State Of Washington v. Joseph W. Rhodes ( 2020 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
June 30, 2020
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 53005-8-II
Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH WAYNE RHODES, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant
LEE, C.J. – Joseph Wayne Rhodes appeals certain legal financial obligations (LFOs)
imposed following his conviction for a felony domestic violence court order violation. The State
concedes error. In his statement of additional grounds (SAG) for review, Rhodes contends that he
should have received an exceptional sentence below the standard range and that he was not on
community custody.
We accept the State’s concession regarding LFOs and remand to the trial court to strike
from Rhodes’s judgment and sentence the criminal filing fee, jury demand fee, supervision fee,
and interest accrual provision relating to nonrestitution LFOs. We affirm all other aspects of
Rhodes’s sentence.
FACTS
Police stopped Lori Goodlow, Rhodes’s girlfriend, for a traffic violation. Rhodes was
inside the vehicle. Police discovered a no contact order prohibiting Rhodes from contacting
Goodlow.
No. 53005-8-II
The State charged Rhodes with felony domestic violence court order violation. The jury
found him guilty as charged.
Rhodes requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range of credit for time
served. He argued that he was entitled to an exceptional sentence because Goodlow invited him
into the car and there was no violence.
The trial court recognized its ability to impose an exceptional sentence downward and
considered Rhodes’s request for an exceptional downward sentence, but it did not find a basis for
imposing an exceptional sentence below the standard range. The trial court imposed a standard
range sentence of 15 months and 12 months of community custody.
The trial court found Rhodes indigent under RCW 10.101.010(3)(c) because Rhodes
“receives an annual income, after taxes, of one hundred twenty-five percent or less of the current
federally established poverty level.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 62. The trial court stated on the record
its intent to impose only “the mandatory minimum” legal financial obligations. 2 Verbatim Report
of Proceedings (December 13, 2018) at 247.
On Rhodes’s judgment and sentence, the trial court imposed the following LFOs: $200
criminal filing fee; $250 jury demand fee; community custody supervision fees as determined by
the Department of Corrections (DOC), and interest on nonrestitution financial obligations.
Rhodes appeals.
ANALYSIS
A. LFOS
Rhodes challenges the provisions on his judgment and sentence imposing a criminal filing
fee, jury demand fee, community custody supervision fee, and interest on nonrestitution LFOs in
2
No. 53005-8-II
light of State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). The State concedes that these
provisions should be stricken. We accept the State’s concession.
Currently, the LFO statutes prohibit trial courts from imposing a criminal filing fee, jury
demand fee, and interest accrual on a defendant under certain circumstances. See RCW
36.18.020(2)(h); RCW 10.46.190; RCW 10.82.090(2)(a); Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d at 746-47. Also,
trial courts have the discretion to waive community custody supervision fees. RCW
9.94A.703(2)(d). Here, the trial court found Rhodes to be indigent under RCW 10.101.010(3)(c),
and stated an intent to impose only mandatory minimum LFOs. Therefore, we accept the State’s
concession, and we remand for the trial court to strike the criminal filing fee, jury demand fee,
supervision fee, and interest on nonrestitution LFOs from Rhodes’s judgment and sentence.
B. SAG ISSUES
1. Exceptional Sentence Below Standard Range
Rhodes contends that the trial court should have imposed an exceptional sentence below
the standard range of just time served because Goodlow was a willing participant and there was
no violence. We disagree.
Generally, a sentencing court must impose a sentence within the standard range set by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW. RCW 9.94A.505(1); State v. Graham, 181
Wn.2d 878, 882, 337 P.3d 319 (2014). However, RCW 9.94A.535(1) provides that a sentencing
court may depart from the standard sentence range for substantial and compelling reasons and it
may “impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range if it finds that mitigating
circumstances are established by a preponderance of the evidence.”
3
No. 53005-8-II
We review a sentencing court’s decision to deny an exceptional sentence for abuse of
discretion. State v. McGill, 112 Wn. App. 95, 99-100, 47 P.3d 173 (2002). A court abuses its
discretion when it denies an exceptional sentence based on an incorrect belief that it is not
authorized to grant the sentence. See State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696-97, 358 P.3d 359(2015). In contrast, where a trial court considers the facts of the case and concludes that there is
no factual or legal basis to impose an exceptional downward sentence, it has exercised discretion,
and the trial court’s ruling is not appealable. McGill, 112 Wn. App. at 100.
Here, Rhodes makes the same arguments raised and rejected below. The trial court
recognized its ability to impose an exceptional sentence downward and considered Rhodes’s
arguments. But the court found no basis to impose an exceptional sentence, and imposed a
standard range sentence. Therefore, based on the record, Rhodes fails to show that his standard
range sentence is appealable.
2. Community Custody
Rhodes next contends he “was not on Community Custody and . . . served 58 days,”
referring to two prior DOC violations and a prior criminal case.1 SAG at 2. RAP 10.10(c) requires
a party to apprise us of the nature and occurrence of any alleged error. Rhodes fails to do this.
Accordingly, this contention is too vague to address on the merits.
1
Here, Rhodes’s judgment and sentence in the current case does not show that an additional point
was added to his offender score based on community custody status. And the judgment and
sentence states, “The defendant shall receive credit for eligible time served prior to sentencing if
that confinement was solely under this cause number. RCW 9.94A.505. The jail shall compute
time served.” CP at 63.
4
No. 53005-8-II
We accept the State’s concession regarding the LFOs and remand to the trial court to strike
the criminal filing fee, jury demand fee, supervision fee, and interest accrual provision from
Rhodes’s judgment and sentence. We affirm all other aspects of Rhodes’s sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Lee, C.J.
We concur:
Melnick, J.
Glasgow, J.
5