State Of Washington v. Matthew D. Schmidt ( 2020 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
July 14, 2020
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52956-4-II
Respondent,
v.
MATTHEW DAVID SCHMIDT, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MELNICK, J. — Matthew David Schmidt appeals his possession of a stolen motor vehicle
conviction. He argues that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the definition of
knowledge. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 12, 2017, Ryan Dillman reported to police that his 1998 Jeep Cherokee had
been stolen off the street just outside his residence. On December 17, Vancouver Police Officer
Aaron Yoder stopped a 1998 Jeep Cherokee for not having license plates. Schmidt was driving
the vehicle, which later was determined to be Dillman’s stolen Jeep. Schmidt told Yoder that he
got the vehicle from his ex-girlfriend and he did not know it was stolen.
The State charged Schmidt with possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
During trial, Dillman testified that after police located his vehicle, they asked him to come
retrieve it. He testified that there was damage to the vehicle, and it appeared someone tried to
change or alter its appearance. The front bumper had been removed, the logos had been removed,
pin striping had been covered up with black spray paint, and the license plates had been removed.
52956-4-II
Additionally, the ignition had been tampered with and the casing around the center console had
been removed.
Dillman’s key would not start the vehicle. Schmidt offered Dillman the key that he used
to start the vehicle. The key was “filed on and altered.” 2 Report of Proceedings at 220.
The court instructed the jury that to convict Schmidt it must find he knowingly possessed
a stolen motor vehicle. In defining knowledge, the court instructed the jury:
A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a fact
or circumstance when he or she is aware of that fact or circumstance. It is not
necessary that the person know that the fact or circumstance is defined by law as
being unlawful or an element of a crime.
If a person has information that would lead a reasonable person in the same
situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is permitted but not required to find
that he or she acted with knowledge of that fact.
When acting knowingly as to a particular fact is required to establish an
element of a crime, the element is also established if a person acts intentionally as
to that fact.
Clerk’s Papers at 24 (Instr. 10). The court took this instruction from 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE:
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (WPIC) 10.02, at 222 (4th ed. 2016).
Schmidt approved the instruction and did not offer any alternative instructions.
The jury found Schmidt guilty as charged. Schmidt appeals.
ANALYSIS
Schmidt argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court’s instruction defining
knowledge violated his right to due process because it permitted the jury to find him guilty based
on constructive rather than actual knowledge that the car was stolen. We decline to reach this
issue.
A defendant who does not object to an instruction in the trial court generally cannot
challenge that instruction for the first time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 188 Wash. 2d 742, 761, 399
P.3d 507 (2017). The exception is when an instructional error is of constitutional magnitude. RAP
2
52956-4-II
2.5(a)(3); State v. Ackerman, 11 Wash. App. 2d 304, 309, 453 P.3d 749 (2019). Schmidt did not
object to the “knowledge” instruction. Therefore, we must determine whether the purported error
involves a manifest error affecting a constitutional right.
Instructional errors are of constitutional magnitude when the jury is not instructed on every
element of the charged crime. State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash. 2d 614, 620, 106 P.3d 196 (2005).
As long as the instructions properly inform the jury of the elements of the charged crime, any error
in defining the terms used in the elements is not of constitutional magnitude. State v. Gordon, 172
Wash. 2d 671, 679-80, 260 P.3d 884 (2011). Even an error defining technical terms does not rise to
the level of constitutional error. Gordon, 172 Wash. 2d at 677.
Here, Schmidt does not argue that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the elements
of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Rather, he argues the trial court erred in defining
“knowledge.” Because the claim of error does not involve a manifest error affecting a
constitutional right, we decline to review it.
Nevertheless, we note that the knowledge instruction provided by the court, and approved
by the parties, was a correct statement of the law. The knowledge instruction is identical to WPIC
10.02. In State v. Leech, 114 Wash. 2d 700, 710, 790 P.2d 160 (1990), abrogated on other grounds
by In re Pers. Restraint of Andress, 147 Wash. 2d 602, 56 P.3d 981 (2002), the Supreme Court
expressly approved of WPIC 10.02 to instruct the jury on the meaning of “knowledge.” And, more
recently, in State v. Allen, 182 Wash. 2d 364, 372, 341 P.3d 268 (2015), the Supreme Court held that
the instruction given reflected the language of WPIC 10.02 and “correctly stated the law regarding
‘knowledge.’” Once the Supreme Court decides an issue of state law, that interpretation is binding
on all lower courts until it is overruled by the Supreme Court. State v. Gore, 101 Wash. 2d 481, 487,
681 P.2d 227 (1984).
3
52956-4-II
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Melnick, J.
We concur:
Worswick, J.
Sutton, A.C.J.
4