State Of Washington v. Jagjit Singh ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
No. 79017-0-I
V.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JAGJIT SINGH,
Appellant. FILED: March 9, 2020
DWYER, J. — Jagjit Singh appeals from his convictions for assault in the
first degree and assault in the second degree. He contends that the trial court
erroneously admitted inadmissible hearsay evidence during his trial and that his
offender score was improperly calculated at sentencing. Because Singh did not
properly preserve his evidentiary claim of error for appeal and the State
concedes that Singh’s offender score was improperly calculated, we affirm the
convictions but remand for resentencing.
The State charged Singh with one count of domestic violence assault in
the first degree (count I), two counts of domestic violence assault in the second
degree (counts II and Ill), and one count of rape in the third degree (count IV) for
acts committed against his wife. Count II also charged a domestic violence
“within sight or sound of the victim’s or the offender’s minor child” aggravating
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factor. Each count also charged a domestic violence “ongoing pattern of.
abuse” aggravating factor.
During Singh’s bench trial, the State called Deputy Sherriff Nathaniel
Obregon and elicited facts regarding that which Singh’s family had reported to
the police:
[Prosecutor:] You talked to the son at this interview, did you not?
[Obregon:] Very briefly, yes.
[Prosecutor:] And did you ask him any questions about what you
were told was happening to him by his father?
[Obregon:] I did. I asked him—as in my notes, if—
[Defense Counsel]: I object. I guess I can’t object to the question.
[Obregon]: —if his father hurt him when he pulled his arm back
behind his back.
[Defense Counsel]: I would object.
The Court: I’m going to overrule the objection.
[Prosecutor]: Go ahead.
[Obregon]: I asked him if it hurt him when his father pulled his arm
behind his back.
[Prosecutor:] And did you get an answer from him?
[Obregon]: I did. He—
[Defense Counsel]: I object to any response.
The Court: Overruled. He may answer the question.
[Obregon]: He said hurt.
Singh was subsequently convicted of the crimes charged in counts
I and II, and the court also concluded that both counts involved domestic
violence that was a part of an ongoing pattern of abuse. At sentencing,
Singh was assigned an offender score of 4 for each offense, thus setting a
standard range sentence of 129 to 171 months for his conviction on count
I and 15 to 20 months for his conviction on count II. Singh was sentenced
at the high end of the standard range for both counts, with the sentences
to run concurrently.
Singh appeals.
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Singh contends (1) that his convictions must be reversed because the trial
court admitted inadmissible hearsay evidence and (2) that his offender score was
improperly calculated, requiring remand for resentencing if his convictions are
affirmed. In response, the State asserts that Singh did not properly preserve his
evidentiary claim for appellate review and concedes that Singh’s offender score
was improperly calculated, requiring remand for resentencing.
A
Singh first asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted inadmissible
hearsay testimony from Deputy Sherriff Obregon and that such error requires
reversal. Specifically, Singh claims that the trial court should not have admitted
Deputy Sherriff Obregon’s three word answer when asked to recount his
interview with the victim’s son—”he said hurt.” However, because Singh did not
interpose a specific objection to this testimony, he has waived any claim of error.
It is a longstanding rule that “[am objection which does not specify the
particular ground upon which it is based is insufficient to preserve the question
for appellate review.” Statev. Guloy, 104 Wash. 2d 412, 422, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985)
(citing State v. Boast, 87 Wash. 2d 447, 553 P.2d 1322 (1976)). For claims of error
pertaining to the proper admission of evidence, “[a] party may only assign error in
the appellate court on the specific ground of [an] evidentiary objection made at
trial.” Guloy, 104 Wash. 2d at 422.
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Singh contends that the court should have excluded Deputy Sheriff
Obregon’s three word answer, “he said hurt’ at the end of the following
exchange:
[Prosecutor:] You talked to the son at this interview, did you not?
[Obregon:] Very briefly, yes.
[Prosecutor:] And did you ask him any questions about what you
were told was happening to him by his father?
[Obregon:] I did. I asked him—as in my notes, if—
[Defense Counsel]: I object. I guess I can’t object to the question.
[Obregon]: —if his father hurt him when he pulled his arm back
behind his back.
[Defense Counsel]: I would object.
The Court: I’m going to overrule the objection.
[Prosecutor]: Go ahead.
[Obregon]: I asked him if it hurt him when his father pulled his arm
behind his back.
[Prosecutor:] And did you get an answer from him?
[Obregon]: I did. He—
[Defense Counsel]: I object to any response.
The Court: Overruled. He may answer the question.
[Obregon]: He said hurt.
Plainly, Singh failed to properly preserve this claim of error for appellate
review. While Singh’s counsel objected to the admission of Deputy Sheriff
Obregon’s statement, no ground for the objection was ever offered. A general
objection is insufficient to preserve the claim of error. Guloy, 104 Wash. 2d at 422.
Singh has therefore waived any claim of error regarding the admission of Deputy
Sherriff Obregon’s statement.
B
Singh next asserts that his offender score was improperly calculated at
sentencing, resulting in the sentencing court imposing a sentence exceeding the
proper standard range sentences for his offenses. Specifically, he asserts that
his offender score for each offense is properly calculated as 2 instead of 4, that
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the court double counted his other current offenses when calculating his offender
score for each offense, and that this resulted in a sentence exceeding the proper
standard range for his offenses. The State concedes that this is so. Both parties
agree that Singh must be resentenced utilizing the proper offender score for each
offense. 1
We therefore affirm Singh’s convictions and remand for resentencing.2
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
WE CONCUR:
‘I
1 Therefore, we decline to consider Singh’s contention that he was improperly required to
pay Department of Corrections’ supervision fees. Because he must be resentenced and the
issue of legal financial obligations will be back before the trial court, this issue is not ripe for
review. See State v. BahI, 164 Wash. 2d 739, 751, 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (noting that, to be ripe for
review, a challenged action must be final); State v. Curry, 118 Wash. 2d 911, 917 n.3, 829 P.2d 166
(1992) (rejecting, as premature, a challenge to the imposition of a victim penalty assessment).
Singh may raise this issue with the sentencing court at his resentencing.
2 Singh also submitted a statement of additional grounds (SAG). However, Singh’s SAG
does not establish any basis for granting appellate relief.
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