State Of Washington v. Harold Robert Marquette ( 2018 )


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  • IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,
    No. 77197-3-1
    Respondent,
    C.
    )
    DIVISION ONE                           -
    )
    V.                                                                   o         -
    o
    PUBLISHED OPINION                rn
    I
    HAROLD ROBERT MARQUETTE,
    -
    Appellant.                   FILED: December 17, 2018
    9?
    r.)
    APPELWICK, C.J. — A jury found Marquette guilty of possession of a stolen—,
    vehicle. He appeals the trial court's calculation of his offender score. He argues
    that a prior out-of-state conviction, which is not factually or legally comparable to
    a Washington criminal offense, and his subsequent confinement, do not interrupt
    the washout period under RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c). We reverse and remand to the
    trial court for resentencing.
    FACTS
    A jury found Harold Marquette guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle. At
    sentencing, the State introduced documents showing 10 convictions prior to 2007
    for class C felonies or equivalent crimes: 3 convictions for forgery(1988 and 1990),
    2 Washington convictions for taking a motor vehicle without permission (1990), 1
    conviction for second degree theft (1993), 1 conviction for attempting to elude a
    pursuing police vehicle (1994), 1 conviction for third degree assault of a child
    No. 77197-3-1/2
    (1996), and 2 California convictions for taking a motor vehicle without permission
    (2001 and 2004).
    The State also introduced evidence that, following these 10 convictions, on
    May 4, 2007, Marquette pleaded guilty in Shasta County, California to 2 counts of
    lewd or lascivious acts with a child under 14 years old. The California court
    sentenced Marquette to 9 years of confinement. It granted him credit for 286 actual
    days in custody, plus 42 days for "custody conduct credit."
    At sentencing in this case, the trial court determined that Marquette's 2007
    California offenses of lewd and lascivious conduct could not be included in his
    Washington offender score.      But, the court agreed with the State that the
    noncomparable California offense had "resulted in conviction and . . . significant
    incarceration," and therefore prevented washout of any of his previous offenses
    under RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c). The court therefore counted all 10 of the other felony
    convictions towards the offender score. Since the 4 convictions for taking a motor
    vehicle counted triple, his offender score was 18. RCW 9.94A.525(20). The court
    sentenced Marquette to a standard range sentence of 56 months of confinement.
    Marquette appeals
    DISCUSSION
    The key issue in this case is whether an out-of-state conviction can prevent
    washout of a defendant's prior felony convictions under RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c).
    The issue is a question of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law this
    court reviews de novo. State v. Ervin 
    169 Wn.2d 815
    , 820, 
    239 P.3d 354
     (2010).
    When interpreting a statute, the court's objective is to determine the legislature's
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    No. 77197-3-1/3
    intent. State v Jones, 
    172 Wn.2d 236
    , 242, 
    257 P.3d 616
     (2011). We give effect
    to the statute's plain meaning when it can be determined from the statute's text.
    
    Id.
     If the statute is still susceptible to more than one interpretation after we conduct
    a plain meaning review, then the statute is ambiguous and we rely on statutory
    construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to determine legislative
    intent. 
    Id.
    RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c) governs when class C felony convictions may be
    included in a person's offender score. That statute provides, in relevant part,
    [glass C prior felony convictions . . . shall not be included in the
    offender score if, since the last date of release from confinement.
    pursuant to a felony conviction, if any, or entry of judgment and
    sentence, the offender had spent five consecutive years in the
    community without committing any crime that subsequently results
    in a conviction.
    RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c). In construing this section, our courts have broken it down
    into two clauses: a "'trigger" clause, which identifies the beginning of the five year
    period, and a "continuity/interruption" clause, which sets forth the substantive
    requirements an offender must satisfy during the five year period.1 Ervin, 
    169 Wn.2d at 821
     (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Nichols, 
    120 Wn. App. 425
    , 432, 
    85 P.3d 955
     (2004)).
    Marquette argues that he must be resentenced, because the trial court
    improperly calculated his offender score by failing to recognize that his prior felony
    1 A conviction for any crime which interrupts the five year period, does not
    simply pause the running of that period during incarceration, it starts a new five
    year period running upon return to the community. See Ervin 
    169 Wn.2d at 821
    ("Because Ervin was then convicted, this crime implicated the
    continuity/interruption clause, effectively resetting the five-year clock.").
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    No. 77197-3-1/4
    convictions "washed out" pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c). He argues that only
    an offense that is comparable to a Washington crime can interrupt the washout
    period for felonies under RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c). And, he asserts that, because his
    2007 California conviction is not factually comparable to a Washington crime, the
    washout period for his earlier convictions ran from his 2007 release from felony
    confinement, and therefore he must be resentenced based on an offender score
    of zero.
    The State disagrees with Marquette's framing of the case. It does not
    address the "continuity/interruption" clause argument. Instead it argues the issue
    involves application of the "trigger" clause of the statute. The State asserts that
    the trigger date is Marquette's 2015 release from custody in California for the lewd
    or lascivious offense. It argues that, because Marquette was confined in California
    for over a year, this satisfies the definition of a felony in RCW 9A.04.040(2).
    It is the sole province of our state legislature to define criminal conduct in
    our state. See Mclnturf v. Horton, 
    85 Wn.2d 704
    , 706, 
    538 P.2d 499
    (1975)("The
    power to decide what acts shall be criminal, to define crimes, and to provide what
    the penalty shall be is legislative."). It defined crimes and classes of crimes:
    (1)     An offense defined by this title or by any other statute
    of this state, for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized,
    constitutes a crime. Crimes are classified as felonies, gross
    misdemeanors, or misdemeanors.
    (2)     A crime is a felony if it is so designated in this title or by
    any other statute of this state or if persons convicted thereof may be
    sentenced to imprisonment for a term in excess of one year.
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    No. 77197-3-1/5
    RCW 9A.04.040. The plain language of this statute does not encompass crimes
    defined by the law of other states or federal law that are not crimes under
    Washington law.
    By contrast, when the legislature was addressing scoring offenses not
    committed in Washington for purposes of sentencing, it specifically addressed how
    to treat out-of-state convictions and federal convictions:
    Out-of-state convictions for offenses shall be classified according to
    the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by
    Washington law. Federal convictions for offenses shall be classified
    according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences
    provided by Washington law. If there is no clearly comparable
    offense under Washington law or the offense is one that is usually
    considered subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, the offense shall
    be scored as a class C felony equivalent if it was a felony under the
    relevant federal statute.
    RCW 9.94A.525(3). The test for whether out-of-state crimes are also crimes in
    Washington—comparable crimes—is addressed in State v. Morley, 
    134 Wn.2d 588
    , 
    952 P.2d 167
    (1998)and In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 
    154 Wn.2d 249
    , 
    111 P.3d 837
     (2005). The court uses a two-part test. Lavery 
    154 Wn.2d at 255
    .
    First, the court analyzes legal comparability by comparing the elements of
    the out-of-state offense to the most comparable Washington offense. Morley 
    134 Wn.2d at 605-06
    . Here, the parties agreed that Marquette's 2007 offense did not
    satisfy the legal prong of the test.
    Second, if the offenses are not legally comparable, the court analyzes
    factual comparability. See Lavery 
    154 Wn.2d at 255-57
    . Offenses are factually
    comparable when the defendant's conduct would have violated a Washington
    statute. Morley 
    134 Wn.2d at 606
    . The court may rely on only facts that were
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    No. 77197-3-1/6
    admitted, stipulated, or proved to the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Lavery 154 Wn 2d at 258. The State concedes that Marquette's guilty plea did
    not include facts that would make the offense comparable to child molestation in
    Washington. And, at sentencing, the trial court agreed with Marquette that, under
    Lavery it could not look beyond the facts acknowledged in the guilty plea. Thus,
    the second prong of the test was not satisfied either.
    The trial court applied that test and properly concluded that Marquette's
    2007 lewd and lascivious conviction is not comparable to any Washington crime.
    But, the court then agreed with the State that the noncomparable California offense
    had "resulted in conviction and . . . significant incarceration," and therefore
    prevented washout of any of his previous offenses under RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c).
    This was error.
    While the length of imprisonment referenced in RCW 9A.04.040(2) may
    make a crime a felony as opposed to a misdemeanor, the threshold question is
    whether the conduct is in fact a crime—a crime recognized under Washington
    law—not merely conduct that is criminal in nature. RCW 9A.04.040(1); RCW
    9.94A.525(3). That determination is properly made under the comparability
    analysis. Under the comparability analysis, Marquette's crime in California was
    not a crime—let alone a felony crime—in Washington. Therefore, the State's
    argument that because Marquette's 2007 California conviction resulted in a
    sentence for more than a year, the underlying crime is a felony for purposes of the
    "trigger" clause, fails.
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    No. 77197-3-1/7
    For the same reason, Marquette's argument, that the California offense is
    not comparable to a Washington crime and does not interrupt the washout period,
    is correct. The issue is addressed in State v. Crocker, 
    196 Wn. App. 730
    , 
    385 P.3d 197
    (2016). In Crocker, the defendant had an Oregon drug conviction from March
    2000, and an Oregon offensive littering conviction from September 2009. Id. at
    733. The issue was whether the defendant's 2009 Oregon offensive littering
    conviction prevented his 2000 drug conviction from washing out under RCW
    9.94A.525(2)(c). Id at 734. On appeal, this court stated,
    When our legislature enacted the offender score statute, RCW
    9.94A.525, it intended to "[treat] defendants with equivalent prior
    convictions in the same way, regardless of whether their prior
    convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere." Therefore,
    the legislature's intent that offenders be treated the same way
    applies equally to the washout provision. When an out-of-state
    conviction is alleged to interrupt the washout period under RCW
    9.94A.525(2)(c), the trial court must determine whether the out-of-
    state crime or conviction is legally or factually comparable to a
    Washington offense.
    Id at 736 (alteration in original)(footnote omitted)(citation omitted)(quoting State
    v. Weiand, 
    66 Wn. App. 29
    , 34, 
    831 P.2d 749
     (1992)). The parties agreed that
    Crocker's Oregon offensive littering conviction was not legally or factually
    comparable to a Washington felony or misdemeanor, and the only comparable
    Washington offense was a civil infraction. Id at 736-37. Therefore, this court held
    that the out-of-state conviction was not "any crime" that interrupted the washout
    period. Id. at 737.
    Here, the trial court correctly concluded that the 2007 California conviction
    was not comparable to a Washington crime, and therefore could not be included
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    No. 77197-3-1/8
    in his offender score. Under the same reasoning, that crime is not a comparable
    Washington crime for purposes of the washout statute—for either the trigger
    clause or the continuity/interruption clause.   It would be incongruous if only
    "comparable" out-of-state crimes are adequate to commence a washout period by
    virtue of the commission of a continuity/interruption "crime" (consistent with
    Crocker and Ervin), but a "noncomparable" out-of-state felony may trigger a
    washout period by virtue of a release from confinement pursuant to a "felony
    conviction."   As a result, the trial court erred in finding that the substantial
    incarceration of the noncomparable California conviction precluded washout under
    RCW 9.94A.525.
    Further, in supplemental briefing, Marquette argues that, because of his
    indigence, the trial court erred under State v. Ramirez      Wn.2d      , 
    426 P.3d 714
    (2018)in imposing discretionary legal financial fees. On remand, the trial court
    should reconsider the criminal filing fee and criminal lab fee imposed on Marquette
    in light of Ramirez.
    We reverse and remand to the trial court for resentencing.
    WE CONCUR:
    Ala,T.
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