State Of Washington v. Logan Joseph Newland ( 2017 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
March 28, 2017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 48416-1-II
Respondent,
v.
LOGAN JOSEPH NEWLAND, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
LEE, J. — Logan Joseph Newland was convicted of three counts of third degree rape of a
child.1 On appeal, Newland argues that (1) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
to object to the testimony presented on the “grooming” process; (2) the trial court violated his due
process rights when it sustained objections during the defense’s closing argument that potentially
limited the defense’s argument; (3) the trial court violated his rights against double jeopardy by
failing to instruct the jury that each of the charges needed to be based on a separate and distinct
act; and (4) this court should decline to award appellate costs to the State if the State substantially
prevails. We affirm.
1
RCW 9A.44.079 states:
(1) A person is guilty of rape of a child in the third degree when the person has
sexual intercourse with another who is at least fourteen years old but less than
sixteen years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least
forty-eight months older than the victim.
(2) Rape of a child in the third degree is a class C felony.
No. 48416-1-II
FACTS
A. UNDERLYING FACTS
In the late spring or summer of 2013, Newland met M.M.E.2 at church. After that, M.M.E.
“friended him on Facebook.” 1 Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings (VTP) at 73. The same day
that they became “friends” on Facebook, they began communicating through Facebook’s private
messaging feature and agreed to meet late that night. M.M.E. did not remember whose idea it was
to meet that night, but she said, “I kind of guessed” that “we were going to have sex [b]ecause we
were talking dirty to each other.” 1 VTP at 74.
M.M.E. lived with her grandmother and told Newland to meet her at the “High Valley 8
sign” in Packwood, Washington that night “[a]fter [her] grandma went to bed, so 11, 12.” 1 VTP
at 76. M.M.E. snuck out and walked to the High Valley 8 sign.
Newland met M.M.E. at the High Valley 8 sign. The two walked down by the river, where
Newland laid out a blanket, and the two shared vodka and soda that Newland brought. After
finishing the vodka, Newland and M.M.E. had sex. In the early morning hours, Newland and
M.M.E. walked back towards M.M.E.’s house, parting ways at the corner because M.M.E. did not
want her grandmother to see Newland.
Newland and M.M.E. continued to communicate through Facebook’s messaging feature
that day and agreed to meet up again that night. They agreed to meet at the same time at the High
Valley 8 sign. When they met up later that night, or in the early morning hours of the next day,
they walked to the same place by the river and had sex a second time.
2
M.M.E. was born on December 23, 1998. She was 14 years old between July 2013 and December
2013, when she turned 15 years old. Per General Order 2011-1 of Division II,
http:www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts, we refer to the minor victim by using initials.
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No. 48416-1-II
M.M.E. estimated that in the first couple of days after becoming “friends” on Facebook,
she and Newland exchanged “maybe a thousand” messages. 1 VTP at 100. Of the approximately
1,000 messages, M.M.E. ultimately erased all but about 400.
M.M.E. decided she did not want to see Newland again. But a month or more later, she
sent him a message saying she wanted to see him. They agreed to meet at the house where
Newland was house-sitting. M.M.E. rode her bike to the house. She remembered it being cold
outside. At the house, Newland made her a cup of coffee and began kissing her. Newland led
M.M.E. to a trailer in a shed near the house “because he didn’t want his brother to hear.” 1 VTP
at 104. Newland and M.M.E. had sex in the trailer.
In early 2014, the principal at M.M.E.’s school contacted M.M.E.’s grandmother when
someone reported Newland’s relationship with M.M.E. After being confronted by her
grandmother, M.M.E. talked with her counselor, Shiloh Reynolds, about her relationship with
Newland.
The principal and Reynolds each submitted a referral to law enforcement. M.M.E. gave a
taped statement to Deputy Kevin Anderson with the Lewis County Sheriff’s Office. Newland was
arrested and charged on amended information with three counts of third degree rape of a child.
Before trial, defense counsel told the trial court that the defense “would have objections to
parts” of Reynolds’s proposed testimony where Reynolds “is basically advising [M.M.E. on] what
grooming is.” 1 VTP at 17. The trial court responded that, until it heard the question that would
be asked, or the response given, it was “not in a position to say categorically that it’s not coming
in.” 1 VTP at 17.
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No. 48416-1-II
B. TRIAL TESTIMONY
At trial, the State called Reynolds. Reynolds testified that M.M.E. disclosed to her that
M.M.E. had sex three times with a man in his 30s, named Logan, who M.M.E. had met at church.
M.M.E. told Reynolds that “he was incredibly nice to her [M.M.E.]. He said nice things to her.
She [M.M.E.] said that he told her that he loved her.” 1 VTP at 45. The State asked Reynolds
what the term “‘grooming’” meant and its effect on a child. 1 VTP at 46. The testimony proceeded
as follows:
[Reynolds]: Grooming is a process which somebody who is a sexual predator will
engage in with trying to get victims. They will treat them really nice or befriend
them or give them gifts or tell them they are going to be there for them for the intent
and purposes of winning their trust and to build a relationship with them so that—
for the purposes of having a sexual encounter.
[State]: What is the affect [sic] of that on a child who experiences that?
[Reynolds]: Well, a child can become incredibly attached to an individual. And
that’s why the process of grooming is used, because that child becomes very
attached and doesn’t want to betray the individual, doesn’t want to lose the love
portions or the gifts portions, depending on which route the person, the groomer,
takes in building that relationship. It’s horrible. It sets that child up for a long time
of mistrust and—because it backfires. But also it causes a lot of confusion for the
child, because they have grown to trust and love somebody, then they need to
protect them. And they have all kinds of mixed feelings and emotions that they
can’t deal with.
[State]: Is that phenomena apparent even with 14-year-olds?
[Reynolds]: Certainly. It can go off into—the symptoms of that can go into
adulthood, affecting later relationships.
[State]: Did you have any discussions with [M.M.E.] regarding grooming?
[Reynolds]: I did.
[State]: What did she say when you explained what that was to her?
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No. 48416-1-II
[Reynolds]: I told her or she—what did she say? She said that it sounded like what
he was doing to her, Logan.
1 VTP at 46-47.
On cross-examination, the defense asked Reynolds about “grooming.” The related
testimony on cross-examination proceeded as follows:
[Defense]: Part of the grooming process you said that person will tell this person,
the target, that he loved her?
[Reynolds]: That could be a thing that happens with grooming.
[Defense]: Okay. You also said that one thing that could happen would be that
they would give gifts to this individual?
[Reynolds]: That could be part of it, yes.
[Defense]: Okay. Did you have any evidence other than what [M.M.E] told you
that my client had told her that he loved her?
[Reynolds]: All of my information was just from [M.M.E.].
[Defense]: Okay. Did she ever disclose to you any gifts that my client gave to
her?
[Reynolds]: Not that I remember or recall.
....
[Defense]: You are the one that brought up the grooming, correct?
[Reynolds]: After [M.M.E.] disclosed and how she disclosed, yes, I brought that
up. That’s what came up for me and what she was talking about.
1 VTP at 56-57, 59.
On redirect, the State asked what, specifically, M.M.E. had said that suggested to Reynolds
that grooming had occurred. Reynolds responded that it was when M.M.E. relayed that Newland
had said “a lot of nice things to her [M.M.E.],” because M.M.E. “was really eating it up and she
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No. 48416-1-II
had pleasure in her eyes when she said he was being very nice to me and he says he loves me. And
the way she said it, it just red flagged it for me.” 1 VTP at 61.
On re-cross, the defense challenged Reynolds’s suspicion that M.M.E. had been subjected
to “grooming.” The testimony proceeded as follows:
[Defense]: You said that she was more vulnerable because she had family issues?
[Reynolds]: Mm-hmm.
[Defense]: And that it’s a place where someone gets victimized, correct?
[Reynolds]: If somebody is in a more vulnerable place, yes, they are more apt to
be victimized rather than somebody that has strong supports.
[Defense]: Isn’t it also a situation where somebody in this could just seek out that
companionship wherever she could find it?
[Reynolds]: Would she want to seek it out?
[Defense]: Yes.
[Reynolds]: Certainly. As a depressed person, she was more isolating. She was
crying. She was angry. She had some anger. She was more withdrawn. I would
be working with her on increasing her social supports, and that’s something we did
work on.
[Defense]: The isolation and the anger is towards her family, correct?
[Reynolds]: She has a lot of anger. I can’t say that it was just towards her family.
[Defense]: But she was having issues with feeling isolated and secluded because
of the family issues, correct?
[Reynolds]: There was a lot of, yeah, family issues. And there was a number of
issues happening. Her father wasn’t with her, and that was a hard thing for her.
[Defense]: Well, would that then send her out seeking relationships where
somebody maybe was willing to be a friend to her?
[Reynolds]: I think if somebody presented themselves as a friend, she may—given
whatever they presented for her that was appealing, she may take that.
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No. 48416-1-II
[Defense]: And just because she found somebody like this doesn’t mean there
was a sexual relationship, does it?
[Reynolds]: If she found a friend or somebody that was kind and nice and said that
they loved her doesn’t equate to a sexual relationship.
[Defense]: You said it doesn’t?
[Reynolds]: It does not equate to a sexual relationship always.
[Defense]: And there is also potential there to embellish to friends and others,
correct, about what she’s—how she’ s finally found somebody that she can trust
and is a friend?
[Reynolds]: Yeah, I don’t know. I didn’t find her to be embellishing. I didn’t hear
it from anybody else but her. I felt—and I’m really involved in the community and
the schools and I hear a lot from a lot of people. And oftentimes I will hear things
from people who are embellishing because everyone knows it. I don’t think she
went out of her way.
1 VTP at 61-63.
The State also called Lisa Wahl to testify. Wahl was a nurse practitioner in the Sexual
Assault and Child Maltreatment Center at Providence St. Peter Hospital. M.M.E. was referred to
Wahl by law enforcement for a medical examination and interview. Relevant to this appeal, Wahl
testified during the State’s direct examination that:
She [M.M.E.] was not able to understand that she was 14 years old, and when you
are 14 and you have an alleged offender who is 30 years [older], that, in fact, what
is happening is that there is a child who is being groomed. Anybody who is having
sex with a 14-year-old going through a grooming process of telling them—and
these are her words—that he loved her; that he wanted to kidnap her and marry her;
that she couldn’t tell, because if she did, he would go to jail; that she knew at 14
that it was against the law. And so she blamed herself because she was breaking
the law. She had taught his children in the Sunday school class that she taught at
church, and she had a lot of misguided ownership of what had happened to her.
2 VTP at 195.
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No. 48416-1-II
On cross-examination, the defense challenged Wahl’s statement that M.M.E. had been
groomed. The defense asked:
[Defense]: So in your eyes then is [M.M.E.] victimized just because of the age
difference? Because if you accept what she says, that she had sex with my client
as a 30-year-old and it’s illegal, that in and of itself is a victimization?
[Wahl]: She’s a victim on lots of levels, as I explained. Do you want me to talk
on that?
[Defense]: Yeah.
[Wahl]: Okay. So if a 14-year-old has been—if a 14-year-old has sex with a
30-year-old, that means that a 30-year-old has enticed a 14-year-old to have sex. A
30-year-old has a lot more global knowledge, coping skills, just general life
experience that a 14-year-old budding child into adolescence and into adult does
not have. So a 14-year-old is naive. A 30-year-old is not. A 14-year-old is a victim.
A 30-year-old is not.
....
[Defense]: At what age does an individual stop being naive?
[Wahl]: Well, we would have to agree on the term “naïve” definition.
[Defense]: Your term. You used it.
[Wahl]: Okay. So what I think of naive is something that I’ve never done
before. This is a new experience that I don’t have any knowledge base. I don’t
have any history to draw from. I don’t have that trial and error. I don’t have
knowledge of relational standards, normative behaviors, I don’t have the
knowledge of what to expect next. So if a 14-year-old is being told by a 30-year-
old that he loves her, he wishes he could marry her and kidnap her, as a 14-year-
old, this is all very romantic, because that’s all I have to go on is I’m naive. I know
nothing more than what is being given to me in the moment.
....
[Defense]: But again, this is all information that you got from [M.M.E.], correct?
[Wahl]: Which piece?
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No. 48416-1-II
[Defense]: Well, all of it. That she—that my client was telling her he was loving
her, he wanted to kidnap her and marry her. This is all coming from [M.M.E.],
correct?
[Wahl]: Correct.
[Defense]: You never talked to my client, [Newland,] did you?
[Wahl]: No.
2 VTP at 206-09. Despite Wahl not having previously mentioned “red flags,” defense also asked
her:
[Defense]: You mentioned several I think you referred to them as red flags. And
this had to do with [M.M.E.]’s life, correct?
[Wahl]: Correct.
[Defense]: What were some of those red flags?
[Wahl]: Red flags would be the fact that her mother used drugs and/or alcohol
prenatally; that her mother had lost parental access to her at an early age; that her—
she was in foster care for a couple of years; that she is estranged from all of her
siblings; that one of her brothers was ultimately killed, murdered in a gang-related
incident; that her father had her care for a while until there was concern that she
had been exposed to him with pornography and masturbation, and then she was
again placed into systems; that she was now being cared for by a 74-year-old
paternal grandmother who herself has challenging health issues; that she’s been
bounced from several living situations, but no stable continuity of care that gave
her a basis of feeling safe and nurtured and protected over time.
2 VTP at 209-10.
M.M.E. also testified and defense counsel cross-examined M.M.E. on inconsistencies
between her testimony, her statement to police, and disclosures she made to her counselor. First,
defense counsel pointed out that in her statement to police, M.M.E. said Newland brought a four-
wheeler to their meeting the first night, but testified in trial that he brought the four-wheeler the
second night. Second, defense counsel asked why M.M.E. had told the police that the first incident
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No. 48416-1-II
had occurred “outside of a vehicle” if her testimony was that Newland only had the four-wheeler
the second night. 2 VTP at 153. Third, defense counsel contrasted M.M.E.’s testimony at trial
that Newland had not ejaculated inside of her to her statement to police stating that he had done
so. Fourth, defense counsel pointed out that M.M.E. had told Reynolds that all three instances had
occurred in the summer of 2013, but testified that the third had occurred late in 2013 when it was
cold outside.
C. CLOSING ARGUMENTS
During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor made the following argument:
So [M.M.E.] gave you a lot of details. She gave details to everybody who has asked
along the way, and she’s given the same account. They had sex three times: The
first time by the river, the second time within a day, and the third time some time
later when it was cold.
2 VTP at 281. The prosecutor later added:
I want to make sure that when you are deliberating on Count I, you are all talking
about the same event. So I would suggest to you that you talk about the event that
occurred on July 11th. Then when you deliberate on Count II, make sure you are
all talking about Count II, the second time, which I believe was on July 12th. And
when you are talking about Count III, concentrate on Count III. But make sure you
are all on the same page, because it would be unfair to just throw all of these
together. You have to consider each count separately and deliberate on each count
separately.
2 VTP at 289-90.
During the defense’s closing argument, defense counsel directed the jury’s attention to the
jury instructions and told the jury that “you need to decide each [count] separately. . . . You need
to determine each one individually to reach verdicts on all three of them and deliberate on them
separately.” 2 VTP at 292.
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No. 48416-1-II
Defense counsel also argued to the jury that “my client’s position is that he never had sex
with [M.M.E.].” 2 VTP at 299. The State objected to this as “[n]ot in evidence,” which the trial
court sustained. 2 VTP at 299. Defense counsel continued, “If my client had admitted to Deputy
Anderson that he had had sex with [M.M.E.], don’t you think that he would have testified to that
on the stand?” 2 VTP at 300. When the State objected, the trial court again sustained the objection.
D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICTS
The defense did not object to any of the jury instructions that were given. The defense also
did not attempt to offer any jury instructions that the court determined would not be given.
Newland was convicted of all three counts of third degree rape of a child. Newland appeals.
ANALYSIS
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Newland argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed
to object to the testimony presented on the “‘grooming’ process that ‘sexual predator[s]’ use to
try[]to get ‘victims.’” Br. of Appellant at 7 (quoting VTP at 46, 60). We disagree.
1. Legal Principles
The right to effective assistance of counsel is afforded criminal defendants by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington
Constitution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674(1984); State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 229, 743 P.2d 816 (1987). To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, Newland must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). Deficient performance occurs
when counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Stenson,
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No. 48416-1-II
132 Wn.2d 668, 705, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). To show prejudice, Newland must demonstrate that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335. If Newland fails to satisfy
either prong, this court need not inquire further. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d
563 (1996).
There is a strong presumption of effective assistance, and Newland bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a legitimate strategic or tactical reason for the challenged conduct.
McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 336. Decisions on whether and when to object are “classic example[s]
of trial tactics.” State v. Madison, 53 Wn. App. 754, 763, 770 P.2d 662 (1989). “‘Only in
egregious circumstances, on testimony central to the State’s case, will the failure to object
constitute incompetence of counsel justifying reversal.’” State v. Johnston, 143 Wn. App. 1, 19,
177 P.3d 1127, 1137 (2007) (quoting Madison, 53 Wn. App. at 763). It is a legitimate trial tactic
to forego an objection in circumstances where counsel wishes to avoid highlighting certain
evidence. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 714, 101 P.3d 1 (2004). Where a
defendant bases his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on trial counsel’s failure to object, the
defendant must show that the objection would likely have succeeded. State v. Gerdts, 136 Wn.
App. 720, 727, 150 P.3d 627 (2007).
Generally, “profile testimony that does nothing more than identify a person as a member
of a group more likely to commit the charged crime is inadmissible.” State v. Braham, 67 Wn.
App. 930, 936, 841 P.2d 785 (1992). In other words, testimony implying guilt based on the
characteristics of known offenders is inadmissible because it invites the jury to conclude that
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No. 48416-1-II
because a defendant shares some of the characteristics, he is more likely to have committed the
crime. Id.
2. No Ineffective Assistance
Newland fails to show the absence of a legitimate strategic or tactical reason for defense
council not objecting. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 336. The record shows that rather than object,
Newland’s defense counsel chose to challenge Reynolds’s and Wahl’s testimony on Newland’s
“grooming” of M.M.E.
First, defense counsel used Reynolds’s example of gift-giving as a form of grooming to
also elicit from Reynolds that M.M.E. had never mentioned Newland giving her any gifts. Second,
defense counsel elicited from Reynolds that it was Reynolds, not M.M.E., who suggested that
Newland had engaged in grooming M.M.E. Third, defense counsel elicited from Reynolds that
M.M.E.’s depression might cause M.M.E. to seek out people who would be willing to be friends
with her, and that such friendships did not mean a sexual relationship would follow. Fourth,
defense counsel elicited from Wahl other psychological and environmental issues that Wahl
considered to be “red flags” in M.M.E.’s life—using a term Reynolds had used earlier in referring
to signals of grooming. Finally, defense counsel challenged both Reynolds and Wahl about the
sources for their opinions regarding whether M.M.E. was groomed, eliciting from both Reynolds
and Wahl that their opinions were formed without seeking information from individuals other than
M.M.E.
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No. 48416-1-II
Thus, defense counsel’s failure to object to the testimony was a legitimate trial tactic.
Therefore, we hold that Newland’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument fails.3
B. LIMITING CLOSING ARGUMENT
Newland argues that the trial court violated his due process rights when it sustained the
State’s objections during defense counsel’s closing argument. Specifically, Newland contends
that, because of the court’s rulings, his “attorney was never able to argue that the jury could infer
that [Newland] contested M.M.E.’s version of events.” Br. of 10-11. We disagree.
A criminal defendant’s “right to counsel encompasses the delivery of closing argument.”
State v. Frost, 160 Wn.2d 765, 768, 161 P.3d 361, 363–64 (2007). Trial courts have broad
“discretion over the scope of closing argument.” Id. at 768, 772. Accordingly, we review these
challenges for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 768. A trial court abuses its discretion “‘only if no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’” Id. at 771 (quoting State v.
Perez–Cervantes, 141 Wn.2d 468, 475, 6 P.3d 1160 (2000)). In all cases, the trial court should
“‘restrict the argument of counsel to the facts in evidence’” and should confine the law to that
which is set forth in the jury instructions. Id. at 772 (quoting Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wn.2d at 475).
Here, the trial court sustained objections to defense counsel’s statements of “my client’s
position is that he never had sex with her” and “[i]f my client had admitted to Deputy Anderson
that he had had sex with [M.M.E.], don’t you think that he would have testified to that on the
3
This case is distinguishable from State v. Braham, 67 Wn. App. 930, 936, 841 P.2d 785 (1992),
relied on by Newland. Braham addressed the admissibility of profile evidence based on the
defendant’s evidentiary challenges; whereas, here, Newland is challenging the testimony as
ineffective assistance of counsel. Braham, 67 Wn. App. at 932. Additionally, here, Reynolds and
Wahl had both interviewed and treated M.M.E. in their professional and medical capacities, and
so had particular and specific information about M.M.E.’s case.
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No. 48416-1-II
stand?” 2 VTP at 299-300. The record shows that no testimony or other evidence was presented
that stated Newland denied having sex with M.M.E. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in limiting defense counsel’s closing argument because the trial court was
limiting the closing argument to the evidence presented at trial.
Even if the trial court did abuse its discretion in limiting the defense’s closing argument,
the error was harmless. An erroneous limitation of the scope of closing argument is subject to a
harmless error analysis. Frost, 160 Wn.2d at 781-82. To find harmless error, we must be
“convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same result
in the absence of the error.” State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 425, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985).
We hold any error was harmless because the argument that defense counsel was making—
that Newland denied having sex with M.M.E.—would not have changed the outcome had the trial
court allowed counsel to make the argument. The jury already knew that Newland denied having
sex with M.M.E. Jury instruction 2 stated, “The defendant has entered pleas of not guilty. Those
pleas put in issue every element of each crime charged.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 39. Also, the jury
was instructed that the elements of the crimes of third degree rape of a child required the state to
prove that Newland had sex with M.M.E.
Thus, the jury was instructed that whether Newland had sex with M.M.E. was at issue.
Whether Newland specifically denied having sex with M.M.E. is irrelevant because the jury was
still instructed that the burden was on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Newland
had sex with M.M.E. On these instructions, the jury found Newland guilty. Therefore, we hold
that even if the court abused its discretion in limiting the defense’s closing, the error was harmless.
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No. 48416-1-II
C. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Newland argues the trial court violated his right against double jeopardy in failing to
instruct the jury that each of the charges for third degree rape of a child needed to be based on a
separate and distinct act. We disagree.
The double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions protect defendants from
being “punished multiple times for the same offense.” State v. Linton, 156 Wn.2d 777, 783, 132
P.3d 127 (2006); see U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9. We review double jeopardy
claims de novo. State v. Mutch, 171 Wn.2d 646, 661-62, 254 P.3d 803 (2011).
When the State provides evidence of multiple acts that could constitute more than one of
the crimes charged, the trial court should instruct the jury that each count must be based on a
separate and distinct act. Id. at 663. If the instructions do not inform the jury that each count must
be based on a separate and distinct act, then we must determine whether the evidence, arguments,
and instructions made the separate act requirements “‘manifestly apparent to the jury.’” Id. at 664
(emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Berg, 147 Wn. App. 923, 931, 198 P.3d 529 (2008), overruled
in part by Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at 663–64)).
Newland’s argument relies on Mutch, 171 Wn.2d 646. In Mutch, our Supreme Court
considered whether a jury instruction, identical to the one used in this case, failed to specifically
advise the jury that each charged count arose from a “separate and distinct” act and whether this
inadequacy created a risk that the jury could have convicted Mutch of five counts of rape based
only on a single criminal act. Id. at 662. Although the court determined that the instruction was
inadequate, the court clarified that this deficiency alone was insufficient to justify relief. Id. at
663–64. Instead, the court held that the deficient instructions must be examined in the context of
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No. 48416-1-II
the record as a whole to determine if the defendant was actually subjected to multiple punishments
for the same offense. Id.The court in Mutch then held that given the charging information, the testimony, and the
arguments presented, it was “manifestly apparent” that the jury instruction “did not actually effect
a double jeopardy violation.” Id. at 665. The court specifically noted that (1) the information had
charged Mutch with “five counts based on allegations that constituted five separate units of
prosecution,” (2) the victim “testified to five separate episodes of rape,” and the defense’s focus
at trial was not centered on the number of rapes but rather whether there was consent and the
victim’s credibility, (3) the jury was given five to-convict instructions, and (4) “[t]he State
discussed all five episodes of rape in its arguments.” Id.We agree with Newland that the instruction provided to the jury in this case failed to
specifically advise the jury that each count charged arose from a separate and distinct act because
the jury instruction used in this case was identical to the one used in Mutch.4 Compare 171 Wn.2d
at 662 with CP at 40. However, as in Mutch, we hold that an examination of the record shows that
the instructions to the jury did not effect a double jeopardy violation.
4
The jury instruction at issue in Mutch stated:
[a] separate crime is charged in each count. You must decide each count separately.
Your verdict on one count should not control your verdict on any other count.
171 Wn.2d at 662 (alteration in original). Here, jury instruction 3 stated:
A separate crime is charged in each count. You must decide each count separately.
Your verdict on one count should not control your verdict on any other count.
Clerk’s Papers at 40.
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No. 48416-1-II
First, M.M.E. testified that she and Newland had sex on three separate occasions—twice
by the river on consecutive nights, and a third time in the trailer by the house Newland was house-
sitting—which is the exact number of to-convict instructions given. Second, Reynolds, Wahl, and
Deputy Anderson also testified that M.M.E. told them she had sex with Newland on three separate
occasions. Third, the jury was given three separate to-convict instructions for each of the three
counts of third degree rape of a child. Each to-convict instruction specified which charged count
the to-convict instruction was for. See, e.g., CP at 45 (“To convict the defendant of the crime of
rape of a child in the third degree as charged in Count II, each of the following elements of the
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). The jury was also provided three verdict
forms for each of the three counts of third degree child rape and answered each separately in the
affirmative. As with the to-convict instructions, each verdict form specifically referenced the
charged count to which it was referring. See, e.g., CP at 56 (“We, the jury, find the defendant,
LOGAN JOSEPH NEWLAND guilty [handwritten] of the crime of Rape of a Child in the Third
Degree as charged in Count III.”). And, finally, the State referenced each of the three charged
instances separately in its closing, suggesting that the jury use the first night they had sex, on July
11th, for Count I; the second night they had sex, on July 12th, for Count II; and the third time they
had sex for Count III. Therefore, we hold that the record shows that it was made manifestly
apparent to the jury that each count charge represented a separate act and that Newland did not
establish that he was subjected to multiple punishments for a single criminal act. Accordingly, we
hold that Newland’s double jeopardy challenge fails.
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No. 48416-1-II
D. APPELLATE COSTS
Newland requests that this court decline to impose appellate costs against him if the State
prevails on this appeal and makes a proper request. We will not consider an award of appellate
costs at this juncture.
Under State v. Grant, 196 Wn. App. 644, 649-50, 385 P.3d 184, (2016), a defendant is not
required to address appellate costs in his or her briefing to preserve the ability to object to the
imposition of costs after the State files a cost bill. A commissioner of this court will consider
whether to award appellate costs in due course under the newly revised provisions of RAP 14.2 if
the State decides to file a cost bill and if Newland objects to that cost bill.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Lee, J.
We concur:
Maxa, A.C.J.
Melnick, J.
19