State Of Washington v. J.l.r. ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80728-5-I
)
Respondent, ) DIVISION ONE
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
J.L.R., )
)
Appellant. )
)
ANDRUS, A.C.J. — J.R. was convicted of malicious mischief in the third
degree, reckless driving, and operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s
license after she lost control of her car while doing “doughnuts” and spun out onto
a soccer field. She appeals the malicious mischief conviction, arguing there was
insufficient evidence to prove she acted maliciously. We conclude the evidence
was sufficient and affirm the conviction.
FACTS
On January 10, 2019, Burlington Police Officer Brandon Kuschnereit
responded to calls of a vehicle in a field at Skagit River Park in Burlington,
Washington. When he arrived, he saw a Toyota 4-Runner stuck in the grass on
the soccer field, approximately 30 feet away from the adjacent gravel road.
No. 80728-5-I/2
Officer Kuschnereit found four occupants in the vehicle: J.R., the driver, and
three passengers. J.R. was only fifteen at the time and had no valid driver’s
license.
Officer Kuschnereit saw a number of circular tire tracks and concluded the
vehicle had been spinning, lost traction, and then “entered the grassy area of the
soccer field where it continued to accelerate and turn,” causing deep gouges in the
grass. He testified that the gouges covered approximately 100 feet and were as
deep as five or six inches. When Officer Kuschnereit asked J.R. about the tire
tracks, J.R. told the officer that she had intentionally made the tracks in the gravel
by accelerating and turning but insisted she had lost control of the vehicle and had
accidentally driven off the gravel roadway. Employees from the city of Burlington
originally estimated that the cost to repair the damage to the soccer field would be
approximately $1500, but managed to complete repairs in-house for only $140.
The State charged J.R. with malicious mischief in the second degree,
reckless driving, and driving without a valid operator’s license. The trial court found
that J.R. had intentionally spun her tires on the gravel road while doing “doughnuts”
or “brodies” and, as a result, lost control of her vehicle and unintentionally went
into the grass soccer field. The court further found that it was reasonably
foreseeable that driving in such manner could have serious consequences,
including losing control and driving into the field. But the court found that the State
had proved only damage of between $100 and $175, and thus found J.R. guilty of
the lesser included offense of malicious mischief in the third degree. The court
also found her guilty of reckless driving, and driving without a valid operator’s
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No. 80728-5-I/3
license. The court sentenced J.R. to 16 hours of community service and six
months of supervision.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, J.R. argues there was insufficient evidence to support her
malicious mischief conviction because the State failed to prove she acted with
malice in causing damage to the soccer field. 1
To satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee, the State
must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV; State v. Chacon, 192 Wn.2d 545, 549, 431 P.3d 477 (2018). Because
the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of constitutional law, we review this
issue de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016).
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable
inferences a trier of fact can draw from that evidence. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.
We defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of
witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Killingsworth, 166
Wn. App. 283, 287, 269 P.3d 1064 (2012).
1
J.R. also argued in her opening brief that the juvenile court erred in failing to file findings of fact
and conclusions of law as required under JuCR 7.11(d). The trial court, however, entered written
findings before the State submitted its responsive brief. Because the trial court has now entered
the required findings, we deem the issue moot. See State v. Cruz, 189 Wn.2d 588, 597, 404 P.3d
70 (2017) (a case is moot if a court cannot provide effective relief or the relief sought).
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A person is guilty of malicious mischief if he or she knowingly and
maliciously causes physical damage to the property of another. RCW
9A.48.090(1)(a). A person “acts knowingly” when he or she is “aware of a fact” or
has “information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to
believe that facts exist” that are “described by a statute defining an offense.” RCW
9A.08.010(1)(b). A trier of fact is permitted to find knowledge if there is sufficient
information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that a fact exists. State
v. R.H.S., 94 Wn. App. 844, 847, 974 P.2d 1253 (1999). To be malicious, an act
must evince “an evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person.”
RCW 9A.04.110(12). Malice may be inferred from acts done in willful disregard of
the rights of another or an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse. Id.This permissive inference is valid when “there is a ‘rational connection’ between
the proven fact and the inferred fact, and the inferred fact flows ‘more likely that
not’ from the proven fact.” State v. Ratliff, 46 Wn. App. 325, 330-31, 730 P.2d 716(1986) (quoting County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165, 99 S.
Ct. 2213, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979)).
J.R. contends there is no evidence she acted maliciously in causing
damage to the soccer field and that, at most, her actions were negligent. But the
evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, shows that J.R.’s actions
went beyond a failure to exercise ordinary care. Negligent driving includes
behaviors like failing to use a turn signal or indicator light or speeding. See Smith
v. Fourre, 71 Wn. App. 304, 309-10, 858 P.2d 276 (1993) (jury allowed to find
negligence where a truck driver failed to use a turn signal); Amrine v. Murray, 28
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Wn. App. 650, 658, 626 P. 2d 24 (1981) (driving at a speed greater than that
permitted by statute is negligence per se).
By contrast, J.R. intentionally accelerated and spun her car around in
doughnuts. These actions damaged the gravel road. Her decision to drive in this
reckless manner led her to lose control of the car and drive onto the soccer field,
where she continued to spin her tires, leaving ruts of five or six inches in depth.
Her loss of control and the damage she caused to the soccer field were reasonably
foreseeable consequences of her reckless driving.
Moreover, Officer Kuschnereit testified that J.R. was nonchalant, laughing,
and playing on her phone while he was talking to her, from which a trier of fact
could conclude J.R. had little regard for the fact that she had driven so recklessly
and caused so much damage to the gravel road and the adjacent soccer field.
There is a rational connection between the evidence demonstrating that J.R. drove
with the willful disregard for the rights of others and the inference that she acted
with malice.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that J.R. knowingly and with “willful disregard
of the rights of another” caused damage to the gravel road and the soccer field.
Accordingly, we affirm her conviction for malicious mischief in the third degree.
WE CONCUR:
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