State of Washington v. Paul Scott Bickle ( 2014 )

FILED
SEPT 9,2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 32286-6-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
PAUL S. BICKLE, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - Paul Bickle challenges the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty,
arguing that the trial court violated the appearance of fairness doctrine. We affmn.
FACTS
In March 2010, Paul Bickle went on a crime spree involving multiple thefts and
burglaries in Lewis County. Mr. Bickle got away and continued his crime spree in
Whitman County. After executing a search warrant of Mr. Bickle's Whitman County
residence, law enforcement discovered property that connected Mr. Bickle to the Lewis
County crimes. Following his arrest in Whitman County, Lewis County charged Mr.
Bickle with two counts of theft ofa motor vehicle, one count of theft in the first degree,
one count of theft in the second degree, and one count of second degree burglary.
No. 32286-6-111
State v. Bickle
Mr. Bickle agreed to plead guilty to the charges. In exchange, the Lewis County
prosecutor agreed to recommend a sentence that would run concurrent to the one that Mr.
Bickle was already serving from Whitman County. In his Statement of Defendant on
Plea of Guilty, Mr. Bickle acknowledged that he knew that the court did not have to
follow anyone's sentencing recommendations. He also acknowledged that he was not
promised anything else in exchange for pleading guilty and that he was not threatened or
otherwise coerced into pleading guilty. At the plea hearing, the court reiterated and re-
obtained Mr. Bickle's acknowledgement that the court was not bound by anyone's
sentencing recommendation. The court then accepted the guilty plea.
The court then sentenced Mr. Bickle to the high end of the standard range as
recommended by the parties. However, the court rejected the State's recommendation for
the sentence to be served concurrently with the Whitman County sentence. Upon hearing
that he would be serving consecutive sentences, Mr. Bickle interrupted the proceeding
and tried to withdraw his guilty plea. The court responded, "I don't want to hear another
word out of you. If you do, we will figure out a way to make it longer." Report of
Proceedings (Feb. 16,2011) at 15.
Mr. Bickle subsequently filed a CrR 7.8 motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
alleging that he did not voluntarily plead guilty. Mr. Bickle claimed that his counsel
promised him that the court would agree to the recommendation, that the jail guard
threatened him into pleading guilty, and that the judge's threat to increase the sentence
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No. 32286-6-111
State v. Bickle
was coerCIve. At the hearing on the motion, Mr. Bickle also claimed that his lawyer told
him that the court did not have the power to give him a different sentence.
The court rejected these arguments as baseless and contradicted by the Statement
of Defendant on Plea of Guilty. Mr. Bickle thereafter timely appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Bickle raises three issues on appeal. He first argues that the sentencing court
violated the appearance of fairness doctrine when it responded to his outburst during
sentencing. He next argues that the lower court abused its discretion when it denied his
CrR 7.8 motion. Finally, he argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance during
the plea stage. We address each of these arguments in tum.
Mr. Bickle failed to raise the first issue at the court below. Thus, we review this
issue only for a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3).
The appearance of fairness doctrine has its roots in the due process and fair trial
provisions of the United States Constitution. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136,
75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955). However, Mr. Bickle has failed to prove that the
judge's threat violated the appearance of fairness doctrine.
The appearance of fairness doctrine asks whether "a reasonably prudent,
disinterested observer would conclude that the parties received a fair, impartial, and
neutral hearing." State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161,187,225 P.3d 973 (2010). Although
the judge became short with Mr. Bickle after his outburst, the circumstances of the
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No. 32286-6-II1
State v. Bickle
hearing were not such that a disinterested observer would have believed that Mr. Bickle
did not receive a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.
The threat did not occur until after Mr. Bickle had received his sentence and
interrupted the hearing. Until that point, the judge (and the hearing in general) had been
nothing but cordial. "This statement showed some agitation no doubt. Above all, it
showed that a judge is a human being, not the type of unfeeling robot some would expect
the judge to be. Such a passing display of exasperation ... falls far short of a reasonable
cause for disqualification for bias or prejudice." Keppel v. BaRoss Builders, Inc.,
7 Conn. App. 435, 444, 509 A.2d 51 (1986). Thus, without more evidence of a bias
against Mr. Bickle personally, we cannot conclude based on a single short-tempered
statement that the judge violated the appearance of fairness.
Mr. Bickle next argues that the lower court erred when it denied his CrR 7.8
motion. This court reviews a decision on a CrR 7.8 motion for abuse of discretion.
State v. Hardesty, 129 Wn.2d 303, 317, 915 P.2d 1080 (1996). Because Mr. Bickle's
argument is based on his bare assertions of coercion and promises, despite earlier
statements to the contrary, we reject his argument. A defendant's denial of being coerced
or promised anything during a plea ~earing is, although not conclusive, highly persuasive
evidence against a later claim of coercion and false promises. State v. Osborne,
102 Wn.2d 87, 97, 684 P.2d 683 (1984) ("More should be required to overcome this
'highly persuasive' evidence ofvoluntariness than a mere allegation by the defendant.").
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No. 32286-6-III
State v. Bickle
Mr. Bickle's last argument involves a claim of ineffective assistance of counseL
An ineffective assistance claim requires the defendant bear the burden of showing that his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there
is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance the result would
have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
In support of his argument, Mr. Bickle relies on his same baseless assertions that
his counsel misrepresented the sentencing court's ability to give him a consecutive
sentence. Generally, a defendant's self-serving statement alleging ineffective assistance
is insufficient by itself to overcome the presumption of effective assistance.
State v. Conley, 121 Wn. App. 280, 287,87 P.3d 1221 (2004). Accordingly, Mr. Bickle
has failed to establish his counsel's deficient performance.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Lawrence- errey, J.
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