated murder conviction.
5
Saunders relies on the language from State v. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979),
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Sweet, 138 Wn.2d 466, 980 P.2d 1223 (1999).
“Although proof of only one such element was necessary, both were intertwined.” Johnson, 92
Wn.2d at 681.
9
49337-3-II
Schorr, 191 Wn.2d at 318.
Here, Knight’s sole homicide conviction was felony murder predicated on robbery. Based
on Schorr’s pronouncement, the felony murder and the robbery merge.
III. FELONY MURDER
A person is guilty of felony murder in the first degree if, in relevant part, she commits, or
attempts to commit, “robbery in the first degree . . . and in the course of or in furtherance of such
crime . . . , he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the
participants.” RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c). The murder must occur in furtherance of the predicate
crime. In this case, the State charged only robbery as the predicate crime to the murder.
In a felony murder prosecution, the intent to commit the predicate felony substitutes for
the mens rea that is otherwise necessary to establish murder. State v. Craig, 82 Wn.2d 777, 781,
514 P.2d 151 (1973); Muhammad, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 63. Where the predicate felony is robbery, it
is immaterial if the property is taken before or after the killing, if the killing and the robbery are
parts of the same transaction. Craig, 82 Wn.2d at 781-82; State v. Coe, 34 Wn.2d 336, 341, 208
P.2d 863 (1949).
The trial court instructed the jury that to convict Knight of murder in the first degree, the
State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant or an accomplice committed
Robbery in the First Degree [and] . . . the defendant or an accomplice caused the death of James .
. . in the course of or in furtherance of such crime.” PRP, App. A (Instr. 9).
In closing argument, the State argued that the felony murder was based on the robbery of
the rings.
With respect to murder in the first degree, which is Count I in your jury
instructions, again, no issue that this occurred on April 28. Charlene testified that
her wedding ring was stolen, [James’s] wedding ring was stolen. The state has to
10
49337-3-II
prove that the defendant or an accomplice caused the death of someone who is not
a participant in the crime. Excuse me. Higashi shot and killed James . . . in the
course of this robbery.
7 RP at 1007.6
Here, James’s death occurred in the course of or in furtherance of the robbery.
IV. ROBBERY
Washington has adopted a “transactional” analysis of robbery. State v. Handburgh, 119
Wn.2d 284, 290, 830 P.2d 641 (1992); State v. Truong, 168 Wn. App. 529, 535-36, 277 P.3d 74(2012). Until the defendant has escaped, the taking is considered to be ongoing. Truong, 168 Wn.
App. at 535-36; State v. Manchester, 57 Wn. App. 765, 770, 790 P.2d 217 (1990). “The definition
of ‘robbery’ thus includes ‘violence during flight immediately following the taking.’” Truong,
168 Wn. App. at 536 (quoting Manchester, 57 Wn. App. at 770). In Handburgh, the court noted,
“Implicit in the Manchester holding is the assumption a taking can be ongoing or continuing so
that the later use of force to retain the property taken renders the actions a robbery.” Handburgh,
119 Wn.2d at 290.
State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 512-13, 14 P.3d 713 (2000), and State v. Cronin, 142
Wn.2d 568, 579, 14 P.3d 752 (2000), are also instructional. The court emphasized that for a
defendant to be guilty as an accomplice, the state must show she possessed general knowledge she
aided the commission of the crime, not just any crime. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 512-13; Cronin,
142 Wn.2d at 579. In this case, that crime was robbery.
6
The State’s supplemental briefing argues, “There is ample evidence in the record to support the
State’s theory that the felony murder occurred based on the robbery of the safe and not of the rings,
giving an independent purpose to each robbery.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 3. The State never argued
this theory at trial, and the theory is contrary to the jury instructions. In addition, the State could
not have argued this theory because there was only an attempted robbery of the safe. The State
only charged and alleged a completed robbery, not an attempted robbery.
11
49337-3-II
In the present case, the court instructed the jury that it must find that Knight, acting as a
principal or an accomplice, caused the death of another in the course of and in furtherance of
robbery in the first degree which, based on the transactional view of robbery was not completed
until Knight and her accomplices escaped. Therefore, the robbery was not separate and distinct
from the felony murder. They were intertwined.
V. FELONY MURDER AND MERGER
The felony murder statute and established precedent demonstrate how the robbery and the
killing are intertwined. Knight was convicted of first degree felony murder which “expressly
require[s] an associated conviction for another crime.” Williams, 131 Wn. App. at 499. A person
is guilty of murder in the first degree when: “He or she commits or attempts to commit the crime
of . . . (1) robbery in the first or second degree . . . and in the course of or in furtherance of such
crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a
person other than one of the participants.” RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c) (emphasis added). A separate
conviction for the predicate crime is, therefore, contrary to the legislative intent and the offenses
merge. Williams, 131 Wn. App. at 499. The plain language of RCW 9A.32.030 necessarily
requires that the killing must be intertwined with, and not separate and distinct from the predicate
felony, which in this case is robbery in the first degree.
In Williams, the court concluded that the predicate offense of attempted robbery merged
with the felony murder conviction. 131 Wn. App. at 497. Williams rejected the state’s argument
that the attempted robbery was factually disconnected from the felony murder or served a different
purpose or intent from it. 131 Wn. App. at 498. In so doing, it ruled the robbery was integral to
the killing.
If, as the State suggests, the jury found the attempted robbery was complete when
Mr. Williams took some undefined substantial step earlier in the evening, then it
12
49337-3-II
could not have found that the shooting was in furtherance of or in flight from that
attempt. And the first degree murder conviction could not stand. Likewise, the
State’s assertion that the two crimes were completely unrelated is inconsistent with
the felony murder charge.
Williams, 131 Wn. App. at 499.
Similarly here, if, as the State suggests and as the dissent concludes, the robbery was
completed after Knight or her accomplices took James’s ring, then the jury could not have found
that the shooting occurred in furtherance of that robbery, and the murder in the first degree
conviction could not stand. It would not be in the course of or in furtherance of the robbery.
Furthermore, the State’s assertion that the killing and robbery have unrelated purposes is
inconsistent with the felony murder charge and its theory of the case at trial.
In addition, the facts of this case demonstrate that the robbery and killing were intertwined.
Knight and her accomplices committed a home invasion robbery in Lake Stevens. One accomplice
contacted Knight and said he wanted to commit another robbery. They targeted James and his
family, arrived at his house, zip-tied Charlene and James and forced them to lie face down on the
floor. One of Knight’s accomplices held a gun to the back of Charlene’s head, and repeatedly
yelled at Charlene and James, demanding to know where their safe was located. Ultimately,
Charlene told Knight’s accomplices that there was a safe. James was led to the garage to open the
safe. James told the intruders a code for the safe, and then broke free of the zip ties and began
fighting with Knight’s accomplice. At that time, the defendant’s accomplice shot and killed James.
In short, the record demonstrates that during the commission of the home-invasion robbery,
James fought with Knight’s accomplices in an effort to stop the robbery, and Knight’s accomplice
shot James. Knight’s accomplices’ use of force was intertwined with, and not separate and distinct
from, the ongoing robbery. See Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 779 (noting that force used to intimidate
a victim into providing property “is often incidental” to robbery); see also Truong, 168 Wn. App.
1349337-3-II
at 535-36 (holding that under Washington’s transactional analysis of robbery, “[t]he taking is
ongoing until the assailant has effected an escape”). No independent purpose existed.
Our inquiry is whether the unnecessary use of force had a purpose independent from
facilitating the robbery. See Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 778-79. Knight’s accomplices restrained
James at gunpoint in order to facilitate the ongoing robbery of the Sanders’s home. James broke
free and attempted to fight back. In that process, Knight’s accomplice shot and killed James.
There is no evidence that Knight’s accomplice shot James with some other motive than to facilitate
the home-invasion robbery. Unlike Schorr, here the State did not charge both premeditated murder
and felony murder. Because the felony murder and the robbery of James were intertwined and
because James’s death occurred in the course of or in furtherance of the robbery, the charges
merge.
VI. ROBBERY AND ASSAULT OF CHARLENE
Knight argues that Whittaker has changed the analysis for the merger doctrine as articulated
in Freeman. Knight also argues that in the interests of justice under RAP 16.4(d), we should
reconsider the holding on direct appeal that the convictions for the robbery of Charlene and the
two assault counts did not merge. Whittaker does not change the merger doctrine analysis. We
decline to reconsider our prior holding on direct appeal.
In Whittaker, the defendant was convicted of one count of felony stalking and one count
of felony violation of a protection order. 192 Wn. App. at 400-01. On appeal, the defendant
argued that his convictions merged because the stalking verdict failed to specify which violation
of the court’s protection order elevated the conviction to a felony. Whittaker, 192 Wn. App. at
409-10. Whittaker applied the well-established rule for merger and recognized the exception to
the merger doctrine articulated in Freeman. It explained,
14
49337-3-II
Specifically, to convict [the defendant] of felony stalking, the jury had to
find at least two instances of either harassment or following and at least one
violation of the court order. To convict [the defendant] of violation of the court
order, the jury had to find that [the defendant] violated the protection order at least
once. But the jury verdict is silent on which incidents it chose to reach its verdicts.
For example, the jury could have found that [the defendant] repeatedly
followed [the victim] on January 3 based on the incident we earlier described that
occurred at her salon. One of these two “followings” could also have served as the
basis for finding him guilty of violation of the court order protecting [the victim].
Of course, this incident at the salon does not exclude the possibility that the
jury could also have based its stalking conviction on [the defendant’s] repeatedly
harassing [the victim] by text and otherwise prior to January 3 and during the
charging period. But this possibility does nothing to clarify what the jury actually
did in this case. Thus, this alternative scenario does not cure the problem of the
ambiguous verdict. We simply cannot exclude the possibility that the jury
convicted on the basis of the first scenario that we described above. The rule of
lenity applies. The convictions must merge.
Whittaker, 192 Wn. App. at 415-16 (footnote omitted).
Knight claims that the analysis in Whittaker demonstrates that the merger doctrine must be
analyzed based on the jury instructions and the jury verdicts alone. Knight also claims that, by
following Whittaker, we no longer consider the individual facts of the case to determine whether
specific counts should merge. As has been previously pointed out, we disagree with Knight.
As to Knight’s claim that we should reconsider our prior holding, a petitioner may not
renew a claim that was raised and rejected on the merits on direct appeal unless the petitioner
shows that the interest of justice require reconsideration under RAP 16.4(d). In re Pers. Restraint
of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). In her appeal, we addressed whether the
convictions for the assault and the robbery of Charlene merged. Knight, 176 Wn. App. at 953. In
rejecting Knight’s argument, we relied on the well-established principles for merger articulated in
Freeman and held that the second degree assault was not necessary to elevate the degree of the
robbery to first degree. Knight, 176 Wn. App. at 953-56. Whittaker does not change the law
regarding the merger doctrine or its application here. Knight’s argument on this issue fails.
15
49337-3-II
VII. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Knight next argues that if we reject her merger arguments, there was insufficient evidence
to support her convictions for felony murder or the assaults because she was not an accomplice to
those crimes. A petitioner claiming insufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State’s
evidence. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). All inferences from the
evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and most strongly against the petitioner. Salinas,
119 Wn.2d at 201. Sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction if any rational trier of fact
could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hosier, 157
Wn.2d 1, 8, 133 P.3d 936 (2006).
We reject Knight’s merger arguments related to robbery and assault. Based on Freeman
and its progeny, and our review of the record in this case, sufficient evidence supports the
convictions for the assaults.
We grant the PRP in part, deny in part, and remand to the trial court for resentencing
consistent with this opinion.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Melnick, P.J.
16
49337-3-II
BJORGEN, J.P.T.* (concurring in part/dissenting in part) — I agree with the result of the
lead opinion and most of its analysis. However, I disagree with the test it uses to apply the
independent purpose exception to the merger doctrine.
The law deals with human conduct, in all its depth and subtleties. Lacking, fortunately, a
precise, quantifiable tool to draw distinctions in the murky shades of that conduct, we use
language as best we can. Words, though, are like the jaws of a vice that don’t quite meet: good
at grasping the easily defined, less so with the finer weave. For example, as figures of rhetoric,
the metaphoric can sometimes evoke the folds of conduct and experience more surely and
vividly than cold exposition. In illuminating distinctions or prescribing rules, though, the
recourse to metaphor often only confuses, through its inherent vagueness or temptation to
multiply categories. In its use of the notion of intertwining as the standard for applying the
independent purpose exemption, the lead opinion does this.
In State v. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d 765, 778-79, 108 P.3d 753 (2005), our state Supreme
Court described the exception to merger here at issue in the following terms:
Finally, we turn to a well established exception that may operate to allow
two convictions even when they formally appear to be the same crime under other
tests. These offenses may in fact be separate when there is a separate injury to “the
person or property of the victim or others, which is separate and distinct from and
not merely incidental to the crime of which it forms an element.” [State v.]Frohs,
83 Wash.App. [803,] 807, 924 P.2d 384 [1996] (citing [State v.]Johnson, 92
Wash.2d [671,] 680, 600 P.2d 1249[1979)]). . . . The test is whether the
unnecessary force had a purpose or effect independent of the crime.
In this test, the key notions of independent purpose or effect and “not merely incidental”
are relatively precise and straightforward to apply. Doing so leads me to agree with the lead
opinion that the charges of felony murder and robbery of James merged. There is no need to
*
Judge Thomas R. Bjorgen is serving as a judge pro tempore for the Court of Appeals, pursuant
to RCW 2.06.150.
17
49337-3-II
clutter the analysis with the vague category of intertwining, even if it has been used in other
Court of Appeals opinions. The Baroque is best confined to music.
___________________________________
Bjorgen, J.P.T.
18
49337-3-II
SUTTON, J. (dissenting in part) — In her personal restraint petition (PRP), Amanda Knight
claims that her conviction for the first degree robbery of James Sanders merges with her felony
murder conviction because they involve the same victim, James Sanders, and the robbery of the
victims’ rings was part of the same continuous course of conduct. The majority agrees with Knight
and holds that the first degree robbery conviction merges with the felony murder conviction.
Because the robbery of the victims’ rings had an independent purpose and effect from the felony
murder, I disagree that the robbery of James Sanders merges with the felony murder conviction.
Therefore, I respectively dissent in part on this basis. Knight also argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support her convictions for felony murder and assault. I disagree.
Knight also argues that State v. Whittaker7 changed the law of merger since her appeal was
filed and therefore, her other first degree robbery conviction merges with one of the first degree
assault convictions because they involve the same victim, Charlene Sanders.8 I agree with the
majority that Whittaker9 did not change the law regarding merger. Therefore, I would deny
Knight’s PRP for the reasons explained below.
Knight argues that in order to avoid a double jeopardy issue, the first degree felony murder
and the first degree robbery of James convictions must merge. I disagree.
7
State v. Whittaker, 192 Wn. App. 395, 367 P.3d 1092 (2016).
8
James Sanders and Charlene Sanders were married and have the same last name. For purposes
of clarity I refer to them by their first names in this opinion. I intend no disrespect.
9
Knight also argues that (1) if this court concludes that the felony murder and robbery do not
merge, the evidence is insufficient to support the charges and (2) her appellate counsel was
ineffective. I agree with the majority that we do not need to decide the ineffective assistance claim.
But I address the sufficiency claim due to my disposition on merger.
19
49337-3-II
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The federal and state double jeopardy clauses prohibit the imposition of multiple
punishments for the same offense. In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 815, 100 P.3d
291 (2004); see U.S. CONST. amend V; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9. Double jeopardy involves
questions of law that we review de novo. State v. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d 765, 770, 108 P.3d 753(2005). “‘The double jeopardy doctrine protects a criminal defendant from being (1) prosecuted a
second time for the same offense after acquittal, (2) prosecuted a second time for the same offense
after conviction, and (3) punished multiple times for the same offense.’” State v. Fuller, 185
Wn.2d 30, 33-34, 367 P.3d 1057 (2016) (quoting State v. Linton, 156 Wn.2d 777, 783, 132 P.3d
127 (2006)).
Freeman outlined a three-part inquiry to apply to double jeopardy claims. Freeman, 153
Wn.2d at 771-73. First, we search for express or implicit legislative intent to punish the crimes
separately. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 771-72. Second, if there is no clear statement of legislative
intent, we may apply the “same evidence” or Blockburger10 test, which asks if the crimes are the
same in law and in fact. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772. And third, we may use the merger doctrine
to discern legislative intent where the degree of one offense is elevated by conduct constituting a
separate offense.11 Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772-73; see State v. Kier, 164 Wn.2d 798, 804, 194
P.3d 212 (2008) (stating the inquiry is a “three-part test”).
10
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).
11
Case law suggests that merger may be raised as a stand-alone claim. See e.g. State v. Novikoff,
1 Wn. App.2d 166, 172-73, 404 P.3d 513 (2017). But that is not the case here because Knight
expressly raises her merger argument in the context of a double jeopardy claim and Freeman
establishes that merger can be examined as part of a double jeopardy analysis. Freeman, 153
Wn.2d at 771-73.
20
49337-3-II
Knight does not address the first two prongs of the Freeman inquiry and argues only that
the merger doctrine applies here. Accordingly, I address only the applicability of the merger
doctrine. See Kier, 164 Wn.2d at 805 n.1 (analyzing only the applicability of the merger doctrine
where neither party suggested that the analysis under steps (1) and (2) would differ from Freeman).
Under the merger doctrine, we presume that “the legislature intended to punish both
offenses through a greater sentence for the greater crime.” Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 773.
Despite this presumption, Freeman recognizes an exception to the merger doctrine that
focuses on the individual facts of the case. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 779. Even if two convictions
appear to merge on an abstract level, the convictions may be punished separately if each conviction
has an independent purpose or effect. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 773. In other words, offenses that
might otherwise merge may be punished separately “when there is a separate injury to ‘the person
or property of the victim or others, which is separate and distinct from and not merely incidental
to the crime of which it forms an element.’” Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 778-79 (quoting State v.
Frohs, 83 Wn. App. 803, 807, 924 P.2d 384 (1996)). Freeman underscored the need for a
reviewing court to take a “hard look at each case” based on its facts, the charged crimes, and even
the jury instructions in the case. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 774; Kier, 164 Wn.2d at 811-12(examining the jury instructions when evaluating defendant’s merger argument).
B. THE ROBBERY AND FELONY MURDER
Knight argues that the conviction for the first degree robbery of James merges with the
conviction for the felony murder of James. Specifically, she argues that because the jury
instructions did not specify which first degree robbery charge was the predicate offense for the
first degree felony murder charge, the rule of lenity requires us to assume that the predicate offense
was the first degree robbery of James and there was “no ‘independent purpose’ between the
21
49337-3-II
robbery and the felony murder.” PRP at 11. Even presuming, but not deciding, that the rule of
lenity12 requires that the robbery of the rings is the predicate offense for the felony murder, her
argument fails because the robbery of the rings had an independent purpose or effect from the
felony murder.13
Here, the evidence showed that Kyoshi Higashi pulled out a gun, zip-tied James’s hands
behind his back, and either Higashi or Knight removed James’s ring. Knight, 176 Wn. App. 936,
942, 309 P.3d 776. The State argued and proved that the first degree robbery of the rings was
completed when Higashi threatened Charlene with a firearm and either he or Knight removed
James’s and Charlene’s rings. Knight, 176 Wn. App. at 954. Knight also admitted during closing
argument that the purpose of the robbery was to obtain the Sanders’ property, the rings, and engage
in a home invasion. Knight, 176 Wn. App. at 947.
The felony murder to convict instruction did not, however, specify which of the two
charged first degree robberies was the predicate offense. To prove the felony murder charge, the
State relied on the following facts and evidence: (1) the murder of James happened after the
robbery of the rings was complete, (2) once Higashi or Knight took the rings, the charged robbery
was complete, (3) the murder of James took place after Clabon Berniard kicked Charlene in the
head, pointed a gun at her head, and started to countdown after threatening to kill her if she did not
disclose the location and combination of the safe and Berniard forced James to the garage to open
12
Although the rule of lenity generally applies when statutes are ambiguous, it may also apply in
the context of merger. See Kier, 164 Wn.2d at 811-14 (applying the rule of lenity to appellant’s
merger argument); State v. Roberts, 117 Wn.2d 576, 586, 817 P.2d 855 (1991) (when a statute is
ambiguous, “The rule of lenity requires the court to adopt an interpretation most favorable to the
criminal defendant.”).
13
To the extent Knight is arguing that Whittaker changes the independent purpose or effect test, I
disagree. Although the Whittaker court addressed merger, it did not discuss the independent
purpose or effect test. Whittaker, 192 Wn. App. at 409-16.
22
49337-3-II
the safe, and (4) Berniard first shot James when James began to fight him, while they were in the
garage and then he and/or Joshua Reese fatally shot James several more times after dragging him
into the living room.
The subsequent felony murder of James resulted from the later actions committed by two
other co-accomplices, Berniard and Reese, with Knight as an accomplice. The felony murder of
James did not occur until after the robbery of the rings was complete and Knight’s accomplices
were attempting to rob the Sanders’ safe.14 Further, the injury sustained by James during his
murder (James’s death) was distinct from the injury he sustained during the robbery of the rings
(the loss of the rings). Thus, the robbery of the rings was an “injury to . . . ‘the person or property
of the victim or others, which [wa]s separate and distinct from” the force used in the murder of
James. See Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 778-79 (quoting Frohs, 83 Wn. App. at 807). Thus, under
Freeman, I would hold that Knight’s convictions for the first degree robbery of James and the
felony murder of James do not merge and that Knight’s double jeopardy claim on this basis fails.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on this basis.
14
By saying that the robbery of the rings was complete, I do not imply that the predicate offense
for the felony murder was an uncharged attempted robbery. I am referring to the completed
robberies of the rings in relation to the defendants’ later acts to demonstrate that the predicate
robbery was not sufficiently intertwined with the robbery of the rings to justify merger.
Under the majority’s view, the independent purpose and effect test does not apply when
the predicate robbery is considered a transactional crime, but that approach would mean that felony
murders based on the predicate offense of robbery could never merge. Case law does not support
that conclusion. See e.g. State v. Saunders, 120 Wn. App. 800, 820-24, 86 P.3d 232 (2004)
(holding that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that the predicate offenses of
rape, robbery, and kidnapping merged with the felony murder conviction because the predicate
offenses were not sufficiently intertwined with the murder and were separate and distinct for
purposes of merger analysis); see also State v. Peyton, 29 Wn. App. 701, 720, 630 P.2d 1362(1981) (refusing to merge predicate robbery with felony murder).
23
49337-3-II
C. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Knight also argues that if we reject her merger arguments, there was insufficient evidence
to support her convictions for first degree felony murder (Count I) or the second degree assaults
of Charlene (Count V) and of JS (count III) because she (Knight) was not an accomplice to those
crimes. She further argues that if we hold that the robberies were complete when the rings were
taken, there was insufficient evidence that the killing took place in the course of or in furtherance
of the robbery. I disagree.
A petitioner claiming insufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State’s evidence.
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). All inferences from the evidence
must be drawn in favor of the State and most strongly against the petitioner. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d
at 201. Sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction if any rational trier of fact could find the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1, 8, 133
P.3d 936 (2006). These standards are the same for appeals and PRPs. See In re Pers. Restraint of
Martinez, 171 Wn.2d 354, 364, 256 P.3d 277 (2011).
Knight argues that she was only an accomplice to the robberies and that if this court holds
that those robberies were completed when the rings were taken from James and Charlene, she
could not be an accomplice to the felony murder or the second degree assaults of Charlene and JS.
I disagree.
Although the charged robberies were complete when the rings were taken, there was
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that Knight agreed to participate in more than just
the robbery of the rings. The fact that Knight continued to search the house for additional items
to steal would allow the jury to conclude that Knight had also agreed to participate in a broader
robbery, a home invasion, and that the later assaults of Charlene and JS and the later felony murder
24
49337-3-II
of James were related to the broader robbery, the home invasion. Because the robberies were not
all completed at the time when Charlene and JS were assaulted and when James was murdered,
her sufficiency of the evidence claim fails.
In addition, even concluding that the robberies of the rings were the predicate offenses for
the felony murder and that those offenses were completed, there was still sufficient evidence to
prove that the killing took place during the course of or in furtherance of the robberies because
“[a] homicide is deemed committed during the perpetuation of a felony, for the purpose of felony
murder, if the homicide is within the ‘res gestae’ of the felony, i.e., if there was a close proximity
in terms of time and distance between the felony and the homicide.” State v. Leech, 114 Wn.2d
700, 706, 790 P.2d 160 (1990). In Leech, the court held that although the crime of arson was
complete when the defendant intentionally set a fire, the death of a firefighter that occurred while
the fire was still burning was close enough in time and place to the arson to be within the res gestae
of that felony. 114 Wn.2d at 708. Here, as in Leech, even presuming that the robberies were
completed when the rings were taken, James’s death still occurred in close proximity in terms of
time and distance to the felony. The death occurred shortly after the rings were taken and before
Knight and her accomplices left the home where the robbery took place. Thus, I would hold that
Knight’s sufficiency of the evidence argument fails.
Accordingly, I dissent in part.
———————————————
SUTTON, J.
25