Travis T. Reiner v. Legislative Seat Of The Snohomish County Clerk ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
TRAVIS T. REINER, ) No. 80618-1-I
)
Appellant, ) DIVISION ONE
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
LEGISLATIVE SEAT OF THE )
SNOHOMISH COUNTY CLERK, )
)
Respondent. )
)
HAZELRIGG, J. — Travis Reiner was the victim of a crime in 1992 that
resulted in an order directing the offender to pay him restitution. The Snohomish
County Clerk’s Office processed restitution payments and disbursed them to
Reiner until November 2018, when it determined that the court no longer had
jurisdiction over the offender for purposes of restitution. Reiner sued, alleging that
it was improper for the County to stop collecting and disbursing the restitution
payments. Reiner seeks reversal of an order granting summary judgment for
Snohomish County. Because the court’s jurisdiction over the offender for purposes
of restitution expired in 2013 and Reiner has not shown that there were documents
missing from the criminal case file that would affect the outcome of the litigation,
there was no dispute of material fact and Snohomish County was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. We affirm.
Citations and pinpoint citations are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
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FACTS
On February 7, 1992, Travis Reiner was involved in a car accident with
Gregory Child. Child was charged with vehicular assault. He entered into a plea
agreement with the State that required him to pay restitution to Reiner. Child was
sentenced to three months of confinement and ordered to pay restitution to Reiner
and two insurance companies.
Reiner also filed a civil suit against Child. Two years after the accident, the
parties to the civil suit entered into a stipulation for agreed partial summary
judgment. The parties agreed that Reiner would obtain a judgment against Child
in the principal amount of $120,000, plus $235 in attorney fees and costs. The
stipulation provided that Child would make monthly payments to Reiner in the
amount of $250, subject to adjustment under certain conditions. The stipulation
also provided that Reiner “shall take no action to execute upon the judgment” so
long as he was receiving timely payments. The document made no mention of the
restitution order in the criminal case.
The superior court then entered a supplementary stipulated order in the
criminal case amending the restitution order “to reflect restitution to Travis T.
Reiner in accordance with the Stipulation and Agreed Partial Summary Judgment”
in the civil case. The order stated that Child should make payments as provided
in the stipulated judgment into the registry of the Snohomish County Superior Court
under the criminal cause number. The Clerk of the Court would then disburse the
payments to Reiner.
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The court later entered another stipulated order clarifying that only a portion
of the civil judgment could be collected as restitution. The parties stipulated that
$60,000 of the principal judgment amount reflected Reiner’s damages for
economic loss and disfigurement. Child’s payments into the court registry would
be applied as restitution for these damages. The parties agreed that the other half
of the principal judgment amount reflected Reiner’s damages for pain and
suffering, which could not be collected as criminal restitution. See RCW
9.94A.753(3) (“Restitution shall not include reimbursement for damages for mental
anguish, pain and suffering, or other intangible losses . . . .”). The court specified
in its order that “[t]he balance for pain and suffering shall not be collected as
restitution in this case.” On June 17, 2003, the court entered an order extending
its jurisdiction to collect restitution to July 1, 2013.
The Snohomish County Clerk’s Office received payments from Child and
disbursed restitution to Reiner until November 2018. That month, Child twice
attempted to make payments, but the Clerk’s Office rejected the payments for
expired jurisdiction. On January 14, 2019, the Clerk’s Office filed a Satisfaction of
Judgment and Notice of Account Receivable Write Off.
Reiner filed suit pro se against the “Legislative Seat of the Snohomish
County Clerk,” alleging that he was entitled to damages because the Clerk’s Office
had improperly stopped collecting restitution payments on his behalf. Snohomish
County moved for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Clerk no longer had
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jurisdiction to collect restitution payments. The court granted summary judgment
for the County and dismissed the case with prejudice.1 Reiner appealed.
ANALYSIS
Reiner contends that the court erred in granting summary judgment for
Snohomish County. He argues that documents missing from the case file and
uncertainty over the date that the court lost jurisdiction over the criminal case
created genuine issues of material fact.
We review orders on summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same
inquiry as the trial court. Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 176 Wash. 2d 460, 466, 296 P.3d
800 (2013). Because we stand in the same position as the trial court, we may
consider only the evidence and arguments that were before the trial court when it
made its decision. Am. Universal Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 59 Wash. 2d 811, 815, 370
P.2d 867 (1962). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the party who filed the motion is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. CR 56(c); Afoa, 176 Wash. 2d at 466. A material fact is a fact that
controls the outcome of the litigation. Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash. 2d 491, 494, 519
P.2d 7 (1974). A genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable minds
could differ on those facts. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wash. 2d 545, 552,
192 P.3d 886 (2008). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, the court must view all facts and inferences from the facts in favor of the
nonmoving party—here, Reiner. See id.
1Snohomish County also argued before the superior court that Reiner had failed to name
a proper party as the defendant. The court did not reach this issue in its summary judgment order,
and the County did not cross-appeal.
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The moving party bears the initial burden to submit evidence establishing
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the moving party submits
adequate evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. Id. The nonmoving
party can avoid summary judgment if it sets forth specific facts that sufficiently
rebut the moving party’s contentions and show a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. The nonmoving party may not rely on speculation or bare assertions that factual
issues exist. Id. Summary judgment should be granted only if, from all the
evidence, reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion. Morris, 83 Wash. 2d
at 494.
I. Jurisdiction
Reiner contends that the court erred in determining that the court’s
jurisdiction to collect restitution payments expired in 2013.
The duration of the court’s jurisdiction over an offender for purposes of
restitution is set out in statute. See RCW 9.94A.753. When we interpret a statute,
our goal is to determine what the legislature intended the statute to mean and to
carry out the intended purpose of the statute. Rental Hous. Ass’n of Puget Sound
v. City of Des Moines, 165 Wash. 2d 525, 536, 199 P.3d 393 (2009). If the meaning
of the statutory language is plain on its face, we will accept that plain meaning as
an expression of the legislature’s intent. Id. “We assume that the legislature
means what it says.” Doan v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 143 Wash. App. 596, 601, 178
P.3d 1074 (2008). So, we must give effect to all of the language in a statute, and
we may not accept an interpretation that renders part of the enacted statute
meaningless or superfluous. In re Det. of Boynton, 152 Wash. App. 442, 451–52,
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216 P.3d 1089 (2009). These rules exist to maintain the separation of powers in
our governmental system:
When the lawmaking branch of the government has spoken, the
courts may interpret, but cannot add to or take from the clear and
unambiguous meaning of the law. To do so would be legislation
rather than interpretation. The policy, expediency, and wisdom of a
statute are legislative and not judicial questions.
Ransom v. City of S. Bend, 76 Wash. 396, 398, 136 P. 365 (1913).
The relevant statute in this case states that the county clerk is authorized to
collect restitution payments while an offender remains under the court’s
jurisdiction. RCW 9.94A.753(4). Logically, the inverse is also true—the clerk is
not authorized to collect restitution payments after the court’s jurisdiction over the
offender has expired. The duration of the court’s jurisdiction over an offender for
purposes of restitution depends on the date that the crime was committed. Id. For
crimes committed between July 1, 1985 and July 1, 2000, the statute states that
the offender remains under the court’s jurisdiction for ten years after the offender’s
release from confinement or ten years after the entry of the judgment and
sentence, whichever is later. Id. In this situation, the court may extend its
jurisdiction an additional ten years to allow for continued payment of restitution. Id.
The statute then states that, for crimes committed on or after July 1, 2000, the
offender remains under the court’s jurisdiction until the obligation is completely
satisfied. Id.
The crime at issue here was committed in 1992. Under the plain language
of the statute, Child remained under the court’s jurisdiction for purposes of
restitution for ten years after his release from confinement or the entry of the
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judgment and sentence. The judgment and sentence was entered on January 28,
1993 and ordered Child to serve a three month term of confinement in the
Snohomish County Jail, followed by 12 months of Community Supervision.
Although the exact date of Child’s release from confinement is not apparent from
the record, he appears to have been released sometime in 1993. Therefore, the
court’s jurisdiction over Child for restitution purposes would last until 2003. In
2003, the State sought an extension of jurisdiction in accordance with RCW
9.94A.753. The court extended its jurisdiction an additional ten years, as allowed
by the statute, to July 1, 2013. By the plain language of the statute and the court’s
order, the court’s jurisdiction over Child expired on that date.
Reiner contends that the interpretation of the statute restricting the court’s
jurisdiction to a maximum of 20 years for older crimes “ignores the life history and
progression of the statute,” as well as the intent of the greater statutory scheme.
Before the legislature amended the relevant statute in 2000, the statute included
only the ten-year period of jurisdiction over the offender for purposes of restitution
with the option to extend jurisdiction an additional ten years. Former RCW
9.94A.142(1) (1997), recodified as RCW 9.94A.753(4). In 2000, the legislature
amended the statute and explicitly created two different rules for the length of the
court’s jurisdiction based on the date that the crime was committed. S.S.B. 6336,
56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000). Although the amendment shows a general
intent to extend jurisdiction for restitution purposes, the creation of the two
categories clearly shows that legislature intended to differentiate between crimes
committed before or after July 1, 2000. As noted above, “[w]e assume that the
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legislature means what it says,” and we will not ignore the explicit language of a
statute. Doan, 143 Wash. App. at 601.
Reiner also argues that Supplementary Stipulated Order Regarding
Restitution provides that the court’s jurisdiction expires when restitution is “paid in
full.” The provision that he points to sets out the order of payment among the
parties entitled to restitution. It states that the other recipients may receive
restitution “when and if restitution to Travis T. Reiner . . . has been paid in full.”
This says nothing about the expiration of the court’s jurisdiction, only that the other
recipients may not begin to receive restitution payments unless or until Reiner is
paid in full.
Finally, Reiner contends that the notices of satisfaction of judgment and
accounts receivable write off filed in January, March, and May of 2019 create a
genuine issue of material fact as to the date that the court lost jurisdiction. These
notices do not affect the court’s jurisdiction over Child; they simply acknowledge
that the State’s monetary judgment against Child is no longer enforceable. By the
terms of the 2003 order extending jurisdiction, the court’s jurisdiction over Child for
purposes of restitution expired on July 1, 2013 without the need for further action
by the court. The fact that the Clerk’s Office apparently overlooked this detail for
more than five years does not change the expiration date.
II. Missing Documents
Reiner also contends that there are documents missing from the criminal
case file and that the absence of these documents creates a genuine issue of
material fact. First, he argues that a document entitled “Amended Order
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Establishing Amount of Restitution and Directing the Disbursement of Funds” is
missing from the case file “in direct violation of the order of the court dated March
30, 1994.” Reiner states that this document defined the terms of restitution in the
case and resulted in his surrender of his right to collect on the civil judgment.
However, Reiner presented no other evidence of the existence or contents of this
document. Reiner’s bald assertion that this document is missing from the criminal
case file does not create a genuine issue of material fact that would prevent
summary judgment.
Also, the order dated March 30, 1994 does not mandate the creation of any
other document. Reiner argues that the order “[i]mpl[ied] a duty to Snohomish
County to amend the restitution order issued February 18, 1993[ ] to reflect the
civil judgment.” He contends that the County never amended the restitution order.
This is not accurate. The document filed March 30, 1994 states that the State,
Child, and Reiner stipulate and agree that the restitution order “should be amended
to reflect restitution to Travis T. Reiner in accordance with the Stipulation and
Agreed Partial Summary Judgment” filed in the civil case. The second portion of
the document, entitled “ORDER,” states:
The parties having stipulated as above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
1. Gregory N. Child shall make payments in accordance with
the Stipulation and Agreed Partial Summary Judgment attached as
EXHIBIT A hereto;
2. Gregory N. Child’s payments shall be made to the
Snohomish County Superior Court, under this cause, and once
made, it is the order of the Court that they shall be distributed to
Travis T. Reiner and his counsel, Thom H. Graafstra;
3. Restitution shall be made to the other parties herein, as
previously set, when and if restitution to Travis T. Reiner in
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accordance with the Stipulation and Agreed Partial Summary
Judgment has been paid in full.
The document was signed by a judge. This is an order of the superior court
amending the previous restitution order to reflect the agreed restitution amount
from the civil case. No separate filing was required.
Reiner argues repeatedly that the County’s write-off of the restitution order
prevents him from enforcing his civil judgment against Child. Ordinarily, the
restitution statute “does not limit civil remedies or defenses available to the victim.”
RCW 9.94A.753(9). We also note that nothing in the record before this court
appears to preclude Reiner from enforcing his civil judgment, especially as a
portion of the civil judgment was not able to be collected as criminal restitution.
Reiner also contends that the criminal file is missing “the order for July 1,
2013 terminating restitution and Write-Off.” His argument appears to be that this
document was never created and that the court’s jurisdiction could not have
expired without it. As explained above, the court’s jurisdiction expired on July 1,
2013 by the terms of the 2003 order extending jurisdiction. No further order was
required.
III. Remaining Assignments of Error
Reiner also argues in his opening brief that a conflict of interest existed
between the plaintiff, defense counsel, defendant, and trial judge and that he was
denied his civil rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, he concedes in his reply brief that he failed to raise these issues before
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the trial court on summary judgment and therefore cannot raise them on appeal.
We decline to address these issues.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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