James Alan Clark v. Wendy Kristine Clark ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In re the Marriage of
No. 79424-8-I
JAMES ALAN CLARK,
DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
WENDY KRISTINE CLARK,
Respondent. FILED: January 13, 2020
ANDRUS, J. — The trial court denied James Clark’s petition to modify his
child support obligation based on a reduction of employment hours and income.
His appeal is largely focused on arguments that he failed to preserve for appeal.
To the extent he challenges the merits of the court’s decision on his petition to
modify, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.
FACTS
James and Wendy Clark dissolved their marriage in 2011.1 They have
two children, who were 6 and 8 years old at the time of the dissolution. The trial
court entered agreed orders that equally allocated residential time with the
children and apportioned the child support obligation according to the standard
1 Some of the factual background is derived from this court’s recent unpublished decision
resolving James’s appeal of a 2017 order entered earlier in this proceeding. ~
clarkv. clark, No. 77253-8-I (Wash. Ct. App. June 11, 2018) (unpublished)
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/772538.pdf. As in our prior opinion, because the parties
share the same last name, we refer to them by first name for clarity.
No. 79424-8-1/2
child support calculation based on each parent’s proportionate share of the
combined income.2
Approximately one year after the final orders were entered, James began
multiple attempts to reduce his child support obligation, seeking to deviate from
the standard child support calculation based on the substantial amount of time
the children reside in his household. See RCW 26.19.075(1)(d).3 The court
rejected these requests.
In 2014, after the court had denied two petitions to reduce support and
awarded attorney fees to Wendy in connection with one of those requests,
James filed a petition to modify support. He again requested a deviation based
on the shared residential schedule. A court commissioner denied the motion,
observing that a deviation for residential credit is discretionary and generally not
warranted where there is a significant disparity in the parents’ income. At the
hearing on James’s motion, the commissioner explained:
The bigger the differential in income, the less likely you are to get a
residential credit, and the reason for that is because the household
that has 50 percent of the time with the lower income is at an
economic disadvantage in maintaining the life that these kids
have.
2 The record on appeal does not include the final dissolution and child support orders
entered in 2011, but James does not dispute that he agreed to an amount of child support that did
not deviate from the standard calculation.
~ RCW26.19.075(1)(d) provides, in pertinent part:
The court may deviate from the standard calculation if the child spends a
significant amount of time with the parent who is obligated to make a support transfer
payment. The court may not deviate on that basis if the deviation will result in insufficient
funds in the household receiving the support to meet the basic needs of the child or if the
child is receiving temporary assistance for needy families. . .
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No. 79424-8-113
The commissioner denied Wendy’s fee request, but cautioned James that she
would “absolutely” award fees if he filed another motion raising the same
argument.
In 2017, James filed a petition to modify the parenting plan. This time, he
proposed a slight increase in his residential time with the children, along with a
reduction of child support. James described his proposal as a “college savings
plan,” which would allow him to set aside over $1,000 per month for future
postsecondary education expenses. While urging the court to dismiss James’s
petition, Wendy also sought an adjustment of child support, because it had been
two years since entry of the previous order of support and one of the children had
moved into a new age bracket. ~ RCW 26.09.170(6)(b) (allowing for
adjustment after one year if a child is no longer in the age category upon which
the support obligation is based).
A commissioner denied James’s petition, describing it as a “cynical” and
transparent attempt to further his own financial interests. The commissioner
granted Wendy’s requested adjustment and awarded her attorney fees. The
superior court denied James’s motion for revision and awarded additional
attorney fees to Wendy. This court upheld the superior court’s order on appeal.
See Clark v. Clark, No. 77253-8-I (Wash. Ct. App. June 11, 2018) (unpublished)
http ://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/772538 pdf.
.
The 2017 child support order required James to make a transfer payment
of $2,054 to Wendy based on his 72 percent proportional share of the combined
income. The order states:
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No. 79424-8-1/4
Father has requested [a] residential deviation which has been
denied multiple times by the court due to disparity in income
between the parties. Downward deviation for post-secondary
support is untimely due to [the] age of the children.
While James’s appeal was pending, he refused to pay the full amount of
child support. As a result, on June 26, 2018, a court commissioner found James
in contempt for failing to comply with the July 2017 support order. The court
ordered him to pay the child support arrearage as well as attorney fees and costs
of more than $2,500 to Wendy.
On August 1, 2018, James filed the petition at issue in this appeal,
seeking to modify child support based on an alleged substantial change of
circumstances with respect to his employment and income. ~
RCW 26.09.170(5)(a) (“[a] party to an order of child support may petition for a
modification based upon a showing of substantially changed circumstances at
any time”). James also asserted that the current support order had been in place
for at least a year and created a “severe economic hardship.” See RCW
26.09.170(6)(a) (support order may be modified if it has been in place for at least
a year without a showing of substantially changed circumstances if the order
creates a “severe economic hardship.”).
James explained that he had been involuntarily laid off by his employer,
Northrop Grumman Corporation (Northrop), on July 26, 2018, and hired by a
different company, Engineering Services Network (ESN), the following day.
However, James stated that while he was reemployed at approximately the same
hourly rate of pay, his new position at ESN was part-time. Consequently, he
claimed his annual salary was reduced to approximately half of his 2017 income.
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No. 79424-8-1/5
James stated that his part-time schedule would allow him to restart a
consulting business he had operated in the past. While he predicted that it would
take approximately a year for the new business to become profitable, James
opined that developing his own business would ultimately increase his earning
potential and said he could “picture roles in the company” for his children in the
future. James argued that, as a result of his reduced income, there was no
longer a substantial disparity between his income and Wendy’s. He believed that
it was “long past time” for the court to award a residential credit under
RCW26.19.075(1)(d) in light of the parties’ equal residential time. Based on his
projected new income, James claimed that his monthly child support obligation
should be reduced to $1,059.
Two months later, James sought a temporary order eliminating his child
support transfer payment. He also reiterated his challenges to the 2017 child
support order that had been recently affirmed on appeal, including his claims that
the existing child support order was detrimental to the children because it
prevented him from saving for their future educational expenses and that he was
entitled to a residential credit deviation.
Wendy opposed modification, arguing that James’s decision to accept
part-time employment was not a basis to modify the 2017 order. Wendy
explained that Northrop, James’s employer for the preceding 13 years,
historically issued layoff notices before its defense contract was renewed and
then promptly rehired its employees after renewal. Wendy pointed out that
James did not say whether he had been offered full-time employment and
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No. 79424-8-1/6
observed that his latest motion represented his sixth attempt since 2011 to
reduce child support.
James denied that he was voluntarily underemployed. He argued Wendy
had no personal knowledge of the negotiations surrounding his 2018 layoff and
rehiring, but at the same time, he provided no information to verify that he was
not offered reemployment with Northrop or that he was not offered full-time
employment at any rate of pay.
At the October 2018 hearing on his motion, James argued that the transfer
payment required by the 2017 support order was neither sustainable nor
equitable in light of his reduced income. But instead of elaborating on his
employment options, James focused on the previously-litigated issue of a
deviation based on residential credit. James said that his purpose, “[f]irst and
foremost,” was to obtain a residential credit deviation. James claimed that any
payment above $1,440, which represented fifty percent of the total child support
obligation, was “backdoor[J” maintenance. James also informed the
commissioner that he had obtained all the credentials to become a “digital
forensics expert witness,” and that he expected to substantially increase his
income “within the next year.”
The commissioner denied the motion to modify, concluding there was no
substantial change in circumstances to warrant modification of child support.
The commissioner noted that James’s requests for a discretionary deviation
based on residential credit had been previously denied based on a significant
disparity in the parties’ incomes and that, since he planned to work full-time and
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No. 79424-8-1/7
to expand his salary base in the near future, the disparity was not eliminated.
The commissioner denied reconsideration and ordered James to pay Wendy
approximately $8,000 in attorney fees.
James filed a motion to revise the commissioner’s ruling. Wendy then
filed a motion seeking to declare James a vexatious litigant and to require that he
post a bond before filing further pleadings seeking affirmative relief. She also
requested attorney fees incurred in responding to James’s motion to revise.
Following a hearing on both motions, the trial court denied James’s motion
to revise, based on a de novo review of the record before the commissioner, but
granted Wendy’s motion to declare James to be a vexatious litigant. The court
entered an order placing limitations on James’s ability, for a year, to file petitions
or motions pertaining to child support. The court denied Wendy’s request for
attorney fees.
James appeals from the order denying revision and the order granting
Wendy’s motion to prevent vexatious litigation. -
ANALYSIS
A. Constitutional Arguments
James primarily argues on appeal that he is entitled to a deviation from
the standard calculation child support obligation. He claims that the failure to
apply a deviation in a case of equally allocated residential time violates several
constitutional principles, including substantive and procedural due process and
equal protection. He also challenges the constitutionality of the statutory
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No. 79424-8-1/8
provision governing residential credit deviations, RCW 26.19.075(1)(d), insofar
as it does not require deviations in cases involving a 50/50 residential schedule.
But James did not argue below that a residential credit deviation was
constitutionally required and did not challenge the constitutionality of
RCW26.19.075(1)(d). Under RAP 2.5(a), we generally do not entertain issues
not raised in the trial court in order to encourage the efficient use of judicial
resources. Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. Symetra Life Ins. Co., 166 Wn. App. 683,
695, 271 P.3d 925 (2012).
RAP 2.5(a)(3) provides an exception to this rule. To determine whether to
consider an unpreserved error under RAP 2.5(a)(3), we inquire whether (1) the
error is truly of a constitutional magnitude and (2) whether it is manifest. An error
is manifest when the asserted error has practical and identifiable consequences
in the trial court. Aventis Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. State, 5 Wn. App. 2d 637, 650,
428 P.3d 389 (2018). Manifest error must be “obvious on the record,” and
“unmistakable, evident, or indisputable.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 100,
217 P.3d 756 (2009); State v. Lynn, 67 Wn. App. 339, 345, 835 P.2d 251 (1992).
James does not allege, much less establish, manifest constitutional error.
His contention that RCW 26.19.075(1)(d) is unconstitutional is unsupported and
conclusory. He provides no cogent argument or persuasive authority that
supports his position that child support allocated in accordance with each
parent’s proportionate share of the combined income is not narrowly tailored and
does not advance a compelling state interest. See In re Custody of Smith,
137 Wn.2d 1, 14-15, 969 P.2d 21(1998) (parental autonomy is a fundamental
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No. 79424-8-1/9
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment upon which the State
may not intrude without a compelling interest and narrow tailoring). Rather than
addressing the criteria of RAP 2.5(a)(3), James simply explains that he failed to
raise the constitutional issues below because “due process arguments
concerning errors of law belong in front of the appellate court.” Although James
raises numerous and extensive constitutional arguments related to a deviation
based on the shared residential schedule, he fails to make a plausible showing
that the alleged error is manifest. We therefore decline to address James’s
constitutional arguments.
B. Substantial Change in Circumstances
James argues the court below erred in denying his request to modify child
support based on his alleged substantial change of circumstances. Washington
courts have statutory and equitable powers to modify support orders.
RCW26.09.175; Pip~jins v. Jankelson, 110 Wn.2d 475, 478, 754 P.2d 105(1988). As a general rule, courts must find a substantial change of
circumstances before modifying a support order. RCW 26.09.170(5); Pi~ins,
110 Wn.2d 475.
“On a revision motion, a trial court reviews a commissioner’s ruling de
novo based on the evidence and issues presented to the commissioner.” In re
Marriage of Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573 (2010). “When an
appeal is taken from an order denying revision of a court commissioner’s
decision, we review the superior court’s decision, not the commissioner’s.”
Williams, 156 Wn. App. at 27. We review such an order for manifest abuse of
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No. 79424-8-1/10
discretion. In re Marriage of Schumacher, 100 Wn. App. 208, 211, 997 P.2d 399(2000). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly
unreasonable, or is based on untenable grounds or an erroneous view of the law.
In re Marriage of Scanlon, 109 Wn. App. 167, 174-75, 34 P.3d 877 (2001).
James contends that the court “ignored” his changed circumstances and
reduced income. He also claims that the court failed to appreciate his need to
“prioritize” the children by working less than full-time in order to fulfill his
substantial caretaking responsibilities. But the denial of James’s motion does
not, in and of itself, suggest that the court failed to consider his new
circumstances. The record supports the conclusion that James was likely to
experience only a temporary reduction in income and that he had no intention of
relying solely on part-time income from ESN. According to James’s financial
documents, his reported expenses, excluding child support, significantly
exceeded his new income from ESN.4 James conceded that part-time
employment was “not a long term option” for him. He admitted it would be
appropriate to credit him immediately with additional annual earnings generated
by his new business of between $18,000 and $30,000. The court had a basis in
the record for rejecting James’s argument that his employment status would lead
to a significant reduction in his income.
James also did not establish that his salary reduction was unavoidable.
He did not describe any specific efforts to secure full-time employment and did
not specifically say whether he was offered full-time employment, or what, if any,
~ According to James’s financial declaration submitted in August 2018 in conjunction with
his petition to modify support, at his new monthly income, his household would operate at a
monthly deficit of approximately $5,000.
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No. 79424-8-I/il
offer his previous employer made, Instead, he vaguely asserted that the
“layoff/rehire process can be brutal,” that managers he previously reported to had
left, that his “program” was “in flux,” and that the “overall workload” was reduced.
He provided very few details and nothing to substantiate his claim that, by
accepting part-time hours, he had “saved his job.”
James also asserted below that he accepted reduced hours in order to
meet the needs of his teenaged children. This assertion, however, is arguably
inconsistent with his historical ability to work full-time and manage his parenting
responsibilities and his contention that he needs the additional time to develop
his own business. The record shows that the children have resided with James
50 percent of the time since 2011, and he apparently worked full-time throughout
that 7-year period. And his stated intent was to devote his additional available
hours, not to his children, but to developing a business. The court did not
manifestly abuse its discretion in finding James’s arguments to be unconvincing.
Because the court rejected James’s contention that there has been a substantial
change in circumstances, it did not abuse its discretion in rejecting his request for
a residential credit.
James cites In re Marriage of Payne, 82 Wn. App. 147, 916 P.2d 968(1996), to argue that the court abused its discretion because his child support
obligation is based on prior, not current, earnings. His reliance on Payne is
misplaced. The father in Payne earned approximately $600 less per month after
he moved to Seattle to be closer to his daughter following the mother’s
relocation. Payne, 82 Wn. App. at 151. We concluded the trial court did not err
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No. 79424-8-1/12
in calculating the father’s child support obligation based on his projected future
income in Seattle, rather than his prior earnings, because to do otherwise would
“unfairly penalize” him for moving. kJ. In those circumstances, we deemed the
father’s slightly higher income from a previous position to be irrelevant. Payne is
distinguishable because, unlike the case here, the change in income was not
associated with probable voluntary reduced work hours, but a change in location
and employer due to the other parent’s relocation. ~ RCW 26.09.170(5)(b)
(“An obligor’s voluntary unemployment or voluntary underemployment, by itself,
is not a substantial change of circumstances.”)
James also cites Schumacher for the position that full-time employment
need not always amount to 40 hours per week. But unlike the father in that case,
James does not argue, here or below, that less than 40 hours should be
considered full-time employment, in view of his work history, education, age, and
other relevant factors. See Schumacher, 100 Wn. App. at 215.
Based on the record here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying James’s petition to modify the child support order.
C. Vexatious Liticiation Order
James also challenges the court’s order placing temporary limitations on
his ability to challenge the order of child support.
“[A] court may, in its discretion, place reasonable restrictions on any
litigant who abuses the judicial process.” See In re Marriacie of Giordano,
57 Wn. App. 74, 78, 787 P.2d 51(1990). Here, the court found that James had
“engaged in a pattern of abusive litigation tactics that constitute vexatious
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No. 79424-8-1/13
litigation regarding child support, particularly the issue of a residential credit.”
The court noted that James’s “comments at oral argument support this finding.”5
The court determined that it was “appropriate and necessary” to place restrictions
on James’s ability to file future motions pertaining to child support. Specifically,
the order prohibits James from filing any motions regarding child support within a
year of the court’s December 11, 2018 order unless he is represented by a
licensed attorney, or unless he either (1) posts a $10,000 bond in the superior
court registry prior to filing a petition or motion, or (2) obtains prior approval of a
court commissioner before filing a new petition or motion.6
James does not challenge the finding that he engaged in “abusive
litigation tactics that constitute vexatious litigation,” or otherwise challenge the
sufficiency of the court’s findings. The only argument he raises with respect to
the order is that he cannot be deemed a vexatious litigant because he complied
with statutory requirements as to the timing of his June 2017 and August 2018
petitions. .~ RCW 26.09.170(6), (7). But James provides no authority or
reasoned argument to support his position. As a general matter, we decline to
address arguments that are unsupported by citation to authority or cogent
argument. ~ RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley,
118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
James does not challenge any of the specific restrictions or contend that
the injunction was overly broad. Yurtis v. Phiprs, 143 Wn. App. 680, 693,
~ The hearing on the motions was apparently not transcribed and a report of the
proceeding is not included in the record on appeal.
~ In these proceedings involving his 2018 petition, James has represented himself pro se,
but it appears that he was represented by counsel earlier in the litigation.
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No. 79424-8-1/14
181 P.3d 849 (2008) (courts must be careful not to impose overly comprehensive
injunctions that restrict litigation). And he fails to mention critical facts about the
scope of the order. The order was not a moratorium and set forth three separate
means by which James could seek relief from child support prior to expiration of
the order. .~ Giordano, 57 Wn. App. at 78 (no abuse of discretion where trial
court’s order restricting ability to file motions did not amount to a “total denial of
access” to the court). James fails to establish that the court abused its
discretion.
D. Attorney Fees
Wendy requests attorney fees on appeal, citing RAP 18.1,
RCW26.09.140, and RAP 18.9 based on her need and James’s ability to pay,
principles of intransigence, and a frivolous appeal.
This court has the discretion to award attorney fees on appeal under
RAP 18.1(a) if authorized by applicable law. RCW 26.09.140 allows the appellate
court, in its discretion, and based on consideration of the “financial resources” of
both parties, to order a party to pay the attorney fees of the other party in cases
governed by chapter 26.09 RCW. The court may also award fees based on
conduct that may be characterized as “foot-dragging” or “obstructionist.”
MacKenzie v. Barthol, 142 Wn. App. 235, 242, 173 P.3d 980 (2007); Eide v.
Eide, I Wn. App. 440, 445, 462 P.2d 562 (1969). And under RAP 18.9, the
appellate court may impose fees against a party who files a frivolous appeal. “An
appeal is frivolous if the appellate court is convinced that the appeal presents no
debatable issues upon which reasonable minds could differ and is so lacking in
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No. 79424-8-1/15
merit that there is no possibility of reversal.” In re Marriacie of Foley, 84 Wn. App.
839, 847, 930 P.2d 929 (1997).
We conclude that attorney fees are warranted under RAP 18.9 because
James’s appeal lacks merit. He largely focused on issues not properly before us,
did not assign error to any of the key factual findings, failed to brief in any
meaningful way the basis for reversing the finding that he is a vexatious litigant,
and presented no debatable issues for review. We therefore grant Wendy’s
request for attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.9, subject to her compliance
with RAP 18.1.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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