State Of Washington, V Baron Del Ashley, Jr. ( 2020 )


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  • IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,
    No. 81392-7-I
    Respondent,
    v.                                 DIVISION ONE
    BARON DEL ASHLEY JR,                              UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    aka Mike J Allen, Michael Jones Ashley,
    Baron D Edington, Baron Dale Edington
    Appellant.
    LEACH, J. — Baron Del Ashley, Jr. appeals his convictions for felony
    violation of a domestic violence no contact order protecting Lorrie Marie
    Brookshire. Ashley asserts the State conducted an unlawful warrantless search in
    violation of Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution when it listened
    to recorded conversations he made from jail to Brookshire. Because Ashley did
    not have an expectation to privacy in the calls he made from jail, the recordings
    were not “private affairs” protected under Article I, section 7. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On April 3, 2018, Vancouver Police Department Detective Sandra Aldridge
    arrested Baron Del Ashley, Jr. for violating a 2017 domestic violence no contact
    order that prohibited him from contacting his wife Lorrie Marie Brookshire. The
    trial court had modified this order to permit Ashley and Brookshire to talk by phone,
    Citations and pincites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
    No. 81392-7-I/2
    text, and email. While in custody, Detective Aldridge warned Ashley the trial court
    would likely issue a new no contact order prohibiting him from talking by phone
    with Brookshire. The next day, on April 4, 2018, the trial court entered another
    domestic violence no contact order that prohibited Ashley from contacting
    Brookshire by phone.
    Ashley used the Clark County Jail phone to call Brookshire using his and
    other inmates’ telephone accounts.      By the phone, a sign is posted warning
    inmates their calls “are recorded and subject to monitoring.” Telmate is the system
    that records the calls. To place a call, inmates must enter their personal account
    number. Telmate uses the account number to identify the inmate. It also records
    the call receiver’s phone number, what time the inmate placed the call, and the
    call’s duration. When a call is initiated, Telmate’s prerecorded message warns the
    caller and the call receivers that the “call is subject to recording and monitoring.”
    Telmate stores the recordings on an off-site server that is accessible to law
    enforcement.
    Detective Aldridge used Telmate to search for and identify calls placed from
    Ashley to Brookshire. Detective Aldridge determined that Ashley called Brookshire
    on April 4, 5, 7, and 8, 2018. The State charged Ashley with four counts of felony
    domestic violence court order violation for contacting Brookshire on those days.
    On April 25, 2018, Brookshire asked the court to modify/rescind the no
    contact orders signed on April 11, 2018 and April 18, 2018. The trial court denied
    her request pending trial.
    2
    No. 81392-7-I/3
    During trial, Ashley asked the court to suppress the recordings. He argued
    that Detective Aldridge conducted an unlawful warrantless search.         Detective
    Aldridge testified the State generally does not obtain a search warrant before
    searching and listening to recorded calls because the inmates do not have an
    expectation of privacy with those calls. The trial court denied Ashley’s request. It
    stated:
    both the federal and the state courts have found that the practice of
    putting up a notice saying everything is going to be recorded and
    then automatically taping and randomly monitoring these calls of
    inmates is proper and that the inmates, having been given that
    warning and understanding that the calls are going to be recorded,
    don’t have any expectation of privacy under either the federal or
    State constitution.
    ...
    [H]e doesn’t have a right to constitutional warnings where he
    voluntarily decides to go on a system that -- and talk to a private
    individual, knowing -- because the sign says so and because the
    recording says so that the call is going to be recorded.
    On December 13, 2018, the jury convicted Ashley on all four counts of
    felony domestic violence court order violation. The trial court sentenced Ashley to
    60 months of confinement. It did not impose another no contact order because it
    determined the existing order would expire soon after Ashley’s release from jail,
    and because Brookshire did not want a no contact order.
    Ashley appeals.
    3
    No. 81392-7-I/4
    ANALYSIS
    Private Affairs
    Ashley asserts the trial court should have suppressed the recordings
    because the State obtained them by an unlawful warrantless search in violation of
    Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.
    We review the denial of a request to suppress evidence by determining
    whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether
    those findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law. 1 Substantial evidence
    exists if it is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the
    matter asserted.2 We review conclusions of law de novo. 3
    The Washington State Constitution Article I, section 7 provides, “No person
    shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
    law.” It protects against warrantless searches of a citizen’s private affairs.4 “To
    determine whether governmental conduct intrudes on a private affair, we look at
    the ‘nature and extent of the information which may be obtained as a result of the
    governmental conduct’ and at the historical treatment of the interest asserted.”5
    In State v. Archie, Archie appealed the trial court’s denial of his request to
    suppress calls recorded from jail.6 This court determined the recordings of calls
    1
    State v. Levy, 
    156 Wash. 2d 709
    , 733, 
    132 P.3d 1076
    (2006).
    2
    
    Levy, 156 Wash. 2d at 733
    .
    3
    State v. Schultz, 
    170 Wash. 2d 746
    , 753, 
    248 P.3d 484
    (2011); State v.
    Carneh, 
    153 Wash. 2d 274
    , 281, 
    103 P.3d 743
    (2004).
    4
    
    Schultz, 170 Wash. 2d at 753
    .
    5
    State v. Muhammad, 
    194 Wash. 2d 577
    , 586, 
    451 P.3d 1060
    (2019) (citing
    State v. Miles, 
    160 Wash. 2d 236
    , 244, 
    156 P.3d 864
    (2007)).
    6
    
    148 Wash. App. 198
    , 
    199 P.3d 1005
    (2009).
    4
    No. 81392-7-I/5
    made from jail were not private affairs deserving protection under Article I,
    section 7.7
    Posted by the Clark County Jail inmate telephones are signs and a pre-
    recorded Telmate message plays that warn callers and call receivers the calls are
    subject to recording and monitoring. Looking at the nature and extent of the
    information obtained, Ashley’s recorded calls were not private affairs deserving
    protection under Article I, section 7 because he received multiple warnings the
    calls were subject to recording and monitoring.        And, looking at this court’s
    treatment of the interest asserted, Ashley’s recorded calls from jail were not private
    affairs deserving protection.
    Consent
    Ashley asserts that while he consented to the search of the recording by jail
    officials, he did not consent to the search by the State as part of a criminal
    investigation.
    “Under article I, section 7, a search occurs when the government disturbs
    ‘those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be
    entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.’”8 The State
    must have a valid warrant to conduct a search unless the State shows that an
    7
    
    148 Wash. App. 198
    , 
    199 P.3d 1005
    (2009).
    8
    
    Muhammad, 194 Wash. 2d at 586
    (citing State v. Myrick, 
    102 Wash. 2d 506
    ,
    511, 
    688 P.2d 151
    (1984)).
    5
    No. 81392-7-I/6
    exception to the warrant requirement applies. 9 A warrantless search is per se
    unreasonable unless one of Washington’s recognized exceptions applies.10
    A person may waive protection from warrantless searches by providing
    meaningful and informed consent.11 “It is the State’s burden to establish that a
    consent to search was lawfully given.      In order to meet this burden, three
    requirements must be met: (1) the consent must be voluntary, (2) the person
    consenting must have the authority to consent, and (3) the search must not exceed
    the scope of the consent.”12
    In Archie, we found that Archie consented to the recording and monitoring
    when he placed the call and continued the call after receiving a warning.13 Under
    Archie, Ashley’s claim fails. A posted sign by the inmate telephone and the
    Telmate pre-recording warned Ashley the call was subject to recording and
    monitoring. Ashley consented to the search when he proceeded with the call after
    receiving those warnings. And, regardless of who listened to the recordings and
    their reason for doing so, Ashley’s conversations were not protected under
    Article I, section 7.
    9
    
    Muhammad, 194 Wash. 2d at 586
    (citing State v. Miles, 
    160 Wash. 2d 236
    , 244,
    
    156 P.3d 864
    (2007); State v. Rife, 
    133 Wash. 2d 140
    , 150-51, 
    943 P.2d 266
    (1997)).
    10
    State v. Rankin, 
    151 Wash. 2d 689
    , 695, 
    92 P.3d 202
    (2004).
    11
    
    Schultz, 170 Wash. 2d at 753
    , 758.
    12
    State v. Thompson, 
    151 Wash. 2d 793
    , 803, 
    92 P.3d 228
    , 233 (2004).
    13
    
    Archie, 148 Wash. App. at 204
    .
    6
    No. 81392-7-I/7
    Plain View Exception
    The State argues the recordings falls under the plain view exception to the
    warrant requirement. Because the State prevails without this argument, we do not
    address it.
    CONCLUSION
    Because Ashley had no reasonable expectation of privacy, the recordings
    were not “private affairs” protected under Article I, section 7, and the trial court
    properly admitted the recordings. We affirm.
    WE CONCUR:
    7