State Of Washington, V Trelane Hugh Hunter ( 2017 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 12, 2017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 49052-8-II
Respondent,
v.
TRELANE HUGH HUNTER, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
SUTTON, J. — Trelane H. Hunter appeals his conviction for driving while under the
influence. Hunter argues that the arresting officer testified to an improper opinion on his guilt
which violated his right to a fair jury trial. The officer’s testimony was not an improper opinion
on guilt. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On February 11, 2016, the State charged Hunter with driving while under the influence. 1
The arresting officer, Matthew Hoover of the City of Vancouver Police Department, testified at
Hunter’s jury trial.
Officer Hoover testified that, on February 9, 2016, he was on patrol and observed Hunter’s
car moving very slowly toward the stop line of a highway exit ramp. Hunter’s car caught Officer
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RCW 46.61.502(1)(c). The State also charged Hunter with assault in the third degree and
possession of a controlled substance — methamphetamine. A jury found Hunter guilty of
possession of a controlled substance — methamphetamine. However, Hunter does not appeal his
conviction for possession of a controlled substance — methamphetamine. The jury found Hunter
not guilty of assault in the third degree.
No. 49052-8-II
Hoover’s attention because there were no other vehicles that would require Hunter’s car to slow
down. Officer Hoover pulled behind Hunter’s car and Hunter’s car began to accelerate in an
inconsistent and jerky manner. Hunter’s car then quickly made a right turn. Hunter’s car partially
entered the left lane before correcting and pulling completely into the right lane. Hunter’s vehicle
continued to travel approximately 15-20 miles per hour in a 40 mile per hour speed zone. Officer
Hoover then executed a traffic stop and contacted Hoover in his vehicle.
Officer Hoover smelled the strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and observed
Hunter’s eyes were watery and droopy. Officer Hoover attempted to administer field sobriety tests
(FSTs) to Hunter. Officer Hoover terminated the FSTs due to Hunter’s inability to follow
directions and perform the tests.
After Officer Hoover testified about Hunter’s attempted FSTs, the following exchange took
place,
[STATE]: And based on your training and experience and your common
understanding at that point, did you believe he was intoxicated?
[HOOVER]: Yes.
[DEFENSE]: Objection, You Honor. That’s a conclusion.
[STATE]: Proper opinion testimony.
[COURT]: Overruled.
The objection[]s -- he can state his opinion based on his training and
experience. It’s up to the jury as to whether they accept the opinion.
[STATE]: Thank you.
[STATE]: And did you form an opinion as to his -- whether he was intoxicated or
not?
[HOOVER]: Yes.
[STATE]: And what was what was (sic) your opinion?
[HOOVER]: I believed he was intoxicated.
[STATE]: Okay. Was that obvious to you?
[HOOVER]: Yes.
II Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 162-63.
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No. 49052-8-II
Officer Hoover arrested Hunter and transported him to the jail. While in the patrol car,
Hunter stated, “I smoke meth. I smoke crystal. I smoke crack. I smoke every drug you got.”
II VRP at 167. Hunter was behaving aggressively, yelling, and kicking the door during the
transport. Hunter’s aggressive behavior continued after he was placed in a cell in the jail. While
being booked into the jail Hunter stated, “I’m not taking no alcohol, no nothing.” II VRP at 168.
Hunter refused the breath test.
The jury found Hunter guilty of driving while under the influence. Hunter received a
standard range sentence. Hunter appeals.
ANALYSIS
Hunter argues that Officer Hoover’s testimony was an improper opinion on his guilt.
Opinion testimony as to the guilt of the defendant invades the exclusive province of the jury and
may be reversible error because it violates the defendant’s right to a trial by jury. State v. Kirkman,
159 Wn.2d 918, 927, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). To determine whether testimony is an improper
opinion on guilt, this court considers
“(1) the type of witness involved, (2) the specific nature of the testimony, (3) the
nature of the charges, (4) the type of defense, and (5) the other evidence before the
trier of fact.”
Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 929 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Demery, 144
Wn.2d 753, 759, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001)). “Testimony from a law enforcement officer regarding the
veracity of another witness may be especially prejudicial because an officer’s testimony often
carries a special aura of reliability.” Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 928. An officer may not testify that
FSTs produce scientifically certain results. State v. Quaale, 182 Wn.2d 191, 198, 340 P.3d 213(2014). An officer is also prohibited from predicting the “specific level of drugs present in a
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No. 49052-8-II
suspect.” Quaale, 182 Wn.2d at 198. However, an officer is permitted to testify that a person was
intoxicated provided that the testimony does not imply “a specific level of intoxication: that the
alcohol consumed impaired the defendant, which is the legal standard for guilt.” Quaale, 182
Wn.2d at 199.
In Quaale, an officer testified that he had “no doubt” that the defendant was impaired based
on an FST. 182 Wn.2d at 198. The officer also testified that the defendant was “impaired.”
Quaale, 182 Wn.2d at 199. Our Supreme Court held that the officer’s testimony was an improper
opinion on defendant’s guilt because the testimony cast scientific certainty on the reliability of the
FST and the officer impliedly testified to the level of drugs in the defendant’s system by
characterizing the defendant as impaired. Quaale, 182 Wn.2d at 198-99. Here, Officer Hoover’s
testimony is sufficiently distinguishable from Quaale to be proper.
First, Officer Hoover’s testimony did not cast scientific certainty on any of the attempted
FSTs because Officer Hoover testified to his opinion based on the totality of his training and
experience. Second, Hoover did not testify to a certain level or effect of the suspected drugs in
Hunter’s system. Because Officer Hoover testified that Hunter was intoxicated rather than
impaired, Officer Hoover’s testimony did not imply a certain level of drugs in Hunter’s system.
Accordingly, Officer Hoover’s testimony was within the bounds expressed by our Supreme Court
in Quaale.
Officer Hoover’s testimony, while an opinion, was not an opinion on the ultimate issue of
guilt. To prove driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the State must prove that the
defendant is “under the influence of or affected by” the intoxicating liquor or any drug. RCW
46.61.502(c). It is not sufficient to simply prove that the defendant is intoxicated. Because Officer
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No. 49052-8-II
Hoover’s testimony did not offer an opinion as to whether Hunter was under the influence or
affected by alcohol or methamphetamine, his testimony was not an improper opinion on the
ultimate issue of whether Hunter was guilty of driving under the influence.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
SUTTON, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, P.J.
LEE, J.
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