State Of Washington v. Timothy Bradford ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 80624-6-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
TIMOTHY WILLIAM BRADFORD,
Appellant.
APPELWICK, J. — Bradford appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. He argues the plea was not knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Bradford with one count of indecent liberties by forcible
compulsion. The parties struck a plea deal whereby Bradford would plead guilty
to the lesser charge of second degree assault with sexual motivation.
The initial plea hearing occurred on April 12, 2019. Prior to the hearing,
Bradford signed a statement of the defendant on plea of guilty. 1 At the initial plea
hearing, Bradford disclosed to the court that he was hard of hearing. The court
ensured that Bradford could hear, then said, “If at any point during the hearing
today you cannot hear anybody at any given time, you raise your hand or stop us
1That statement correctly indicated that the maximum term for the new
charge was life in prison and a $50,000 fine. The State’s sentencing
recommendation did not include a maximum term or otherwise indicate that a life
sentence was the maximum term.
No. 80624-6-I/2
right away.” The court periodically asked Bradford if he was able to hear during
the hearing.
The court proceeded to review the statement of the defendant on plea of
guilty with Bradford. Before proceeding, the court said, “If at any point you can’t
hear or understand what I’ve said, you stop me right away.” Bradford responded,
“Okay.” The two had the following exchange:
THE COURT: All right. So the first thing, did you and [defense
counsel] go through this document completely together?
[Bradford]: Yes.
THE COURT: And if you had any questions, did she answer
them for you? If you had a question, I don’t understand this part, did
she clarify that for you?
[Bradford]: Yes.
After confirming Bradford’s biographical information, the court proceeded:
THE COURT: At the bottom of that same page, paragraph 6
indicates that the charge carries a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment and 50,000-dollar fine with a standard range based on
your criminal history of from 15 to 20 months in custody. The sexual
motivation adds 24 months consecutive to your standard range. Do
you understand that?
[Bradford]: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
[Bradford]: So it’d be 44 months.
THE COURT: Well, I’m not sure what the recommendation is,
but we’ll get to that. But your standard range is 15 to 20. And in
addition to whatever you get, you will add 24 months for sexual
motivation.
[Bradford]: Oh.
THE COURT: You understand?
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No. 80624-6-I/3
[Bradford]: Yes.
....
THE COURT: And do you understand that this particular
charge falls within what’s called the indeterminate sentencing, which
means that you have a standard range, but at the conclusion of that,
your case will be reviewed to see if it’s safe enough for you to be
released; do you understand that?
[Bradford]: Yes.
THE COURT: And do you understand that that could include
potentially holding you in custody for the rest of your life?
[Bradford]: Yeah.
THE COURT: All right. Any questions about that?
[Bradford]: Well, I’m thinking I should go --
THE COURT: Do you need just a -- Mr. Bradford, do you need
just a minute to talk to [defense counsel]?
[Bradford]: Well, I’m just --
THE COURT: Well why don’t you step back just a little bit from
the bar, and I’ll give you a chance to visit with her for just a moment.
After consulting with counsel, Bradford declined to enter a plea. A follow up
hearing was scheduled for the following Tuesday.
The next plea hearing was held on April 19, 2019. The court began by
ensuring Bradford could hear the proceedings. Bradford responded that he had
his hearing aids in and was able to hear the proceedings. The court again advised
Bradford that if he could not hear anything that was said, he could stop the hearing.
The court had the following exchange with Bradford:
THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Bradford, you and I were -- and
everybody were here last week or so, and you had some additional
questions for your counsel. Did you get all of your questions
answered?
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No. 80624-6-I/4
[Bradford]: Every one of them.
THE COURT: Okay. So I have been handed this form called
the statement of Defendant on plea of guilty. You have a copy in
front of you. I’m going to ask you a number of questions about the
document, and I’d like you and your lawyer to follow along on your
copy. Do you understand, sir? Do you understand what we’re going
to do today?
[Bradford]: Yes. I understand, sir.
THE COURT: All right. So the first thing, did you and your
counsel go through the statement form completely together? Did you
read through that with your lawyer?
[Bradford]: I understand. Right.
THE COURT: Mr. Bradford, listen to my questions. And if you
can’t hear them, you let me know. My first question is did you and
your lawyer read through your statement form together?
[Bradford]: Yes, we did.
The court proceeded to verify Bradford’s biographical information and ensure he
was aware the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. The exchange continued:
THE COURT: At the bottom of the same page, paragraph 6
indicates that the charge carries a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment and a 50,000-dollar fine with a standard range, based
on your criminal history, from 15 to 20 months in custody. The
enhancement carries an additional 24 months consecutive to your
standard sentence. Do you understand the penalties?
[Bradford]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And do you understand that even if you
complete the entire sentence, that you would then be subject to a
hearing to determine if it was safe for you to be released into the
general public?
[Bradford]: I’ll never have the kind of money you’re talking
about.
THE COURT: Well do you understand that even if you serve
your standard sentencing range and complete it, that at that point
there would be an additional hearing to see if you were safe to be
released into the general public?
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No. 80624-6-I/5
[Bradford]: Oh yeah. Yeah.
THE COURT: And do you --
[Bradford]: Well I’ll just go ahead and do it my life. Yeah. Just
give me life.
THE COURT: Well, do you understand that that is a possibility
if they find that you are not safe to be released?
[Bradford]: Oh okay.
THE COURT: Do you understand that?
[Bradford]: Yeah, I understand it all.
Bradford went on to plead guilty to second degree assault with sexual
motivation at the hearing. Prior to accepting the plea, the court again asked
Bradford if he had any trouble hearing at the proceeding. Bradford replied, “Not at
all.”
At sentencing, Bradford sought to withdraw his plea. In light of this, his
attorney withdrew from representation. Bradford informed the court that his
hearing impairment made him unable to understand his attorney, that he did not
understand his rights. He indicated he wanted a new attorney and to go back to
his original charge.
Bradford was provided another attorney and advised that attorney that he
wished to plead guilty to assault in the second degree with sexual motivation.
Another sentencing hearing was held. At that hearing, Bradford again indicated
that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. He said that he could not understand
his previous attorney and that she had told him prior to his plea hearing to just say
yes to everything that was said. He indicated that he was confused and wished to
exercise his right to face his accuser. The court set another hearing to investigate
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No. 80624-6-I/6
the withdrawal of his plea. His substitute counsel subsequently withdrew from
representation. Bradford then filed a formal motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The court held a hearing to consider Bradford’s motion. Bradford testified
in support of his own motion. He testified that he was born with a hearing
impairment that made it difficult for him to comprehend vowel sounds. He said that
this might make him comprehend only 60 percent of the words said to him. He
claimed to have developed a tendency to agree with things he did not understand.
Bradford further testified that prior to his first plea hearing, his previous
attorney told him she could not represent him at a jury trial. He said that she
insisted on a plea deal even though he told her he did not want one and instead
wanted to go to trial. He testified that she did not go over written documentation
with him and told him to just say yes to everything the court asked him. He said
that he again told her that he did not want to plead guilty. He said she conveyed
these messages again prior to his second plea hearing. He later indicated that he
was unaware he was at a plea hearing due to issues with his thyroid medication.
He did not express that he was confused about his sentence specifically or express
that he thought his release was contingent on his ability to pay fines.
Bradford’s original plea counsel testified next. She testified that she
conducted discovery, went over the evidence with Bradford, and asked for his
input. She said they discussed the possibility of trial and plea negotiations. She
testified that she discussed the plea agreement with Bradford, including the
sentence. She perceived that Bradford was comfortable asking questions and that
they had adequate communication and an uncontentious relationship. She
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No. 80624-6-I/7
testified that Bradford told her that he wanted to accept the plea deal. She further
testified that she told him that he had the option to go to trial and that she would
represent him at trial if he chose to do that.
Bradford’s original plea counsel further testified that she went over
paperwork related to the plea deal with Bradford. She said she perceived him to
be comfortable asking questions and that she was able to answer his questions.
She denied telling him to just say yes to the questions asked at the hearing.
The trial court denied Bradford’s motion to withdraw his plea. It specifically
found that Bradford’s original plea counsel’s testimony was credible, and that
Bradford’s testimony was not. The trial court sentenced Bradford to 44 months
with an indeterminate life sentence.
Bradford appeals.
DISCUSSION
Bradford argues that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
He argues that he was confused about whether his release from prison was
contingent on his ability to pay a $50,000 fine. He argues the trial court failed to
ensure he understood the consequences of his plea and erred in denying his
motion to withdraw the plea. He further argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney did not ensure his plea was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.
I. The Court
A guilty plea constitutes a waiver by the defendant of several important
constitutional rights. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L.
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No. 80624-6-I/8
Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Prior to accepting a defendant’s guilty plea, a court must
affirmatively ensure the defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived
those rights. Id. at 242-43. The court must ensure that the defendant understands
the permissible range of sentences. Id. at 244 n.7.
That a defendant signs a plea contract is strong evidence that a plea is
voluntary. State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635, 642, 919 P.2d 1228 (1996). When
the trial court inquiries into the voluntariness of the plea on the record, we presume
a plea is voluntary. State v. Pugh, 153 Wn. App. 569, 577, 222 P.3d 821 (2009).
CrR 4.2(f) requires a trial court to allow a defendant to withdraw their guilty
plea if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. A manifest injustice is shown
by (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the defendant not ratifying the plea, (3)
the plea being involuntary, or (4) the prosecutor not honoring the plea agreement.
Pugh, 153 Wn. App. at 577. The manifest injustice standard is demanding. Id.
The defendant has the burden of showing a manifest injustice that is “obvious,
directly observable, overt, [and] not obscure” has occurred. State v. Turley, 149
Wn.2d 395, 398, 69 P.3d 338 (2003).
The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. State
v. A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d 91, 107, 225 P.3d 956 (2010). We review the trial court’s
order on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. State v. Lamb,
175 Wn.2d 121, 127, 285 P.3d 27 (2012). A trial court abuses its discretion if its
decision is manifestly unreasonable or base on untenable grounds or reasons. Id.Here, Bradford argues that his plea was not voluntary because he did not
understand his sentence. Specifically, he says he believed that he would not be
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No. 80624-6-I/9
released from prison if he was unable to pay a $50,000 fine. He points to the
following exchange:
THE COURT: At the bottom of the same page, paragraph 6
indicates that the charge carries a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment and a 50,000-dollar fine with a standard range, based
on your criminal history, from 15 to 20 months in custody. The
enhancement carries an additional 24 months consecutive to your
standard sentence. Do you understand the penalties?
[Bradford]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And do you understand that even if you
complete the entire sentence, that you would then be subject to a
hearing to determine if it was safe for you to be released into the
general public?
[Bradford]: I’ll never have the kind of money you’re talking
about.
THE COURT: Well do you understand that even if you serve
your standard sentencing range and complete it, that at that point
there would be an additional hearing to see if you were safe to be
released into the general public?
[Bradford]: Oh yeah. Yeah.
THE COURT: And do you --
[Bradford]: Well I’ll just go ahead and do it my life. Yeah. Just
give me life.
THE COURT: Well, do you understand that that is a possibility
if they find that you are not safe to be released?
[Bradford]: Oh okay.
THE COURT: Do you understand that?
[Bradford]: Yeah, I understand it all.
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No. 80624-6-I/10
Bradford argues this exchange shows that he was confused about how his ability
pay the fine would affect his ability to secure release at the end of his minimum
term. We disagree.
At best, the exchange shows Bradford expressing his inability to pay the
maximum fine. Bradford never expressed that he believes this will affect his
release. When the trial court reaffirms that his release is contingent on a hearing
to determine whether he is safe to be released, Bradford acknowledges he
understands that and does not express a concern about an inability to pay keeping
him incarcerated even if he was deemed safe for release. During his testimony on
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Bradford never says that he was confused
about how his ability to pay the fine would affect his sentence.
At the plea hearing, the trial court affirmatively inquired as to Bradford’s
understanding of his plea and its voluntariness. It specifically inquired as to
Bradford’s understanding that he was giving up rights by pleading guilty. It ensured
that Bradford had an opportunity to review forms with his attorney before signing,
and that he was not threatened or coerced. It ensured that Bradford could properly
hear the proceedings and encouraged him to halt the proceedings if he could not.
It again confirmed Bradford’s ability to hear before accepting his plea.
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, the trial court specifically
inquired with the State as to Bradford’s understanding of his sentence. It
specifically considered whether Bradford’s statements, combined with the
inconsistency concerning the maximum sentence as noted in the statement of
defendant on plea of guilty and the sentencing recommendation, could mean that
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No. 80624-6-I/11
he did not understand his sentence. But, it found any potential confusion was
overcome by the fact that counsel went over the statement of the defendant on
plea of guilty with him before he signed it.2 It therefore found that the plea was
voluntary and declined the motion. This decision was not manifestly unreasonable
and was not an abuse of discretion.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Bradford argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
plea counsel did not ensure that he understood his sentence. Specifically, he
argues counsel should have intervened at the plea hearing when he expressed
confusion about his sentence.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a
defendant receives effective assistance of counsel at critical stages in the
proceeding, including when he enters a guilty plea. Lee v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 137
S. Ct. 1958, 1964, 198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017). To establish ineffective assistance
of counsel, Bradford must show that his counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by the
performance. Id. Prejudice can be demonstrated by showing a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Id. Where the defendant alleges that counsel’s deficient
performance led him to accept a guilty plea, a defendant can show prejudice by
2 That finding is supported by substantial evidence. See A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d
at 107. Bradford testified this did not occur. His counsel testified that it did. The
trial court found counsel’s testimony was credible and Bradford’s was not. The
trial court had previously confirmed that the two had gone over the forms before
accepting Bradford’s plea.
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No. 80624-6-I/12
showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty. Id. We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo.
State v. Wafford, 199 Wn. App. 32, 41, 397 P.3d 926 (2017).
Bradford argues that counsel was deficient for not intervening at the
prehearing despite his confusion over his sentence. Bradford’s counsel went over
the plea agreement with him prior to the plea hearing. As noted above, the
exchange between Bradford and the court regarding his sentence did not evidence
confusion regarding the sentence. Any confusion that may have been present was
cleared up by the trial court asking twice if Bradford understood the sentence.
Bradford twice confirmed his understanding. It was therefore objectively
reasonable not to intervene because there was no confusion sufficient to justify an
intervention. Counsel’s performance was not deficient.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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