State Of Washington, Resp. v. Raymel Curry, App. ( 2013 )


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  •                                                           JOURT Or APPEALS DiV 1
    STATE OF V/ASHINGTC?-;
    2013 APR-I   AH 8:1*5
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                            NO. 67409-9-1
    Respondent,                DIVISION ONE
    v.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    RAYMEL JABAR CURRY,
    Appellant.                 FILED: April 1,2013
    Leach, C.J. — Raymel Curry appeals his conviction for second degree
    assault.    He contends that the State violated his Sixth Amendment right to
    counsel when a psychologist questioned him without his counsel at an intake
    interview incident to his admission to Western State Hospital for a psychiatric
    evaluation.   Because the psychologist did not deliberately elicit any statement
    about the crime charged in the intake interview, we reject this claim. Curry also
    challenges several proposed jury instructions. Because his case was tried to the
    court, we also reject these challenges and affirm.
    FACTS
    On September 17, 2010, Raymel Curry assaulted a passenger exiting a
    King County Metro bus. Before the assault, Curry had been loud and disruptive,
    NO. 67409-9-1/2
    talking, cursing, and rapping aloud to himself. The bus's security cameras made
    an audio and video recording of this behavior. The video footage shows Curry
    yelling and making menacing hand gestures at the cameras and threatening the
    victim.    As the victim exits the front door of the bus, Curry exits behind him,
    punches him, and runs away.
    The State charged Curry with second degree assault, and Curry asserted
    an insanity defense.    Pursuant to a court order, Western State Hospital (WSH)
    admitted him for psychiatric evaluation on February 23, 2011. A multidisciplinary
    team of mental health providers, led by Dr. Amber Simpler, conducted an intake
    assessment with Curry on February 24.         This interview allows the doctors to
    develop a working diagnosis of the patient's mental condition and to identify
    safety concerns for the patient and staff. Simpler asked Curry standard intake
    questions about his social history, substance abuse, and psychiatric and medical
    history, as well as specific questions about symptoms of psychosis, such as
    paranoia and hallucinations. Curry indicated that while he used several different
    drugs, his favorite was sherm, a type of tobacco or marijuana cigarette dipped in
    formaldehyde or PCP (phencyclidine).      He stated that he usually smoked four
    "sticks" a day and that he had a special ability to hear other people's thoughts
    that only occurred when he was high on sherm. Simpler did not ask Curry about
    any details of the crime, and Curry did not volunteer any.
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    NO. 67409-9-1/3
    The court-ordered forensic evaluation took place on March 9 with Curry's
    defense counsel present.     Simpler also conducted that evaluation, which her
    supervisor, Dr. Ray Hendrickson, attended.         To prepare for the forensic
    evaluation, Simpler reviewed a copy of the discovery materials.          She then
    realized that some overlap existed between WSH's standard intake questions
    and the specifics of Curry's intoxication on the day of the attack.     During the
    forensic evaluation, Simpler asked Curry focused questions about his sherm use
    on the day of the assault and how it affected his thinking at the time. Her final
    forensic mental health report concluded,
    Mr. Curry reported he smoked two dipped cigarettes or "sherm"
    within two hours of getting on the Metro bus. He related he
    experienced hallucinations on the bus in the form of hearing the
    victim's thoughts that he perceived as threatening. Mr. Curry
    related these hallucinatory experiences only occur when he has
    smoked sherm. Because his hallucinations are directly induced by
    his voluntary ingestion of sherm, it would appear that insanity as a
    defense is not a viable strategy for Mr. Curry at this time.
    Curry moved to dismiss the charges or suppress Simpler's report and
    testimony. Simpler and Hendrickson testified at the hearing. Simpler stated that
    the drug use questions are necessary for safety concerns and that she could not
    have avoided them at the intake, even if she had known that drug use was an
    issue in the crime.   She also testified that in writing her forensic report, she
    considers all of the information gathered during the patient's stay, including both
    the forensic evaluation and the intake assessment. She noted that based solely
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    NO. 67409-9-1/4
    upon the March 9 interview, she would have reached the same conclusion about
    Curry's mental state. Hendrickson agreed that a psychologist reviews all aspects
    of the patient's behavior during the commitment as part of a final evaluation. The
    court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. Hendrickson
    testified for the State, and the court convicted Curry of assault. He appeals.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence under an
    abuse of discretion standard. The trial court's decision will be upheld unless it is
    manifestly unreasonable or is based upon untenable grounds or reasons.1 The
    trial court's credibility determinations are not subject to review on appeal.2
    However, whether a proceeding is a "critical stage" is a question of law subject to
    de novo review.3 Likewise, whether the State deliberately elicited incriminating
    statements from Curry is also a legal question, which we review de novo4
    ANALYSIS
    To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim, Curry must demonstrate two
    things—that the intake interview constituted a "'critical stage of the proceedings'"
    and that the psychologist who questioned him at the intake interview
    1State v. Stenson. 
    132 Wash. 2d 668
    , 701, 
    940 P.2d 1239
     (1997).
    2 In re Pers. Restraint of Benn. 
    134 Wash. 2d 868
    , 910, 952 P.2d 116(1998).
    3 State v. Irbv. 
    170 Wash. 2d 874
    , 880, 
    246 P.3d 796
     (2011).
    4 State v. Evervbodvtalksabout. 
    131 Wash. App. 227
    , 237-38, 
    126 P.3d 87
    (2006), rev'd on other grounds. 
    161 Wash. 2d 702
    , 
    166 P.3d 693
     (2007).
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    NO. 67409-9-1 / 5
    "'deliberately elicited'" information about the crime charged.5        Because the
    psychologist did not deliberately elicit information about the crime charged, we
    reject Curry's claim without deciding if the intake interview was a critical stage of
    the proceeding.
    Curry pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. To establish an insanity
    defense, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
    [a]t the time of the commission of the offense, as a result of mental
    disease or defect, the mind of the actor was affected to such an
    extent that:
    (a) He was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act
    with which he is charged; or
    (b) He was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the
    particular act charged.[61
    Under RCW 10.77.030, "[n]o condition of mind proximately induced by the
    voluntary act of a person charged with a crime shall constitute insanity." This
    includes mental conditions brought about by voluntary intoxication.7
    When a defendant claims insanity, the State may require him to submit to
    an expert psychiatric evaluation.8 That occurred here. Curry contends that the
    5 Evervbodvtalksabout. 161 Wn.2d at 709.
    6 Former RCW 9A. 12.010 (1975).
    7According to former RCW 9A.16.090 (1975),
    No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary
    intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his
    condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular
    mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular
    species or degree of crime, the fact of his intoxication may be
    taken into consideration in determining such mental state.
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    NO. 67409-9-1 / 6
    intake interview before his formal psychiatric evaluation at WSH violated his Sixth
    Amendment right to counsel.     He claims that the psychologist who questioned
    him, Simpler, deliberately elicited information about the crime during the intake.
    We disagree.
    Once the constitutional right to counsel has attached, the State violates
    the Sixth Amendment only when the State "deliberately elicit[s]" incriminating
    statements from the individual in defense counsel's absence.9 The State does
    so when it purposely stimulates conversation about the crime.10 In the intake
    interview, Simpler asked Curry about his past and present mental and physical
    health and about his past and present drug use. She asked follow-up questions
    about every drug Curry said he had used, including sherm, MDMA, cocaine, and
    hallucinogenic mushrooms. Curry volunteered that sherm was his favorite drug
    and that when he was high on sherm, he believed that he could hear people's
    thoughts.   He denied experiencing any other auditory or visual hallucinations.
    Curry makes no claim that Simpler questioned him about the crime during the
    intake interview.
    8 State v. Hutchinson. 
    135 Wash. 2d 863
    , 878, 
    959 P.2d 1061
     (1998)
    (Hutchinson III).
    9 Massiah v. United States. 
    377 U.S. 201
    , 206, 
    84 S. Ct. 1199
    , 
    12 L. Ed. 2d
     246 (1964); Evervbodvtalksabout 161 Wn.2d at 708-09.
    10 Evervbodvtalksabout, 161 Wn.2d at 708-09.
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    NO. 67409-9-1/7
    The trial court found some overlap in the information gained during the
    intake interview and the subsequent forensic evaluation but also found that
    Simpler asked the intake questions for valid safety purposes. Additionally, the
    court found that she did not ask about or intentionally encourage Curry to discuss
    any details of the crime charged. We agree with this assessment. The intake
    interview here was not an adversarial proceeding, and Simpler did not elicit or
    receive any information about the specifics of the crime.11 The State's actions
    did not violate Curry's Sixth Amendment right, and the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion by denying Curry's suppression motion.
    In a statement of additional grounds, Curry challenges the court's failure to
    provide jury instructions. However, the parties tried this case to a judge without a
    jury. "In a bench trial, no jury instructions are required."12 Indeed, there is no jury
    to instruct. Thus, Curry's claims fail.
    11 In fact, Simpler did not realize that Curry's drug use played a role in the
    crime until the day before the forensic evaluation when she received a copy of
    the discovery information and the defense expert's report.
    12 In re Pers. Restraint of Heidari. 
    159 Wash. App. 601
    , 609, 
    248 P.3d 550
    (2011), affd, 
    174 Wash. 2d 288
    , 
    274 P.3d 366
     (2012).
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    NO. 67409-9-1/8
    CONCLUSION
    Because Simpler did not deliberately elicit information about the assault
    during Curry's intake interview, his Sixth Amendment challenge fails.       Because
    Curry elected a bench trial, the court did not require jury instructions. We affirm.
    A^/e
    O
    WE CONCUR:
    czrf,J.
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