State Of Washington v. Jesse Thomas Fuller ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 74143-8-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JESSE THOMAS FULLER,
Appellant. FILED: December 27, 2016
Appelwick, J. — Fuller appeals his conviction for two counts of rape of a
child in the first degree. The six year old victim was a key witness at trial, but her
in-court testimony was difficult to hear. Fuller argues that the trial court erred by
allowing a transcript ofthe victim's testimony to be read to the jury. He also alleges
that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument. We affirm.
FACTS
A.M.F. told her mother that her father, Jesse Fuller, had been making her
engage in sex acts with him. A.M.F. was four years old at the time. The King
County Sheriff's Office was notified, and Fuller was charged with two counts of
rape of a minor in the first degree.
At trial, A.M.F. testified about the sexual abuse. The testimony was difficult
to hear, and the prosecutor had to ask A.M.F. numerous times to speak up. The
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court provided A.M.F. with a microphone. The court noted that the jurors and the
court alike had difficulties hearing her testimony. During deliberations, the jury
asked, "Can we get a copy of the transcript of [A.M.F.j's testimony because we
had a very hard time hearing her." Instead of providing the jury with a copy of the
transcript, the trial court ordered a transcript of A.M.F.'s testimony be read to the
jury a single time by a bailiff from another chambers.
The jury found Fuller guilty on two counts of rape of a child in the first
degree. Fuller appeals.
DISCUSSION
Fuller makes three arguments. First, he argues that the trial court erred by
allowing a transcript of the victim's previous testimony to be read to the jury.
Second, he argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing
arguments. Finally, he argues that even if thesetwo errors do not warrant reversal
on their own, they amount to cumulative error.
I. Reading testimony to jury
Fuller first argues thatthe trial court erred by ordering a transcript ofA.M.F.'s
testimony to be read to the jury due to the difficulty in hearing A.M.F.'s original
testimony.1 He contends that this overemphasized the child victim's testimony and
denied Fuller the right to a fair and impartial jury.
1 The State also admitted as exhibits two videos of A.M.F. In one video, she tells
her mother about Fuller sexually abusing her. The second video is her interview
with a child interview specialist. The jury was permitted to review them in the jury
room. But, Fuller has not alleged any error regarding the jury's review of those
videos in the jury room. We therefore limit our analysis to only the trial court's
decision to have a transcript of A.M.F.'s testimony read to the jury.
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We will overturn a trial court's decision to allow a jury to review testimony
only if we find that the trial court abused its discretion. See State v. Morqensen,
148 Wash. App. 81, 87, 197 P.3d 715 (2008). Reviewing testimony during
deliberations is disfavored, and must be weighed against the danger that the jury
may place undue emphasis on testimony considered a second time at such a late
stage of the trial. State v. Koontz, 145 Wash. 2d 650, 654, 41 P.3d 475 (2002). But,
whether a jury may rehear testimony is dependent on the particular facts and
circumstances of a case. ]d.
Fuller relies primarily on two Washington cases. First, he relies on Koontz.
In that case, our Supreme Court held that replaying video of three witnesses'
testimony was reversible error because of the possibility of "undue emphasis" on
certain portions of testimony. \_± at 660-61, 657. The Court reasoned that courts
should balance the needs for reviewing the testimony with procedural safeguards,
such as limiting the amount oftimes the jury can review the video, to prevent juries
from overemphasizing the evidence. Id at 657. And, the Court was careful to note
that the "unique nature ofvideotaped testimony" made replaying video for the jury
especially concerning, and motivated its decision to reverse. Id, at 657, 659-61
Fuller argues that, under Koontz, reading a transcript to the jury is "a poorer
substitute" than reviewing live testimony via video, and therefore reading a
transcript should raise greater concern than the jury reviewing a video. But, this
directly contradicts the Koontz reasoning, "Reviewing videotaped testimony raises
greater concerns than reading from a transcript because videotaped testimony
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allows the jury to hear and see more than the factual elements contained in a
transcript." lcLat655.
Although Koontz establishes that rereading transcribed testimony is less
concerning than replaying video, any second presentation of testimony is
"disfavored." jU at 654. But, Koontz does not say it is prohibited. See jU And, in
such situations, it is important for the trial court to take "the proper precautions to
address the concerns raised in Koontz." Morqensen. 148 Wash. App. at 88-89
(holding that trial court "took the proper precautions," such as inviting authority and
arguments from the parties on balancing the concerns raised in Koontz, and
replaying audio only once instead of giving the jury a transcript during
deliberations.). Here, the trial court first invited the parties to submit authority on
the issues so that its decision on the jury's request was properly informed. After
deciding to have the testimony reread, the trial court specifically reminded the jury
that it must take into account all of the evidence presented, and not just the reread
testimony:
Ladies and gentlemen, you've asked to rehear the testimony
of [A.M.F.].
After consulting with the attorneys, Iam granting your request.
In making this decision, I want to emphasize that I'm making
no comment on the value or weight to be given to any particular
testimony in this case. The testimony you requested will be read to
you here in the courtroom. You will hear it only one time.
After you've heard the testimony, you will return to the jury
room to resume deliberations. When you - when you do, remember
that your deliberations must take into account all of the evidence in
the case, not just the testimony that you have asked to rehear.
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And, it did not grant the jury's initial request to "get a copy of the transcript," but
instead took the more careful approach of allowing the transcripts to be read to the
jury a single time in open court. The trial court applied the types of protections that
Koontz contemplates.
Fuller also relies on in State v. Monroe, 107 Wash. App. 637, 27 P.3d 1249
(2001). There, a jurywas permitted to read a witness's transcribed testimony while
in the jury box, but was not allowed to reference the transcript in deliberations, jd.
at 640. The court reversed Monroe's conviction, because the trial court expressed
no concern for the possibility of undue emphasis of the testimony, jd. at 645-46.
And, the manner of review—review in the jury box—overemphasized that
testimony. \_± at 640, 643, 645. But, the facts of that case are critically different:
the jury in Monroe could review the transcripts at will in the jury box, but in this
case the testimony was read to the jury once from a transcript, jd, at 640. And,
the Monroe trial court did not find "any logical basis" for disallowing the jury to
review the testimony and imposed no safeguards, whereas the trial court here
implemented the safeguards discussed above. jU at 645. Monroe is factually
distinct and does not control.2
Fuller also relies on United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1985),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 595, 602 (9th
2 The Monroe court based its decision on the Court of Appeals' Koontz
decision. Monroe, 107 Wash. App. at 643 ("We believe that fState v. IKoontzf, 102
Wash. App. 309, 6 P.3d 124 (2000),] should control."). We note that the Supreme
Court later reversed the Court of Appeals' Koontz decision. State v. Koontz, 145
Wash. 2d 650, 661, 41, P.3d 475 (2002). Because we hold that Monroe is factually
distinguishable from the instant case, we decline to address whether the Supreme
Court's Koontz decision affected Monroe's validity.
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Cir. 1985), which Koontz cited favorably. Koontz. 145 Wash. 2d at 655. In that case
the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the jury
to review videotaped testimony in the jury room. Binder. 769 F.2d at 600-01. The
court perceived that replaying the video risked unduly emphasizing that testimony.
Id Binder is critically different than this case: there, the jury was allowed to review
the videotaped testimony in the privacy of the jury room. Id But, here, the trial
court allowed the transcript to be read to the jury in open court. And, Koontz
explicitly notes that replaying video raises greater concern than reading a
transcript. Koontz. 145 Wash. 2d at 655. Binder is not dispositive.
Fuller also argues that the trial court should have given instructions with
more detail, such as the jury instructions given in United States v. Montgomery.
150 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1998), which Koontz cited favorably. Koontz. 145 Wash. 2d at
654. In Montgomery, the trial court allowed a jury to review testimony transcripts
in the jury room. 150 F.3d at 999. The court found no abuse ofdiscretion because
the trial court gave a lengthy instruction that reminded the jury not to emphasize
the transcripts over the other evidence:
"I want you to bear in mind that the testimony at trial is the evidence,
not the transcripts. The transcript is not authoritative. If you
remember something different from what appears in the transcripts,
your collective recollection is controlling. In other words, the
transcripts may not serve as a substitute for the collective memories
of the jury or take the place of the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses subject to the usual rules. . . . Finally, as the court has
previously instructed you, you must weigh all of the evidence in the
case and not focus on any one portion of the trial."
]d at 999-1000 (alteration in original).
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Here the trial court gave a limiting instruction that explicitly reminded the jury
that it must consider all evidence, not just the transcripts. Admittedly, it did not
make the same admonitions as Montgomery regarding the transcript not being
authoritative and regarding reliance on their collective recollections ifdifferent from
the transcript. But, Fuller has never suggested that the transcript was not an
accurate statement of the testimony given. It is not clear such an admonition was
necessary.
The trial court allowed the transcript to be read aloud only a single time, did
not allow the jury to bring a transcript into the jury room, and cautioned the jury to
consider all of the evidence. This aligns with the Koontz and Morgensen courts'
emphasis on procedural safeguards. Koontz. 145 Wash. 2d at 654-55; Morgensen.
148 Wash. App. at 88-89. There is little else that the court could have done in this
case to guard against potential undue emphasis. For these reasons, we cannot
say that the trial court's decision to allow the transcript to be read to the jury was
an abuse of discretion.
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Fuller next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his
closing argument.
The defendant bears the burden of proving that the prosecutor's alleged
misconduct was both improper and prejudicial. State v. Emery. 174 Wash. 2d 741,
756, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). The burden to establish prejudice requires the
defendant to prove that there is a substantial likelihood that the instances of
misconduct affected the jury's verdict. State v. Thorgerson. 172 Wash. 2d 438, 442-
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43, 258 P.3d 43 (2011). The failure to object to an improper remark constitutes a
waiver of error unless it is so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it causes an enduring
and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized by an admonition to
the jury. Id at 443. Fullerdid not object to any of these statements. His arguments
on this issue are therefore waived unless the remarks were flagrant, ill-intentioned,
and unable to be cured by a supplemental instruction, jd
A. Appeal To Jurors' Passions
Fuller first argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making an
improper appeal to the jurors' passions. Fuller points to the prosecutor asking the
jury to "[t]hink for a moment about the powerlessness of that little girl." He argues
this error was compounded when the prosecutor elaborated on these statements
by analogizing the victim's willingness to share her story to a child testing the water
for danger before swimming in unknown waters. By the prosecutor's analogy, as
the victim became more comfortable, she began to share more, which explained
the child victim's inconsistent willingness to share her story. In response, the State
contends thatthe prosecutor's comments were not an improper appeal to emotion,
but rather inferences "reasonably drawn from the evidence."
A prosecutor may not appeal to the passions ofthe jury so as to encourage
a verdict based on emotion rather than evidence. State v. Berube, 171 Wash. App.
103, 118-19, 286 P.3d 402 (2012). This court reviews a prosecutor's allegedly
improper remarks in the context of the total argument. State v. Russell. 125 Wash. 2d
24, 85-86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). Here, the prosecutor made the "powerlessness"
comment in the context of explaining to the jury how and when A.M.F. told her
No. 74143-8-1/9
mother about her father's conduct. The prosecutor's next sentence addressed
A.M.F. "trying to articulate to her mother what was happening." A.M.F.'s credibility
was a key issue at trial. A prosecutor has "wide latitude" to comment on and
explain its evidence in closing arguments. See Thorgerson. 172 Wash. 2d at 453.
Based on the context, the prosecutor referenced A.M.F.'s "powerlessness" to
explain A.M.F.'s reluctance to describe the sexual abuse and her delay in alerting
her mother. And, we are not persuaded that a limiting instruction would have been
inadequate.
With respect to the swimming analogy, Washington courts have upheld
prosecutors' use of analogies and metaphors before. See State v. Fuller, 169 Wn.
App. 797, 828, 282 P.3d 126 (2012). For example, in Fuller, we upheld a
prosecutor's puzzle analogy for the evidence introduced because the analogy "did
not minimize the State's burden of proof because it did not purport to qualify the
level of certainty to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard nor did it
minimize or shift the burden of proof to the defendant in the context of the argument
as a whole and the trial court's correct jury instructions." ]d at 826. And, in State
v. Barajas, we affirmed a conviction when the prosecutor compared the defendant
to a "mangie [sic], mongrel mutt." 143 Wash. App. 24, 39-40, 177 P.3d 106 (2007)
(alteration in original). There, though the court found this obviously adverse
metaphor for the defendant improper, it did not find that the metaphor was flagrant,
ill-intentioned, and incurable such that reversal was warranted. ]d 40.
A swimming analogy for the victim's thought process is not as prejudicial as
the analogy upheld in Barajas. The swimming analogy did not comment on the
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burden of proof and did not denigrate the defendant. And, the analogy did not
even relate to proving the elements of the crime charged like the puzzle analogy
in Fuller. It was merely the prosecutor's attempt at a metaphor that presented the
evidence favorably. Fuller has not carried his burden to show that the remarks
were flagrant, ill-intentioned misconduct.
B. Mischaracterization of the burden of proof
Second, Fullerargues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by shifting
the burden of proof. He points to a handful of the prosecutor's statements as
burden-shifting. The prosecutor told the jury that if "you believed [the victim], that
is enough in this case for you to find the defendant guilty." Later, she stated,
[T]he last point I want to make in my closing is the State's burden,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. You have an instruction telling
you about what that means. But in a case like this, it's simple, if you
believe [A.M.F.] when she tells you what her father did, you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State responds that it gave a "proper statement of the law" in its statements
about satisfying the burden. According to the State, it was merely reminding the
jury that a victim's testimony alone can satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard without any corroborating evidence, physical or otherwise.
Fuller analogizes to State v. Fleming. 83 Wash. App. 209, 213, 921 P.2d 1076
(1996). In Fleming, this court reversed when the prosecutor told the jury that it
must find that the defendants were lying or mistaken in their testimony in order to
acquit. ]d Fleming is critically different from this case. There, the prosecutor
argued that the jury may acquit only if it did not believe a witness's testimony. ]d
But, here, the prosecutor told the jury that the prosecution had carried its burden
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No. 74143-8-1/11
to convict if it believed the victim-witness. The former misstated the burden
because it required the defendant to prove something just to support acquittal.
Here, the prosecutor merely reminded the jury that belief in A.M.F.'s
testimony alone satisfied that burden because her uncontradicted testimony
covered all the elements of the crime. Rape of a child in the first degree is defined
as follows: "A person is guilty of rape of a child in the first degree when the person
has sexual intercourse with another who is less than twelve years old and not
married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least twenty-four months older
than the victim." RCW 9A.44.073(1). A.M.F. testified that Fuller had engaged in
sexual intercourse with her, and that A.M.F. was less than twelve years old. This
satisfied the statutory elements of the crime, and therefore, mere belief in A.M.F.'s
truthfulness was indeed sufficient to find Fuller guilty. The prosecution therefore
did not shift the burden of proof.
The prosecutor later made the following comment about why rape of a child
does not require proof of a specific date: "this kind of crime notably does not require
the State to prove the specific date. And that makes sense, doesn't it? Because
what child could or would keep track of dates?" She later stated, "The law doesn't
require corroboration. The law doesn't require medical evidence. The law doesn't
require eyewitnesses." Fuller argues that these comments are prohibited under
this court's recent decision in State v. Smiley, 195 Wash. App. 185, 379 P.3d 149
(2016), review denied, 2016 WL 7466613. In Smiley, the prosecutor's closing
argument included a lengthy explanation about why it is good policy to not require
corroborating evidence of sexual assault victims' testimony. Id at 191. Most
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No. 74143-8-1/12
notably, the Smiley prosecutor stated that ifvictim testimony alone was insufficient
to support a conviction, " 'we'd have to tell the kids, sorry ... we can't hold your
abuser responsible.' " Id at 192 (alteration in original). This court found the
prosecutor's comments improper because "the implication was clear: if the jury
agreed with defense counsel and refused to convict without corroborating
evidence, other children are in danger." Id at 194. However, the court did not
reverse, id at 197. Smiley did not object at trial, and the court found that the
resulting prejudice would have been curable upon objection. Id
In Smiley, the improper statements to the jury were focused on policy
implications of a not guilty verdict on other cases. But, the prosecutor here made
no statements that rise to the level of" '[w]e couldn't hold the majority of sexual
abusers responsible.'" jd at 191. Rather, the prosecutor's statement was a brief
explanation that a victim's testimony alone can be sufficient to support the
elements necessary to convict. The prosecutor discussed the policy behind why
rape of a child requires only a charging date range rather than the specific date of
the crime: "And that makes sense, doesn't it? Because what child could or would
keep track of dates?" But, this explanation did not implicate the impact of the
decision of this jury on other sexual assault cases or future policy implications like
the Smiley statements. The statements in Smiley were more prejudicial than the
prosecutor's statements here, yet they did not warrant reversal underthe "flagrant,
ill-intentioned" standard that we must apply here, jd at 197; Thorgerson. 172
Wash. 2d at 443. The policy statements discussed here were not flagrant, ill-
intentioned misconduct.
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No. 74143-8-1/13
C. Comment on witness' truthfulness
Third, Fuller argues that the State personally vouched for A.M.F.'s
credibility. During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated, "I think you knew that
she was telling you what happened." Later, the prosecutor also told the jury that
"you'll look back and know what [A.M.F.] said is what happened to her." The State
contends that these statements were merely a "summation" that amounted to no
more than "a permissible inference drawn from the evidence."
It is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal opinion on the
credibility of a witness. State v. Warren. 134 Wash. App. 44, 68, 138 P.3d 1081
(2006), affd, 165 Wash. 2d 17, 195 P.3d 940 (2008). But, a prosecutor enjoys wide
latitude to argue draw reasonable inferences from the concerning witness
credibility, id 165 Wash. 2d at 30.
Here, based on the context, the prosecutor's allegedly wrongful statements
merely stressed A.M.F.'s credibility. One sentence after the prosecutor states
"you'll look back and know," she asks the jury to consider A.M.F.'s demeanor when
judging her credibility. This is a "reasonable inference from the facts concerning
witness credibility" that the prosecutor is allowed to make, id
Moreover, none of the allegedly wrongful statements expressed the
prosecutor's personal view as to whether the victim was credible. Rather, the
prosecutor's statements were mere suggestions that the jury would, upon
reflection, find A.M.F. to be a credible witness. The two allegedly wrongful
statements to the jury were that "you'll look back and know she was telling you
what happened" and "I think vou knew" the victim was telling the truth. (Emphasis
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No. 74143-8-1/14
added.) The prosecutor did not state something along the lines of "I know" or "I
guarantee" A.M.F. was telling the truth. Fuller has not carried his burden to show
that these comments were flagrant, ill-intentioned misconduct.
III. Cumulative Error
Fuller argues that the foregoing issues amount to cumulative error. The
cumulative error doctrine applies when there have been several trial errors that
standing alone do not warrant reversal, but when combined deny a defendant a
fair trial. State v. Greiff. 141 Wash. 2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390 (2000). But, because
we find no error in the rereading of A.M.F.'s testimony and no prosecutorial
misconduct, we find no cumulative error.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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