State Construction Inc v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company ( 2020 )


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  •        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a                  )         No. 78753-5-I
    Washington Corporation,                      )
    )         DIVISION ONE
    Appellant,               )
    )
    v.
    CITY OF SAMMAMISH, a governmental            )
    entity, PORTER BROTHERS                      )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Washington             )
    Corporation,
    Defendants,
    HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE                      )
    COMPANY, a corporation, Bond No.             )
    52BCSDL1 582,                                )
    Respondent.              )         FILED: January 13, 2020
    ANDRUS, J.   —   State Construction, Inc., a subcontractor on a public works
    project, challenges the dismissal of its lien and bond claims. Because its claims
    were untimely, we affirm.
    FACTS
    In May 2014, Porter Brothers Construction, Inc. contracted with the City of
    Sammamish (City) to construct the Sammamish Community & Aquatic Center (the
    No. 78753-5-1/2
    Project).1   The City and Porter Brothers entered into an American Institute of
    Architects Standard Form Agreement between Owner and Contractor (AlA
    Agreement). Under this agreement, Porter Brothers invoiced the City monthly, and
    when the City paid the invoice, it retained five percent of the funds owed to Porter
    Brothers, as required by RCW 60.28.011 ~2 A retainage fund totaling $1 ,351 ,472
    is now on deposit in an escrow account at Heritage Bank pursuant to a retainage
    agreement between Porter Brothers and the City.
    Porter Brothers subcontracted with State Construction on June 10, 2014, to
    perform certain excavation and utilities work. State Construction began this work
    shortly thereafter.
    Porter Brothers also obtained a payment and performance bond3 for the
    value of the Project, $28 million, from Hartford Fire Insurance Company.                          On
    October 12, 2015, Hartford filed a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) financing
    statement against Porter Brothers, attaching, as collateral for debts owed to
    Hartford, Porter Brothers’ interest in any payments due to the contractor, including
    monies to which it might be entitled from retainage funds.
    1 The Project involved the construction of a 69,000 square foot building with a 6-lane, 25-yard lap
    pool and other spaces, a parking structure and surface parking lot, and an access loop road.
    2 RCW 60.28.011(1)(a) required the City to hold back a contract retainage not to exceed five
    percent of the moneys earned by the contractor and to deposit the retained funds into a trust fund
    for the protection and payment of claims and state taxes and penalties. This is commonly referred
    to as a retainage fund.
    ~ RCW 39.08.010(1)(a) provides that on public improvement projects, contractors must post a
    performance and payment bond to ensure that they have the financial ability to perform all
    provisions of the contract; to pay all laborers, mechanics, subcontractors, and material suppliers;
    and to pay all state taxes, increases, and penalties. Contractor bonds guarantee that the contractor
    will perform the contract and will pay bills for labor and materials for which it contracts. 11 LEE R.
    Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUcH ON INSURANcE 3D, § 163:10 (2005). If the contractor defaults,
    the surety agrees to pay an owner’s damages up to the limit of the bond and to pay claims of unpaid
    subcontractors and suppliers. Id.
    -2-
    No. 78753-5-1/3
    Porter Brothers subsequently executed multiple “Irrevocable Assignment”
    documents, in which it assigned to Hartford any right to payment it had on several
    outstanding projects, including this Project.                       The assignment at issue here,
    executed November 3, 2015, included the right to receive any portion of the
    retainage funds held by the City:
    FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, Porter Brothers
    Construction, Inc.,     hereby irrevocably assigns, transfers and sets
    .   .   .
    over to Hartford Fire Insurance Company. all Contract Funds of.   .
    any nature, including, but not limited to, progress payments, earned
    or unearned funds, change orders, extras, claims of any nature,
    retainages, with all the interest accruing thereon, and whether said
    Contract Funds are due now or in the future under the         contract   .   .
    [for the Project].
    The City determined that the Project was “substantially complete” on April
    1, 2016.~ The building was operational at that point and, according to the City,
    punch list items5 were completed thereafter. State Construction completed punch
    list items in June 2016.
    At some point around this time, Porter Brothers experienced financial
    difficulty and notified the City it was abandoning the contract because it was unable
    to complete the work. After Porter Brothers’ voluntary default, Hartford stepped in
    ~ Although the record does not contain a complete copy of the City’s AlA Agreement with Porter
    Brothers, they executed the AlA Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor,
    Document Al 01-2007, which, in section 9.1.2, incorporated by reference AlA Document A201-
    2007, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction (General Conditions). Under paragraph
    9.8.1 of the General Conditions, “substantial completion” is defined as “the stage in the progress of
    the Work when the Work    .  is sufficiently complete
    .   .                     .so that the Owner can occupy or utilize the
    .   .
    Work for its intended use.” WERNER SABO, LEGAL GUIDE TO AlA DOCUMENTS § 4.56 SUBSTANTIAL
    COMPLETION: ¶9.8, at ¶9.8.1 (6th ed. 2019); see also I JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON
    CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AlA DOCUMENTS § 15.14, at 627-28 (5th ed. 2009).
    ~ Under paragraph 9.8.2 of the General Conditions, when the Contractor considers the work
    substantially Complete, the Contractor submits a list of items needing to be Corrected before final
    payment. LEGALGUIDETOAIADOCUMENTS § 4.56 SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION: ¶ 9.8, at~T 9.8.2.
    This list is known as the punch list. SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AlA
    DOCUMENTS § 15.14, at 628.
    -3-
    No. 78753-5-1/4
    and paid certain debts, including monies owed to union trust funds for employee
    fringe benefits and dues, and materials and supplies furnished by various
    companies.
    The City stated in discovery that landscaping work was completed on
    August 31, 2016. The landscaping subcontractor testified that it completed its
    punch list work in November 2016. The City received as-built drawings on January
    13, 2017. Porter Brothers indicated that the last subcontractor to perform services
    on the Project was Milne Electric, which completed its work on January 19, 2017.
    In discovery, the City stated that “Porter Brothers, by and through its
    subcontractors, was performing work under the contract through February 2017,
    of which the City has no[] specific knowledge. After February 21, 2017, warranty
    work was completed.”6
    On February 21, 2017, the City’s council passed a resolution recognizing
    the “[P]roject was substantially completed by the contractor on April 1, 2016,”
    accepting the Project as officially complete, and authorizing the contract closure
    process. The City filed a notice of completion with the state agencies, pursuant to
    RWC 60.28.051, on April 13, 2017, listing the “Date Work Completed” as
    “4/1/2016,” and the “Date Work Accepted” as “2/21/2017.”
    On March 27, 2017, State Construction filed with the City a notice of a lien
    claim against the retainage fund and notified Hartford of its claim against the bond
    6 The General Conditions contains an express warranty that the work will be free from defects and
    conform to the design documents. LEGAL GUIDE TO AlA DOCUMENTS § 4.17 WARRANTY: ¶ 3.5.
    The warranty period runs for one year after substantial completion of the contract. Ia. at § 4.70
    CORRECTION OF WORK: ¶ 12.2, at ¶ 12.2.2.1: see also Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr., Warranties,
    Guarantees, and Correction Remedies under the AlA Document A201 (1997), Constr. Law. 19, 24
    (1998). Any work a contractor must perform to correct deficiencies is known in the construction
    industry as “warranty work.”
    -4-
    No. 78753-5-1/5
    for $250,462.27. State Construction later amended its claim against the retainage
    fund to $199,205.66 and claimed to be owed another $7,295.16 on unpaid
    invoices.
    On April 28, 2017, State Construction filed suit against the City, Porter
    Brothers, and Hartford. State Construction sought to foreclose on its lien against
    the retainage fund, to collect the amounts it was owed from Hartford’s bond or from
    the City, and to obtain a judgment against Porter Brothers for the amount owed
    under its subcontract.
    In March 2018, Porter Brothers stipulated to the entry of judgment against
    it in favor of State Construction, in the amount of $1 99,205.66.~
    In May 2018, State Construction and Hartford filed cross-motions for
    summary judgment. State Construction sought judgment against Hartford and the
    City for $199,205.66, or an order requiring Hartford to pay State Construction’s lien
    from the retainage fund. Hartford contended the claims were time barred under
    RCW 39.08.030 and RCW 60.28.011(2).
    The trial court dismissed State Construction’s claims against the City. It
    further granted summary judgment for Hartford, concluding that while the retainage
    fund “is a statutorily authorized trust and may not be assigned to the general
    contractor’s creditors,” State Construction’s lien claim was not timely filed and, as
    a result, was not enforceable against the retainage fund.             The order did not
    separately address State Construction’s claim against Hartford’s bond but
    dismissed all claims against Hartford.
    ~ State Construction waived its claim to $7,295.16 in unpaid bills.
    -5-
    No. 78753-5-1/6
    The trial court awarded $20,012.21 in attorney fees to Hartford under
    RCW 39.04.240. State Construction appeals.
    ANALYSIS
    State Construction contends the trial court erred in concluding that its lien
    claims against Hartford’s bond and the retainage fund were time barred. State
    Construction also maintains that if the notices were untimely, it resulted from the
    City’s failure to notify it of the date of substantial completion, in violation of due
    process.
    State Construction alternatively argues that even if its lien claims are
    untimely, it is still entitled to be paid out of the retainage fund because Porter
    Brothers unlawfully assigned the retainage funds to Hartford, and its stipulated
    judgment against Porter Brothers is a valid lien against any funds to which Porter
    Brothers is otherwise entitled. Finally, State Construction contends the trial court
    erred by awarding Hartford attorney fees.
    A. Standard of Review
    We review summary judgment orders de novo, performing the same inquiry
    as the trial court. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 
    151 Wn.2d 853
    , 860, 
    93 P.3d 108
     (2004). A court may grant summary judgment if the evidence, viewed in
    a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establishes there is no genuine
    issue of any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law. CR 56(c); Hisle, 
    151 Wn.2d at 861
    .
    -6-
    No. 78753-5-1/7
    B. State Construction’s Bond and Retainage Claims
    1. RCW 39.08.030—Performance Bond
    State Construction first contends the trial court erred in dismissing its claim
    against Hartford’s performance bond. It argues that its notice was timely under
    RCW 39.08.030(1)(a). We disagree.
    Subcontractors may bring a claim against a performance bond for any
    completed work, but
    such persons do not have any right of action on such bond for any
    sum whatever, unless within [30] days from and after the completion
    of the contract with an acceptance of the work by the affirmative
    action of the  .  city. ,the
    .   .         subcontractor.
    .   .          must present to
    .   .   .     .   .
    and file with such     city. a notice in writing [in a form set out in
    .   .   .           .   .
    the statute].
    RCW 39.08.030(1)(a).
    The City passed a resolution on February 21, 2017, accepting the Project
    as complete as of that date. State Construction concedes that the City “accept[ed]
    the Project as complete,” as required by the statute, on February 21, 2017. It
    further concedes that it filed its lien claim notice with the City 34 days after the date
    of acceptance. It argues, however, that its notice should be considered timely
    because the statute requires both “completion of the contract” and “acceptance of
    the work” to occur before the 30-day deadline is triggered. It contends there are
    questions of fact as to whether contract completion occurred before or after
    February 21, 2017.
    Hartford contends that the City’s certification of the date of completion and
    acceptance is legally conclusive and that State Construction cannot factually
    -7-
    No. 78753-5-I/S
    challenge the certification.8 When a subcontractor initiates a lien foreclosure
    action, rather than file an answer, a public owner certifies
    the name of the contractor; the work contracted to be done; the date
    of the contract; the date of completion and final acceptance of the
    work; the amount retained; the amount of taxes certified due or to
    become due to the state; and all claims filed with it showing
    respectively the dates of filing, the names of claimants, and amounts
    claimed.
    RCW 60.28.030 (emphasis added).
    The City initially certified the date of completion to be the same date as the
    date of final acceptance—February 21, 2017. But the City amended its certification
    to distinguish between the “date of completion” and the “date of final acceptance.”
    In its amended filings, the City certified the date of completion as April 1, 2016—
    the date it identified as the date of substantial completion under the contract.
    RCW 60.28.030 does not explicitly provide that a certification is conclusive
    proof of the date of contract completion under either the bond or retainage statute.
    The Washington Supreme Court, however, considered a similar argument in
    Denny-Renton Clay & Coal Co. v. National Surety Co., 
    93 Wash. 103
    , 
    160 P. 1
    (191 6),~ and Pearson v. Puqet Sound Machinery Depot, 
    99 Wash. 596
    , 
    169 P. 961
    (1918). In Denny-Renton, the plaintiff supplied bricks for a street improvement
    project in Wenatchee.         
    93 Wash. at 104
    . The engineer certified the work as
    complete on November 25, 1913, even though there remained “cleanup work” to
    8 A ‘conclusive presumption,” or “irrebuttable presumption,” is “[a] presumption that cannot be
    overcome by any additional evidence or argument because it is accepted as irrefutable proof that
    establishes a fact beyond dispute.” BLACK’S LAw DICTIONARY 1435 (11th ed. 2019).
    ~ Superseded by statute, LAWS OF 1915, ch. 28, § 2 (requiring affirmative action of a public body to
    effectuate acceptance), as recognized in Nat’l Blower & Sheet Metal Co. v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y.,
    
    41 Wn.2d 260
    , 264, 
    248 P.2d 547
     (1952).
    -8-
    No. 78753-5-1/9
    be completed, including the removal of unused bricks and tarpaulins and sand from
    the pavement. fri at 107-08.
    The Court held that the engineer’s certification constituted the city’s legal
    acceptance and that this acceptance was binding on the contractor and the brick
    supplier.     at 110. It held that “[t]he fact that the ‘cleanup work’ was done after
    the engineer certified that the work was [100 percent] completed [wa]s immaterial.”
    
    Id.
     The date certified by the public owner could not be undermined except by
    evidence of fraud or collusion on the part of the owner or its agent. j4~. Because
    the plaintiff had no evidence of fraud or collusion, the Court concluded it could not
    rebut the certified contract completion date. j~
    Similarly, in Pearson, a subcontractor filed a claim against a surety bond on
    a Port of Seattle construction project 31 days after the Port engineer certified the
    building complete and the Port, by resolution, accepted it. 
    99 Wash. at 598
    . The
    Court deemed the bond claim untimely because the subcontractor had no
    evidence that the engineer concealed the certificate of completion and both the
    certificate and the Port’s resolution accepting the work were public records. fri. at
    599. Quoting Denny-Renton, the Court reiterated that the engineer’s certificate
    and the Port’s resolution of acceptance were legally binding on the subcontractor.
    fri. at 599-600.
    Under Denny-Renton and Pearson, a public owner’s resolution—deeming
    the project complete and accepting the project—is legally conclusive absent
    evidence of fraud or collusion by the public owner in the certification or acceptance
    process.    We have seen no evidence of any fraud or collusion here.           State
    Construction’s evidence regarding work activities undertaken after April 1, 2016 is
    -9-
    No. 78753-5-Ill 0
    thus immaterial and insufficient to preclude entry of summary judgment.                          See
    Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 
    98 Wn.2d 668
    , 671, 
    658 P.2d 653
     (1983) (disputes
    over immaterial facts are not a bar to summary judgment). We conclude that the
    City’s formal resolution accepting the Project as complete is legally conclusive and
    triggered the bond claim filing deadline of RCW 39.08.030.10
    Nevertheless, State Construction contends that the City’s resolution, on its
    face, demonstrates that the contract was not complete because it authorized the
    deputy city manager to take steps “to complete the contract closure process.” One
    of the key steps to closing out a public works contract, it maintains, is the filing of
    a “Notice of Completion of Public Works Contract” with the State, as required by
    RCW 60.28.051          ~   State Construction argues the City filed this notice on April 13,
    2017, and that the “completion of the contract” for purposes of the bond lien statute
    did not occur until then.
    The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. Dep’t of
    Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 
    146 Wn.2d 1
    , 9, 
    43 P.3d 4
     (2002). Our primary
    10 For this reason, we reject State Construction’s argument that work still in progress in 2016 and
    2017 creates a genuine issue of material fact. Moreover, State Construction’s punch list argument
    appears contrary to the language in the City’s AlA Agreement with Porter Brothers. Paragraph
    5.2.1.1 provided that the City would issue final payment to Porter Brothers after Porter Brothers
    fully performed the contract, “except for the Contractor’s responsibility to correct Work.” This
    provision demonstrates that the parties had agreed that “full performance of the contract” did not
    include punch list work. The bond statute does not preclude a public owner from accepting a
    contract as complete before all punch list work has been finished. ~ Seattle Plumbing Su~Iy
    Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 
    151 Wash. 519
    , 521-22, 
    276 P. 552
     (1929) (school board’s acceptance of
    project as complete, subject to terms as to repair of any defective work discovered within a
    year. and subject to all necessary clean-up work,” is complete for purposes of bond claim); I``I
    .   .
    Blower & Sheet Metal Co., 
    41 Wn.2d at 267
     (clarifying that Seattle Plumbing ‘hold[s] squarely that
    an acceptance subject to necessary clean-up work does not make the acceptance conditional”).
    ~ Under RCW 60.28.051, the public owner must notify various state agencies when a contract is
    completed and cannot release any of the retained funds until the state agencies certify that all taxes
    or any other money owed to the state by the contractor have been paid or can be paid without
    recourse to the state’s lien on the retained percentage.
    -10-
    No. 78753-5-I/il
    duty in interpreting a statute is to discern and implement the legislature’s intent.
    State v. J.P., 
    149 Wn.2d 444
    , 450, 
    69 P.3d 318
     (2003). Statutory interpretation
    begins with the statute’s plain meaning. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n,
    
    169 Wn.2d 516
    , 526, 
    243 P.3d 1283
     (2010).
    Well-established rules of statutory construction lead us to conclude that the
    phrase “completion of the contract” refers to completion of the contract by the
    contractor, not by the public owner.      Had the legislature used the language
    “completion of the contract   ~   acceptance of the work by the public owner,” we
    might conclude that the prepositional phrase “by the public owner” modifies both
    preceding phrases. But the legislature did not use this language. Instead, it used
    the phrase “completion of the contract ~ an acceptance of the work by the
    affirmative ~ction of the [public owner].” RCW 39.08.030 (emphasis added). Under
    the last antecedent rule of statutory construction, courts construe the final
    qualifying words and phrases in a sentence to refer to the last antecedent unless
    a contrary intent appears in a statute. Eyman v. Wyman, 
    191 Wn.2d 581
    , 599,
    
    424 P.3d 1183
     (2018). Thus, under this rule, the prepositional phrase “by the
    affirmative action of [the public owner]” modifies only “acceptance of the work,” and
    not the phrase “completion of the contract.”
    State Construction also relies on the fact that RCW 39.08.030 refers to
    “completion of the contract” while the language used in the retainage lien statute,
    RCW 60.28.011(2), refers to “completion of the contract work.” It argues that
    because the legislature used different language in the two statutes, it must have
    intended different meanings. It maintains that the omission of the word “work” after
    “contract” in RCW 39.08.030 means that the City’s post-acceptance activities can
    -11   -
    No. 78753-5-1/12
    delay the trigger date for bond claims.
    But we find no material difference between “completion of the contract” and
    “completion of the contract work” as those phrases are used in the bond and
    retainage lien claim statutes. Although chapter 39.08 RCW does not contain
    definitions, a related public works statute—chapter 39.04 RCW—does.                 The
    definitions in this related statute provide context for evaluating State Construction’s
    arguments here. ~ Lake, 
    169 Wn.2d at 526
     (courts discern plain meaning from
    the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the statute’s context, related
    provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole).
    RCW 39.04.010(2) defines “contract” to mean “a contract in writing for the
    execution of public work for a fixed or determinable amount duly awarded after
    advertisement and competitive bid.” The term “public work” is defined as “all work,
    construction, alteration, repair, or improvement.    .   .   executed at the cost of the
    state or of any municipality.” RCW 39.04.010(4). The focus of these definitions is
    clearly on the physical execution of construction activities performed by a
    contractor, not administrative activities performed by the public owner.
    Furthermore, State Construction has not identified any authority for the
    proposition that “completion of the contract” as used in RCW 39.08.030(1)(a)
    occurs only after a public owner completes its internal administrative closure
    process or files a notice of completion required by RCW 60.28.051. Where a party
    fails to cite to relevant authority, we generally presume that the party found none.
    Edmonds Shopping Cen. Assocs. v. City of Edmonds, 
    117 Wn. App. 344
    , 353, 
    71 P.3d 233
     (2003).
    State Construction’s argument is also unsupported by the City’s AlA
    -   12-
    No. 78753-5-1/13
    Agreement with Porter Brothers. Article 3 refers to the dates of commencement,
    substantial completion, and final completion of “the Work.” And article 5 ties final
    payment to when “the Contractor has fully performed the Contract.” The parties
    appear to have treated completion of the contract to equate to completion of the
    contract work by Porter Brothers.
    We agree with State Construction that the use of the preposition “with” to
    link the two events (contract completion and acceptance of work) means that the
    bond claim filing deadline does not trigger until both events occur. But the City’s
    AlA Agreement with Porter Brothers did not permit it to accept the contractor’s
    work before Porter Brothers completed it. Paragraph 5.2 of the AlA Agreement
    provided that the City would not make final payment of “the entire unpaid balance
    of the Contract Sum” to the contractor until “the Contractor has fully performed the
    Contract” and “Final Acceptance has occurred.” The contract itself indicates the
    City would not accept the work until Porter Brothers had fully performed the
    contract. 12
    Our construction of the bond lien statute is consistent with the historical
    understanding of its requirements.            As Hartford persuasively contends, the
    construction industry and our courts have long understood the deadline for a claim
    against a bond to coincide with the public owner’s acceptance of the work. ~
    Seattle Plumbing Su~ly Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 
    151 Wash. 519
    , 522, 
    276 P. 552
    12  Acceptance has significant ramifications for a project owner. The owner is acknowledging that
    the work conforms to the applicable contract quality and quantity requirements and that title and
    risk of loss pass from the contractor to the owner. 4A BRuNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW
    § 13:58 (2019 Update). Moreover, acceptance is generally the commencement of any warranty
    period set out in the contract. Id. State Construction’s suggestion that the City issued a final
    acceptance before Porter Brothers fully performed its contractual obligations is not supported by
    the record.
    -13-
    No. 78753-5-1/14
    (1929) (materialmen’s notice of claim, filed more than 30 days after school board
    accepted contract as complete, was deemed untimely); Pearson, 99 Wash, at 600
    (materialman’s claim against bond deemed untimely when filed 31 days after port
    commission passed resolution accepting warehouse as completed); C-Star
    Concrete Corp. v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 
    8 Wn. App. 872
    , 874, 
    509 P.2d 758
    (1973) (filing period runs 30 days after acceptance of work).
    Finally, State Construction asks the court to conclude that it “substantially
    complied” with the bond statute by filing a lien claim 34 days—rather than 30
    days—after the City’s acceptance of the Project. This argument runs contrary to
    well-established law that a person claiming the benefits of a statutory lien must
    demonstrate strict compliance with the time deadline in the statute. Kinskie v.
    Capstin, 
    44 Wn. App. 462
    ,464, 
    722 P.2d 876
     (1986); see also Shope Enters., Inc.
    v. Kent Sch. Dist., 
    41 Wn. App. 128
    , 131, 
    702 P.2d 499
     (1985) (courts strictly
    construe time deadlines in lien statutes).
    A party asserting substantial compliance must demonstrate:
    (1) that some notice must be filed with the proper body; (2) that it
    must be filed within at least [30] days from the completion of the
    contract and acceptance of the work; (3) that there must be some
    identification of the bond, surety, and work; and (4) that there must
    be some notice of an intent to claim against the bond.
    Foremost-McKesson Sys. Div. of Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Nevis, 
    8 Wn. App. 300
    , 303-04, 
    505 P.2d 1284
     (1973) (quoting Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Herbert
    H. Conway, Inc., 
    14 Wn.2d 551
    , 558, 
    128 P.2d 764
     (1942)). A subcontractor
    cannot establish substantial compliance if it failed to meet the 30-day deadline.
    Keller Supply Co., Inc. v. Lydig Construction Co., Inc., 
    57 Wn. App. 594
    ,
    
    789 P.2d 788
     (1990), on which State Construction relies, does not provide
    -   14   -
    No. 78753-5-1/15
    otherwise. In Keller, a plumbing materials supplier sent a timely preclaim lien
    notice to a project owner. j..ç~ at 596, 599. The only alleged deficiency in the notice
    was the failure to state specifically that the supplier would look to the contractor’s
    bond or retainage for any claim in the case of nonpayment.          at 596, 598. This
    court deemed the form of the notice substantially complied with the statute
    because it identified the job for which Keller supplied materials and specifically
    stated that Keller intended to claim a lien if it was not paid. ki. at 599-600.
    But Keller’s holding—relating to the form of a notice—has never been
    extended to resuscitate an untimely notice.       To the contrary, in Pearson, the
    Supreme Court held that a subcontractor’s bond claim, filed 31 days after the port
    commission certified a building as complete and accepted it, was one day late and
    thus untimely. 99 Wash, at 598-600. Pearson remains good law.
    State Construction was required to file its bond claim no later than March
    23, 2017. The City did not receive it until four days later. As a result, State
    Construction’s right to assert a claim against the performance bond under
    RCW 39.08.030 expired, and the trial court properly dismissed its claim against
    the bond.
    2. RCW6O.28.011(2)—Retainage Fund
    State Construction makes similar arguments regarding its retainage fund
    claim. If a contractor fails to pay a subcontractor, the subcontractor may seek
    recovery directly from the retainage fund according to a specific statutory
    procedure:
    Every person performing labor or furnishing supplies toward
    the completion of a public improvement contract has a lien upon
    moneys reserved by a public body under the provisions of a public
    -15-
    No. 78753-5-1/16
    improvement contract. However, the notice of the lien of the claimant
    must be given within [45] days of completion of the contract work,
    and in the manner provided in RCW 39.08.030.
    RCW 60.28.011(2). The timeliness of State Construction’s retainage lien claim
    thus depends on whether it served notice on the City within 45 days of the
    “completion of the contract work.”
    Hartford contends State Construction’s lien was not timely filed because it
    was sent almost a year after the date of substantial completion, April 1, 2016, the
    date the City certified as the date of “completion of the contract work.” It again
    argues the City’s certification is legally conclusive and cannot be challenged
    factually by State Construction. We agree. State Construction is bound by the
    City’s determination that the contract work was complete as of April 1, 2016.
    State Construction argues, however, that the statute does not set as the
    trigger date the date of “substantial completion of the contract work,” and Hartford
    is impermissibly injecting a word into the statute that does not exist.           It also
    contends the trigger date for filing a retainage fund lien claim should be the same
    as the trigger date for filing a bond lien claim—February 21, 2017. To support this
    argument, State Construction submitted a publication from the Municipal Research
    and Services Center (MRSC), a non-profit organization that helps local
    governments in Washington serve their citizens “by providing legal and policy
    guidance on any topic.”13        State Construction’s President, Phuong Busselle,
    testified that she relied on this publication in closing out some of the company’s
    public works contracts.       In the MRSC overview of “required steps that local
    13   About MRSC, MRSC: LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUCCESS, http://mrsc.orq/Home/About-MRSC.aspx.
    -16-
    No. 78753-5-1/17
    governments in Washington State must take to officially complete a public works
    contract,” it provides the following ‘Practice Tip:”
    The contract documents should clarify that for the purposes of the
    retainage statute (RCW6O.28.0l1), “completion of all contract work”
    is the same as “date of final acceptance” in the performance and
    payment bond statute (RCW 39.08.010). This means that the trigger
    date for retainage release will be the same as the trigger date for
    filing claims.
    The problem with relying on an Internet summary of the law, however, is
    that it may be incorrect. The retainage statute does not refer to “completion of all
    contract work.” It merely states “completion of ~ contract work.” While the
    retainage statute may allow a local government to contractually deem the date of
    “completion of the contract work” to be the date of final acceptance, rather than the
    date of substantial completion, we find nothing in the language of the statute
    mandating that outcome.14
    Indeed, the general conditions of a construction contract often define what
    constitutes completion of the contract work. See ROBERT L. OLSON, Payment, ~,
    WASH. STATE BAR Ass’N, WASHINGTON CONSTRUCTION LAW DESKBOOK                            § 10.3(2)(c),
    at 10-11 (2019). It appears well-established that parties may contractually select
    as the date of completion of the work either the date of substantial completion or
    the date of final completion. 5 BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 15:14
    (2019 Update). But
    14We similarly reject State Construction’s argument that the date of “corripletion of the contract
    work” should be the date the City filed its Notice of Completion with the state agencies under
    RCW 60.28.051. This argument would require us to import words into the statute that do not exist.
    RCW 60.28.011(2) makes no reference to the date the owner notifies state agencies of the
    completion of the contract work. Our rules of statutory construction prohibit reading additional
    words into a statute. Densley v. Dept of Ret. Sys., 
    162 Wn.2d 210
    , 219, 
    173 P.3d 885
     (2007).
    The date the City filed a statutorily required Notice of Completion is not the date that triggered the
    45-day deadline.
    -   17-
    No. 78753-5-1118
    [u]nless otherwise defined by the contract to mean “final
    completion[,]” the date on which the work is 100 [percent] complete,
    “comjletion” ordinarily is understood to mean “substantial
    comijletion”—the date on which all material elements of the work are
    sufficiently complete in conformance with the contract so that the
    owner can use the work for its intended purpose.
    kI. at   § 15:15 (emphasis added).
    Furthermore, under paragraph 9.8.4 of the General Conditions, the City’s
    architect was required to inspect the work and issue a “Certificate of Substantial
    Completion.”        WERNER    SABO,   LEGAL     GUIDE   TO AlA    DOCUMENTS       § 4.56
    SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION: ~ 9.8, at ~ 9.8.4 (6th ed. 2019). This certificate
    would have established the date of substantial completion and started the warranty
    period. j4~ “Final completion” would only have occurred after the contractor
    notified the owner that all the work was ready for final inspection, the architect
    inspected the work and deemed it acceptable under the contract documents, and
    the architect issued a certificate for final payment.            ki. at   § 4.58 FINAL
    COMPLETION AND FINAL PAYMENT: ~ 9.10, at~ 9.10.1.
    Although we have no certificate of substantial completion in the record
    before us, State Construction does not challenge that, as of April 1, 2016, a
    sufficient amount of construction had been completed so that the City could use
    the community and aquatic center for its intended purpose.                Instead, State
    Construction argues, without evidence, that the City did not decide, until February
    2017, ten months after-the-fact, that Porter Brothers had reached substantial
    completion on April 1, 2016. But there is no evidence in the record that the City
    failed to follow the process for determining and certifying substantial completion
    here.
    -18-
    No. 78753-5-1/19
    Even if the City’s certification were not legally conclusive, State
    Construction has not established a genuine issue of material fact that the
    substantial completion date provided by the City was not the date of “completion
    of the contract work” for purposes of RCW 60.28.011(2). Therefore, the contract
    work was completed on the Project as of April 1, 2016, and State Construction’s
    notice of lien claim, filed on March 27, 2017, was untimely as it was not filed within
    the 45 days required by statute.
    C. State Construction’s Due Process Claim
    State Construction next argues it had no notice that April 1, 2016 was the
    trigger date for filing a retainage lien claim and, as a result, the City violated its due
    process rights by failing to provide it notice.
    Article I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution provides that “[nb
    person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
    The Washington Supreme Court has held that the state due process clause is no
    broader than its federal counterpart. In re Dependency of E.H., 
    191 Wn.2d 872
    ,
    884-85, 
    427 P.3d 587
     (2018). The loss of lien rights to funds held in trust under
    RCW 60.28.011 implicates a property interest protected by due process. The
    question is what process is due to protect subcontractors like State Construction
    against the erroneous deprivation of that property interest.
    A procedural due process challenge under the state constitution turns on
    whether the increased accuracy afforded by additional procedures is outweighed
    by the government’s legitimate reasons in denying more protections. ki. at 891.
    Our Supreme Court has employed the balancing test adopted by the United States
    Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridqe, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 
    96 S. Ct. 893
    , 47 L. Ed. 2d
    -19-
    No. 78753-5-1/20
    18 (1976), to assess procedural due process challenges on a case-by-case basis.
    EH., 191 Wn.2d at 891-92. The Mathews test requires a court to compare the
    status quo to the procedures sought and identify (1) the private interest involved,
    (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest, and (3) the government’s
    interest. 
    424 U.S. at 335
    .
    The first Mathews factor requires us to identify the nature and weight of the
    private interest affected by the challenged action. Prostov v. Dept of Licensing,
    
    186 Wn. App. 795
    , 811, 
    349 P.3d 874
     (2015) (quoting City of Redmond v. Moore,
    
    151 Wn.2d 664
    , 670, 
    91 P.3d 875
     (2004)).               In this case, we agree that
    subcontractors like State Construction have a substantial interest in being paid by
    contractors and receiving full payment on public projects. The money deposited
    into the retainage fund was deducted from State Construction’s invoices to Porter
    Brothers and, but for the retainage requirement, would have been paid to State
    Construction for its work. This factor weighs in favor of State Construction.
    Under the second Mathews factor, we consider whether the risk of an
    erroneous deprivation of this private interest under the existing statutory scheme
    is unreasonable. See Prostov, 186 Wn. App. at 813-14. Here, if a subcontractor
    is unaware that the public owner and contractor have contractually agreed that the
    date of substantial completion will trigger the retainage lien statute, or does not
    know that a contractor has reached substantial completion, there is a risk that this
    subcontractor will miss the deadline to file a notice of lien claim.
    But State Construction has not demonstrated that that risk is unreasonable.
    Subcontractors have multiple ways to protect their interest in the retainage fund,
    including negotiating with the contractor for advance notice of the lien filing
    -   20   -
    No. 78753-.5-l121
    deadline, tracking the contractor’s progress on the project and requesting records
    from the public owner as to the status of the contractor’s progress, or filing lien
    claims regularly throughout the project. Courts have noted on several occasions
    that a claimant need not wait until project completion and acceptance to file a claim.
    Airefco, Inc. v. Yelm Cmty. Schs. No. 2, 
    52 Wn. App. 230
    , 232-34, 
    758 P.2d 996
    (1988); see also Pearson, 99 Wash, at 598-600; Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Coffman,
    Dobson & Co., 
    97 Wash. 211
    , 213-15, 
    166 P. 620
     (1917) (unnecessary to wait
    until end of project to file claim); Denny-Renton, 93 Wash, at 110 (“This works no
    hardship upon a reasonably prudent laborer or materialman. He is not required to
    wait for completion or acceptance of the work. He can file his claim as soon as he
    finishes furnishing labor or materials.”); WASHINGTON CONSTRUCTION LAW
    DESKBOOK      §   10.4(2), at 10-29 (acknowledging that it is safer to submit claim upon
    completion of subcontractor work instead of waiting for main contract completion).
    State Construction had methods by which it could protect its private interest in the
    retainage fund without imposing new notice requirements on the City. The second
    Mathews factor weighs against State Construction.
    The third Mathews factor addresses the government’s interest in the fiscal
    and administrative burden that additional procedural requirements would entail.
    Prostov, 186 Wn. App. at 816.                The City has an interest in minimizing the
    administrative burden of having to track the identity of multiple subcontractors and
    suppliers on large public works projects and having to notify each one when the
    contractor achieves substantial completion.15 The public works contracts and
    15 It is for this reason that State Construction argued, see supra note 14, the trigger date for filing
    lien and bond claims should be the date the Notice of Completion is filed with the state agencies,
    -   21   -
    No. 78753-5-1/22
    certificates of substantial completion are available to the public, even if not
    available from the contractor. The third factor weighs against State Construction.
    Given the subcontractors’ ability to manage the risk associated with filing a
    timely notice of lien, and the burden a notice requirement would pose on public
    bodies       managing      large    construction            projects,   we   conclude   that State
    Construction’s due process rights were not violated by the City when it failed to
    notify it that Porter Brothers had achieved substantial completion under the
    contract.
    D. Porter Brothers’ Assignment of Retainage Funds
    Next, State Construction maintains that because retainage funds are trust
    funds that cannot be assigned, Porter Brothers’ assignment to Hartford is invalid.
    And if the assignment is invalid, it argues its judgment takes priority over any claim
    Hartford may have to the retainage funds. We reject both arguments and conclude
    that Porter Brothers had a property interest in excess retainage funds under
    RCW6O.28.021, and it lawfully assigned that interest to Hartford.                        Therefore,
    Hartford’s assignment predated State Construction’s judgment and has priority
    over it.
    First, under RCW 60.28.021, any excess retainage funds, after payment of
    all taxes, timely lien claims, foreclosure costs, and attorney fees, must be paid to
    the contractor. In Johnson Service Co. v. Roush, 
    57 Wn.2d 80
    , 87, 89, 
    355 P.2d i
    .e., subcontractors can search public records to ascertain when a public works contract has been
    completed. While this might be expeditious for all parties, that is not what the statutes provide, and
    we cannot rewrite or modify statutory language under the guise of statutory interpretation or
    construction. Garcia v. DeQ’t of Soc. & Health Svcs.,        Wn. App. 2d
    —              —, 
    451 P.3d 1107
    , 1123
    (2019). We must give full effect to the plain language of the statutes, even when the results may
    seem harsh. Geschwind v. Flana~an, 
    121 Wn.2d 833
    , 841, 
    854 P.2d 1061
     (1993).
    -   22   -
    No. 78753-5-1/23
    815 (1960), the Supreme Court held that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) could
    not attach money on deposit in a retainage fund for taxes owed by a contractor
    because the funds were held in trust for payment to subcontractors and suppliers,
    “except to the extent that the claim of the [contractor] exceeds the aggregate of the
    claims of the subcontractors and the State Tax Commission.”             Because the
    retainage was exhausted by payment of timely lien claims, there was no balance
    to remit to the contractor and nothing to which the federal tax lien could attach. ki.
    at 89. But had there been funds sufficient to remit to the contractor, the IRS could
    have attached those funds to prevent their payment to the contractor.
    RCW 60.28.011(1)(a) makes the retainage fund a “trust fund for the
    protection and payment” of claims arising under the contract. But once an owner
    determines that all taxes and timely lien claims have been paid, the contractor is
    entitled to the remaining funds.    RCW 60.28.021; see also Fid. & Deposit, 
    14 Wn.2d at 568-69
     (duty to remit remaining funds to contractor because         “[ut was
    clearly the contractor’s money, and any retention would constitute an unlawful
    deprivation of the money”).
    Porter Brothers’ assignment to Hartford only conveyed title to contract funds
    that were “due now or in the future.” Under RCW 60.28.021, no retainage funds
    were due to Porter Brothers until all taxes and timely liens were paid. Just as
    Porter Brothers will not receive any excess funds from the retainage until all taxes
    and timely liens are paid, neither will Hartford. See Levinson v. Linderman, 
    51 Wn.2d 855
    , 861, 
    322 P.2d 863
     (1958) (“An assignment of a sum of money due or
    to become due will pass to the assignee only so much as a construction of the
    instrument shows was intended to pass.”) (quotation and citation omitted). We
    -   23   -
    No. 78753-5-1/24
    conclude that Porter Brothers lawfully assigned to Hartford any excess retainage
    funds that it may be entitled to receive under RCW 60.28.021.
    Second, because State Construction’s lien was untimely, its lien against the
    retainage fund ceased to exist. “‘The right to a lien ceases to exist when the
    designated period is over.” Thompson v. Peninsula Sch. Dist. N. 401, 
    77 Wn. App. 500
    , 505, 
    892 P.2d 760
     (1995) (quoting Shope, 
    41 Wn. App. at 131
    ). Once
    State Construction’s lien ceased to exist, the funds in the account based on State
    Construction’s work became available to other lien claimants and, if any excess
    exists, to Porter Brothers or its secured creditors. The record is insufficient for the
    court to determine whether the retainage fund has any excess funds that would be
    payable to Porter Brothers. The City’s certification lists over 20 lien claimants (in
    addition to State Construction) whose combined claims well exceed the $1.3
    million in the retainage fund.
    To the extent any excess funds in the retainage fund are due to Porter
    Brothers, Hartford, as a secured creditor, has a claim to those funds that takes
    priority over State Construction’s judgment. A debtor’s general assignment for the
    benefit of a creditor passes to the creditor all title to the property vested in the
    debtor and that title is superior to any unsecured creditor who acquires a judgment
    against the debtor thereafter. Steinberg v. Raymond, 
    50 Wn.2d 502
    , 503, 
    312 P.2d 824
     (1957). Because Porter Brothers executed a valid assignment for the
    benefit of Hartford that included title to any excess funds that would otherwise be
    owing to Porter Brothers, and that assignment preceded State Construction’s
    judgment, Hartford’s interest is superior to that of State Construction.
    -   24   -
    No. 78753-5-1/25
    E. Attorney Fee Award to Hartford
    Lastly, State Construction argues that Hartford is not entitled to attorney’s
    fees for two reasons—first, under RCW 60.28.030 and RCW 39.08.030, only the
    party claiming against the retainage fund and the bond may recover fees; and
    second, under RCW 39.04.240, State Construction’s action does not arise out of
    a public works contract.
    Washington courts may only award attorney fees “when doing so is
    authorized by a contract provision, a statute, or a recognized ground in equity.”
    King County v. Vinci Constr. Grands Projets/Parsons RCI/Frontier-Kemper, JV,
    
    188 Wn.2d 618
    , 625, 
    398 P.3d 1093
     (2017). Generally, attorney fee awards are
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Guillen v. Contreras, 
    169 Wn.2d 769
    , 774,
    
    238 P.3d 1168
     (2010). But the “underlying question of which fees may be awarded
    pursuant to the statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Olympic Peninsula
    Narcotics Enf’t Team v. Real Prop. Known as (1) Junction City Lots 1 Through 12
    Inclusive, Block 35, (2) Lot 2 of the Nelson Short Plat Located in Jefferson County,
    
    191 Wn.2d 654
    , 661, 
    424 P.3d 1226
     (2018).
    Hartford’s motion for attorney fees and costs was based on RCW
    39.04.240(1), which provides:
    The provisions of RCW 4.84.250 through 4.84.280 shall apply
    to an action arising out of a public works contract in which the state
    or a municipality, or other public body that contracts for public works,
    is a party, except that: (a) The maximum dollar limitation in RCW
    4.84.250 shall not apply; and (b) in applying RCW 4.84.280, the time
    period for serving offers of settlement on the adverse party shall be
    the period not less than thirty days and not more than one hundred
    twenty days after completion of the service and filing of the summons
    and complaint.
    -   25   -
    No. 78753-5-1/26
    Under RCW 4.84.250 through .280, if a defendant makes a settlement offer to a
    plaintiff and the plaintiff subsequently recovers nothing or recovers an amount
    equal to or less than the settlement offer, the defendant is deemed the prevailing
    party entitled to recover attorney fees.
    Hartford represented, and State Construction does not dispute, that it
    offered to settle State Construction’s claims for $0 on August 29, 2017, a date
    within the deadlines prescribed in RCW 39.04.240 and RCW 4.84.280. State
    Construction did not accept this offer.                Because State Construction recovered
    nothing in its suit, Hartford argued it was the prevailing party under RCW 4.84.270
    and, as a result, entitled to attorney fees under RCW 39.04.240. The trial court
    agreed.
    State Construction argues that RCW 60.28.030 and RCW 39.08.030 only
    permit a lien claimant to recover attorney fees. It contends the more general public
    works attorney fee statute, RCW 39.04.240, conflicts with the lien statutes and is
    thus inapplicable. It relies on Housing Authority of City of Everett v. Kirby, 
    154 Wn. App. 842
    , 856, 
    226 P.3d 222
     (2010)16 for this proposition. We decline to extend
    Kirby to public works contract disputes because of the mandatory nature of the
    language in RCW 39.04.240.
    In Kirby, the Housing Authority brought an unsuccessful unlawful detainer
    action against Kirby, who then sought attorney fees under multiple statutes,
    including RCW 4.84.250 and .270.              154 Wn. App. at 846, 848. The Housing
    Authority noted that applying these statutes to residential unlawful detainer actions
    16            on other grounds by Hous. Auth. of C[ty of Seattle v. Bin, 
    163 Wn. App. 367
    , 
    260 P.3d 900
     (2011).
    -   26   -
    No. 78753-5-1127
    would, in certain situations, create a conflict between them and the specific statute,
    RCW 59.18.290, that allowed landlords to recover attorney fees in residential
    unlawful detainer actions. jç[. at 856. We affirmed the denial of Kirby’s request for
    attorney fees, reasoning that it made no sense that a tenant, found guilty of non
    payment of rent and subject to eviction, could become the prevailing party entitled
    to an award of attorney fees by offering to settle for less rent than the landlord
    claimed was owed. Id. at 856-57. Such an outcome, we concluded, would conflict
    with RCW 59.18.290, which authorizes a discretionary fee award to the landlord
    who prevailed in recovering possession of the premises. Id. We determined that
    RCW 59.1 8.290 superseded RCW 4.84.250 and .270. k~.
    But the public works statute under which Hartford sought an award of
    attorney fees is distinguishable from the general language of RCW 4.84.250 and
    .270. RCW 39.04.240 provides that the provisions of RCW 4.84.250 through .280
    “shall apply to an action arising out of a public works contract in which the state or
    a municipality.   .   .   is a party.” Additionally, the right to recover attorney fees under
    the settlement offer process set out in RCW 4.84.250 to .280 “may not be waived
    by the parties to a public works contract” entered into after June 11, 1992, and any
    contractual provision providing for such a waiver is void against public policy.
    RCW 39.04.240(2).
    When the legislature uses the word “shall,” we deem it to be mandatory.
    Khandelwal v. Seattle Mun. Court, 6 Wn. App. 2d 323, 337-38, 
    431 P.3d 506
    (201 8). In addition, the statute contains a significant legislative statement of public
    policy.      The mandatory language of RCW 39.04.240 undermines State
    Construction’s suggestion that the legislature intended RCW 60.28.030 and RCW
    -   27   -
    No. 78753-5-1/28
    39.08.030(1)(b) to supersede it. We therefore conclude that RCW 60.28.030 and
    RCW 39.08.030(1) do not supersede RCW 39.04.240.
    Finally, State Construction contends that RCW 39.04.240 does not apply
    because Hartford was not a party to the public works project contract and because
    its lien foreclosure action did not arise out of a public works contract. But State
    Construction misreads RCW 39.04.240.
    By its language, RCW 39.04.240 applies when the state or a city is a party
    to a public works contract and is a party to a lawsuit arising out of that contract.
    The statute does not require that the party seeking attorney fees is a party to the
    underlying contract.   .~    Puget Sound Elec. Workers Health & Welfare Tr. v.
    Lighthouse Elec. Grp., No. C12-276 RAJ, 
    2014 WL 2619921
     (W.D. Wash. June
    12, 2014) (granting the surety and the general contractor their attorney fees for
    time period that the State was a party to the action); see also Am. Safety Cas. Ins.
    Co. v. City of OlymiDia, 
    162 Wn.2d 762
    , 773, 
    174 P.3d 54
     (2007) (awarding
    RCW 39.04.240 fees to the city as prevailing party in lawsuit brought by surety as
    assignee of the general contractor’s rights under a public works construction
    project). It is undisputed that the City was a party to the dispute.
    We also conclude that State Construction’s action arose out of a public
    works contract. A public works contract is a condition precedent to a bond or
    retainage lien claim. See RCW 39.08.010(1) (public owner must require contractor
    to obtain bond); RCW6O.28.011(1) (public works contracts must set up retainage
    trust fund). Retainage and bond lien claims brought pursuant to RCW 39.08.010
    and 60.28.011 thus arise out of a public works contract.         Puget Sound Elec.
    Workers Health & Welfare Tr., 
    2014 WL 2619921
    , at *1.
    -   28   -
    No. 78753-5-1/29
    We affirm the trial court’s award of Hartford’s attorney fees pursuant to RCW
    39.04.240. Furthermore, because Hartford is the prevailing party on appeal, we
    award it attorney fees and costs pursuant to RAP 14.2, subject to its compliance
    with RAP 18.1.
    Affirmed.
    WE CONCUR:
    -   29   -