State Of Washington v. Daryl Harding ( 2017 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
June 6, 2017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 48408-1-II
Respondent,
v.
DARYL GLENN HARDING, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
LEE, J. – A jury found Daryl Glenn Harding guilty of two counts of second degree assault
with a deadly weapon. He appeals, contending there is insufficient evidence to support his
convictions because the State failed to disprove that Harding was acting in self-defense and failed
to prove the weapon used during the assaults was a deadly weapon. Harding also alleges the trial
court erred by denying his request for an inferior degree jury instruction on fourth degree assault
and erred by giving the jury a first aggressor instruction. We affirm.
FACTS
A. INCIDENT
Greg Stark lived in apartment 3, an upstairs apartment in a fourplex apartment unit. Both
Stark’s apartment and the neighboring apartment, apartment 4, had chairs outside their units on an
adjoining balcony.
As Stark was leaving his apartment, he observed Harding sitting in front of apartment 4.
When Stark returned, Harding was sitting in one of Stark’s chairs in front of apartment 3. Harding
No. 48408-1-II
asked Stark for a cigarette, and Stark gave him one. Over the next two days, Harding remained
outside of Stark’s apartment and Stark continued giving him cigarettes.
After three days, Stark grew weary of Harding sitting on his balcony and asked Harding to
not sit in front of his apartment because Harding was making both Stark and Stark’s girlfriend
nervous. Harding pulled a $10 bill out of his sock and showed it to Stark. Stark told Harding that
he needed to go buy himself a pack of cigarettes.
Later that night, Stark’s friend, Norm Jensen, came to Stark’s apartment. Stark and Jensen
left the apartment to go purchase beer. When they returned to Stark’s apartment, Harding was
sitting in a chair in front of apartment 4. Words were exchanged between the men and Harding
called Stark, who was Native American, a racial slur. Stark’s downstairs neighbor, who was also
Native American, heard Harding and came outside of his apartment and started walking up the
stairs.
Stark then told Harding to leave, calling Harding a racial slur. Stark and Jensen went inside
Stark’s apartment. Harding remained outside of Stark’s apartment, hitting the door, using
profanity, and calling Stark racial slurs. Stark called the police.
When Kelso Police Officer John Johnston arrived, Harding was sitting in a chair outside
apartment 4. Harding told Officer Johnston he was transient and had been staying in front of
apartment 4. He also told the officer that someone had stolen his guitar and amplifier. Officer
Johnston tried to take a report, asking Harding to describe the items, but Harding got frustrated
and stated, “Forget it, I’m leaving,” and left. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Oct. 22,
2015) at 116.
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Harding eventually returned to the apartment complex after the police left. Stark and
Jensen were still inside Stark’s apartment. When Jensen exited the apartment to go home, Harding
swung a three foot, two-by-two board with nails sticking out of it (spiked board) at Jensen’s head.
Jensen put his hand up to protect his head. Harding struck Jensen in the hand, driving a nail
through his finger. Harding also struck Jensen on the shoulder and side.
Stark exited the apartment and pushed Jensen back inside. Stark grabbed the spiked board,
but Harding pulled the spiked board from Stark’s hand, cutting Stark’s hand. Harding then swung
the spiked board at Stark’s head. Stark raised his arm to block the blow. Harding then struck Stark
multiple times in the forearm, puncturing Stark’s arm with one of the nails protruding from the
board. Stark went back inside his apartment and closed the door. Harding began to strike Stark’s
glass door with the spiked board, attempting to break it. Stark again called the police.
Officer Johnston returned to the apartment complex. When Harding saw him, Harding
stood up, placed his hands behind his back, and said, “I’m putting my hands behind my back; arrest
me; I got my point across.” VRP (Oct. 22, 2015) at 118. Officer Johnston retrieved a spiked board
propped up against the chair where Harding was sitting.
The State charged Harding with two counts of second degree assault, each with a deadly
weapon enhancement. Harding argued that he acted in self-defense.
B. TRIAL
During trial, Officer Johnston testified that the spiked board recovered at the scene posed
“[l]ots of danger” and could break and/or puncture things. VRP (Oct. 22, 2015) at 127. Officer
Johnston further explained that if a nail caught a person in the wrong location, it could kill them.
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No. 48408-1-II
Jensen testified that as he was leaving Stark’s apartment to go home; Harding swung a
spiked board at his head. Jensen put his hand up to protect his head and Harding struck his hand,
driving a nail through his finger. Harding also struck Jensen on the shoulder and side.
Stark testified that after Harding struck Jensen, Stark exited the apartment and pushed
Jensen back inside. Stark grabbed the spiked board, but Harding pulled the spiked board from
Stark’s hand, cutting Stark’s hand. Harding then swung the spiked board at Stark’s head. Stark
raised his arm to block the blow, and Harding struck Stark multiple times in the forearm,
puncturing Stark’s arm with one of the nails protruding from the board. Stark got back inside his
apartment and closed the door. Harding began to strike Stark’s glass door with the spiked board,
attempting to break it. Stark called the police.
Harding also testified. He stated that Stark and Jensen were drunk and asked Harding how
much money he had. Harding claimed that Stark and Jensen were “deliberately trying to pick a
fight with me.” VRP (Oct. 22, 2017) at 160. They continued to call him racial slurs after the
police left the first time. Harding also stated that “the Indian that stays downstairs” came upstairs
and told Harding, “I’ll kill you if you disrespect my people.” VRP (Oct. 22, 2015) at 163. Harding
then called the three men, “[A] bunch of bitches” and stated, “You want to take my money, you
come and take my money.” VRP (Oct. 22, 2015) at 164. Harding claims he then put his hand
behind his back pocket to make the men think he had a knife to scare them off. After that, the
third man from downstairs said he had something for him and went downstairs to his apartment.
Harding then looked for “any kind of weapon” he could find and located the spiked board. VRP
(Oct. 22, 2015) at 165. After he found the spiked board, he challenged Stark and Jensen to “[c]ome
on out here and take my money.” VRP (Oct. 22, 2015) at 166. Stark and Jensen came at him “like
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No. 48408-1-II
two defensive linemen getting ready to rush a quarterback.” VRP (Oct. 22, 2015) at 166. Harding
struck Stark and Jensen because he feared they would assault him or throw him off the balcony.
Harding did not claim that the spiked board was not a weapon. Instead, Harding claimed
that he was justified in using the spiked board because he was outnumbered, being attacked, and
needed to defend himself.
The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense. At the State’s request, the trial court
gave the jury a standard first aggressor instruction:
No person may, by any intentional act reasonably likely to provoke a
belligerent response, create a necessity for acting in self-defense and thereupon use,
offer, or attempt to use force upon or toward another person. Therefore, if you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the aggressor, and that defendant’s
acts and conduct provoked or commenced the fight, then self-defense is not
available as a defense.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 91. Harding objected.
The defense proposed an inferior degree instruction for fourth degree assault. The trial
court declined to instruct the jury on the inferior degree instruction because no evidence was
presented that an assault was committed without the use of the deadly weapon.
The jury found Harding guilty as charged. The jury also made a special finding that Harding
was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of both assaults. Harding appeals.
ANALYSIS
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Harding first contends sufficient evidence does not exist to support his second degree
assault convictions because the State failed to disprove that Harding was acting in self-defense and
failed to prove the weapon used during the assault was a deadly weapon. We disagree.
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Sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction if any rational trier of fact, when viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, could find the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1, 8, 133 P.3d 936 (2006). A defendant
claiming insufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State’s evidence. State v. Salinas,
119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). All inferences from the evidence must be drawn in
favor of the State and most strongly against the defendant. Id. When reviewing the sufficiency of
the State’s evidence, we consider circumstantial evidence and direct evidence as equally reliable.
State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). We defer to the trier of fact on issues
of conflicting witness testimony, witness credibility, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State
v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).
To convict Harding of second degree assault, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he assaulted another with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). A deadly weapon
is means a “weapon, device, instrument, article, or substance . . . which, under the circumstances
in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing
death or substantial bodily harm.” RCW 9A.04.110(6).
1. Disprove Self-defense
Harding contends the State failed to disprove self-defense because Harding’s testimony
established that Stark and Jensen were using racial slurs; a downstairs neighbor joined in, making
the confrontation three against one; and Stark and Jensen rushed Harding like football players.
Harding’s contention fails.
A person acts in self-defense when he reasonably believes that he is about to be injured
and uses no more force than necessary to prevent an offense against his person. RCW
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9A.16.020(3); State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 863, 215 P.3d 177 (2009). Once a defendant offers
some evidence tending to demonstrate self-defense, the burden shifts to the State to prove the
absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469, 473, 932
P.2d 1237 (1997).
Evidence of self-defense is evaluated under both a subjective and an objective prong. Id.
at 474. Under the subjective prong, the jury considers the apparent threat from the defendant’s
point of view. Id. Under the objective prong, the jury considers what “a reasonably prudent person
similarly situated would have done.” Id. Self-defense justifies only the degree of force that “a
reasonably prudent person would find necessary under the conditions as they appeared to the
defendant.” Id. (citing State v. Bailey, 22 Wn. App. 646, 650, 591 P.2d 1212 (1979)).
Here, the parties involved had an argument. Harding left the building and then returned.
When Harding returned, he swung a spiked board at Jensen’s head as he was leaving Stark’s
apartment, driving a nail through Jensen’s finger when Jensen put his hand up to protect his head.
When Stark exited the apartment to push Jensen back inside, Harding swung the spiked board at
Stark’s head. Harding struck and punctured Stark’s arm with a nail protruding from the board
when Stark raised his arm to block the blow. When Stark got back inside his apartment, he called
the police. Officer Johnston returned to the apartment complex. Upon seeing him, Harding stood
up, placed his hands behind his back, and said, “I’m putting my hands behind my back; arrest me;
I got my point across.” VRP (Oct. 22, 2015) at 118.
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State and deferring to the trier of fact
on issues of credibility, a reasonably prudent person would not believe he or she was about to be
injured. Stark and Jensen were inside their apartment. Harding struck them as they exited the
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apartment. Thus, the above evidence is sufficient to disprove Harding’s claim of self-defense.
Accordingly, sufficient evidence exits to support Harding’s second degree assault convictions.
2. Deadly Weapon
Harding next argues sufficient evidence does not exist to prove the spiked board was a
deadly weapon. We disagree.
RCW 9A.04.110(6) distinguishes between deadly weapons “per se” (firearms and
explosives) and deadly weapons “in fact” (other weapons). In re Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 171
Wn.2d 354, 365, 256 P.3d 277 (2011). Because the spiked board used in this case does not fall
within the narrow scope for deadly weapons per se, the spiked board’s status rests on the
circumstances in which it was used. RCW 9A.04.110(6); Martinez, 171 Wn.2d at 365. The
circumstances to consider when determining whether an object is a deadly weapon include “‘the
intent and present ability of the user, the degree of force, the part of the body to which it was
applied and the physical injuries inflicted.’” State v. Skenandore, 99 Wn. App. 494, 499, 994 P.2d
291 (2000) (quoting State v. Schilling, 77 Wn. App. 166, 171, 889 P.2d 948, review denied, 127
Wn.2d 1006 (1995)).
Harding relies on Skenandore for his argument that the evidence is insufficient to support
a finding that the spiked board constituted a deadly weapon under the circumstances. But
Harding’s reliance on Skenandore is misplaced.
In Skenandore, the defendant challenged his conviction of second degree assault for
striking a corrections officer with a spear made out of rolled up writing paper bound with dental
floss and affixed to a golf pencil. 99 Wn. App. at 496. The blows left non-abraded red indentations
on the officer’s chest that faded within hours of the assault. Id. at 500. In that case, the court
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determined that the evidence failed to show the spear’s ready capability to cause substantial bodily
harm where all three blows landed on the officer’s torso, well below his head, the cell door
restricted the spear’s movement, and the spear did not tear the officer’s shirt or break the skin. Id.
In addition, the court noted that the jury was unable to examine the spear in its completely
assembled state to determine its deadly weapon capability because Skenandore had partially
disassembled it and flushed the pencil point down his cell toilet. Id. The court reversed
Skenandore’s second degree assault conviction, holding that the surrounding circumstances
inhibited the spear’s ready capability to inflict substantial bodily harm. Id. at 501.
Harding mistakenly analogizes the defendant’s spear in Skenandore to his spiked board in
the present case. Here, with respect to the intent and present ability of the user, Harding’s objective
was to strike Stark and Jensen. Harding swung the spiked board at both Stark and Jensen’s heads.
Harding struck both men multiple times.
Next, with respect to degree of force used, Harding delivered the blows with such force
that a nail punctured Stark’s forearm. He also drove the nail through Jensen’s finger and left a
mark on his shoulder.
Lastly, Harding swung the spiked board at the heads of both men. He also struck Jensen
in the side. Both men suffered the majority of their injuries while attempting to protect their heads
from Harding’s blows. A blow to the head from a spiked board put Stark and Jensen at risk for
substantial injuries. Further, Officer Johnston testified the nails protruding from the board could
cause death.
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Under the circumstances in which the spiked board was used, it was readily capable of
causing substantial bodily harm or death. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to find the spiked board was a deadly weapon.
B. ALLEGED INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR
Harding next contends his convictions should be reversed based on instructional error. He
argues the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the inferior degree offense of fourth degree
assault and giving the jury a first aggressor instruction. We disagree.
1. Inferior Degree Offense
Harding argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on
fourth degree assault as an inferior degree offense of second degree assault as charged. Harding’s
argument fails.
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on an inferior degree offense only if it is supported
by the law and the evidence, and he or she meets the requirements of the Workman test. State v.
Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 447-48, 584 P.2d 382 (1978). Under the Workman test, a party is entitled
to an inferior degree offense instruction if “(1) each of the elements of the lesser offense is a
necessary element of the offense charged (legal prong) and (2) the evidence in the case supports
an inference that only the lesser crime was committed (factual prong).” State v. LaPlant, 157 Wn.
App. 685, 687, 239 P.3d 366 (2010). The legal prong is satisfied if each element of the lesser
offense is a necessary element of the charged offense. State v. Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541, 545-46,
947 P.2d 700 (1997). We review the trial court’s ruling on the legal prong of a request for an
inferior degree jury instruction de novo. LaPlant, 157 Wn. App. at 687. The factual prong is
satisfied if the evidence would permit a jury to rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser
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offense but acquit the defendant of the greater offense. Id. We review a trial court’s findings on
the factual prong for an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises
it on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d
615 (1995).
Under the legal prong of the Workman test, fourth degree assault is an inferior degree
offense to the charge of second degree assault by use of a deadly weapon since all of the elements
of fourth degree assault are necessary elements of second degree assault.1 Thus, the issue here is
whether Harding satisfied the factual portion of the Workman test. Specifically, whether the
evidence raises an inference that only the inferior degree offense was committed to the exclusion
of the charged offense. State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d 448, 455, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000).
Harding cannot show that only fourth degree assault was committed. All parties agree that
Harding struck both men with the weapon. Stark and Jensen both testified that Harding had swung
the spiked board at their heads. Officer Johnston testified that the nails protruding from the board
could cause death. Thus, a jury could only have found that the spiked board was a deadly weapon.
There was no evidence that Harding assaulted Stark and Jensen without the spiked board.
1
“A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circumstances not
amounting to assault in the first degree:
...
(c) Assaults another with a deadly weapon.”
RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c).
“A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree if, under circumstances not amounting to assault
in the first, second, or third degree, or custodial assault, he or she assaults another.” RCW
9A.36.041(1).
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No. 48408-1-II
The trial court declined to instruct the jury on the inferior degree instruction because no
evidence was presented that an assault was committed without the use of the deadly weapon.
Tenable grounds support this finding. The trial court did abuse its discretion in declining to instruct
the jury on the inferior degree offense of fourth degree assault.2
2. First Aggressor
Harding next contends that the trial court erred by giving a first aggressor instruction
because his conduct was insufficient to show that he was the first aggressor. We disagree.
Whether the State produced sufficient evidence to justify a first aggressor instruction is a
question of law we review de novo. State v. Bea, 162 Wn. App. 570, 577, 254 P.3d 948, review
denied, 173 Wn.2d 1003 (2011). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
requesting the instruction. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455-56.
A trial court “properly submits [a first] aggressor instruction where (1) the jury can
reasonably determine from the evidence that the defendant provoked the fight; (2) the evidence
conflicts as to whether the defendant’s conduct provoked the fight; or (3) the evidence shows that
the defendant made the first move by drawing a weapon.” State v. Anderson, 144 Wn. App. 85,
89, 180 P.3d 885 (2008) (citing State v. Riley, 137 Wn.2d 904, 909-10, 976 P.2d 624 (1999)). The
trial court errs in submitting the instruction if the evidence shows the defendant used only words
to provoke the fight. Id. (citing Riley, 137 Wn.2d at 910-11).
2
Harding also argues that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on fourth degree assault
would not be harmless error. The State responds that recent case law concerning harmless error
and inferior degree instructions should be overturned. Since we hold that the trial court did not err
in declining to instruct the jury on fourth degree assault, we decline to reach the parties’ arguments
regarding harmless error.
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Here, the parties presented conflicting evidence as to whether Harding provoked the fight.
Jensen and Stark testified that after an exchange of words with Harding, Harding left the premises.
He later returned, armed with the spiked board, and waited outside Stark’s apartment. When
Jensen exited the apartment, Harding attacked him. In an effort to defend Jensen, Stark attempted
to grab the weapon from Harding. Harding then struck Stark. Stark and Jensen’s wounds are
consistent with their testimonies. In contrast, Harding testified there was a second argument after
the police left and a third man went downstairs to retrieve a weapon. Harding claims at that point
he obtained his weapon. He testified that he hit Jensen and Stark as they came at him like defensive
linemen rushing a quarterback.
The trial court followed the directive in Riley that a first aggressor instruction is appropriate
if there is conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant’s conduct precipitated the fight. 137
Wn.2d at 910. Based on the conflicting evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Harding
provoked the fight. We, therefore, conclude that in light of the conflicting evidence as to whose
actions precipitated the fight, the first aggressor instruction was proper.
C. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS (SAG)
In his SAG, Harding contends the police, Stark, and Jensen were not credible. In support
of this argument, Harding points to alleged discrepancies between his testimony and their
testimonies. But credibility is an issue for the trier of fact, and we do not review credibility
determinations on appeal. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). The jury
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and determined who they found were credible.
Therefore, we do not address this contention.
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We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Lee, J.
We concur:
Maxa, A.C.J.
Sutton, J.
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