State Of Washington v. Paul Anthony Martinez ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 79539-2-I
)
Respondent, ) DIVISION ONE
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
PAUL ANTHONY MARTINEZ, )
)
Appellant. )
)
HAZELRIGG, J. — Paul Martinez entered a guilty plea to the charge of second
degree murder and admitted the aggravating circumstance that the crime was a
domestic violence offense committed within sight and sound of his and the victim’s
minor children. He seeks reversal of his exceptional sentence, arguing that the
court erred in determining as a matter of law that substantial and compelling
reasons existed to justify the exceptional sentence and failed to enter sufficient
written findings and conclusions. We disagree and affirm the exceptional
sentence.
The State concedes that the trial court improperly imposed interest on
Martinez’s legal financial obligations. We accept the State’s concession and
remand to strike the interest on Martinez’s non-restitution legal financial
obligations.
No. 79539-2-I/2
FACTS
Paul Martinez shot and killed his estranged wife, Holly Martinez. Martinez
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated domestic violence second
degree murder with a firearm allegation. He admitted the aggravating
circumstances that he was armed with a firearm and that the crime was committed
within sight and sound of their children under the age of 18. In the plea agreement
filed with the court, Martinez stipulated that the facts as outlined in the affidavit of
probable cause existed beyond a reasonable doubt and provided a legal basis for
an exceptional sentence above the standard range. He agreed that the court could
consider those facts when deciding whether there were substantial and compelling
reasons to sentence him outside the standard range. This section of the
agreement also contained a handwritten addition stating that “[t]he defense agrees
a legal [and] factual basis exists but will be requesting a sentence of 183 months.”
In exchange, the State agreed not to file the charge of aggravated domestic
violence first degree murder with a firearm against Martinez.
The State recommended an exceptional sentence of 312 months
confinement. Martinez disagreed with the State’s recommendation and requested
a sentence at the low end of the standard range. The court found that substantial
and compelling reasons existed that justified an exceptional sentence above the
standard sentencing range. The court noted that the aggravating factors were
stipulated by Martinez and were found by the court after Martinez waived his right
to a jury trial. The court entered separate findings of fact and conclusions of law
in which the court found that “[t]his crime was aggravated by the following
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circumstance: This offense involved domestic violence, as defined by RCW
10.99.020, and it occurred within the sight or sound of the victim’s or the offender’s
minor children under the age of eighteen years.” The court also listed the following
conclusion of law: “In consideration of the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act,
RCW 9.94A. et seq., substantial and compelling reasons exist to impose an
exceptional sentence above the standard range.” Martinez was sentenced to 312
months imprisonment, including a 60 month firearm enhancement.
Martinez was ordered to pay a $500 victim assessment, $100 biological
sample fee, and restitution in an amount to be determined. The court ordered that
the legal financial obligations imposed “shall bear interest from the date of the
judgment until payment in full, at the rate applicable to civil judgments.” Martinez
appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. Exceptional Sentence
Martinez contends that the trial court erred in imposing an exceptional
sentence. “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury[ ] and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). The statutory maximum
is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts found
by a jury or admitted by the defendant; that is, without making any additional
findings. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L.
Ed. 2d 403 (2004). “[A] jury need not find facts supporting an exceptional sentence
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when a defendant pleads guilty and stipulates to the relevant facts.” State v.
Ermels, 156 Wn.2d 528, 537, 131 P.3d 229 (2006).
Once the facts supporting aggravating circumstances are established, the
court may impose an exceptional sentence if it determines, considering the
purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA),1 “that the facts found are
substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” RCW
9.94A.537(6). The purposes of the SRA are described in statute:
The purpose of this chapter is to make the criminal justice
system accountable to the public by developing a system for the
sentencing of felony offenders which structures, but does not
eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting sentences, and to:
(1) Ensure that the punishment for a criminal offense is
proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender’s
criminal history;
(2) Promote respect for the law by providing punishment which is
just;
(3) Be commensurate with the punishment imposed on others
committing similar offenses;
(4) Protect the public;
(5) Offer the offender an opportunity to improve himself or herself;
(6) Make frugal use of the state’s and local governments’
resources; and
(7) Reduce the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community.
RCW 9.94A.010. “Whenever a sentence outside the standard sentence range is
imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of
fact and conclusions of law.” RCW 9.94A.535. Appellate courts review de novo
whether a trial court’s reasons for imposing an exceptional sentence meet the
requirements of the SRA. State v. Friedlund, 182 Wn.2d 388, 394, 341 P.3d 280(2015).
1 Chap. 9.94A RCW.
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Martinez first contends that the court’s determination of whether the facts
are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence is a
factual rather than legal question. Therefore, he argues, the court violated his
constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury when it made this factual
determination. However, as Martinez acknowledges, the Washington Supreme
Court has specifically stated that this is a legal issue. See, e.g., State v. Suleiman,
158 Wn.2d 280, 290–91, 291 n.3, 143 P.3d 795 (2006) (“The trial judge was left
only with the legal conclusion of whether the facts alleged and found were
sufficiently substantial and compelling to warrant an exceptional sentence. . . .
[T]he question of whether the found factors are sufficiently substantial and
compelling is a matter of law.”) We are bound to follow directly controlling authority
of the Supreme Court. State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 487, 681 P.2d 227 (1984).
We cannot accept Martinez’s invitation to disregard this authority.2
Martinez also argues that the trial court failed to enter sufficient findings of
fact and conclusions of law detailing its reasons for imposing an exceptional
sentence. He complains that the court’s findings of fact listed only the aggravating
factor admitted by Martinez in his guilty plea and were “silent as to any additional
factual considerations.” However, the underlying factual bases for an aggravating
factor must be determined by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Suleiman, 158
Wn.2d at 290. The addition of factual findings beyond the facts admitted by
Martinez would run the risk of offending Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296. See
2 The State responds that this claim is barred by the doctrine of invited error because
Martinez expressly agreed that the facts of his case supported an exceptional sentence in the plea
agreement. Because Martinez’s argument is directly controverted by controlling precedent, we
assume without deciding that this issue is not barred.
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State v. Perry, 6 Wn. App. 2d 544, 557, 431 P.3d 543 (2018) (finding that the trial
court erred in making findings of fact beyond those made by the jury to support the
exceptional sentence). The court did not err in limiting its factual findings to the
facts admitted by Martinez in his guilty plea.
Martinez further contends that the written conclusions are deficient because
the court did not explain its reasoning for concluding that an exceptional sentence
was justified. This claim is also without merit. Martinez argues that the court did
not identify the reasons that it found to be substantial and compelling to justify the
exceptional sentence, but the reasons are identified in the finding of fact: Martinez
committed a domestic violence offense within sight or sound of his minor children.
He argues without citation to authority that “[c]ertainly, the finding of an
aggravating factor by itself is not a basis to impose an exceptional sentence.” This
statement does not appear to be an accurate assessment of the law. The SRA
sets out “an exclusive list of factors that can support a sentence above the standard
range” if the facts are properly established. RCW 9.94A.535(3). When the
relevant facts underlying one of these factors are established, the court is
authorized to impose an exceptional sentence. See State v. Duncalf, 177 Wn.2d
289, 296, 300 P.3d 352 (2013) (“[The jury] found this aggravating factor [listed in
RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y)] beyond a reasonable doubt. This was the only finding
required to authorize the trial court’s imposition of the exceptional sentence.”);
State v. Mutch, 171 Wn.2d 646, 661, 254 P.3d 803 (2011) (“[T]he legislature
specifically stated that a high offender score that results in current offenses going
unpunished in a reason justifying an exceptional sentence. RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c).
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The trial court made a written finding that the defendant’s high offender score will
result in current offenses going unpunished. This is a written finding of a
substantial and compelling factor, justifying an exceptional sentence, in
satisfaction of RCW 9.94A.535.”). One enumerated factor in the statute is that
“[t]he current offense involved domestic violence, as defined in RCW 10.99.020, .
. . and . . . [t]he offense occurred within sight or sound of the victim’s or the
offender’s minor children under the age of eighteen years.” RCW
9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii).
Here, the facts establishing this factor were admitted by Martinez in his
statement set out in the guilty plea and, in the plea agreement, he concurred that
they provided a sufficient legal and factual basis. The legislature has determined
that this aggravating factor can support an exceptional sentence. Martinez’s
argument that the findings do not state that the court considered the purposes of
the SRA in determining that an exceptional sentence was warranted is also
baseless. The court explicitly noted that it found substantial and compelling
reasons to impose the exceptional sentence “[i]n consideration of the purpose of
the Sentencing Reform Act.” The written findings and conclusions were sufficient,
and the court did not err in concluding that substantial and compelling reasons
existed to impose an exceptional sentence.
II. Legal Financial Obligations
Martinez also contends that the trial court improperly imposed interest
accruing from the date of sentencing on his legal financial obligations. The State
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concedes that the provision imposing interest on non-restitution financial
obligations should be stricken.
The statute governing interest on judgments states that, “[a]s of June 7,
2018, no interest shall accrue on nonrestitution legal financial obligations.” RCW
10.82.090(1). We accept the State’s concession that the provision was imposed
in error and remand to strike the language imposing interest on Martinez’s non-
restitution legal financial obligations.
III. Statement of Additional Grounds for Review
In a statement of additional grounds for review, Martinez raises claims of
governmental misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and “suppression of
discovery” regarding potentially mitigating evidence. When such a pro se
statement is submitted, we consider only those issues that adequately inform us
of the nature and occurrence of the alleged errors. State v. Calvin, 176 Wn. App.
1, 26, 316 P.3d 496 (2013). Additionally, “issues that involve facts or evidence not
in the record are properly raised through a personal restraint petition, not a
statement of additional grounds.” Id.Martinez claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
his attorney failed to object when the children’s temporary guardian and the lead
detective addressed the court at sentencing. To sustain a claim of ineffective
assistance, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was objectively
deficient and resulted in prejudice. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 755, 278 P.3d
653 (2012). By statute, “[t]he court shall . . . allow arguments from the prosecutor,
the defense counsel, the offender, the victim, the survivor of the victim, or a
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representative of the victim or survivor, and an investigative law enforcement
officer as to the sentence to be imposed” at the sentencing hearing. RCW
9.94A.500. Martinez’s counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to object to
statements permitted by statute.
Martinez also contends that he received ineffective assistance when his
attorney presented a different argument at sentencing than the one they had
previously discussed and that he was denied a psychiatric evaluation. He argues
that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its argument and use of
evidence at sentencing and that the lead detective failed to conduct a fair and
impartial investigation. Finally, he claims that relevant mitigating evidence was not
considered. To the extent that we are able to discern the nature of Martinez’s
additional claims, the issues appear to involve matters outside the record before
us. Accordingly, we decline to consider these claims.
Affirmed in part and remanded to strike the interest on non-restitution legal
financial obligations.
WE CONCUR:
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