State Of Washington v. Jessica Carde ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 73324-9-1
(Consolidated with No. 74228-1-1)
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
JESSICA CARDE
AKA JESSICA HARTMAN UNPUBLISHED OPINION
AKA JUANITA HOFSETH-LAMMER
AKA JUANITA HOFSETH
AKA JUNITA FRYE,
Appellant. FILED: January 30, 2017
Schindler, J. — A jury convicted Jessica Carde of three counts of theft in the
first degree, one count of attempted theft in the first degree, and three counts of
mortgage fraud. Carde seeks reversal of her convictions and the order of restitution.1
Carde challenges denial of two pretrial motions to substitute appointed counsel. Carde
also challenges denial of her request to continue the restitution hearing to allow her to
replace appointed counsel with private counsel. Because the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by denying the pretrial motions to substitute appointed counsel and the
motion to continue the restitution hearing, we affirm.
1 Carde filed an appeal of the judgment and sentence and the order of restitution. This court
consolidated the appeals.
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Charges Against Carde
In March 2013, the State filed 12 charges against Carde that involved 10 victims:
four counts of theft in the first degree, one count of attempted theft in the first degree,
two counts of theft in the second degree, two counts of securities fraud, and three
counts of mortgage fraud. The State alleged that over a period of five years, Carde
engaged in a pattern and practice of deception by presenting herself as a legitimate
prospective buyer of a series of upscale homes, persuading sellers to allow her to move
into the homes, securing lease-to-purchase agreements under false pretenses, and
living in each of the homes for as long as possible while making minimal or no
payments.
December 2013 Request To Appoint New Counsel
After Carde was extradited from Montana in October 2013, the court appointed
public defender Jonathan Newcomb to represent her. Two months later, in December
2013, Carde asked the court to appoint new counsel. Carde asserted there was a
"breakdown in communication" with Newcomb, he was difficult to reach by telephone,
and matters she and counsel "discussed" about the bail hearing were "not performed."
Carde said she lacked confidence in Newcomb. The court told Carde that as a general
rule, public defenders are difficult to reach by telephone. The court advised Carde that
if the court granted her motion, "it's not going to happen again." Because it was
"sufficiently early in the case," the court granted Carde's request to appoint new
counsel.
The court appointed The Defender Association (TDA) to represent Carde. After
continuing the case scheduling hearing several times to allow counsel to investigate and
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review thousands of pages of discovery, the court set a trial date of July 7, 2014. In
June 2014, TDA attorney Timothy Johnson assumed responsibility for Carde's case. At
the request of TDA, the court appointed Kristin Shotwell as co-counsel. At the request
of defense counsel and over the objection of Carde, the court continued the July 2014
trial date three times. In September 2014, the court granted the defense motion to
dismiss both counts of securities fraud. The State filed an amended information without
the two dismissed charges.2
December 2014 Motion To Discharge Counsel
On December 23, 2014, approximately six weeks before the scheduled trial date,
Carde asked the court to substitute appointed counsel. Carde wanted to replace
Johnson but retain Shotwell as her attorney. Johnson explained to the court that he and
Shotwell had divided trial preparation by charges and Carde disagreed with the defense
strategy. Johnson said Carde wanted to explore and investigate a different theory, but
he and Shotwell "decided ... to take a different course" based on a strategy that they
believed was "sound" and would better serve Carde's "legal interests."
The court explained that granting the request would result in the discharge of
both defense attorneys. The court offered Carde more time to weigh her options.
Carde declined. Carde said she was in "total disagreement" with the defense strategy
and claimed Johnson failed to obtain evidence that would help her case in a
"tremendous number of ways." Carde also said Johnson met with her only 10 times, he
was difficult to reach by telephone, and he had an "abrasive" style. Carde complained
the defense made "[decisions" without consulting her, she lacked "confidence" in
2The amended information also changed one count of theft in the second degree to theft in the
first degree. Just before trial, the State dismissed one count of theft in the second degree on its own
motion based on the death of the victim.
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Johnson's representation, and Johnson was "undermining" and "counterproductive" to
the case. However, Carde reiterated she did not want the court to replace Shotwell.
Johnson and Shotwell confirmed they had performed extensive work on the
case. The attorneys had interviewed the majority of the State's approximately 25
potential witnesses, reviewed and indexed approximately 12,000 pages of discovery,
and nearly completed trial preparation. Johnson said Carde's case had been his "top
priority" for several months. Shotwell confirmed there had been many meetings about
strategy and she and Johnson were in agreement as to trial strategy.
The court denied the motion. The court noted the ongoing concern expressed by
Carde that she had already been in custody for 17 months and appointing new counsel
would result in "extensive delay." The court found both attorneys were experienced and
competent and the attorneys had been diligently preparing for trial. The court also
noted counsel were in agreement as to the strategy with which Carde disagreed.
February 2015 Motion To Discharge Counsel
On the first day of trial, February 3, 2015, Carde renewed her request to
discharge counsel. This time, Carde sought to replace both attorneys. Carde asserted
the defense trial brief contained "innumerable . . . misstatements [and]
misrepresentations." Carde claimed she had no opportunity to review the briefing or
motions before filing. Carde also blamed her attorneys for an inadequate response to
statements included in the State's trial brief that she believed were improper, including
reference to a prior custodial interference charge in Minnesota and her flight from
Washington after charges were filed. Carde renewed her complaint that her attorneys
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failed to obtain relevant evidence. She claimed the attorneys' conduct left her without a
defense and without "appropriate and fair representation."
The court explained the purpose of a trial brief was to provide context for the
motions, the trial brief was not evidence, and it would not be considered by the jury.
The court explained that decision-making authority is between a client and an attorney
in a criminal case. To the extent Carde was concerned her attorneys did not adequately
understand her view of the facts, the court offered to give her additional time to meet
with the attorneys. Johnson informed the court that he and Shotwell had spent
considerable time discussing the evidence with Carde and had done their best to
incorporate her views into the defense strategy. Johnson stated that he and Shotwell
had conducted a thorough independent investigation and were prepared for trial.
The court observed it would be inappropriate to invade attorney client privilege or
work product to evaluate independently the manner and thoroughness of the
investigation. The court denied Carde's motion. The court stated that after reading the
47-page defense trial brief and listening to defense counsel, "what I've read and seen
does not equal a lack of investigation."
[Bjased on this record, I could not conclude that somehow the Defense
investigation is so lacking as to deprive Ms. Carde of a constitutional right,
nor that it is the case that Defense Counsel is not zealously, ethically
representing their client.
Twenty witnesses testified during the 10-day trial. The jury acquitted Carde of
two counts of theft in the first degree. The jury found Carde guilty of three counts of
theft in the first degree, one count of attempted theft in the first degree, and three counts
of mortgage fraud. The court imposed concurrent standard range sentences for a total
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sentence of 28 months confinement. Following a restitution hearing, the court ordered
restitution for three victims.
Denial of Motions To Substitute Appointed Counsel
Carde challenges the decision to deny her motions to substitute appointed
counsel claiming there was a "complete breakdown" in her communication and
relationship with counsel.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that in "all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall. . . have the assistance of counsel for [her]
defense." A defendant" 'does not have an absolute, Sixth Amendment right to choose
any particular advocate.'" State v. Varqa. 151 Wash. 2d 179, 200, 86 P.3d 139 (2004)
(quoting State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 668, 733, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997)). The essential
aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for a criminal
defendant "rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the
lawyer whom [s]he prefers." Wheat v. United States. 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S. Ct.
1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988).
A defendant who seeks to substitute appointed counsel must show good cause
" 'such as a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in
communication between the attorney and the defendant.'" Varga, 151 Wash. 2d at 200
(quoting Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d at 734). A general loss of confidence in defense counsel
by itself is not sufficient cause for substitution. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d at 733-34. The
attorney and the defendant must be "so at odds as to prevent presentation of an
adequate defense." Stenson. 132 Wash. 2d at 734.
A disagreement over defense theories and trial strategy does not
by itself constitute an irreconcilable conflict entitling the defendant to
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substitute counsel because decisions on those matters are properly
entrusted to defense counsel, not the defendant.
State v. Thompson. 169 Wash. App. 436, 459, 290 P.3d 996 (2012).
Whether dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel justifies the appointment of
new counsel is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Varga, 151 Wash. 2d at 200;
Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d at 733. A court abuses its discretion when its decision adopts a
view no reasonable person would take or is based on untenable grounds or untenable
reasons. State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wash. 2d 607, 623, 290 P.3d 942 (2012).
On appeal, we consider (1) the extent of any conflict between the defendant and
counsel, (2) the adequacy of the trial court's inquiry into the grounds for the motion, and
(3) the timeliness of the motion and potential effects on the trial schedule. State v.
Cross. 156 Wash. 2d 580, 607, 132 P.3d 80 (2006). In examining the extent of conflict
between a defendant and her attorney, we consider the extent and nature of the
breakdown in the relationship and its effect on the representation. State v. Schaller,
143 Wash. App. 258, 270, 177 P.3d 1139(2007).
Because the purpose of providing assistance of counsel is to ensure that
defendants receive a fair trial, the appropriate inquiry necessarily must
focus on the adversarial process, not only on the defendant's relationship
with [her] lawyer.
Schaller. 143 Wash. App. at 270.
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carde's December 2014 motion
to appoint new counsel. First, the record does not indicate a breakdown in
communication or irreconcilable conflict affecting the adequacy of Carde's
representation. Carde disagreed with counsel over strategy and evidence she believed
was helpful. Defense counsel has wide latitude to control trial strategy and tactics, in
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re Pers. Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wash. 2d 710, 733, 16 P.3d 1 (2001). Disagreement
about defense strategy does not establish a complete collapse of communication
between counsel and client. See Cross, 156 Wash. 2d at 606-09. Here, the record does
not suggest Carde and her counsel were unable to communicate. To the contrary,
Carde obviously engaged in discussions with her attorneys about strategy and the
evidence. There was no basis for the court to conclude that Carde and her attorneys
were "so at odds as to prevent presentation of an adequate defense." Stenson, 132
Wash. 2d at 734.
Second, Carde does not challenge the adequacy of the inquiry. Nevertheless,
the record reflects the court allowed Carde to explain fully the reasons for her
dissatisfaction with counsel, and the trial court had before it the information necessary
to assess the merits of her request. See Schaller, 143 Wash. App. at 271; Varga, 151
Wash. 2d at 200-01. "[A] trial court conducts adequate inquiry by allowing the defendant
and counsel to express their concerns fully." Schaller, 143 Wash. App. at 271.
Third, the timing of Carde's request and the effect on the trial schedule also
supports the court's decision. Granting the request to appoint new counsel would have
resulted in additional significant delay of an already long-delayed and complicated case.
By December 23, 2014, six weeks before trial, Johnson and Shotwell had nearly
completed preparation for trial, including review of more than 10,000 pages of discovery
and interviews of approximately 20 State witnesses. Further, Carde was equivocal
about further delay. While she expressed dissatisfaction with Johnson, she also
complained about the considerable time she had spent in custody and raised concerns
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about previous continuances and her right to a speedy trial. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the December 2014 motion to appoint new counsel.
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying the request to appoint new
counsel on the first day of trial. The court again conducted an adequate inquiry by
allowing Carde and her attorneys to fully air their concerns. Carde's attorneys told the
court they had discussed strategy and evidence with Carde numerous times, had
attempted to incorporate her views, and were prepared to proceed to trial.
As to the nature and extent of the conflict, the only new issue Carde raised was
her dissatisfaction with the defense trial brief and the response to aspects of the State's
brief. The defense submitted an extensive brief that included numerous motions to
exclude areas of testimony, documents, and e-mail messages. Carde did not
specifically state how the brief was deficient. As to Carde's particular objections to the
State's brief, her attorneys expressly addressed those concerns by moving to exclude
all evidence related to the Minnesota criminal charge, Carde's alleged flight from
Washington, and extradition.
While the record reflects a disagreement about strategic decisions, the record
does not demonstrate a complete breakdown in communication or in the relationship or
an irreconcilable conflict that affected the adequacy of representation. The court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Carde's renewed motion for new appointed counsel on
the first day of trial.
Restitution Order
Carde contends she is entitled to reversal of the restitution order. Carde argues
the trial court violated her right to retain counsel of her choice by denying her motion to
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continue the restitution hearing.
The restitution hearing was scheduled for September 15, 2015. At Carde's
request, the court continued the hearing until September 25. On September 25, Carde
requested another continuance to obtain additional information. The record shows
Carde wanted additional time to obtain evidence that she was not guilty of the crimes,
not to challenge the amount of restitution. The record also shows the arguments Carde
intended to raise were largely the same ones the jury rejected at trial.
For instance, as to one of the victims, who was deceased by the time of trial,
Carde wanted to present evidence showing the loans were personal and the victim did
not intend that Carde repay his family members.
With regard to another victim, Carde intended to argue, as she had at trial, that
the lease-to-purchase agreement did not obligate her to pay any rent until the sale
closed. Since the sale never occurred, Carde wanted to argue she did not commit theft
by failing to pay rent. Carde also maintained the victim had no right to collect rent
because bankruptcy trustees controlled the property.
As to a third victim, Carde wanted to obtain additional evidence to support her
argument that she lived in the home as a guest and was not obligated to pay rent.
Again, the jury rejected the same argument at trial.
Carde said she needed 30 days to gather information to support her claims. The
State opposed the continuance. The State argued the information Carde intended to
present was not relevant to the amount of restitution. The court stated, "I think the
strong presumption is there wouldn't be any additional continuance since there's been
two, and at this point we'll have all the relevant information that's been alluded to." But
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the court granted the motion and continued the hearing to October 22. At Carde's
request and due to unspecified medical issues, the court continued the hearing to
November 10.
Carde appeared at the restitution hearing on November 10 with her appointed
counsel and private attorney Barry Flegenheimer. Carde asked the court to substitute
private counsel for her appointed counsel. The request was contingent on granting a
continuance. Flegenheimer told the court that Carde's family had "recently" secured
funds to hire him and Carde had described a "number of issues" that she wanted him to
investigate for the restitution hearing. Flegenheimer did not indicate how long of a
continuance would be required but acknowledged he would need "some time" to
prepare. Appointed counsel Johnson stated he learned about the motion only that day
and did not oppose it.
Carde informed the court that "some" material she wished to present at the
restitution hearing could be obtained only by means of a subpoena and her attorneys
had failed to assist her in this regard. She claimed there was evidence that could
"exonerate" or at least "attenuate" restitution. But Carde did not identify or describe the
evidence.
The court denied the motion.
As accurately stated earlier, this restitution matter has been continued a
number of times, always at the Defense request. And I granted that so as
to allow full opportunity for investigation and airing of any concerns.
Moreover, and this is a very general statement, but it was my
understanding that many of the arguments against the requested
restitution amounts involved the very defenses that were forwarded
thoroughly at trial.
This court knows these Defense Counsel still of record to be
competent and served in that capacity at trial. In other words, there's no
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adequate showing or good cause before this Court to grant the request to
substitute private counsel. Motion is denied.
Carde interrupted to argue she needed more time to show the State was relying
on "fraudulent" information. The court reminded Carde it had granted a continuance six
weeks earlier precisely to allow her the full opportunity to obtain the evidence necessary
to challenge the amount of restitution. Yet in the six weeks since the last continuance,
Carde had not obtained any new information to present to the court.
The State initially sought restitution for four victims. At the November 10 hearing,
the prosecutor told the court the State was no longer requesting restitution for one of the
victims. Relying on the same arguments asserted at trial, Carde's counsel objected to
restitution for each of the three victims. Defense counsel asked the court to disregard
the jury verdict and find "as a matter of law" that the facts did not support the requested
restitution. The court imposed restitution in the amount requested by the State of
approximately $220,000.
Carde claims the court's decision to deny her motion to substitute private
counsel is contrary to the Washington State Supreme Court decision in State v.
Hampton. 184 Wash. 2d 656, 361 P.3d 734 (2015), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct 1718, 194 L
Ed. 2d 816 (2016).
A defendant who does not require appointed counsel generally has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice. Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d at 662. However, this
right is not absolute. Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d at 663. When a court considers a
continuance for the purpose of allowing a defendant to retain counsel of her choice, it
may balance that right against the demands of its calendar and the public's interest in
the prompt and efficient administration of justice. Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d at 663. " The
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resolution of this balancing exercise falls squarely within the discretion of the trial
court.'" Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d at 663 (quoting State v. Aguirre, 168 Wash. 2d 350, 365,
229 P.3d 669 (2010)). We review a trial court's decision to deny a continuance to
determine whether the denial was " 'so arbitrary as to violate due process.'" Hampton,
184 Wash. 2d at 663 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite. 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S. Ct. 841, 11 L.
Ed. 2d 921 (1964)).
In Hampton, the court identified 11 factors the trial court should consider in
determining whether to grant a continuance to allow substitution of private counsel:
"(1) whether the request came at a point sufficiently in advance of trial
to permit the trial court to readily adjust its calendar;
(2) the length of the continuance requested;
(3) whether the continuance would carry the trial date beyond the
period specified in the state speedy trial act;
(4) whether the court had granted previous continuances at the
defendant's request;
(5) whether the continuance would seriously inconvenience the
witnesses;
(6) whether the continuance request was made promptly after the
defendant first became aware of the grounds advanced for
discharging his or her counsel;
(7) whether the defendant's own negligence placed him or her in a
situation where he or she needed a continuance to obtain new
counsel;
(8) whether the defendant had some legitimate cause for
dissatisfaction with counsel, even though it fell short of likely
incompetent representation;
(9) whether there was a 'rational basis' for believing that the defendant
was seeking to change counsel 'primarily for the purpose of delay';
(10) whether the current counsel was prepared to go to trial;
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(11) whether denial of the motion was likely to result in identifiable
prejudice to the defendant's case of a material or substantial
nature."
Hampton. 184 Wash. 2d at 669-70 (quoting 3 Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal
Procedure § 11.4(c), at 718-20 (3d ed. 2007)).
The court acknowledged that "these situations are highly fact dependent" and the
court is not required to apply any mechanical test. Hampton, 361 P.3d at 669. Further,
"[n]ot all factors will be present in all cases, and thus a trial court need not evaluate
every factor in every case." Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d at 670.
Although the Supreme Court issued its decision in Hampton nine days after the
trial court ruled on Carde's request for a continuance, the record shows the trial court
considered many of the 11 factors set forth in Hampton, and virtually all of the factors
support the trial court's decision to deny Carde's last-minute request for another
continuance.
At Carde's request, the court had granted three previous continuances. Carde's
request for a fourth continuance on the date of the restitution hearing was untimely. On
the day of the restitution hearing, Carde's appointed counsel Johnson was prepared to
proceed. Although neither Carde nor retained counsel Flegenheimer stated the exact
length of the continuance needed, the restitution hearing had already been continued
beyond the 180-day statutory deadline and granting Carde's request would have
resulted in substantial further delay.
Carde expressed no legitimate cause for dissatisfaction with appointed counsel.
Carde cited counsel's unwillingness to obtain subpoenas as the reason to retain new
counsel. But as the trial court observed, Carde was seeking to present evidence
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relevant to arguments the jury rejected at trial and not relevant to the amount of
restitution. Accordingly, denial of Carde's motion resulted in no identifiable prejudice of
a material or substantial nature.
Carde also offers no explanation as to why she did not obtain documentation or
information despite the previous six-week continuance. And according to Carde, only
some documents she wanted to obtain required a subpoena.
Consistent with the factors identified in Hampton, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Carde's motion for a continuance of the restitution hearing to allow
newly retained counsel to represent her. The denial of Carde's request was not
arbitrary and did not violate her right to due process.
Carde also contends that under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 21 of the Washington State Constitution, she is
entitled to a jury determination of the amount of restitution. We disagree. In State v.
Kinneman, 155 Wash. 2d 272, 282, 119 P.3d 350 (2005), the Washington Supreme Court
held, "There is no right to a jury trial to determine facts on which restitution is based
under RCW 9.94A.753."
Carde also characterizes restitution as "damages" and claims she is entitled to a
jury determination under Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d. 636, 771 P.2d711,780
P.2d 260 (1989). But Sofie is inapposite.3
Statement of Additional Grounds
Carde filed a statement of additional grounds challenging the trial court decisions
denying her requests for new appointed counsel. Because appellate counsel's briefing
3 No authority supports Carde's argument that the analysis in Sofie applies in a criminal setting to
the determination of restitution.
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adequately addresses this argument, we need not address it. See State v. Gomez. 152
Wash. App. 751, 754, 217 P.3d 391 (2009). To the extent she also alleges fraud and
unethical conduct on the part of the prosecutor or ineffective assistance of counsel, her
claims appear to involve matters outside the trial record. Accordingly, we cannot
consider them on direct appeal. See State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 335, 899
P.2d 1251 (1995).
We affirm the judgment and sentence and the order of restitution.4
SfJU/i U-rf&, 192 Wash. App. 380, 393, 367 P.3d 612 (2016), we exercise our discretion to not award
costs.
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