State of Washington v. William Vern Gadberry ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                           FILED
    APRIL 2, 2020
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )
    )         No. 36489-5-III
    Respondent,              )
    )
    v.                                     )
    )
    WILLIAM VERN GADBERRY,                        )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    Appellant.               )
    KORSMO, J. — William Gadberry appeals from a conviction for second degree
    assault, contending that evidence was improperly admitted and that his attorney
    performed deficiently. We affirm.
    FACTS
    The victim, Ms. Quinn Learn, lived in the basement of the home of Jeanne
    Gadberry, a woman for whom Learn provided caregiving services in exchange for room
    and board. Two of Gadberry’s sons, Steven and William, also lived in the basement.
    When Ms. Gadberry was hospitalized due to medical complications, her other children
    decided to sell the house. Eviction notices were served on all those living in the building.
    An agitated William Gadberry confronted Learn on June 19, 2018, about missing
    jewelry; she attempted to lock herself in her room. According to her, William jumped on
    No. 36489-5-III
    State v. Gadberry
    her and started to squeeze her neck, cutting off her air supply. He then put one of her
    belts around her neck and attempted to tighten it; she used her hand to prevent the belt
    from closing too tightly. At Learn’s urging, Steven called the police.
    During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Learn why his client had gotten
    upset. Learn responded that they had been talking about the missing jewelry, leading him
    to become upset. She tried to avoid him because it was “not the first time he’s ever
    assaulted me.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 138. Counsel then received permission to
    question Learn about prior arguments not recounted during her direct examination. Learn
    testified that Gadberry “has a history of arguing with everybody” and that he had hit her a
    couple of times. RP at 145.
    In contrast, William Gadberry testified that he confronted Learn about jewelry his
    siblings reported missing and she punched him, beginning an altercation. The two fell to
    the floor and she began hitting him with a belt. He testified that he never put his hands
    on her neck to strangle her, but did use the belt on her neck to “control” her. She was a
    larger person than he was.
    The incident resulted in charges of second degree assault, attempted second degree
    murder, and harassment. The case proceeded to jury trial in the Spokane County
    Superior Court. Deputy Sheriff Christopher Johnston testified to the injuries suffered by
    both Learn and Gadberry. He characterized the scratches on Gadberry’s face as
    “defensive wounds.” Detective Mike Ricketts conducted the follow up investigation. He
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    No. 36489-5-III
    State v. Gadberry
    testified that the injuries to Learn’s neck were consistent with manual strangulation and
    that the injuries were serious, in the “upper 15 percent” of strangulation injuries that
    could be photographed. RP at 174-175.
    The defense obtained instructions on self-defense and argued the case to the jury
    on that theory. The jury acquitted Gadberry on the attempted murder and harassment
    counts, but convicted him of second degree assault.
    Mr. Gadberry timely appealed to this court. A panel considered his case without
    hearing argument.
    ANALYSIS
    This appeal raises claims of improper opinion testimony by Deputy Johnston and
    ineffective assistance by trial counsel. We address those claims in the order listed.
    Testimony of Deputy Johnston
    Mr. Gadberry first contends that Johnston’s testimony about “defensive wounds,”
    when coupled with his testimony that he was trained to identify the aggressor, amounted
    to an opinion that the defendant was guilty. Gadberry did not challenge the testimony at
    trial and cannot now establish manifest constitutional error.
    Two related legal principles govern our review. The first is the recognition that a
    proper objection must be made at trial to perceived errors in admitting or excluding
    evidence; the failure to do so precludes raising the issue on appeal. State v. Guloy, 
    104 Wn.2d 412
    , 421, 
    705 P.2d 1182
     (1985). “‘[A] litigant cannot remain silent as to claimed
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    State v. Gadberry
    error during trial and later, for the first time, urge objections thereto on appeal.’” 
    Id.
    (quoting Bellevue Sch. Dist. 405 v. Lee, 
    70 Wn.2d 947
    , 950, 
    425 P.2d 902
     (1967)). A
    trial judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    Diaz v. State, 
    175 Wn.2d 457
    , 462, 
    285 P.3d 873
     (2012). Discretion is abused when it is
    exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker,
    
    79 Wn.2d 12
    , 26, 
    482 P.2d 775
     (1971).
    The second principle is that appellate courts review trial court rulings. Where, as
    here, there is no trial court ruling to challenge, appellate review normally is not available.
    RAP 2.5(a). There are certain exceptions to this doctrine that recognize a small class of
    errors that can be reviewed even in the absence of a trial court challenge. The most
    common of those exceptions, found in RAP 2.5(a)(3), permits review of a manifest error
    affecting a constitutional right. A party claiming the existence of manifest constitutional
    error is first required to establish the existence of error that is constitutional in nature. If
    such an error is demonstrated, the party must then show that the error was not harmless
    and actually had an identifiable and practical impact on the case. State v. Kirkman, 
    159 Wn.2d 918
    , 934-935, 
    155 P.3d 125
     (2007); State v. Scott, 
    110 Wn.2d 682
    , 687-688, 
    757 P.2d 492
     (1988).
    Mr. Gadberry argues that this is an instance of manifest constitutional error
    because witnesses are not permitted to opine as to the guilt of the defendant. State v.
    Black, 
    109 Wn.2d 336
    , 348, 
    745 P.2d 12
     (1987). Such testimony invades the jury
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    No. 36489-5-III
    State v. Gadberry
    functions of determining credibility and guilt or innocence. Kirkman, 
    159 Wn.2d at 927
    ;
    Black, 
    109 Wn.2d at 348
    . However, opinion testimony indirectly related to an ultimate
    fact is not a “manifest” constitutional error that may be raised for the first time on appeal.
    Kirkman, 
    159 Wn.2d at 936
    .
    The fact that Mr. Gadberry has to combine disparate portions of the deputy’s
    testimony to raise this contention defeats his argument by demonstrating there was no
    direct testimony opining who was the aggressor. A far closer question was presented in
    Kirkman. There, our court concluded that testimony that the child victim’s report of
    sexual abuse was “consistent” with the medical findings did not amount to a comment on
    the victim’s credibility.
    Moreover, the testimony was not particularly harmful to the defense. Both parties
    testified that Mr. Gadberry used the belt on Ms. Learn’s neck. The fact that a person
    being strangled would lash out and scratch the assailant’s face in defense was consistent
    with the uncontested fact that Gadberry choked Learn with the belt. It did not speak to
    the question of who started the fight and whether Gadberry’s use of the belt constituted
    lawful self-defense. This testimony was not harmful.
    The alleged error was not manifest.
    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    Despite the fact that the jury acquitted on the attempted murder and harassment
    charges, Mr. Gadberry alleges that he was the victim of ineffective assistance of counsel
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    No. 36489-5-III
    State v. Gadberry
    due to failure to challenge some of the previously mentioned trial testimony from the two
    officers and the victim. This claim, too, is without merit.
    An attorney’s failure to perform to the standards of the profession will require a
    new trial when the client has been prejudiced by counsel’s failure. State v. McFarland,
    
    127 Wn.2d 322
    , 334-335, 
    899 P.2d 1251
     (1995). Courts must be highly deferential to
    counsel’s decisions when evaluating ineffectiveness claims. A strategic or tactical
    decision is not a basis for finding error. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 689-
    691, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
     (1984). Under Strickland, courts evaluate
    counsel’s performance using a two-prong test that requires determination whether or not
    (1) counsel’s performance failed to meet a standard of reasonableness and (2) actual
    prejudice resulted from counsel’s failures. 
    Id. at 690-692
    . When a claim fails one prong, a
    reviewing court need not consider both Strickland prongs. 
    Id. at 697
    ; State v. Foster, 
    140 Wn. App. 266
    , 273, 
    166 P.3d 726
     (2007). If the evidence necessary to resolve the
    ineffective assistance argument is not in the record, the claim is not manifest and cannot
    be addressed on appeal. McFarland, 
    127 Wn.2d at 334
    .
    Mr. Gadberry contends that his counsel erred by failing to challenge (1) Johnston’s
    testimony concerning the defensive wounds; (2) Learn’s testimony that there were prior
    assaults; and (3) Rickett’s testimony about the photographs. It is an exceptionally difficult
    proposition to establish error in this regard absent evidence from the trial attorney. As the
    Strickland court noted, no two lawyers would try a case in the same manner. 
    466 U.S. at
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    689. Accordingly, discerning such error from an undeveloped appellate record is largely a
    fruitless undertaking because the decision to object is a “classic example of trial tactics.”
    See State v. Madison, 
    53 Wn. App. 754
    , 763, 
    770 P.2d 662
     (1989). “Only in egregious
    circumstances, on testimony central to the State’s case, will the failure to object constitute
    incompetence of counsel.” 
    Id.
     A reviewing court presumes that a “failure to object was
    the product of legitimate trial strategy or tactics, and the onus is on the defendant to rebut
    this presumption.” State v. Johnston, 
    143 Wn. App. 1
    , 20, 
    177 P.3d 1127
     (2007) (citing
    cases).
    All of Gadberry’s arguments run right into this presumption and the even stronger
    Strickland presumption that counsel performed effectively. All of the challenged
    evidence also fails the Madison centrality argument. The testimony of Johnston and
    Ricketts addressed the uncontested fact that Gadberry used a belt around Learn’s neck
    during their altercation. None of that testimony addressed the question of who started the
    fight.
    Learn’s testimony concerning the previous altercations allowed defense counsel to
    raise the issue of prior conflict between the two in support of his self-defense claim and
    fit in with his client’s subsequent testimony that Learn was bigger than he was and had
    fought him before. The decision to run with the testimony when Learn opened the
    subject up was clearly a tactical one by counsel who used the testimony to examine Learn
    outside the scope of her direct examination testimony. Accordingly, counsel’s tactical
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    No. 36489-5-III
    State v. Gadberry
    decision was not error under Strickland. The information concerning prior physical
    conflicts also was highly relevant to the need to use force in self-defense, a defense that
    apparently was successful as to the far more serious offense of attempted second degree
    murder.
    Gadberry has not established that his counsel erred, nor has he shown any
    prejudicial harm from the alleged errors. Since he needed to establish both, his claim of
    ineffective assistance fails.
    The conviction is affirmed.
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
    2.06.040.
    _________________________________
    Korsmo, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________________
    Fearing, J.
    _________________________________
    Pennell, C.J.
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