Anna Schemstad v. Robert J. Williams ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Estate of David ) No. 80398-1-I
Edward Williams, deceased, )
) DIVISION ONE
ROBERT JOSEPH WILLIAMS, a )
Washington resident; AMY RENEE ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETRUCCI, a California resident; )
WARREN SWANSON, a Washington )
resident; and BEVERLY PAULSEN, )
)
Appellants, )
)
v. )
)
ANNA SCHEMSTAD, Personal )
Representative of the ESTATE OF )
DAVID EDWARD WILLIAMS, )
)
Respondent. )
)
HAZELRIGG, J. — Acting in his capacity as personal representative for his
mother’s estate, David E. Williams executed a personal representative’s deed after
conveyance of the family home to his brother and him by her will. The personal
representative deed included language in the caption that referenced joint tenancy
between the brothers, but their mother’s will conveyed the property to them as
tenants in common. Upon David William’s death, his estate initiated an action
seeking declaratory relief and to quiet title to his interest in the property under the
Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA)1. At the initial hearing on the
1 Ch. 11.96A RCW.
Citations and pinpoint citations are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
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TEDRA petition, the trial court determined that the personal representative’s deed
contained a scrivener’s error and reformed the deed to conform with their mother’s
will. Robert Williams argues the court improperly reformed the deed and that the
TEDRA proceeding should have been dismissed based on insufficient evidence of
the brothers’ intent. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Marie Williams2 died in June 2015 and left the family home to her two sons,
David and Robert, in her will. Specifically, the will provided, “I give, devise and
bequeath all of my property, real, personal and mixed to my children, DAVID
EDWARD WILLIAMS and ROBERT JOSEPH WILLIAMS, share and share alike,
per stirpes.” David Williams was appointed as personal representative of Marie’s
estate. In July 2015, David executed a personal representative’s deed which
stated the following:
GRANTOR: DAVID E. WlLLIAMS, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF MARIE C. WILLIAMS, deceased, under Whatcom
County Probate No. 15-4-00322-8,
GRANTEE(S) DAVID E. WlLLIAMS AND ROBERT J. WILLIAMS as
joint tenants with right of survivorship
....
THE GRANTOR, DAVID E. WILLIAMS, as the duly appointed
and acting personal representative of the ESTATE OF MARIE C.
WlLLIAMS, deceased, Whatcom County Superior Court Cause No.
15-4-00322-8, and not in Grantor’s individual capacity, hereby grants
and confirms to DAVID E. WILLIAMS and ROBERT J. WILLIAMS,
Grantees, distrbutes the real property commonly known as 2705
Utter Street, Bellingham, Whatcom County, Washington.
2 For clarity, we refer to the parties by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
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David died testate on May 13, 2019. Anna Schemstad serves as David’s
appointed personal representative. David’s will was admitted to probate in
Whatcom County Superior Court. Schemstad, acting in her capacity as personal
representative for David’s estate (the Estate), filed a TEDRA action on behalf of
the Estate seeking declaratory relief. The Estate sought a ruling to determine that,
irrespective of any contrary language in the personal representative deed David
had executed, the property was held by David and Robert as tenants in common.
If, as the Estate asserted, David’s interest was that of a tenant in common, then it
was an asset of the Estate, subject to distribution under his will. As such, the
Estate also sought judgment and an order quieting title in David’s half interest in
the property and reformation of the deed to conform with Marie’s bequest. The
Estate requested that this relief be granted at the initial TEDRA hearing set in
August 2019.
In support of the TEDRA petition, the Estate argued that Marie had
conveyed the property to Robert and David as tenants in common under her will
and, as such, the conveyance vested in Robert and David immediately upon
Marie’s death. The Estate explained that since the purpose of the personal
representative’s deed was merely to paper the title which had already vested, any
discrepancy between the deed and will was a mistake subject to reformation.
Additionally, the Estate argued regardless of whether a mistake existed, the deed
was insufficient to create a joint tenancy as a matter of law, therefore David and
Robert’s respective interests remained a tenancy in common.
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In response, Robert argued that the personal representative’s deed was a
testamentary bequest by David to his brother. Robert attempted to offer testimony
as to conversations he alleged that he had with David about this bequest, which
the trial court refused to consider. Further, Robert asked the court to order the
testimony of the attorney who had helped David prepare the personal
representative’s deed in order to indicate there was no mistake in the deed.
However, the trial court denied this request.
The trial court concluded that, contrary to the language contained in the
caption to the personal representative’s deed, at the time of David’s death, David
and Robert held the family home as tenants in common and David’s interest in the
property was thereby an asset in his estate. The trial court granted the TEDRA
petition, reforming the deed and quieting title to David’s interest in the property in
favor of the Estate. Robert timely appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
I. Reformation of the Personal Representative’s Deed
Robert first argues that the trial court erred in reforming the personal
representative’s deed. Robert’s primary contention is that the deed was facially
valid, created a joint tenancy, and cannot be reformed absent evidence of intent
from the parties to the deed.
“[R]eformation is an equitable remedy reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
Glepco, LLC v. Reinstra, 175 Wn. App. 545, 563, 307 P.3d 744 (2013). “A trial
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court abuses its discretion if its decision rests unreasonable or untenable grounds.”
In re Estate of Evans, 181 Wn. App. 436, 451, 326 P.3d 755 (2014).
In Washington, the default rule is that when two or more people co-own
property, it is held as tenants in common. RCW 64.28.020. A joint tenancy
however, may be created through an express written agreement by the owner or
owners of property. RCW 64.28.010. The statute and case law both reinforce the
need for the “‘four unities of time, title, interest and possession’” to all be present
for a joint tenancy to be established under the law. Id.; In re Domestic P’ship of
Walsh v. Reynolds, 183 Wn. App. 830, 853-54, 335 P.3d 984 (2014) (quoting
Merrick v. Peterson, 25 Wn. App. 248, 258, 606 P.2d 700 (1980)). Further, our
state supreme court has held that a third party cannot create a joint tenancy.
Lambert v. Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash., 89 Wn.2d 646, 650, 574 P.2d 738 (1978);
In re Estate of Olson, 87 Wn.2d 855, 858-60, 557 P.2d 302 (1976).
Robert argues that his brother was able to create a valid joint tenancy while
acting as the personal representative of their mother’s estate, despite the fact that
her will did not provide for joint tenancy between her sons. This argument is not
well taken. When Marie died, her will expressly provided the following, “I give,
devise and bequeath all of my property, real, personal and mixed to my children,
DAVID EDWARD WILLIAMS and ROBERT JOSEPH WILLIAMS, share and share
alike, per stirpes.” This language established a tenancy in common between
Robert and David which vested immediately by operation of law upon their mother
Marie’s death. See RCW 11.04.250. Robert does not dispute that Marie’s will
established that Robert and David were tenants in common.
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Robert argues that his brother’s subsequent execution of the personal
representative’s deed created a valid tenancy in common. We disagree. The
personal representative’s deed was captioned as follows:
GRANTOR: DAVID E. WlLLIAMS, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF MARIE C. WILLIAMS, deceased, under Whatcom
County Probate No. 15-4-00322-8,
GRANTEE(S) DAVID E. WlLLIAMS AND ROBERT J. WILLIAMS as
joint tenants with right of survivorship[.]
The body of the deed then provided:
THE GRANTOR, DAVID E. WILLIAMS, as the duly appointed
and acting personal representative of the ESTATE OF MARIE C.
WlLLIAMS, deceased, Whatcom County Superior Court Cause No.
15-4-00322-8, and not in Grantor’s individual capacity, hereby grants
and confirms to DAVID E. WILLIAMS and ROBERT J. WILLIAMS,
Grantees, distributes the real property commonly known as 2705
Utter Street, Bellingham, Whatcom County, Washington.
The personal representative’s deed was merely an instrument to paper the title
that had already legally vested by operation of law. See RCW 11.04.250.
The trial court has the equitable authority to reform the deed to correct this
scrivener’s error such that the personal representative’s deed conforms with
Marie’s will. See Glepco, 175 Wn. App. at 554-55. “To establish either mutual
mistake or scrivener’s error, it must be shown that the parties to the instrument
possessed the same intentions.” Id. at 561. Here, the inquiry only goes to Marie’s
intentions as expressed in her will, which neither party disputes. See In re Estate
of Frank, 146 Wn. App. 309, 318, 326-27, 189 P.3d 834 (2008). The will clearly
intended to create a tenancy in common.
“Per stirpes” means “proportionately divided between beneficiaries
according to their deceased ancestor’s share.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11 th ed.
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2019). If a parent bequeaths property to two sons in equal shares and uses the
phrase per stirpes, then each son receives the same share in the bequeathed
property. If one son predeceases the parent, his share passes to his own heirs,
rather than to the surviving son. See Erienbach v. Estate of Thompson, 90 Wn.
App. 846, 851, 954 P.2d 350 (1998). The will language gave Robert no
survivorship interest in David’s share of the real estate. As such, it was proper for
the trial court to exercise its equitable powers to correct the scrivener’s error to
bring the personal representative’s deed in line with the intentions conveyed by
Marie in her will.
Further, the personal representative’s deed was insufficient under
Washington law to create a joint tenancy between Robert and David. The primary
defect is that the deed expressly states that David was acting in his capacity as
personal representative of Marie William’s estate, not in his individual capacity.
This discrepancy supports our determination that the trial court properly concluded
that a scrivener’s error occurred preventing the personal representative’s deed
from conforming with Marie’s will and that reformation was appropriate.
We agree with the respondent that regardless of scrivener’s error, the trial
court could properly quiet title to the property on the alternative basis that the
personal representative’s deed was insufficient to establish a joint tenancy, despite
any discrepancies between Marie’s will and the deed. A third party is legally unable
to establish a joint tenancy. Lambert, 89 Wn.2d at 650. The deed specifically
states “THE GRANTOR, DAVID E. WILLIAMS, as the duly appointed and acting
personal representative of the ESTATE OF MARIE C. WlLLIAMS, deceased,
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Whatcom County Superior Court Cause No. 15-4-00322-8, and not in Grantor’s
individual capacity.” Acting as personal representative for Marie’s estate, David
was in a third party capacity to the title action.
Additionally, David could not unilaterally create a joint tenancy in either his
individual or personal representative capacity. RCW 64.28.010 sets out two
methods by which the brothers could have become joint tenants. First, the
brothers could have both conveyed the property to themselves in a separate deed,
subsequent to the personal representative’s deed, as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship. See RCW 64.28.010. Second, Marie’s will could have established
that she was bequeathing the property to the bothers as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship. Id. The record is clear that regardless of scrivener’s error, the
personal representative’s deed was ineffectual under statute to create a joint
tenancy between David and Robert. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
reforming the deed to conform with Marie’s will.3
II. Attorney Fees
The Estate requests an award of attorney fees and costs under RCW
11.96A.150 and RAP 18.1. TEDRA allows appellate courts to exercise discretion
to award costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees to a party to the proceedings. RCW
11.96A.150. The statute allows an award to come from another party to the
proceeding or from the assets of the estate or trust involved in the proceeding. Id.3 Robert argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the TEDRA action because the
Estate failed to demonstrate David’s intent when he executed the deed. Dismissal of the TEDRA
petition was not required under these facts where, contrary to the assertions of appellant,
evidence existed to support the critical party’s intent: the will itself clearly expressed Marie’s intent
that her sons take title as tenants in common. Robert or David’s intent is immaterial.
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We grant the Estate’s request and award attorney fees and costs on appeal,
provided it complies with RAP 18.1.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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