State of Washington v. Juan Manuel Flores-Arroyo ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    MAY 12, 2020
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )
    )         No. 36392-9-III
    Respondent,             )
    )
    v.                                   )
    )
    JUAN MANUEL FLORES-ARROYO,                     )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    Appellant.              )
    KORSMO, J. — Juan Flores-Arroyo appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw
    his guilty plea. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the
    court erred in excluding evidence offered to attack his plea counsel’s credibility. We
    affirm.
    FACTS
    Mr. Flores-Arroyo came to the United States on a tourist visa in 2013 and
    overstayed the visa limit. In 2017, he was charged in Chelan County with drive-by
    shooting, possession of methamphetamine, and alien in possession of a firearm. Mr.
    Flores-Arroyo’s family hired George Trejo to represent Mr. Flores-Arroyo. Mr. Trejo
    negotiated an agreement for Flores-Arroyo to plead guilty solely to drive-by shooting
    with a low end sentence recommendation. Mr. Trejo advised Mr. Flores-Arroyo that
    No. 36392-9-III
    State v. Flores-Arroyo
    immigration consequences were possible and that he likely would be deported if federal
    authorities commenced immigration proceedings. Mr. Flores-Arroyo acknowledged on
    the record that he could face immigration consequences from his plea. The court
    accepted the plea after verifying that it was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
    Immigration authorities commenced deportation proceedings after Mr. Flores-
    Arroyo completed his sentence. An immigration judge determined that the drive-by
    shooting constituted a “particularly serious crime” for immigration purposes and ordered
    his deportation. Mr. Flores-Arroyo appealed the immigration decision.
    While that appeal was underway, Mr. Flores-Arroyo also filed a CrR 7.8 motion to
    withdraw his guilty plea in Chelan County Superior Court. He argued that he received
    ineffective assistance of plea counsel because his attorney failed to adequately advise him
    about immigration consequences. He also asserted that he would have accepted a longer
    prison time in order to avoid deportation. The court conducted a hearing on the motion.
    Mr. Flores-Arroyo sought to call a past client of Mr. Trejo to testify that he had received
    incorrect immigration advice. The trial court found the testimony irrelevant to whether
    Mr. Flores-Arroyo received proper advice. The court also disallowed evidence of
    counsel’s bar discipline history.
    The trial court denied the CrR 7.8 motion because it found Mr. Flores-Arroyo was
    adequately advised about immigration consequences before entering his plea. The court
    further noted that, of the three charges Mr. Flores-Arroyo faced, the drive-by shooting
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    No. 36392-9-III
    State v. Flores-Arroyo
    charge carried the least certain immigration consequences. Mr. Trejo correctly advised
    his client that deportation was likely.
    Mr. Flores-Arroyo timely appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion. A panel
    considered his appeal without hearing argument.
    ANALYSIS
    The appeal presents two arguments. We first address whether the trial court erred
    in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea before turning to the contention that the
    court erred when it rejected impeachment evidence.
    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    We review the trial court’s decision whether to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea
    for abuse of discretion. State v. Quy Dinh Nguyen, 
    179 Wash. App. 271
    , 281-282, 
    319 P.3d 53
    (2013). The trial court may allow withdrawal of a guilty plea to correct a manifest
    injustice, including ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Id. at 282.
    A defendant who claims ineffective assistance must establish that counsel’s
    performance was deficient and prejudicial. State v. Sandoval, 
    171 Wash. 2d 163
    , 170, 
    249 P.3d 1015
    (2011). Prejudice is established if the defendant can demonstrate that, but for
    counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability he would have gone to trial rather
    than plead guilty.
    Id. at 174-175.
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    No. 36392-9-III
    State v. Flores-Arroyo
    Defense counsel must advise a client about the consequences of pleading guilty.
    In re Ramos, 
    181 Wash. App. 743
    , 749-750, 
    326 P.3d 826
    (2014). Counsel must provide
    accurate information about potential immigration ramifications, even though the relevant
    law is often unclear.
    Id. at 750-751.
    Subsequent to Padilla v. Kentucky1, counsel must
    appropriately advise a client when federal law classifies the defendant’s offense as clearly
    deportable.
    Id. at 751.
    If immigration consequences for the offense are not clear, counsel
    must provide a general warning that immigration consequences are possible.
    Id. at 752.
    Contradictory or wavering warnings about deportation are disfavored because they
    decrease the likelihood that a defendant will appreciate the potential consequences. State
    v. Manajares, 
    197 Wash. App. 798
    , 807, 
    391 P.3d 530
    (2017).
    Both parties acknowledge Washington’s drive-by shooting offense does not have
    clear federal deportation consequences, while possession of methamphetamine and alien
    in possession of a firearm have clear negative consequences. Mr. Trejo correctly
    informed Mr. Flores-Arroyo that he could face immigration consequences, including
    possible deportation, if he chose to plead guilty to drive-by shooting. This advice was
    accurate and sufficient for an offense with unclear immigration consequences. Had Mr.
    Flores-Arroyo pleaded guilty to his other two offenses or been convicted for these
    offenses, his immigration consequences were likely far worse. While Mr. Flores-Arroyo
    1
    Padilla v. Kentucky, 
    559 U.S. 356
    , 
    130 S. Ct. 1473
    , 
    176 L. Ed. 2d 284
    (2010).
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    State v. Flores-Arroyo
    now argues he would prefer to go to trial, he does not argue that he had any likelihood of
    success at trial. Conviction for any of his charged offenses would still carry immigration
    consequences regardless of his sentence duration.
    Mr. Trejo gave his client accurate and adequate advice prior to pleading guilty.
    Counsel was not ineffective for negotiating a relatively favorable deal under the
    circumstances. Mr. Flores-Arroyo has not met his heavy burden of establishing that
    counsel provided ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion by denying the motion to withdraw the plea.
    Impeachment Evidence
    This court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Peralta v. State,
    
    187 Wash. 2d 888
    , 894, 
    389 P.3d 596
    (2017). A trial court abuses its discretion when it
    applies the wrong legal standard. Gilmore v. Jefferson County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area,
    
    190 Wash. 2d 483
    , 499, 
    415 P.3d 212
    (2018). Evidentiary errors are not presumptively
    prejudicial and we will only reverse when the appellant establishes the error affected the
    outcome. State v. Barry, 
    183 Wash. 2d 297
    , 303, 313, 
    352 P.3d 161
    (2015).
    A witness may not be impeached on a collateral matter. State v. Oswalt, 
    62 Wash. 2d 118
    , 120-121, 
    381 P.2d 617
    (1963). “An issue is collateral if it is not admissible
    independently of the impeachment purpose.” State v. Fankhouser, 
    133 Wash. App. 689
    ,
    693, 
    138 P.3d 140
    (2006). Prior conduct normally is inadmissible to show that an
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    No. 36392-9-III
    State v. Flores-Arroyo
    individual acted in a same manner on a given occasion. ER 404. A court may allow
    specific instances of conduct to be raised during cross-examination if the court considers
    the issue probative of truthfulness. ER 608(b). Extrinsic evidence may not be used to
    prove or disprove past conduct.
    Id. Even prior
    conduct related to credibility may not be
    admissible if not germane. Harbottle v. Braun, 
    10 Wash. App. 2d
    374, 396, 
    447 P.3d 654
    (2019).
    Mr. Flores-Arroyo sought to use one of Trejo’s past clients to suggest that Mr.
    Trejo gave that client incorrect immigration advice. This is a single past instance of
    conduct used to suggest Mr. Trejo acted in the same way with Mr. Flores-Arroyo. After
    hearing arguments from each side, the court reasonably concluded that this witness would
    only testify about issues unrelated to the advice given to Mr. Flores-Arroyo. The court
    properly followed evidentiary rules in concluding the testimony was irrelevant.
    Mr. Flores-Arroyo also did not present any reason why the bar discipline history
    was relevant. In fact, it was ancient and involved unrelated circumstances. The only
    relevance was to challenge Mr. Trejo’s character, not to show that he lied or acted
    improperly in this case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it disallowed
    questions about the discipline history.
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    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
    Affirmed.
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
    2.06.040.
    _________________________________
    Korsmo, A.C.J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________________
    Lawrence-Berrey, J.
    _________________________________
    Siddoway, J.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 36392-9

Filed Date: 5/12/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/12/2020