2020-11

State Of Washington v. Tsai Fen Lee ( 2020 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 78512-5-I
Respondent,
v. DIVISION ONE
TSAI FEN LEE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
LEACH, J. —Tsai Fen Lee appeals her conviction for unlawful imprisonment. She
claims her guilty plea was involuntary because the record does not contain sufficient
factual support for this plea. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the record establishes these
facts. Cassandra Mitchell is a yoga instructor who works in Seattle. Lee attended yoga
classes at Mitchell’s studio “over the past few years.” Lee began harassing Mitchell
using social media. Mitchell attempted to “block” Lee’s accounts, but Lee would quickly
create duplicate profiles and resume the harassment. Mitchell relied on social media to
promote her business. Mitchell decided she could not simply ignore or avoid Lee’s
cyber harassment.
Lee posted personal and inflammatory messages. She accused Mitchell’s
boyfriend of being a “murderer” and mocked the stillbirth of Mitchell’s daughter. Lee
also sent messages professing love for Mitchell even though they never had any kind of
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No 78512-5-I/2
intimate relationship. Lee later began posting defamatory accusations on the social
media pages of yoga studios where Mitchell taught. Mitchell obtained a protection order
against Lee but the harassment continued. Mitchell reported at least 10 protection
order violations by Lee to the police.
On January 22, 2016, Lee came to Mitchell’s yoga studio and attempted to
participate in a class. Lee had been repeatedly told by Mitchell and other employees
that she was not allowed on the studio premises. After Mitchell called 911 to report this
violation, Lee’s harassment escalated. She began sending Mitchell death threats telling
her “I will have to kill you before I go to jail.” Mitchell lived in constant fear that Lee
would carry out her threats of physical harm. Mitchell had to stop teaching yoga classes
due to Lee’s behavior.
Based on this conduct, the State charged Lee with one count of felony stalking.
Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Lee pleaded guilty to the amended charge of
unlawful imprisonment. Lee provided the following factual statement to express “in [her]
own words” why she was guilty of the amended charge.
I, Tsai Fen Lee, did, without intent to threaten, harm,
frighten, or injure Cassandra Mitchell, knowingly prevented
Cassandra Mitchell from leaving her yoga studio on or around
March 27, 2016, in King County, Washington.
The trial court accepted Lee's guilty plea and sentenced her. Lee did not ask the trial
court to allow her to withdraw her guilty plea. Lee timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Lee claims her guilty plea was not voluntary because the record before the judge
who accepted her plea did not contain sufficient evidence to show a factual basis for the
plea. Specifically, Lee contends the record contains no evidence that she substantially
2
No 78512-5-I/3
restricted Mitchell’s movement, no evidence that she acted knowingly in restricting
Mitchell’s movement, and no evidence that Lee’s intimidation caused any restriction in
Mitchell’s movement. We disagree.
Before a court accepts a plea of guilt, it must be satisfied that the plea is
supported by a sufficient factual basis. This rule protects the defendant by ensuring the
admitted facts actually satisfy the elements of the crime and that the defendant
understands what she is pleading guilty to. 1 Our Supreme Court has defined a
sufficient factual basis as the minimum evidence necessary for a jury to find guilt; the
reviewing court itself need not be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 2
Sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict when, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the
crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.3 A factual basis can be established by “any
reliable source,” so long as the material relied upon is made part of the record at the
time of the plea.4 This means the court can rely on both the defendant’s admissions
and information supplied by the prosecution.5
A person commits the crime of unlawful imprisonment if they “knowingly restrain[]
another person.”6 To “restrain” someone means to “restrict a person’s movements
without consent and without legal authority in a manner which interferes substantially
1
CrR 4.2(d); State v. Arnold,

81 Wash. App. 379

, 383,

914 P.2d 762

(1996).
2
State v. Newton,

87 Wash. 2d 363

, 370,

552 P.2d 682

(1976); State v. Saas,

118 Wash. 2d 37

, 43,

820 P.2d 505

(1991).
3
State v. Luther,

157 Wash. 2d 63

, 77-78,

134 P.3d 205

(2006).
4
State v. Osborne,

102 Wash. 2d 87

, 95,

684 P.2d 683

(1984).
5
State v. Powell,

29 Wash. App. 163

, 167,

627 P.2d 1337

(1981).
6
RCW 9A.40.040(1).
3
No 78512-5-I/4
with his or her liberty.”7 Restraint occurs “without consent” if a person accomplishes it
by either force, intimidation, or deception.8
Lee first claims the record includes no evidence she substantially restrained
Mitchell. The State answers that Lee’s own statement that she “knowingly prevented
Cassandra Mitchell from leaving her yoga studio” provides sufficient evidence. Lee
responds that this statement is insufficient because it does not show Mitchell could not
have taken a different route or door to leave her studio. Evidence of a reasonable
means of escape may be a defense to a charge of false imprisonment. But, this is a
defense and not an element of unlawful imprisonment. 9 So, the State does not have to
present evidence about the absence of a reasonable means of escape to provide
sufficient evidence of restraint.10 Lee’s statement provides sufficient evidence of
restraint.
Lee next claims that no evidence shows she acted knowingly. We disagree. In
her statement quoted above, she says she acted knowingly.
Finally, Lee claims that evidence shows her intimidation of Mitchell caused the
restraint. Lee correctly notes the State must show Lee accomplished Mitchell’s restraint
by either force, intimidation, or deception. The State makes no claim that Lee used
force or deception. It contends that Lee’s months of cyberstalking provide sufficient
evidence of intimidation. Lee responds that her threats occurred after the unlawful
7
RCW 9A.40.010(6).
8
RCW 9A.40.010(6).
9
State v. Dillon,

12 Wash. App. 2d

133, 145,

456 P.3d 1199

, 1205-06 review
denied,

195 Wash. 2d 1022

464 P.3d 198

(2020).
10
State v. Dillon,

12 Wash. App. 2d

at 145.
4
No 78512-5-I/5
imprisonment occurred and could not have caused an earlier event. But, as the State
correctly notes, it need not rely on evidence of threats to prove intimidation, rather “a
feeling of inferiority or timidness could constitute intimidation.”11
Lee’s cyberstalking and other behavior before the charged event caused Mitchell
enough apprehension to motivate her to obtain a protection order. Even if Lee did not
intend to intimidate Mitchell, a reasonable person would know that Lee’s presence
outside the yoga studio would intimidate Mitchell because she had obtained a protection
order and she repeatedly asked Lee not to contact her. From this evidence, a rational
jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee restrained Mitchell by intimidation.
Lee also suggests her plea was not voluntary because she did not understand
the elements of unlawful imprisonment. The record does not support this claim. Her
statement on plea of guilty states the elements of unlawful imprisonment are set forth in
the amended information, which she has discussed with her lawyer. During a colloquy
with the court about Lee’s plea, she agreed an interpreter had read every word of the
information to her. She also agreed she had an opportunity to have the interpreter and
her lawyer answer any questions she had. Lee suggests the court was required to
include in its colloquy a discussion of the elements of unlawful imprisonment to ensure
she understood each element. Lee has not cited to any authority for this proposition.
Washington State courts have held that a constitutionally adequate plea colloquy does
not require the defendant admit each individual element of a crime. 12 “Apprising the
11
State v. Avila,

102 Wash. App. 882

, 889,

10 P.3d 486

(2000).
12
Matter of Ness,

70 Wash. App. 817

, 821,

855 P.2d 1191

(1993).
5
No 78512-5-I/6
defendant of the nature of the offense need not ‘always require a description of every
element of the offense.’’’13
CONCLUSION
We affirm. The record shows Lee’s plea was voluntary.
WE CONCUR:
13
State v. Keene,

95 Wash. 2d 203