Maria A. Pena Avila v. Gumersindo Quin Campos ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In Matter of the Committed Intimate )
Relationship of ) No. 79509-1-I
)
GUMERSINDO QUIN CAMPOS, ) DIVISION ONE
)
Respondent, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
and )
)
MARIA A. PENA AVILA, )
)
Appellant. )
)
SMITH, J. — Maria Pena Avila appeals an order distributing property and
debts acquired and incurred during a committed intimate relationship (CIR)
between Pena and Gumersindo Quin Campos.1 She contends that the trial court
erred by not dismissing Quin’s CIR petition as time barred. She contends further
that the trial court’s property distribution was not just and equitable and that the
trial court erred by denying her motion for reconsideration.
We hold that the trial court did not err by concluding that Quin’s CIR
petition was timely. With regard to the property distribution, we conclude that the
trial court erred by failing to characterize the property and debts at issue before
distributing them and by failing to enter sufficient findings. We hold further that
1 We refer to the parties as Pena and Quin, respectively, for consistency
with their briefs.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
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the record in this case would not, in any event, have supported findings to
sustain the court’s ultimate conclusion that its distribution, which awarded Quin
all of the assets at issue but ordered Pena to pay all of the debts, was just and
equitable. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Quin’s
petition was timely, reverse the trial court’s property distribution, and remand to
the trial court to characterize and distribute the property and debts acquired and
incurred during the CIR. On remand, the trial court will conduct further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
Quin and Pena began a dating relationship in 2004 and moved into an
apartment together in 2005. Some six years later, the couple and Pena’s
children from an earlier relationship moved into a house in SeaTac. The house
had been purchased in Pena’s name in 2011, and only Pena’s name was on the
mortgage.
In 2012, Pena became pregnant with the couple’s son, J.L.Q.P., who was
born in October of that year.
In August 2016, Pena traveled to Mexico with J.L.Q.P. According to
Pena’s later declaration, when she returned in late September, Quin had
changed the locks on the SeaTac house. According to Quin, Pena then “hired an
attorney to initiate an unlawful detainer proceeding against [him].”
About a month later, in November 2016, Quin filed a CIR petition.2 He
2Quin’s petition was styled as a “Petition for Dissolution of Committed
Intimate Relationship.” (Emphasis added.) But because the parties were not
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alleged that the parties began a CIR on June 28, 2005, and that the CIR ended
on August 19, 2016, when “[o]ne of us moved to a separate household.” Quin
asked the court to approve a parenting plan and a child support order regarding
J.L.Q.P. He also asked the court “to assign the [house] as my separate property,
and order [Pena] to sign [a] Quit Claim Deed transferring her interest.” Quin
alleged that “[Pena] sold me her share in the [SeaTac house] in July 2016 for
$8,000, which I pa[id] to her with a check.” A check for $8,000, made payable to
Pena and dated July 6, 2016, was later admitted at trial.
In response to Quin’s petition, Pena declared that she purchased the
SeaTac house and “made the down[ ]payment of $8,000 entirely from funds [she]
had saved up.” According to Pena, “[Quin] contributed nothing to the down
payment.” Pena acknowledged receiving $8,000 from Quin in July 2016, but
declared that it was to repay amounts that she had loaned to Quin and sent to
Quin’s relatives in Mexico. Pena also declared that after she and Quin moved
into the SeaTac house, they divided household expenses equally, as they had
while living in an apartment together. Finally, she declared that her relationship
with Quin ended in 2012, but she and Quin “continued residing together in the
house and dividing expenses equally to save money.” In her response to Quin’s
petition, Pena also raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.
In February 2017, the trial court entered a temporary order in which it
ordered that Pena could stay in the SeaTac house and directed Quin to move out
married, the legal term “dissolution” is inapplicable. Therefore, we refer to Quin’s
petition as a CIR petition.
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by March 10, 2017. The parties later resolved parenting and child support issues
under a CR 2A agreement.
A bench trial was held on Quin’s CIR petition in November 2018. At the
beginning of trial, the court indicated that it would “reserve on the statute-of-
limitations question” until after it heard the testimony. At trial, Quin
acknowledged that his name was not on the title to the SeaTac house.
Nevertheless, according to Quin, he and Pena “split the down payment that we
had to make in half.” In support of this testimony, Quin introduced two Wells
Fargo deposit receipts from September 2011—one for $5,900 and another for
$100. Quin testified that these deposits, totaling $6,000, were “the money that
[he] gave [Pena] so that she would deposit that amount in her account, and this
was for the purposes of the down payment.” Pena, by contrast, testified that she
never received the $6,000 shown on the Wells Fargo receipts, that the amount of
the down payment was $8,000, and that she made the entire down payment
herself with money she had saved.
Pena testified, with regard to the couple’s expenses after they moved into
the SeaTac house, that Quin would contribute the monthly mortgage payment—
then approximately $1,275—and Pena “would cover the bills and the food and
any other expenses for the house.” Quin, by contrast, testified that he
contributed to the household expenses “[a]ll the time,” including the expenses for
two of Pena’s children who were not Quin’s. And Quin’s niece testified that Quin
would bring groceries into the house “all the time.”
Quin also testified that in 2007, he and his brother, Martin Quin Campos
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(hereinafter, for clarity, Martin), formed a company, Quin Construction, which
they owned as equal partners. Quin Construction’s 2014 and 2015 tax returns
were admitted into evidence and indicated that the company netted $70,219 in
income in 2014, $117,773 in 2015, and $63,355 in 2016. Quin reported his 50
percent share of these amounts as his only income on his personal tax returns.
Meanwhile, Pena reported $9,917 in income in 2015.
Pena testified, with regard to Quin Construction, that she sometimes
would help Quin at work sites by handing him tools or wood. She also testified
that she loaned Quin and Martin $6,000 to help them when they started the
company and that the $8,000 check she received from Quin in July 2016 was to
repay that loan, plus an additional $2,000 she sent to Quin’s family. Meanwhile,
Quin testified that there never was any loan. When asked to explain the $8,000
payment he made to Pena in July 2016, Quin testified, “[S]ince all she cares
about is money, she will take whatever it is.” Quin also testified that Pena
“never” came with him to help him on a construction site but that the company
owed a debt to the Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) “because [Pena]’s
son was working with [Quin].” According to Martin, the outstanding amount of the
L&I debt was $48,000 at the time of trial.
With regard to the duration of Pena and Quin’s relationship, Pena’s
daughter testified that her mother and Quin broke up in August or early
September 2012, and Pena testified that she broke up with Quin in July 2012,
while she was pregnant with J.L.Q.P. Pena testified that at that time, she and
Quin stopped sleeping in the same bed, she moved all of her possessions
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upstairs, and Quin moved all of his possessions downstairs. Meanwhile, Quin’s
niece testified that it was not until Quin moved out of the house, in approximately
April or May 2017, that she concluded that Pena and Quin were no longer a
couple. Quin himself did not provide any testimony with regard to the alleged
breakup in 2012 but testified that Pena left the house in August 2016. Quin also
testified that after Pena left, he completely renovated the home, including
replacing the siding, the roof, the flooring, and remodeling the bathroom and
kitchen. He testified that he bought the materials himself, and the trial court
admitted a number of hardware store receipts, which Quin testified reflected
expenses for renovating the house. On cross-examination, Quin acknowledged
that he left some work unfinished because he was required to leave the house.
The trial court entered findings and conclusions and a “Final Dissolution
Order” on November 20, 2018. The court found that the parties began a CIR on
June 28, 2005, and that the CIR ended on August 19, 2016. The court
characterized the SeaTac house as “community property,”3 awarded it to Quin as
his separate property, and ordered Pena to sign a quit claim deed to transfer the
property to Quin by December 15, 2018. The court also awarded to each party
the personal property then in that party’s possession or control, and ordered
each party to pay all debts then in that party’s name. With regard to Pena’s
statute of limitations defense, the court stated, “[Pena] raised the issue of statute
of limitations, a three year period, using the year 2012 as the dissolution of the
3Because there is no true marital community in a CIR, we presume that
the court meant “community-like property.”
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CIR. The court denies this motion by the afore-designated finding [that the CIR
ended on August 19, 2016].”
Pena moved for reconsideration. In her motion, she contended that the
court’s order “distributed the $300,000 real property in Sea-Tac to [Quin] and the
$150,000 debt for the . . . property to [Pena], which is inequitable.” Pena argued
that she “should receive a greater than 50% share of the property” based on the
income disparity between herself and Quin but that at a minimum, the house and
the associated mortgage should have been divided equally. In his response to
Pena’s motion, Quin asked the court to “assign the family home as [Quin]’s
separate property” but “giv[e Pena] her share, fifty percent (50%), of the
property’s equity based on the recorded value the property had with the King
County Assessor’s office” as of August 2016. Quin also asked the court to give
him “a six month period to secure a mortgage loan to remove [Pena] from the
family home’s mortgage loan obligation.” Quin explained that he “was not aware
that the [court’s] order was missing a provision that assigned the mortgage loan
of the family home as [Quin]’s separate debt” until his attorney prepared his
response to Pena’s motion for reconsideration.
On January 2, 2019, the trial court entered an order denying Pena’s
motion for reconsideration. Pena appeals.
ANALYSIS
Timeliness of Quin’s CIR Petition
Pena does not challenge the trial court’s findings that a CIR existed or that
it began on June 28, 2005, and thus, we accept these findings as verities.
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Muridan v. Redl, 3 Wn. App. 2d 44, 57, 413 P.3d 1072, review denied, 191
Wn.2d 1002 (2018). Pena contends, however, that the court erred by finding that
the parties’ CIR ended in August 2016 rather than in 2012. Thus, Pena argues,
the trial court also erred by concluding that Quin’s CIR petition, filed in November
2018, was timely. We disagree.
“The CIR doctrine is a judicially created doctrine used to resolve the
property distribution issues that arise when unmarried people separate after
living in a marital-like relationship and acquiring what would have been
community property had they been married.” In re Kelly & Moesslang, 170 Wn.
App. 722, 732, 287 P.3d 12 (2012). A petition to distribute property acquired
during a CIR must be filed within three years after the CIR ends. Kelly, 170 Wn.
App. at 737. The question of when a CIR ended is a question of fact. Muridan, 3
Wn. App. 2d at 56. A trial court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal
so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of
Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 242, 170 P.3d 572 (2007).
Here, Pena contends that the parties’ CIR ended in July 2012. But it is
undisputed that Quin and Pena had a child together in late 2012 and continued to
cohabitate until August 2016. Additionally, there was evidence, even though
disputed, that Quin continued to contribute to household expenses, other than
just the amount of the mortgage payment, until January 2017 and that others
continued to view Quin and Pena as a couple until well after 2012. See Vermette
v. Andersen, 16 Wn. App. 466, 470, 558 P.2d 258 (1976) (“[S]ubstantial
evidence . . . is not made any less substantial by the presence of contradictory
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testimony.”).
Furthermore, although a party to a CIR can terminate it unilaterally, he or
she must do so unequivocally, in a manner understood by the other party, to
trigger the statute of limitations. See In re Parentage of G.W.-F., 170 Wn. App.
631, 648-49, 285 P.3d 208 (2012) (holding that CIR ended when “one party . . .
clearly demonstrated an intent to end it [and t]his intent was communicated to
and understood by the other party to the relationship.”). But in support of her
contention that “the parties ended the relationship . . . in 2012, and moved into
separate rooms on separate floors,” Pena, who bears the burden of proof on this
issue, relies solely on her testimony that she “broke up with” Quin in July 2012.
She points to no evidence that Quin understood Pena’s intent to end the
relationship in 2012 and cites to no authority for the proposition that a CIR ends
merely because the parties move into separate bedrooms. Cf. G.W.-F., 170 Wn.
App. at 649 (pointing out that one party testified that the other party’s intent to
end the relationship “was ‘clear to me’”); Muridan, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 61 (“The
word ‘intimate’ in the term ‘committed intimate relationship’ was not intended to
make sexual intimacy the litmus test for whether courts should equitably divide
property at the end of the relationship.”). For these reasons, the trial court did
not err by concluding that Pena failed to satisfy her burden to prove her statute of
limitations defense. See Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 620-21, 547
P.2d 1221 (1976) (“Since the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, . . .
the burden was on [the party asserting the defense] to prove those facts which
established the defense.”).
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Pena disagrees and relies on Kelly in support of her contention that the
CIR ended in 2012. But in Kelly, there was evidence that the party asserting the
statute of limitations defense had been in a serious relationship with a third party
since 1999. 170 Wn. App. at 738. There also was evidence that by 2003, the
party who filed the CIR petition was aware of that relationship and “considered
herself ‘single.’” Kelly, 170 Wn. App. at 738. In other words, there was evidence
that as early as 2003, both parties understood that the CIR had ended. Thus, we
concluded, the trial court did not err by dismissing the petition, which was not
filed until 2009, as time barred. Kelly, 170 Wn. App. at 739. Here, unlike in
Kelly, Pena points to no evidence that Quin understood that the CIR had ended
as of 2012. Therefore, Pena’s reliance on Kelly is misplaced.
Property Distribution
Pena next contends that the trial court’s property distribution must be
reversed because it was not just and equitable. We agree—not only because the
trial court’s distribution of the parties’ property and debts was inequitable, but
also because the trial court erred by failing to enter findings and failing to
characterize the property and debts at issue before distributing them.
Once the court determines that a CIR existed, it then “evaluate[s] each
party’s interest in the property acquired during the [CIR]” and “make[s] a just and
equitable distribution of that property.” In re Committed Intimate Relationship of
Amburgey, 8 Wn. App. 2d 779, 787, 440 P.3d 1069 (2019). We review de novo
a trial court’s characterization of property and debts as community-like or
separate. G.W.-F., 170 Wn. App. at 637-38; see also Oil Heat Co. of Port
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Angeles, Inc. v. Sweeney, 26 Wn. App. 351, 356, 613 P.2d 169 (1980)
(characterizing, as a conclusion of law, trial court’s determination that debt was a
separate obligation). And we review a trial court’s ultimate distribution of
property and debts for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Neumiller, 183 Wn.
App. 914, 920, 335 P.3d 1019 (2014); see also Amburgey, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 788
(“[A]pplication of marriage principles by analogy applies . . . once the existence of
a CIR has been established.”). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable
reasons.” In re Parenting & Support of L.H., 198 Wn. App. 190, 194, 391 P.3d
490 (2016).
The property and debts primarily at issue in this case were (1) the SeaTac
house (including any equity therein), (2) the mortgage associated with the house,
and (3) Quin’s partnership interest in Quin Construction. The trial court awarded
the house to Quin. The court then awarded to each party the personal property
that he or she “now has or controls” and ordered each party to pay the debts
“that are now in his/her name.” The parties do not dispute that the result of the
trial court’s order was that Quin was awarded both the SeaTac house and his
interest in Quin Construction, while Pena was ordered to pay the mortgage on
the house.
To this end, and as an initial matter, CR 52 requires that “[i]n all actions
tried upon the facts without a jury . . . , the court shall find the facts specially.”
CR 52(a)(1). “‘[W]here findings are required, they must be sufficiently specific to
permit meaningful [appellate] review.’” In re Dependency of A.D., 193 Wn. App.
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445, 462, 376 P.3d 1140 (2016) (first alteration in original) (quoting In re Det. of
LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 218, 728 P.2d 138 (1986)). And “[f]or appellate review
to be possible, a trial court’s findings of fact must declare the ultimate facts that
justify its conclusions.” In re Marriage of Tulleners, 11 Wn. App. 2d 358, 369,
453 P.3d 996 (2019).
The parties presented wildly contradictory testimony regarding their
respective contributions toward the house purchase, the mortgage, the
construction company, and the household expenses. And the trial court
ultimately concluded that its property distribution was “fair (just and equitable).”
But the court did not indicate how it resolved any of the factual disputes relevant
to this ultimate conclusion, including what each party contributed and whether
those contributions were community-like or separate in character. The court also
failed to make any findings with regard to the value of the house or the value of
Quin’s interest in Quin Construction (including the impact of the outstanding L&I
obligation on that value).
Ordinarily, without these findings, we would be unable to evaluate whether
the trial court’s distribution of property and debts constituted an abuse of
discretion and would simply remand to the trial court to enter sufficient findings.
See Tulleners, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 369 (where findings are insufficient, “an
appellant is entitled to have the cause remanded so that findings adequate for
review can be made.”). But in this case, it is clear even without findings that the
trial court’s distribution of property and debts between the parties was not just
and equitable. Specifically, and as discussed, the parties do not dispute that the
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trial court awarded Quin all of the assets at issue while leaving Pena burdened
with all of the debts. Quin points to no evidence—much less substantial
evidence—that would support such a one-sided award. And having reviewed the
record, we discern none. Indeed, even Quin acknowledged in his response to
Pena’s motion for reconsideration that the mortgage should have been “assigned
. . . as [Quin’s] separate debt” given that the house was awarded to him. For
these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s distribution of property and debt
was manifestly unreasonable and, thus, an abuse of discretion warranting
reversal.
Reversal is also warranted for another independent reason, which we
address to provide the trial court with additional guidance on remand.
Unlike in a marital dissolution, where both community and separate
property and debts are before the court for distribution, only property and debts
“that would have been characterized as community property [and debts] had the
parties been married” are properly before the court for distribution following the
termination of a CIR. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 349, 898 P.2d 831(1995). Therefore, characterizing property and debts as community-like versus
separate “is a necessary step to take before making a distribution.” Neumiller,
183 Wn. App. at 920.
The trial court characterized the SeaTac house as community-like but did
not indicate in the record how it characterized any other property or debts,
including the mortgage and Quin’s interest in Quin Construction. Instead, the
court’s findings and conclusions refer to “[t]he community personal property,”
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“[t]he separate personal property,” “[t]he community debt,” and “[t]he separate
debt” without specifying what those categories include or the value of the
property in each category. And the trial court did not enter any other findings
from which we can infer how the trial court characterized the remaining property
and debts. This, too, was reversible error because characterization is a
necessary first step to determine what property is properly before the court for
distribution following the termination of a CIR.
To this end, “[p]roperty and income acquired during a CIR is presumed to
be community-like property.” Muridan, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 63. “A party may
overcome this rebuttable presumption ‘by establishing by clear and convincing
proof that the property is separate, i.e., by tracing with some degree of
particularity the separate source of funds used for the acquisition.’” In re Estate
of Langeland, 177 Wn. App. 315, 325, 312 P.3d 657 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Chesterfield v. Nash, 96 Wn. App. 103, 111, 978 P.2d
551 (1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. In re Marriage of Pennington, 142
Wn.2d 592, 14 P.3d 764 (2000)). But “[t]he fact title has been taken in the name
of one of the parties does not, in itself, rebut the presumption of common
ownership.” Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 351. These same presumptions generally
apply to debts incurred during a CIR. See Oil Heat Co., 26 Wn. App. at 353 (“A
debt incurred by either spouse during marriage is presumed to be a community
debt.”).
Here, it is undisputed that the house, the mortgage, and Quin’s interest in
Quin Construction were all acquired or incurred during the CIR. Accordingly, on
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remand, the trial court shall apply the rebuttable presumption that they are
community-like in character. If, on remand, neither party rebuts the presumption
by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must treat the property or debt
as community-like in character. If, however, a party rebuts the presumption, the
court must still consider the community-like interest in the property at issue,
including the extent to which community-like labor and income contributed to the
property’s value. Cf. In re Marriage of Bepple, 37 Wn. App. 881, 884, 683 P.2d
1131 (1984) (“It is well established the community is entitled to an equitable lien
for its contribution to separate property.”).
Motion for Reconsideration
As a final substantive matter, Pena argues that the trial court erred by
denying her motion for reconsideration. We agree.
“Motions for reconsideration are addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court and a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s ruling absent a
showing of manifest abuse of discretion.” Wilcox v. Lexington Eye Inst., 130 Wn.
App. 234, 241, 122 P.3d 729 (2005). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable
reasons.” L.H., 198 Wn. App. at 194.
The trial court stated in its order denying reconsideration that “[Pena]’s
Proposed Amended Final Dissolution Order was not signed because [the] parties
had not conferred or agreed to change Section 7 on Page 2,” i.e., the provision of
the original order that awarded the SeaTac house to Quin. But because there is
no requirement that parties agree or confer with regard to a change proposed in
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a motion for reconsideration, the trial court abused its discretion by denying
Pena’s motion based on the parties’ failure to confer or agree. That said,
because we reverse on the merits, no additional remedy is warranted as a result
of this error.
Fees on Appeal
Quin requests fees on appeal, arguing that Pena’s appeal is frivolous. But
as evidenced by our discussion above, Pena’s appeal is not frivolous. See
Hanna v. Margitan, 193 Wn. App. 596, 615, 373 P.3d 300 (2016) (“‘[A]n appeal is
frivolous if it raised no debatable issues on which reasonable minds might differ
and is so totally devoid of merit that no reasonable possibility of reversal exists.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Protect the Peninsula’s Future v. City of Port
Angeles, 175 Wn. App. 201, 220, 304 P.3d 914 (2013))). Therefore, we deny
Quin’s request for fees on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Quin’s petition was timely,
reverse the trial court’s property distribution, and remand to the trial court to
characterize and distribute the property and debts acquired and incurred during
the CIR. On remand, the trial court will conduct further proceedings consistent
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with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
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