Gregory Hochhalter v. Kat's Cove Condominium Association ( 2021 )

FILED
JULY 8, 2021
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
GREGORY HOCHHALTER, DEBRA ) No. 37979-5-III
BEECH, and SCOTT ANDERSON, )
)
Respondents, )
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
KAT’S COVE CONDOMINIUM )
ASSOCIATION and DAVID LEWIS, )
)
Appellants. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — David Lewis1 appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion to compel arbitration and the trial court’s imposition of CR 11 sanctions. He
additionally seeks direct review of the trial court’s order dismissing his counterclaims.
We conclude that Gregory Hochhalter’s initial complaint was not subject to
arbitration and any discovery sent by Lewis or requests for trial dates associated with that
complaint did not precipitate a waiver. We also conclude that the claims raised by the
parties in their amended pleadings are subject to arbitration and that Lewis did not waive
his right to arbitrate because he promptly asserted it one week after he answered
1
Gregory Hochhalter named David Lewis and Kat’s Cove Condominium Owners
Association as defendants in his initial and amended complaints. He later sought to
enjoin Lewis from acting on behalf of the Association, so this opinion refers to Lewis as
the only appellant.
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Hochhalter v. Kat’s Cove Condo. Owners Ass’n
Hochhalter’s amended complaint. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s order denying
arbitration and imposition of terms and direct the trial court to compel arbitration.
FACTS
Parties and background
Kat’s Cove Condominium (Kat’s Cove) is a five-unit building in Ocean Shores,
Washington. Four individuals collectively own Kat’s Cove: David Lewis, the original
declarant and developer, owns two units, and Gregory Hochhalter, Debra Beech, and
Shane Kearns each own one unit. Beech’s partner, Scott Anderson, lives with her in her
unit. Kearns is not a party to this action.
Unit owners at Kat’s Cove are members of the Kat’s Cove Condominium Owners
Association (Association), a Washington not-for-profit corporation governed by a board
of directors. The “Declaration of Condominium” (Declarations) establishing Kat’s Cove
was signed and executed in 2007 by David Lewis and Kathryn Lewis. The relevant
portions of the Declarations provide:
Article XII: Remedies
....
12.1.5 Arbitration. The Association may commence
arbitration proceedings pursuant to Subsection 12.6 herein or resort to a
court of competent jurisdiction in those instances where injunctive relief
may be appropriate.
....
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12.4 Disputes Among Owners, How Resolved. Any dispute among
Owners concerning, or arising under the provisions of the Declaration . . .
shall be referred to the Board of Directors for resolution. . . . [T]he Board
of Directors may, in the exercise of its sole discretion, elect to hear and
resolve such dispute or to require the disputing Owners to submit to binding
arbitration as hereinafter described.
....
12.4.2 Board Determination Requiring Arbitration. If the
Board determines to require the parties to submit to arbitration as aforesaid,
it shall inform the parties to such decision by written notice . . . .
12.4.3 Default to Arbitration. If the Board fails to advise the
parties to any such dispute of its decision . . . the parties to such dispute
shall be required to submit said dispute to arbitration as provided for at
Subsection 12.6 below.
....
12.6 Arbitration. Subject to any provisions elsewhere contained
in this Declaration which specifically authorize an alternative means for
resolution or remedy thereof, (a) all disputes among Owners or other
residents of the Community, and (b) all disputes between any Owner or
resident of the Property on one hand, and the Association, the Board of
Directors, any director(s) or officer(s) or agent(s) of the Association, . . . on
the other hand, concerning, arising out of, under or which pertain to the
interpretation, violation or enforcement of the terms and provisions of the
Declarations . . . or any actual or alleged malfeasance, misfeasance or
nonfeasance, negligent or wrongful act or omission on the part of the
Board, any such director(s), officer(s) or agent(s), shall be submitted to
and resolved by arbitration before a single arbitrator, using the rules of
commercial arbitration of the American Arbitration Association.
....
12.6.6 Equitable Remedies; Actions to Compel Arbitration.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent an Owner, the Association, or other
interested party from resort to a court of competent jurisdiction in any
instance where injunctive relief or provision process is, or becomes, the
only reasonable and necessary remedy available under the
circumstances, nor shall anything in this Article XII affect the right of any
party or person interested in any dispute subject to arbitration hereunder to
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commence and prosecute an appropriate proceeding to compel arbitration
hereunder.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 168-69, 174-75 (some emphasis added).
The owners of Kat’s Cove—in particular, Hochhalter and Lewis—do not get
along. In July 2017, Lewis allegedly approached Beech, Anderson, and Kearns to form a
new board of directors for the Association. Hochhalter later learned a board had been
elected without notice to him. The legitimacy of this board and Lewis’s purported status
as its president caused considerable strife, prompting owners to withhold payment and
resulting in multiple disputes and litigation. Relevant here is Hochhalter’s skepticism of
Lewis’s management of the Association, which leads to the complaint underlying this
appeal.
Trial court proceedings
Initial complaint
On November 29, 2018, Hochhalter filed suit to obtain financial records, survey
maps, meeting minutes, and other Association records pursuant to RCW 64.34.372.2 The
complaint named Kat’s Cove and Lewis as defendants and requested an order directing
production of the records. Hochhalter also requested costs and attorney fees.
2
“All financial and other records of the association . . . shall be made reasonably
available for examination and copying by . . . any unit owner . . . .” RCW 64.34.372(1).
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On December 21, 2018, Lewis filed a pro se response requesting additional time.
Lewis indicated that there were 12 years of records that could not be assembled quickly
and that he was the only board member available to respond to the demands. Lewis also
stated the Association had no funds because Hochhalter owed assessments exceeding
$16,000. Other than this response, Lewis never filed an answer to the initial complaint.
On January 8, 2019, Hochhalter moved for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to CR 12(c). Lewis responded, again pro se, that the relevant statutes do not permit unit
owners to demand 12 years of records. He alleged Hochhalter owed the Association
$18,754.98 in past dues and requested the court enter a judgment for the past due sum and
retain jurisdiction for the purpose of declaring default if Hochhalter failed to pay.
On January 22, 2019, the court held a hearing on Hochhalter’s CR 12(c) motion.
The parties disputed whether Lewis had released all of the requested documents. The
alleged money owed by Hochhalter was not discussed. The court denied the motion due
to the factual dispute over records and told Hochhalter to “get a trial date and you can file
a motion for summary judgment.” Report of Proceedings (RP) (Jan. 22, 2019) at 5.
On March 14, 2019, Lewis filed a note for trial that indicated the case was subject
to arbitration because the sole relief sought was a money judgment not exceeding
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$50,000.3 On March 21, Lewis filed exhibits with the trial court. These exhibits reflect
Lewis’s intent to request damages against Hochhalter for his nonpayment of association
dues and his interference with the sale of Lewis’s unit.
On March 26, 2019, Hochhalter filed his own note for trial stating the case was not
subject to mandatory arbitration because he was “seek[ing] relief other than a money
judgment.” CP at 123-24. Hochhalter stated:
David Lewis has incorrectly stated in his Note for Trial . . . that the case is
subject to mandatory arbitration . . . . However, at this point the only claim
[Hochhalter] has asserted is for injunctive relief and neither [Lewis nor the
Association] has filed a counterclaim . . . [nor] served an answer to the
Complaint in this action. Although [Hochhalter] intends to move to amend
the Complaint in the very near future, the proposed amended Complaint is
likely to seek only injunctive and declaratory relief and costs and attorney
fees.
CP at 124.
On June 14, 2019, Hochhalter sought a temporary restraining order to prohibit
Lewis from representing that he was an officer or director of the Association or from
acting on behalf of the Association until trial had completed. The court granted the order
on June 24.
3
The request for arbitration appears to have been made pursuant to chapter 7.06
RCW.
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Amended complaint
On July 8, 2019, Hochhalter filed an amended complaint, adding Beech and
Anderson as co-plaintiffs. The amended complaint asserted that Lewis engaged in
misconduct, including financial self-dealing, and sought a “judgment against
Defendants.” CP at 133. In addition, Hochhalter sought a declaratory judgment that the
Association had no valid directors or officers, that any actions taken by Lewis acting as
director were null and void, and that Lewis was required to pay all assessments in full
when due with no credit for any purported earlier payments. Finally, Hochhalter sought
various types of injunctive relief.
On July 18, 2019, Lewis obtained counsel. On July 29, Lewis filed an answer and
asserted several counterclaims against Hochhalter. He alleged he “ha[d] paid, out of his
own pocket, various assessments and costs that were the responsibility of [the
Association].” CP at 139. He claimed he was entitled to reimbursement, and Hochhalter
had not timely paid his dues. Also on July 29, Lewis moved for a trial continuance. In
his supporting declaration, Lewis noted that the amended complaint added two new
plaintiffs, alleged entirely new causes of action, and requested different relief. The
parties ultimately stipulated to continue the trial from late July to late November 2019.
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On August 5, 2019, Lewis’s counsel sent Hochhalter’s counsel an e-mail stating,
“The declarations by which this association was formed require that any dispute not
resolved by the Board be subject to arbitration. Take this as our arbitration demand.”
CP at 192. The next day, Hochhalter’s counsel responded that the matter was not subject
to arbitration and if Lewis moved to compel arbitration, he would seek terms.
Motion to compel arbitration
On September 19, 2019, Lewis filed a motion to compel arbitration. Citing
Article 12.4.3 and Article 12.6 of the Declarations, he argued:
As this dispute is among Owners or residents of the Property, on one
hand, and the Association, on the other, and arises out of violation and
enforcement of the terms and provisions of the Declarations, and because
the Board has failed to advise the parties of a decision, Defendant David
Lewis moves this Court to compel this matter to arbitration in accordance
with the terms of the Declarations.
CP at 147. The full Declarations were attached to his declaration in support of the motion
to compel arbitration.
On September 23, 2019, Hochhalter filed a memorandum in opposition to Lewis’s
motion to compel. Referring to section 12.6.6 of the Declarations, he argued that because
he sought only injunctive and declaratory relief, arbitration was neither required nor
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mandatory. He also argued Lewis waived his right to arbitration through his continued
litigation activity, including his request for a trial, continuance, and discovery requests.4
Hochhalter also moved to dismiss Lewis’s counterclaims. Citing CR 17(a), he
argued Lewis lacked standing to assert claims for dues owed to the Association. Citing
chapter 64.34 RCW, he further argued that Lewis’s claim for reimbursement must be
made against the Association and not the other owners.
On September 27, 2019, Lewis filed a reply in support of his motion to compel
arbitration. He disagreed with Hochhalter’s interpretation of the legal authority and
Declarations, argued he had not waived arbitration, and asserted Hochhalter sought
damages by demanding Lewis pay all assessments in full. He also opposed Hochhalter’s
motion to dismiss his counterclaims.
On September 30, 2019, the court held a hearing on the motions to compel
arbitration and to dismiss counterclaims. The court addressed the counterclaims first.
The following exchange took place:
4
To the trial court, Hochhalter argued Lewis sent “extensive” discovery requests
before moving to compel arbitration. CP at 189. On appeal, Lewis responds, “There is
no evidence that [he] participated in discovery related to the amended complaint.”
Appellants’ Am. Br. at 23. The record contains no discovery requests.
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THE COURT: . . . [Your response] is premised primarily upon an
assertion . . . that somehow the individual plaintiffs were unjustly enriched.
Is that your argument, Mr. Friese [defendant’s counsel]?
[DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL]: It is.
THE COURT: In your client’s answer and counterclaim did they
plead unjust enrichment?
[DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL]: It didn’t specifically plead unjust
enrichment.
THE COURT: They did not, did they. Motion to dismiss is granted.
RP (Sept. 30, 2019) at 3.
The parties then addressed the motion to compel arbitration:
[DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL]: . . . We ask that the Court grant this
motion to compel arbitration. The declarations forming the association
require that matters between owners be compelled to arbitration. This is
given by Section 12.6 of the declarations.
THE COURT: But isn’t there another provision that says if the only
relief being sought is equitable, that action may be brought in a court as
opposed to arbitration?
[DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL]: The declarations do provide that if
injunctive relief or equitable relief is sought it may be sought in courts.
THE COURT: Okay. And isn’t that the only relief they’re seeking
here?
[DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL]: That is not the only relief they’re
seeking.
THE COURT: What—what are they seeking that’s not equitable?
[DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL]: They’re seeking monetary damages
against Defendant Lewis.
THE COURT: Attorney fees and costs. They’re not seeking a
money judgment for actual damages.
[DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL]: I do believe—
THE COURT: At least that’s how I read their complaint. It’s pretty
clear.
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Mr. Damasiewicz [plaintiff’s counsel], are your clients seeking any
monetary damages other than their attorney fees and costs?
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: Absolutely not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Motion to compel arbitration is denied.
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I had also asked for
terms, because I—to me this is a frivolous motion. Not only do the
declarations provide for venue here when there’s equitable relief only, but
they have waived—they requested trial, they moved to continue trial—
THE COURT: I understand. . . . I think the fact that the declarations
involved in the homeowner’s association specifically authorize an action to
be brought in court is—renders this motion to compel arbitration frivolous,
especially when you consider how much time and effort has been spent in
the litigation itself. I’m going to grant your request for attorney fees. . . .
You may present a judgment.
RP (Sept. 30, 2019) at 3-5. The court entered written orders denying the motion to
arbitrate and imposing CR 11 sanctions against Lewis’s counsel for filing a frivolous
motion. The court granted Hochhalter’s motion to dismiss Lewis’s counterclaims.
Motion to amend
On October 7, 2019, Lewis filed a motion to amend his answer and counterclaims.
The motion read, in part:
[Lewis’s] initial pleadings may not have made clear that Defendant
David Lewis is, in fact, pleading that he is owed monetary damages by
Plaintiffs for the bills, costs, and liabilities Defendant Lewis paid on behalf
of Plaintiffs. Defendant Lewis pleads the Plaintiffs have been unjustly
enriched by Defendant Lewis and Defendant Lewis pleads for monetary
damages and reimbursement of such liabilities paid on Plaintiffs’ behalf.
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CP at 297. Lewis alleged he had learned additional evidence since filing his first answer
and counterclaims. He claimed the Association was being mismanaged: it had no board
of directors, failed to file an annual report with the State, and failed to retain insurance.
Lewis also moved to reconsider the CR 11 sanctions. He argued sanctions were
not warranted because his motion to compel arbitration was well-grounded in fact and
law and was not made to harass or cause unnecessary delay. He argued his right to
arbitration was not affected by the fact that Hochhalter resorted to the courts for
temporary injunctive relief. He further contended the relief sought by both parties was
not just injunctive; both sides wanted money damages for purported reimbursement and
payment of assessments owed. The court denied reconsideration on October 10, finding
the motion lacked merit.
Lewis timely appealed as a matter of right the trial court’s denial of the motion to
compel arbitration. See RAP 2.2(a)(3); Weiss v. Lonnquist, 153 Wn. App. 502, 509, 224
P.3d 787 (2009); Stein v. Geonerco, Inc., 105 Wn. App. 41, 43-44, 17 P.3d 1266 (2001).
ANALYSIS
Lewis contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel arbitration of
the claims in the amended pleadings. Hochhalter responds that those claims are not
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subject to arbitration and Lewis waived his right to arbitrate.5 We review arbitrability of
a particular case de novo. River House Dev., Inc. v. Integrus Architecture, PS, 167 Wn.
App. 221, 230, 272 P.3d 289 (2012).
Washington courts apply a strong presumption of arbitrability and resolve all
doubts in favor of arbitration. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. Servs. of Seattle, Inc.
v. Yates, Wood & MacDonald, Inc., 192 Wn. App. 465, 474, 369 P.3d 503 (2016). Thus,
a party opposing arbitration bears the burden of showing that the arbitration clause is
inapplicable or unenforceable. River House, 167 Wn. App. at 237.
A motion to compel arbitration should not be denied “‘unless it may be said with
positive assurance the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute.’” Peninsula Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Pub. Sch. Emps. of Peninsula, 130
Wn.2d 401, 413-14, 924 P.2d 13 (1996) (quoting Council of County & City Emps. v.
Spokane County, 32 Wn. App. 422, 424-25, 647 P.2d 1058 (1982)). All disputes that are
even arguably covered by an arbitration agreement should be sent to arbitration upon a
motion to compel. Marcus & Millichap, 192 Wn. App. at 480.
5
The parties agree that Lewis had no right to arbitrate the claims in Hochhalter’s
initial complaint. In that complaint, Hochhalter sought only injunctive relief requiring
Lewis to produce Association records.
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In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, courts first consider whether there is a
valid arbitration agreement and, second, whether the parties’ dispute falls within the
scope of that agreement. Heights at Issaquah Ridge Owners Ass’n v. Burton Landscape
Grp., Inc., 148 Wn. App. 400, 402, 200 P.3d 254 (2009).
Here, the parties do not dispute the validity of the arbitration agreement. Rather,
they dispute whether the claims in Hochhalter’s amended complaint fall within the scope
of the arbitration provision. Given the requirement that all disputes even arguably
covered by an arbitration agreement be referred to arbitration, we conclude that the claims
in Hochhalter’s amended complaint must be arbitrated.
Section 12.6 provides in relevant part: “Subject to any provisions elsewhere
contained in this Declaration which specifically authorize an alternative means for
resolution or remedy thereof,” disputes between owners “shall be submitted to and
resolved by arbitration.” CP at 174. Lewis and Hochhalter are both owners.
Hochhalter points to subsection 12.6.6 of the Declarations, which provides:
“Nothing herein contained shall prevent an Owner, the Association, or other interested
party from resort to a court of competent jurisdiction in any instance where injunctive
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relief or provisional process[6] is, or becomes, the only reasonable and necessary remedy
available under the circumstances . . . .” CP at 175 (emphasis added). This provision
permits Hochhalter to seek injunctive relief from a court if it is the only reasonable and
necessary remedy available.
Hochhalter’s amended complaint seeks not only injunctive relief, but also
monetary relief and declaratory relief. It seeks monetary relief in the form of a judgment
for financial self-dealing. And it seeks declaratory relief in the form of declaring the
rights and obligations of Lewis. Because injunctive relief was not the only reasonable
and necessary remedy available to Hochhalter, his amended claims are subject to
arbitration. We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that Hochhalter’s claims are
outside the scope of the arbitration provision.
Waiver
A party waives their right to arbitration when they do not timely assert it. Otis
Hous. Ass’n v. Ha, 165 Wn.2d 582, 587, 201 P.3d 309 (2009). “Waiver of an arbitration
clause may be accomplished expressly or by implication.” Canal Station N. Condo. Ass’n
v. Ballard Leary Phase II, LP, 179 Wn. App. 289, 297, 322 P.3d 1229 (2013).
6
The parties have not discussed “provisional process.” We construe this phrase as
permitting a party to commence an action so as to compel arbitration and to enforce a
later arbitration award.
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When determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate, we consider:
(1) the party’s knowledge of the existing right to compel arbitration, (2) whether the party
acted inconsistently with that right, and (3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration
resulting from such inconsistent acts. Jeoung Lee v. Evergreen Hosp. Med. Ctr., 195
Wn.2d 699, 705, 464 P.3d 209 (2020); Schuster v. Prestige Senior Mgmt., LLC, 193 Wn.
App. 616, 633, 376 P.3d 412 (2016). In other words, waiver applies when a party
“‘elects to litigate instead of arbitrate.’” Jeoung Lee, 195 Wn.2d at 705 (quoting Otis
Hous. Ass’n, 165 Wn.2d at 588). We review waiver of arbitration de novo. Id.
Arbitration has long been favored as a matter of policy. Hill v. Garda CL Nw.,
Inc., 179 Wn.2d 47, 53, 308 P.3d 635 (2013). Accordingly, “[w]e must indulge every
presumption in favor of arbitration, whether the issue is construction of an arbitration
clause or allegation of waiver, delay, or another defense to arbitrability.” Canal Station,
179 Wn. App. at 297; see also Schuster, 193 Wn. App. at 632 (“Any doubts concerning
waiver should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”).
Knowledge of existing right to arbitrate
A waiver analysis is necessarily dependent on the particular facts of each case.
Schuster, 193 Wn. App. at 633; Canal Station, 179 Wn. App. at 298. In analyzing the
first factor—whether Lewis knew of his existing right to arbitrate—the answer is
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undisputedly yes. Lewis is the original declarant of Kat’s Cove and presumably read the
Declarations—including the arbitration clause—prior to signing it in 2007. He knew he
did not have a right to arbitrate issues raised by Hochhalter’s initial complaint, but he
knew he had a right to arbitrate issues raised by Hochhalter’s amended complaint filed in
July 2019.
Acting inconsistently with right to arbitrate
A party acts inconsistently with their right to arbitrate by failing to assert it at the
outset or in subsequent pleadings and engaging in extensive discovery. See, e.g., Jeoung
Lee, 195 Wn.2d at 707-08 (parties conducted discovery and litigated for nine months,
defendant opposed trial continuance and did not move to compel until the third amended
complaint); Schuster, 193 Wn. App. at 636 (parties engaged in discovery and motion
practice for over one year before demanding arbitration); Ives v. Ramsden, 142 Wn. App.
369, 383-84, 174 P.3d 1231 (2008) (party compelled arbitration on the eve of trial after
three years of litigation including extensive discovery); Steele v. Lundgren, 85 Wn. App.
845, 855, 853, 935 P.2d 671 (1997) (party failed to assert right at “several obvious
opportunities” including in the answer, in response to the amended complaint, the
substitution of counsel, case assignment to the court’s calendar). Similarly, a party acts
inconsistently with its right to arbitrate by attending a status conference, agreeing to a trial
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schedule and date, and representing to the court it is preparing for trial before demanding
arbitration. River House, 167 Wn. App. at 238-39.
Conversely, a party has not acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate when it
fails to invoke the right in its initial complaint but does so less than two months
thereafter, Verbeek Props., LLC v. GreenCo Envtl., Inc., 159 Wn. App. 82, 89-90, 246
P.3d 205 (2010), answers, requests a stay, and engages in limited discovery for three
months before asserting the right, Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. No. 414 v. Mobile Modules Nw.,
Inc., 28 Wn. App. 59, 63-64, 621 P.2d 791 (1980), or raises its right after losing its
CR 12(b)(6) motion, Canal Station, 179 Wn. App. at 301-02. Further, a party that
unsuccessfully moves for summary judgment on the basis it is not a proper party has not
acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Townsend v. Quadrant Corp., 173 Wn.2d
451, 463, 268 P.3d 917 (2012).
Hochhalter’s November 2018 complaint sought Association records. This was
injunctive relief in that it sought to require Lewis to perform a specific act. Lewis had no
right to arbitrate injunctive relief. So any discovery he engaged in or request he made for
a trial date related to Hochhalter’s initial complaint did not precipitate a waiver of the
nonexistent right to arbitrate.
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Lewis did not file a counterclaim to the original complaint, but in March 2019 he
filed exhibits indicating his desire for a money judgment. Lewis soon after claimed in his
note for trial that he was seeking damages of less than $50,000. Hochhalter responded
with his own note for trial and disputed that the controversy was subject to mandatory
arbitration. He accurately asserted that Lewis had not filed a counterclaim. We infer that
the trial court agreed that Lewis had not filed a counterclaim because the matter
proceeded to trial and not to mandatory arbitration under chapter 7.06 RCW.
Hochhalter expanded his claims in July 2019. As noted above, those claims were
subject to arbitration. In late July, Lewis filed an answer and counterclaims. He notified
Hochhalter one week later that the controversy was subject to arbitration under the
Association’s governing documents. Six weeks later, Lewis filed his motion to compel
arbitration.
There is no evidence that Lewis engaged in any discovery related to Hochhalter’s
amended complaint or his own newly asserted counterclaims. Lewis promptly asserted
his right to arbitrate after he answered Hochhalter’s amended complaint and asserted his
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counterclaims. We conclude that Lewis did not act inconsistently with his right to
arbitrate.7
Prejudice
Hochhalter does not argue how he would be prejudiced by having the controversy
arbitrated. Had the trial court properly granted Lewis’s motion to compel arbitration, it
would have had no authority to decide the concurrently noted motion to dismiss
counterclaims. The motion to dismiss counterclaims should have been heard by an
arbitrator. If the counterclaims lack merit, they can be as easily dismissed by an arbitrator
as they were below.
Weighing the three factors, it is apparent that Lewis did not waive his right to
arbitrate the claims asserted in the amended pleadings.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court erred by not granting Lewis’s motion to compel
arbitration. We reverse and direct the trial court to enter an order compelling arbitration
of the claims in the amended pleadings. Because Lewis’s motion to compel is
7
Hochhalter had the burden of showing that the dispute was not subject to
arbitration. We will not presume that Lewis’s “extensive” discovery requests were
related to the amended pleadings.
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meritorious, we reverse the trial court' s imposition of CR 11 sanctions.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printe
d in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursu
ant to
RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
11 ~ .....
- I • .,J •
Pennell, C.J. Fearing, J. >
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