In Re The Marriage Of: Francisco Antonio Castillos, App. And Ilhamiye Duyar Castillos, Res. ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 73117-3-1
FRANCISCO A. CASTILLOS,
Appellant,
and
ORDER DENYING MOTION
ISABELLA CASTILLOS, TO PUBLISH, WITHDRAWING &
REPLACING OPINION
Respondent.
Respondent filed a motion to publish the court's opinion filed November 16,
2015. Appellant filed an answer. The court has considered the motion and determined
that the motion to publish should be denied and that the opinion should be withdrawn
and a replacement opinion filed.
The opinion has been changed by adding a sentence and footnote on page 5
after the first sentence of the first full paragraph as follows:
The trial court did not mention or make any findings on an alternative
equity-based approach for an award of fees under RCW 26.09.140.14
14 See Matter of Marriage of Van Camp. 82 Wn. App. 339, 342, 918 P.2d
509 (1996) (trial court was not required to apply lodestar method in
determining an award of attorney fees in dissolution case under
RCW 26.09.140); In re Guardianship of Decker, 188 Wn. App. 429, 446-
47, 353 P.3d 669, review denied. 184 Wn.2d 1015, 360 P.3d 818 (2015)
(trial court was not required to conduct a lodestar analysis in determining
an award of attorney fees as costs when determining compensation under
the guardianship statute). Here, the court did not enter any findings
applying either a lodestar analysis or equitable considerations in awarding
attorney fees.
No. 73117-3-1/2
Now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that respondent's motion to publish is denied. It is further
ORDERED that the opinion of this court filed November 16, 2015 is withdrawn
and a replacement opinion filed with the revisions noted above. ^
cT
Dated this JTclav of January, 2016.
tP
£zt7< J«
Order Denying Motion to Publish,
Withdrawing and Replacing Opinion - 2
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 73117-3-1
r-o
FRANCISCO A. CASTILLOS,
Appellant,
and
ISABELLA CASTILLOS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION CO
Respondent. FILED: January 19, 2016
Verellen, A.C.J. — A trial court generally determines the amount of an
attorney fee award based upon a lodestar calculation of reasonable hours and
reasonable rates. Here, the trial court decided that the award of requested fees was
reasonable, pending the filing of counsel's fee declaration. Counsel filed a fee
declaration, but it is not clear that the superior court commissioner analyzed the
reasonable hours or reasonable rates or even reviewed the declaration. Therefore,
we reverse the judgment awarding fees and remand to develop an adequate record
with adequate findings in support of an award of fees.
FACTS
Isabella and Francisco Castillos married in 1981.1 On July 6, 2012, after a
two-day trial, a decree of dissolution was entered dissolving their marriage. The trial
For clarity, we refer to the Castillos by their first names.
No. 73117-3-1/2
court ordered Francisco to pay $2,500 in spousal maintenance on or before the 15th
of each month.
On November 21, 2014, Isabella filed a "Motion/Declaration for an Order to
Show Cause Re Contempt" in King County Superior Court after Francisco failed to
pay the November spousal maintenance.2 In addition to back maintenance, she
requested that Francisco prepare a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) and
that the court enter a judgment for her attorney fees in the amount of $7,728.56.
At the show cause hearing on January 16, 2015, Francisco argued the
superior court should consider his December 15, 2014 petition to modify spousal
maintenance in determining the amount of spousal maintenance owed. But the
superior court refused to consider the petition without proof of service. In response,
Francisco's attorney attempted to serve Isabella in court. But the superior court
commissioner disallowed such service, stating, "When a judicial officer sits on the
bench, you may serve nobody without asking the person sitting on the bench. And
we're not going to do that now."3
Next, Francisco argued that Isabella had "not shown any basis for the
calculation of attorney's fees."4 He also told the court, "The [QDRO] is being done.
That is in the works. Itjust takes the federal government a long time to finally do that.
But that is in the works and I don't know that [Isabella,] if she's received it or not, but
she should receive it."5
2 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 25-28.
3 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Jan. 16, 2015) at 9.
4 CP at 65.
5RP(Jan. 16, 2015) at 11.
No. 73117-3-1/3
The commissioner found that Francisco intentionally failed to comply with the
spousal maintenance award and ordered him to pay back maintenance in the amount
of $7,500 for the months of November and December 2014 and January 2015.
In the January 16, 2015 order on show cause, the commissioner entered
findings and conclusions that the requested attorney fees were "reasonable" and
ordered Francisco pay "for reasonable/fair fees" in the amount of $7,728.56, "pending
filing of [Isabella's] counsel's declaration re fees, which shall be provided to counsel
and court."6 The commissioner also ordered Francisco to prepare a QDRO for his
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) retirement plan.
On January 23, 2015, Isabella's attorney filed her "Declaration re Fees on
Motion for Contempt of Court."7 The declaration itemized the time incurred and the
hourly rate charged. There is no indication that the commissioner reviewed the
declaration.
Francisco appeals the January 16, 2015 award of Isabella's attorney fees.
ANALYSIS
First, Isabella argues the January 16, 2015 judgment was not a final judgment
and therefore is not appealable. But her argument is not compelling. Substance
controls over form when analyzing whether an order constitutes a final judgment.8
The January 16, 2015 award is in the form of a judgment, including an express award
6 CP at 91-92.
7 CP at 103.
8 Rhodesv.D&D Enters.. Inc.. 16 Wn. App. 175, 177, 554 P.2d 390 (1976)
(for appeal purposes, in determining whether particular judicial determination is an
order, final judgment, or final order, substance controls over form and "the court looks
to the content of a document rather than its title").
No. 73117-3-1/4
of fees in the amount of $7,728.56, and a judgment summary. More important, the
award is a judgment in substance. A judgment is final and therefore appealable
"even if it directs performance of certain subsidiary acts in carrying out the judgment,
the right to the benefit of which is adjudicated in that judgment."9 Here, the pending
filing of a fee declaration provision functions as a subsidiary act to the award of fees.
Further, Isabella argues that a subsequent ruling enforcing the judgment was the
actual final judgment. The necessary premise of her argument is that the notice of
appeal was premature. But even under her theory, such a premature notice of
appeal would be effective. RAP 5.2(g) provides that "[a] notice of appeal... filed
after the announcement of a decision but before entry of the decision will be treated
as filed on the day following the entry of the decision." Even ifthe subsequent order
on enforcement is considered the entry of the final judgment awarding attorney fees,
the January 16 order announced that decision, and the notice of appeal is effective.
We conclude the January 16, 2015 award of attorney fees is appealable.
Second, Francisco argues the superior court commissioner "completely failed
to review any declaration or evidentiary basis before entering a judgmentfor the full
amount of fees sought" by Isabella.10 We agree.
This court reviews an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.11
Discretion is abused when the superior court exercises it "on untenable grounds or
9 Wlasiukv. Whirlpool Corp.. 76 Wn. App. 250, 255, 884 P.2d 13 (1994).
10 Appellant's Br. at 5.
11 Estrada v. McNultv. 98 Wn. App. 717, 723, 988 P.2d 492 (1999).
No. 73117-3-1/5
for untenable reasons. The burden of demonstrating that a fee is reasonable is upon
the fee applicant."12
Generally, Washington courts apply the lodestar method to calculate attorney
fees.13 The trial court did not mention or make any findings on an alternative equity-
based approach for an award of fees under RCW 26.09.140.14 To arrive at a
lodestar award, the court first considers the number of hours "'reasonably expended
on the matter.'"15 To this end, the attorney "'must provide reasonable documentation
of the work performed,'" including the number of hours worked, type of work
performed, and category of attorney who performed the work.16 The awarding court
should discount hours "spent on unsuccessful claims, duplicated effort, or otherwise
unproductive time."17
12 Berrvman v. Metcalf. 177 Wn. App. 644, 657, 312 P.3d 745 (2013) review
denied sub nom. Berrvman v. Farmers Ins. Co.. 179 Wn. 2d 1026, 320 P.3d 718(2014) (citation omitted).
13 Mahler v. Szucs. 135 Wn.2d 398, 433, 957 P.2d 632 (1998), overruled on
other grounds by Matsvuk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 173 Wn.2d 643, 272 P.3d
802(2012).
14 See Matter of Marriage of Van Camp. 82 Wn. App. 339, 342, 918 P.2d 509(1996) (trial court was not required to apply lodestar method in determining an award
of attorney fees in dissolution case under RCW 26.09.140); In re Guardianship of
Decker. 188 Wn. App. 429, 446-47, 353 P.3d 669, review denied. 184 Wn.2d 1015,
360 P.3d 818 (2015) (trial court was not required to conduct a lodestar analysis in
determining an award of attorney fees as costs when determining compensation
under the guardianship statute). Here, the court did not enter any findings applying
either a lodestar analysis or equitable considerations in awarding attorney fees.
15 McGreevv v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 90 Wn. App. 283, 291, 951 P .2d 798 (1998)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks. 122 Wn.2d 141, 149, 859
P.2d 1210 (1993)).
16 \± at 292 (quoting Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co.. 100 Wn.2d 581,
597, 675P.2d 193(1983)).
17 Id.No. 73117-3-1/6
Next, the court determines if the hourly fee charged was reasonable.18 The
attorney's usual fee is not conclusively reasonable and may require an adjustment.19
Then the court multiples the reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number
of hours expended on the litigation to produce the lodestar fee.20 After the lodestar
figure is calculated, the court may consider an adjustment based on additional
factors.21
"Courts must take an active role in assessing the reasonableness of fee
awards, rather than treating cost decisions as a litigation afterthought. Courts should
not simply accept unquestioningly fee affidavits from counsel."22 The trial court "must
supply findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to permit a reviewing court to
determine why the trial court awarded the amount in question."23
While a superior court "does not need to deduct hours here and there just to
prove to the appellate court that it has taken an active role in assessing the
reasonableness of a fee request[,]" the court's "findings must do more than give lip
service to the word 'reasonable.' The findings must show how the court resolved
disputed issues offact and the conclusions must explain the court's analysis."24 The
18 Id, at 291.
19 Id,
20 Id,
21 Id,; Mahler. 135 Wn.2d at 434.
22 Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at 434-35.
23 SentinelC3. Inc. v. Hunt. 181 Wn.2d 127, 144, 331 P.3d 40 (2014).
24 Berrvman. 177 Wn. App. at 658.
No. 73117-3-1/7
"absence of an adequate record upon which to review a fee award will result in a
remand of the award to the trial court to develop such a record."25
Here, the superior court entered a conclusory finding that the requested fees
were reasonable. The court then ordered Francisco to pay the amount of attorney
fees requested by Isabella "pending filing of counsel's declaration [regarding] fees,
which shall be provided to counsel and court."26 But there is no indication the
superior court commissioner actively and independently confronted the question of
what was a reasonable fee either before or after counsel's fee declaration was filed.
Moreover, there is no evidence the commissioner even reviewed the declaration.
Therefore, it does not appear the superior court meaningfully reviewed the basis of
the calculation of Isabella's attorney fees. The superior court simply accepted
Isabella's requested attorney fees before considering her attorney's documentation of
the work performed.
On this record, the superior court's findings are inadequate to support a
determination that the requested fees are reasonable. We reverse the award and
remand for the entry of findings offact and conclusions of law that explain the basis
for an award of fees.
Third, Francisco argues this court should "vacate the requirement" that he
draft a QDRO because the QDRO has already been filed.27 Confusingly, Francisco
did not represent that a QDRO had already been filed at the show cause hearing.
25 Mahler. 135 Wn.2d at 435.
26 CP at 92.
27 Appellant's Br. at 19.
No. 73117-3-1/8
Instead, Francisco told the superior court "[t]he [QDRO] is being done. That is in the
works."28 Regardless, the key point is that a QDRO for Francisco's FAA retirement
plan had been filed in 2012.29 This court will not entertain an appeal of an issue
where no effective relief can be given.30 The issue is moot.31
Fourth, Francisco assigns error to the superior court commissioner's decision
not to consider the filing of his petition to modify spousal support. Here, the superior
court commissioner reviewed the clerk's electronic court records and determined
there was no proof that Francisco had served Isabella with the petition to modify.
Francisco still urged the superior court to consider his petition, arguing that Isabella's
attorney "was aware of it; I've raised that defense earlier in the response [to the
motion for contempt] when I was contacted."32 But because Francisco's service of
process was deficient, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
consider the unserved petition.
Fifth, Francisco argues the commissioner improperly provided Isabella
immunity from service of process at the show cause hearing. We disagree.
The superior court "is generally in the best position to perceive and structure
its own proceedings."33 Accordingly, a superior court "has broad discretion to make a
variety of trial management decisions, ranging from 'the mode and order of
28RP(Jan. 16, 2015) at 11.
29 See CP at 19-22.
30 Orwick v. City of Seattle. 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984).
31 Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham. 55 Wn. App. 706, 709, 780 P.2d 272(1989).
32RP(Jan. 16, 2015) at 10.
33 State v. Dve. 178 Wn.2d 541, 547, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013).
8
No. 73117-3-1/9
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence' to provisions for the order and
security of the courtroom."34 In order to effectuate the superior court's discretion, this
court grants the superior court broad discretion.35 We will not reverse unless such a
decision is "'manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable
reasons.'"36
Here, it was within the superior court's discretion to refuse to allow Francisco's
attorney to serve Isabella during the show cause hearing. Francisco had alternate
methods of service available to him. On appeal, Francisco relies on several cases
concerning the "privilege of service of process immunity."37 But neither Isabella nor
her attorney asserted a claim of immunity at the hearing. Rather, the superior court
commissioner simply refused to allow the service in her courtroom and limited the
hearing to the motion for show cause regarding contempt. Because the superior
court commissioner has discretion to control proceedings in her courtroom, we reject
Francisco's argument.
Finally, Francisco argues he is entitled to attorney fees based on his need and
Isabella's ability to pay. Under RCW 26.09.140, this court has the discretion to order
a party to pay the other party's attorney fees associated with the appeal of a
dissolution action. "In exercising our discretion, we consider the arguable merit of the
34 jd, at 547-48 (quoting ER 611 (a)).
35 id, at 548.
36 jd, (quoting In re Marriage of Littlefield. 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d
1362(1997)).
37 Appellant's Br. at 12-19 (citing Anderson v. Ivarsson. 77 Wn.2d 391, 462
P.2d 914 (1969); Warner v. Kresslv. 9 Wn. App. 358, 512 P.2d 1116 (1973);
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis, v. Hitchcock. 158 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mo. 1958);
Northern Light Tech.. Inc. v. Northern Lights Club. 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001)).
No. 73117-3-1/10
issues on appeal and the parties' financial resources."38 In order for us to consider
their financial resources, both parties must file financial affidavits no later than 10
days before the date the case is set for consideration on the merits.39 Because
Francisco has not timely filed a financial affidavit and because the ultimate question
of the amount of fees remains to be resolved on remand, we decline to award
Francisco any fees on appeal.40
We reverse the January 16, 2015 judgment awarding attorney fees of
$7,728.56 and remand to develop an adequate record with findings in support of an
award of fees.
WE CONCUR:
38 In re Marriage of C.M.C.. 87 Wn. App. 84, 89, 940 P.2d 669 (1997).
39 RAP 18.1(c) ([E]ach party must serve upon the other and file a financial
affidavit no later than 10 days prior to the date the case is set for oral argument or
consideration on the merits. . .. Any answer to an affidavit of financial need must be
filed and served within 7 days after service of the affidavit.).
40 RAP 18.1; In re Marriage of Crosetto. 82 Wn. App. 545, 565-66, 918 P.2d
954 (1996). Isabella's request for fees on appeal is denied because she is not the
prevailing party on appeal.
10