In the Matter of the Marriage of: Benjamin E. Jones & Lisa A.M. Jones ( 2020 )

FILED
JULY 2, 2020
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Marriage of: ) No. 36509-3-III
)
BENJAMIN E. JONES, )
)
Respondent, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and )
)
LISA A.M. JONES, )
)
Appellant. )
PENNELL, C.J. —Lisa McCrea‑Jones 1 appeals a divorce decree, dissolving her
20-year marriage to Benjamin Jones. Ms. McCrea-Jones challenges the trial court’s
allocation of student loan debt, her maintenance award, orders regarding specific pieces
1
The appellant’s name was changed to “Lisa Annette McCrea‑Jones” under the
dissolution decree. Clerk’s Papers at 64.
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of property, and denial of attorney fees. We affirm the trial court’s rulings and deny the
parties’ requests for attorney fees on appeal.
BACKGROUND
The parties were married in Alaska on May 17, 1996. Shortly after marriage, the
couple completed their undergraduate degrees and adopted two special needs children. 2
Mr. Jones worked for Alaska Airlines and the Alaska Air National Guard, and provided
the family’s main source of income. Ms. McCrea-Jones focused on child-rearing, but she
also worked full time, earning approximately $30,000 per year.
In 2004, Ms. McCrea-Jones left the workforce to pursue a doctoral degree in
psychology at Oregon’s George Fox University. The family moved from Alaska to
Oregon, with Mr. Jones commuting to Alaska for work and sometimes deploying to other
locations for his Alaska Air National Guard service. Mr. Jones also worked for Evergreen
Aviation in McMinnville, Oregon, for six months after the move, then resumed work for
Alaska Airlines in Portland.
The family funded much of Ms. McCrea-Jones’s doctorate studies through student
loans. It typically takes five years to complete a doctoral degree in psychology from
George Fox University. But Ms. McCrea-Jones took nine years. Her progress was
2
The two children are biological siblings.
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delayed by childcare responsibilities, including the adoption of a third child in 2008. 3
Approximately $175,000 in student loans were taken out to support Ms. McCrea-Jones’s
professional studies. Of that amount, roughly $30,000 went to support community
expenses. The community also contributed about $60,000 toward Ms. McCrea-Jones’s
education.
The family moved to Spokane in 2010. At that point, Ms. McCrea-Jones planned
to complete her dissertation and finish the process for obtaining a professional license.
Her goal was to begin employment as a licensed psychologist by 2011. Ms. McCrea
Jones was in contact with a potential employer, and contemplated a job offer for $93,000
per year.
Ms. McCrea-Jones’s progress toward employment did not work out as planned.
She did not receive her doctorate until June 2013. In 2015, Ms. McCrea-Jones traveled to
San Francisco to participate in a psychology licensure preparation course. At this point,
Ms. McCrea-Jones expected the license process would take approximately four months.
She was well positioned to spend time on obtaining her license, as her two oldest children
had moved out of the home and the youngest child was enrolled in school full time.
3
The third child is the biological sibling of the Joneses’ other two children.
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However, Ms. McCrea-Jones was unable to obtain her license. She did manage to teach
as a lecturer at Whitworth University from 2014 to 2015, earning approximately $27,000
per year.
In 2015, the parties were contacted by the State of Alaska, requesting they take in
a fourth child. 4 At this point, the marriage had deteriorated. Mr. Jones expressed
reluctance at adding another child to the family. Nevertheless, he participated in at least
one trip to Alaska to meet the child. The parties separated in November 2016 and Ms.
McCrea-Jones pursued adoption as a single parent. Mr. Jones filed for legal separation on
December 30, 2016. A petition for dissolution was filed several months later.
Shortly before and after separation, the parties engaged in some financial
transactions that proved relevant at trial. Prior to separation, Ms. McCrea-Jones had
cashed out $40,000 in equity from the parties’ home. Though the funds were originally
intended for home repairs, Ms. McCrea-Jones spent the bulk of the money on post-
separation legal fees. Ms. McCrea-Jones was also involved in an accident that totaled her
vehicle. Ms. McCrea-Jones purchased a new vehicle for $27,032, including a $3,000
down payment. The source of the down payment was unclear, but may have come from
the $40,000 in home equity.
4
The fourth child is the biological sibling of the other three.
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A superior court commissioner issued temporary orders governing the parties’
financial circumstances pending trial. In addition to a support payment for the parties’
third child, Mr. Jones was ordered to make mortgage payments on the parties’ home and
to pay $1,800 each month in spousal maintenance. The temporary order did not specify
which party was responsible for making payments on the student loans. Ms. McCrea-
Jones obtained a forbearance of the loans pending trial. Due to accrued interest, this
raised the monthly payments on the loans from $1,153 to $2,055.
The matter went to trial in August 2018. By that time, Ms. McCrea-Jones had not
yet completed the licensing process. Her student loan balance was $154,592. Ms.
McCrea-Jones testified that she planned to start working on her license immediately, but
it would take 7 to 11 months to complete the process and obtain employment. Apart from
maintenance and child support, Ms. McCrea-Jones’s only income at the time of trial was
$1,100 per month from the State of Alaska. Mr. Jones’s monthly net income was
$7,098.62.
The primary financial disputes at trial were the student loans, maintenance, sale
of the parties’ residence and the $40,000 in home equity.
Mr. Jones asked the court to assign Ms. McCrea-Jones the student loan liabilities
and to award him reimbursement for $16,237.57 in overpaid maintenance due to Ms.
McCrea-Jones’s failure to make loan payments during the course of the dissolution.
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Mr. Jones also requested the court terminate maintenance, order the immediate sale of the
parties’ home, and characterize the $40,000 in home equity as a pre-dissolution
distribution.
Ms. McCrea-Jones argued the student loan obligation should be split and that no
reimbursement was owing. She requested five years’ maintenance and a reasonable
period of time (three to five years) to refinance the residential property. Ms.
McCrea-Jones agreed that the $40,000 should be characterized as a pre-dissolution
distribution. However, she claimed this amount should not be calculated against her final
award, but instead characterized as an attorney fee award based on her need and
Mr. Jones’s ability to pay.
The trial court issued a compromise decision. It assigned Ms. McCrea-Jones full
responsibility for repaying her student loans, reasoning the marital community had never
seen any financial benefit from Ms. McCrea-Jones’s doctorate. However, the court did
not find Mr. Jones was entitled to an award for overpayment. The court ordered
Mr. Jones to continue making maintenance payments, but only for one year and at a
reduced amount that did not include monthly mortgage costs. The court based the one-
year timeline on its finding that Ms. McCrea-Jones would be able to become fully
employed within nine months. The court granted Ms. McCrea-Jones’s request for time to
refinance the residential property, but again limited the period to 12 months. Finally, the
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court characterized the $40,000 in home equity funds as a pre-dissolution distribution, as
requested by the parties. However, the court did not offset this distribution as an award of
attorney fees, as requested by Ms. McCrea-Jones.
The court emphasized that its property distribution decisions were driven by
equitable considerations. Given the differences in the parties’ current employment
circumstances, Mr. Jones was primarily awarded nonliquid assets such as retirement
accounts. Ms. McCrea-Jones was awarded assets that were more easily reduced to cash,
including the bulk of the proceeds from the expected sale of the parties’ Oregon rental
property. The trial court reasoned the funds from the sale of the rental property could be
used to help Ms. McCrea-Jones refinance her home within the one-year timeline. Because
Mr. Jones was not awarded as many liquid assets, the court declined Ms. McCrea-Jones’s
request for an award of attorney fees.
Ms. McCrea-Jones appeals.
ANALYSIS
All issues in this appeal are governed by the abuse of discretion standard of
review. See In re Marriage of Neumiller, 183 Wash. App. 914, 335 P.3d 1019 (2014).
This is an extremely deferential standard; reversal is warranted in only rare cases. In re
Marriage of Williams, 84 Wash. App. 263, 267, 927 P.2d 679 (1996). A trial court abuses
its discretion if its award is based on untenable grounds, is made for untenable reasons, or
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is manifestly unjust or clearly inequitable. In re Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wash. 2d
795, 803, 108 P.3d 779 (2005); Davis v. Davis, 13 Wash. App. 812, 813, 537 P.2d 1048
(1975). If reasonable minds can differ as to the appropriateness of a trial court’s
disposition, the matter must be affirmed. Davis, 13 Wash. App. at 813-14.
Assignment of student loan debt
Characterized as an inequitable disposition of property under RCW 26.09.080,
Ms. McCrea-Jones challenges the trial court’s decision to assign her sole responsibility
for repayment of her student loans. 5 We find no abuse of discretion.
A professional degree is a financial asset that can be taken into account in a
dissolution decision. In re Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 178, 677 P.2d 152
(1984). When a spouse obtains a professional degree during marriage, but dissolution
occurs before realization of a financial benefit from the degree, an economic offset may
be warranted. Id. The offset can take the form of maintenance under RCW 26.09.090, or
it may be considered when “making a fair and equitable division of property and
liabilities pursuant to RCW 26.09.080.” Id.
The trial court here appropriately accounted for Ms. McCrea-Jones’s doctorate by
assigning her both the future costs and the benefits of the degree under RCW 26.09.080.
5
Discounting the student loans, the court’s assignments of assets and liabilities
favored Ms. McCrea-Jones.
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It is undisputed that the marital community never realized any financial gain from Ms.
McCrea-Jones’s doctorate. Although some of the student loans were used for community
expenses, these payments were more than offset by community contributions to Ms.
McCrea-Jones’s education and the loss of Ms. McCrea-Jones’s previous income.
Moreover, the true value of the doctoral degree is not the cash amount of the loans, but
the future earning potential the degree confers. Ms. McCrea-Jones was able to leave the
marriage with this future earning potential, without having ever contributed a portion of it
to the marital community. Given the indivisible nature of Ms. McCrea-Jones’s degree, it
was equitable for the court to assign all future costs and benefits of the degree to Ms.
McCrea-Jones.
Spousal maintenance
Ms. McCrea-Jones challenges the trial court’s maintenance award, arguing it is
unreasonably low. Her primary focus is on what she perceives was the trial court’s
inequitable distribution of assets and liabilities, discussed above. According to Ms.
McCrea-Jones, the trial court should have offset its unequal property distribution with a
much larger maintenance award. Given our disagreement with Ms. McCrea-Jones’s
arguments regarding assets and liabilities, we also disagree with her analysis of
maintenance.
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Spousal maintenance ‘‘is not awarded as a matter of right.” In re Marriage of
Luckey, 73 Wash. App. 201, 209, 868 P.2d 189 (1994). The purpose of maintenance is to
allow the recipient a period of time to prepare for life on a single income. Id. A trial court
may award a spouse post-decree maintenance “in such amounts and for such periods of
time as the court deems just.” RCW 26.09.090. When considering a maintenance request,
the court must consider six statutory factors, including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
including separate or community property apportioned to him or her, and
his or her ability to meet his or her needs independently, including the
extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party
includes a sum for that party;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to find employment appropriate to his
or her skill, interests, style of life, and other attendant circumstances;
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage or
domestic partnership;
(d) The duration of the marriage or domestic partnership;
(e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial
obligations of the spouse or domestic partner seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse or domestic partner from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his or her needs and financial obligations
while meeting those of the spouse or domestic partner seeking
maintenance.
Id. The trial court’s “paramount concern is the economic condition in which the
dissolution decree leaves the parties.” Williams, 84 Wash. App. at 268.
Here, the trial court’s maintenance decision was consistent with the
aforementioned statutory factors. The court found Ms. McCrea-Jones could be fully
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employed and self-sufficient within 12 months. Given Ms. McCrea-Jones’s relatively
young age (43) and apparent good health, she would be able to have a long career and
realize the benefits of her professional degree. With the assets from the sale of the
parties’ rental property in Oregon, the trial court reasoned Ms. McCrea Jones would be
able to maintain her existing home and meet other outstanding obligations. Although the
trial court certainly could have awarded more maintenance to Ms. McCrea-Jones, it was
not required to do so. The maintenance decision is therefore not subject to reversal.
Individual property decisions
$40,000 taken from home equity
Ms. McCrea-Jones claims the trial court abused its discretion by characterizing her
use of $40,000 in community funds as a pre-dissolution distribution. This claim fails
based on invited error. See In re Det. of Rushton, 190 Wash. App. 358, 372, 359 P.3d 935
(2015) (“Under the doctrine of invited error, a party may not materially contribute to an
erroneous application of law at trial and then complain of it on appeal.”). At trial, Ms.
McCrea-Jones agreed that the $40,000 constituted a pre-dissolution distribution. She
simply requested that the $40,000 not be counted toward her final award and instead be
treated as an attorney fee award. The trial court declined this request, noting that it had
fashioned its distribution of liquid assets in a way that favored Ms. McCrea-Jones over
Mr. Jones. Because Ms. McCrea-Jones agreed with the court’s characterization of the
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asset at trial, she cannot allege on appeal that the trial court erred in its characterization.
Moreover, the court’s ruling on the $40,000 character was a reasoned decision that does
not qualify for reversal under the abuse of discretion standard.
The Chrysler Pacifica
Ms. McCrea‑Jones challenges the trial court’s characterization of the Chrysler
Pacifica as community property. According to Ms. McCrea-Jones, because the vehicle
was purchased post-separation with a down payment that was used from pre-dissolution
distribution funds, it should have been treated as separate property and not used to offset
the court’s property award.
Again Ms. McCrea-Jones’s position is precluded by invited error. At the
presentment hearing, the trial court asked the parties for guidance on whether the
Chrysler should be characterized as community or separate property. Ms. McCrea-
Jones’s attorney told the court: “You could go either that way or the law would allow, I
think the down payment was [$]3,000. You could call that one community, the remainder
separate but it is probably cleaner to do it all as community.” 4 Report of Proceedings
(RP) (Sept. 17, 2018) at 791. Based on this representation, the court found the Pacifica
was a community asset. The court also noted the amount of the asset was “trivial” (there
was only $3,000 in equity) and that its allocation of assets and liabilities would be the
same regardless of the proper characterization. Id. at 790-91. The trial court’s observation
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comports with precedent. See Williams, 84 Wash. App. at 269 (primary concern is whether
allocation is fair and equitable, not the technical characterization as separate or
community). Accordingly, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in its
characterization.
Numerica account
Ms. McCrea-Jones claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing to charge
Mr. Jones with a pre-dissolution distribution of $3,500, which he used to pay attorney’s
fees.
Ms. McCrea-Jones’s challenge would require us to review the trial court’s final
award in a myopic manner. We decline to do so. “RCW 26.09.080 does not require a
mathematically precise division of all marital property. Rather, it requires a ‘just and
equitable’ distribution of property.” Davis, 13 Wash. App. at 814. So long as a trial court’s
decision falls within the just and equitable criterion, mere mischaracterization of property
does not warrant reversal. Williams, 84 Wash. App. at 269.
Here, the trial court emphasized that it was not aiming for “dollar-for-dollar”
precision, but a fair and equitable result. 4 RP (Nov. 16, 2018) at 859. This was a legally
sound approach and the trial court adequately explained the factual basis for its overall
distribution. We will not reverse the decree based merely on the alleged
mischaracterization of $3,500.
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The residential property
Ms. McCrea‑Jones claims the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that she
sell or refinance her home within one year of trial. We are unpersuaded.
At trial, Ms. McCrea-Jones agreed to refinancing, so long as she was given enough
time to get back on her feet. The trial court made an oral finding (later incorporated into
its written findings) that one year would be sufficient, particularly given the expected sale
of the parties’ Oregon rental property. Ms. McCrea-Jones has not challenged this finding
on appeal. There was no abuse of discretion.
Denial of attorney fees
As a final matter, Ms. McCrea-Jones challenges the trial court’s denial of attorney
fees under RCW 26.09.140. We note that as a technical matter Ms. McCrea-Jones never
asked the trial court for attorney fees. She instead asked the court to treat the $40,000
home equity distribution as an attorney fee award. As previously explained, the trial court
declined Ms. McCrea-Jones’s request to treat the distribution as attorney fees, finding
that the liquid assets awarded in her favor provided sufficient funds. Again, this was not
an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The final order on dissolution is affirmed. The parties’ requests for attorney
fees on appeal are denied. Neither party has complied with the financial declaration
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requirements of RAP 18.1(c). See In re Marriage of Spreen, 107 Wash. App. 341, 351-52,
28 P.3d 769 (2001).
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________
Pennell, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
Andrus, J. 6
6
The Honorable Beth Andrus is a Court of Appeals, Division One, judge sitting in
Division Three under CAR 21(a).
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