State Of Washington v. Justin Matthew Gray Bacani ( 2018 )

r ILEO
CUT OF APPEALS WV I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
2010 JUN 18 AM 8:36
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) DIVISION ONE
Respondent, )
) No. 76371-7-1
v. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JUSTIN MATTHEW BACANI, )
)
Appellant. ) FILED: June 18, 2018
)
DWYER, J. — Justin Bacani was charged and convicted of murder in the
second degree for the death of Annelise Harrison. On appeal, Bacani contends
that the trial court erred by (1) refusing to admit hearsay statements concerning
Harrison's sexual practices,(2) redacting a portion of a 911 call that was played
for the jury, and (3) denying his request to instruct the jury on voluntary
intoxication. Bacani also contends that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel and that the prosecutor committed flagrant misconduct during closing
argument, thus depriving him of a fair trial. Finding no error, we affirm.
The Ridgedale Apartments in Bellevue were undergoing major
renovations in February 2015. On February 7, maintenance employees were
inspecting apartment units and assessing the damage caused by a recent sewer
backup. Although all of the apartment units should have been vacant,
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maintenance employees discovered a woman's purse on the floor inside one of
the apartments. The employees looked around the apartment and discovered
the body of Annelise Harrison in the bathroom.
Police searched the apartment and discovered traces of blood on the
walls in the bathroom, on the toilet, in the bathroom sink, and on the light switch
of the bathroom. Police also discovered blood in the hallway, on the deadbolt of
the front door, and in the cracks of the hallway flooring. There were black scuff
marks on the hallway baseboards and fresh paint on Harrison's boots that was
consistent with the paint from the baseboards. The smoke alarm in the
apartment made a chirping sound because the battery was low.
Dr. Richard Harruff, chief medical examiner for the King County medical
examiner's office, performed the autopsy. Dr. Harruff noted that Harrison had
abrasions and contusions on her neck and blood spots on the surfaces of her
eyes. Dr. Harruff concluded that Harrison died by strangulation sometime
between February 1 and 2. Harruff also found that Harrison was under the
influence of drugs at the time of her death but testified that "if she had died of a
drug overdose, simply, then there wouldn't have been any bruising." Finally, Dr.
Harruff determined that it was possible, though unlikely, that the injuries
sustained from strangulation occurred more than a few hours before Harrison's
death.
Police discovered a cell phone inside of Harrison's pants pocket.
Detective Jennifer Robertson searched the cell phone and discovered that the
last telephone call made from that phone was on February 1 at 8:21 p.m.
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Robertson dialed that number and a man answered. The man identified himself
as "Jesse" and stated that he did not know anyone named Annalise. Robertson
asked the man if he recognized the telephone number that she was calling from.
The man stated that he did not and then promptly ended the call.
Police reviewed Harrison's cell phone records and searched for video
footage of buses traveling from Seattle to Bellevue. The search produced video
footage showing Harrison and a man boarding a bus at Westlake Station on
February 1 at 10:53 p.m. Video footage showed Harrison and the man exit
together at the Bellevue transit center, enter a Walgreens store near the
Ridgedale Apartments, exit Walgreens, and walk toward the Ridgedale
Apartments.
Using the video footage and the telephone number that Harrison dialed
shortly before her death, the police were able to determine that the man who
identified himself as "Jesse" was, in fact, Justin Bacani. The police were able to
utilize cell tower information and track Bacani from downtown Seattle to a tower
near the Ridgedale Apartments. Police also discovered that Bacani had placed
three 911 calls between February 1 and 2. These calls were placed at 12:13
a.m., 2:18 a.m., and 2:44 a.m., and came from near the Walgreens store and the
Ridgedale Apartments. Following his arrest, DNA testing revealed that the blood
found in the apartment matched Bacani.
Bacani was charged and convicted of murder in the second degree. The
sentencing court found that Bacani was a persistent offender and sentenced him
to a term of confinement for life. Bacani appeals.
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II
Bacani first contends that his constitutional right to present a defense was
violated. This is so, he asserts, because the trial court excluded hearsay
statements that Harrison allegedly enjoyed engaging in sex acts that included
strangulation.
We review an alleged denial of the constitutional right to present a
defense de novo. State v. Lizarraga, 191 Wash. App. 530, 551, 364 P.3d 810
(2015), review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1022(2016). "But a criminal defendant has no
constitutional right to have irrelevant or inadmissible evidence admitted in his or
her defense." State v. Aquilar, 153 Wash. App. 265, 275, 223 P.3d 1158(2009).
Rather, "[t]he defendant's right to present a defense is subject to 'established
rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability
in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Lizarraqa, 191 Wash. App. at 553
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038,35 L. Ed.
2d 297 (1973)).
The hearsay rule
has long been recognized and respected by virtually every State, is
based on experience and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy
evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court
statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the
conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under
oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the
solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to
cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his
demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury.
Chambers,410 U.S. at 298. "[A]llowing inadmissible hearsay testimony 'places
the [witness's] version of the facts before the jury without subjecting the [witness]
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to cross-examination,' depriving the State 'of the benefit of testing the credibility
of the statements' and denying the jury 'an objective basis for weighing the
probative value of the evidence." Lizarraga, 191 Wn. App. at 558(some
alterations in original)(quoting State v. Finch, 137 Wash. 2d 792, 825, 975 P.2d 967
(1999)). "A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will be disturbed on
appeal only if there is an abuse of discretion." Aguilar, 153 Wash. App. at 275.
Here, Bacani sought to elicit testimony from three witnesses whom he
stated would all testify that Harrison had expressed to them that she enjoyed
"rough sex," "that she was into BDSM," and that "[s]he enjoyed to be choked
during the sexual activity." The defense theory was that Harrison had died of a
drug overdose and that the indications of strangulation found on her body were
caused by a consensual sex act that preceded her death.
_ Bacani's counsel never indicated to the court when Harrison allegedly
made the proffered statements or in what context the statements were made.
Neither did defense counsel proffer any evidence that Harrison had sex—or
engaged in the acts described—within the relevant window of time before her
death) Defense counsel conceded that the statements were hearsay and did
not identify any exception to the hearsay rule that would make the statements
admissible.
1 Dr. Harruff testified that it was very unlikely that Harrison was strangled more than 12
hours before her death. Thus, in order for the proffered evidence to be relevant, it was incumbent
on Bacani to establish that Harrison engaged in sex acts that included choking within the relevant
time frame. However, there is no evidence that Harrison had sex at all the day that she died, let
alone evidence that she engaged in choking during sex prior to her death.
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The trial court recognized that the limited information provided was
insufficient to make such evidence relevant. "Everything that you just told me
related to sex. She may like to be choked during sex. She may have been
engaged at some point in prostitution. If she hadn't been, if there is no evidence
to suggest that she did either one of those things sufficiently close to her death,
then that could have been the cause of those marks, then that is just pure
speculation; isn't it?" Bacani was not able to provide any further information
concerning the statements or evidence that Harrison had sex prior to her death.
Accordingly, the trial court ruled that the statements were inadmissible. The
ruling was not an abuse of the court's discretion.
Nevertheless, for the first time on appeal, Bacani asserts that the
statements were admissible pursuant to the "then existing state of mind" hearsay
exception. That exception permits the admission of:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification,
or terms of declarant's will.
ER 803(a)(3).
Although Bacani contends that the statements allegedly made by Harrison
fit "squarely within the hearsay exception," Br. of Appellant at 23, he entirely fails
to identify when Harrison was supposed to have made these statements. Under
ER 803(a)(3),"hearsay evidence is admissible if it bears on the declarant's state
of mind and if that state of mind is an issue in the case." State v. Terrovona, 105
Wash. 2d 632, 637, 716 P.2d 295(1986). Without any indication of when Harrison
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allegedly made the proffered statements, it is impossible to know whether
Harrison's "then existing state of mind" was material.
Similarly, Bacani has not established that evidence concerning Harrison's
preferred sexual practices was relevant. "To be relevant, evidence must meet
two requirements:(1)the evidence must have a tendency to prove or disprove a
fact (probative value), and (2)that fact must be of consequence in the context of
the other facts and the applicable substantive law (materiality)." State v. Rice, 48
Wash. App. 7, 12, 737 P.2d 726 (1987). Statements made by Harrison that she
enjoyed engaging in sex acts that included choking could be found to be
probative, but they are not material absent evidence that Harrison engaged in
such acts in close proximity to her death. Bacani proffered no such evidence.
The out-of-court statements allegedly made by Harrison are thus lacking both
temporality and materiality.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the proffered
evidence.2
2 Bacani also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
counsel failed to identify the "then existing state of mind" hearsay exception. Bacani asserts that,
had his counsel asserted the hearsay exception, Harrison's out-of-court statements would have
been admitted.
"Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel is established only when the defendant
shows that(1) counsel's performance, when considered in light of all the circumstances, fell
below an objectively reasonable standard of performance and (2)there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." State v. Woods, 198 Wash. App. 453, 461, 393 P.3d 886(2017)(citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). Failing to satisfy
either requirement ends the inquiry. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563
(1996). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient representation and
prejudice. In re Det. of Hatfield, 191 Wash. App. 378, 401,362 P.3d 997 (2015).
As discussed herein, Harrison's alleged statements lacked both temporality and
materiality. There is no indication in the record of when the statements were made and there is
no evidence that Harrison engaged in such conduct in close proximity to her death. Even
assuming that defense counsel had identified the "then existing state of mind" hearsay exception,
the alleged statements were not relevant and, thus, were not admissible. Counsel is not
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Ill
Bacani next contends that the trial court erred by redacting a portion of a
recording of a 911 call that was played for the jury. Bacani asserts that the trial
court's redaction violated the rule of completeness and misled the jury.
We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 571-72, 940 P.2d 546
(1997). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d at
572.
The "rule of completeness," as codified in ER 106, provides that "[w]hen a
writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse
party may require the party at that time to introduce any other part ... which
ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." The offered
statement must be relevant and must(1) explain the admitted evidence,(2) place
the admitted portions in context,(3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, and (4)
insure fair and impartial understanding of the evidence. State v. Larry, 108 Wn.
App. 894, 910, 34 P.3d 241 (2001)(citing United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d
1467, 1475(7th Cir. 1992)).
Here, Bacani placed three 911 calls on the night of Harrison's murder.
During the third 911 call, Bacani whispered to the emergency operator and
displayed paranoid behavior. Bacani identified himself on the call and stated that
ineffective for failing to assert a hearsay exception when the evidence that is sought to be
admitted is not relevant.
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he was with a female friend, "Rachel." The emergency operator asked to speak
to Rachel but Bacani refused, claiming that she was sleeping. Bacani told the
emergency operator that there was "somebody outside with a gun" waiting for
him. The emergency operator asked Bacani if he had any weapons on him and
Bacani replied, "I kill to protect myself but 1 already got two strikes so I don't want
to go there."3 The chirping sound of the smoke alarm in the apartment could be
heard in the background of the recording.
During pretrial motions, the parties agreed that there could be no
discussion during trial of the penalty that Bacani faced if convicted, including any
mention that a conviction would be Bacani's "third strike." One of Bacani's prior
convictions was for robbery—a crime of dishonesty that would be admissible for
impeachment purposes should Bacani elect to testify at trial. Defense counsel
was cognizant of the prejudicial effect of introducing evidence of past crimes.
Accordingly, defense counsel sought a ruling directing the State to refer to that
conviction as a "theft of property" conviction or as a felony involving dishonesty
should Bacani testify. The trial court denied the request. Bacani did not testify.
During trial, the State sought to play for the jury the portion of the
recording of the third 911 call in which Bacani stated, "I kill to protect myself but I
already got two strikes so I don't want to go there." Consistent with the pretrial
discussion, the prosecutor redacted the words "but I already got two strikes."
However, defense counsel objected to the redaction. Defense counsel argued
that the redacted statement, "I kill to protect myself. .. so I don't want to go
3 It is not clear whether the statement was "I kill," "I killed," or "I will kill."
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there," was confusing and led to the inference that Bacani would kill Harrison.
Defense counsel also argued that redaction of everything after "I kill to protect
myself" was likewise misleading.4
The trial court disagreed. The trial court determined that the redaction of
the "two strikes" comment was not confusing, that Bacani's utterance was highly
probative, and that the admission of the redacted utterance was not unduly
prejudicial. Defense counsel then requested that the entire utterance be played
for the jury, including the "two strikes" comment. The State objected, referencing
the pretrial ruling that evidence of prior "strikes" could not be admitted. The trial
court agreed and the redacted call was later played for the jury.
On appeal, Bacani renews his contention that the redacted 911 call was
misleading and led to the inference that Bacani would kill Harrison. Bacani also
asserts that production of the entire utterance was required pursuant to the rule
of completeness.
Bacani's assertions are unavailing. The redaction of the "two strikes"
comment was entirely appropriate and not at all misleading. First, Bacani's
statements were not directed at Harrison. Rather, the statements were made in
response to the emergency operator's questions concerning the man outside
with a gun and whether Bacani was armed. "I kill to protect myself. . . so I don't
want to go there" is not a misleading statement, was not admitted to prove
4 Defense counsel recognized that the admission of the "two strikes" comment was
"problematic." The trial court observed that defense counsel's objection "sounds like an objection
of reason. Why I am objecting is because it hurts my case."
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conformity with a character trait, and was not a statement that was directed
toward Harrison or "Rachel."
Second, defense counsel repeatedly recognized that evidence of prior
crimes and references to the three strikes policy were highly prejudicial. It would
have been damaging to Bacani's case for the jury to learn that he had previously
committed two other serious crimes. Had the trial court granted defense
counsel's request to have the "two strikes" comment played for the jury, Bacani
would now likely be asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on
appea1.5
Bacani's assertion that the rule of completeness required production of the
entire utterance is likewise meritless. The rule of completeness contemplates the
admission of other parts of a recorded statement when those parts "ought in
fairness" be considered contemporaneously with the admitted statement. ER
106. The statement that is sought to be admitted must be relevant and the trial
court must consider whether its admission will "insure a fair and impartial
understanding of all of the evidence." Velasco, 953 F.2d at 1475. As discussed
above, Bacani would have been prejudiced by the introduction of the "two strikes"
comment. Its admission would not have facilitated a fair and impartial
5 It is plain that the trial judge was aware of the unfairness to Bacani of the "two-strikes"
evidence and of the potential for appellate second-guessing had the judge admitted the entire
utterance. Bacani's appellate counsel, at oral argument, pressed the assertion that since trial
counsel sought the evidence's admission, the trial judge should simply have acquiesced. Implied
in this argument is the assurance that, after conviction, no appellate defense counsel would later
seek to exploit the trial judge's acquiescence by claiming either trial court error or ineffective
assistance of counsel in association with the admission of the greatly prejudicial "two-strikes"
statement. "It is hard to say whether this conclusion springs from a touching faith in the good
sportsmanship of criminal defense counsel or an unkind disparagement of their intelligence."
Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 286, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 185 L. Ed. 2d 85(2013)(Scalia,
J. dissenting). The trial judge's apprehension was well-warranted.
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No. 76371-7-1/12
understanding of all of the evidence. Accordingly, the rule of completeness did
not mandate its admission.
The trial court recognized that the admission of Bacani's "two strikes"
comment would be highly prejudicial and determined that the redacted statement
was relevant and not confusing or misleading. There was no abuse of
discretion.6
IV
Bacani next contends that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the
jury on voluntary intoxication. This is so, he asserts, because there was
sufficient evidence to support the theory that Bacani was under the influence of
methamphetamine at the time that Harrison was killed.
,
We review a trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction for an
abuse of discretion. In re Det. of Pouncy, 168 Wash. 2d 382, 390, 229 P.3d 678
(2010). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d at
572.
"Evidence of intoxication and its effect on the defendant may be used to
prove that the defendant was unable to form the particular mental state that is an
essential element of a crime." State v. Gallegos, 65 Wash. App. 230, 237, 828
P.2d 37(1992)(citing RCW 9A.16.090; State v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d 882, 889,
735 P.2d 64 (1987)). "However, '[i]t is well settled that to secure an intoxication
6 Bacani also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
counsel failed to argue that the rule of completeness mandated the admission of the "two strikes"
comment. Because the rule of completeness did not require the statement's admission, his claim
fails.
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No. 76371-7-1/13
instruction in a criminal case there must be substantial evidence of the effects of
the alcohol on the defendant's mind or body." Gallegos, 65 Wash. App. at 237
(alteration in original)(quoting Safeco Ins. Co. v. McGrath,63 Wn. App. 170,
179, 817 P.2d 861 (1991)).
"Under RCW 9A.16.090, it is not the fact of intoxication which is relevant,
but the degree of intoxication and the effect it had on the defendant's ability to
formulate the requisite mental state." Coates, 107 Wash. 2d at 891. A defendant is
entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction only if "(1) the crime charged has as
an element a particular mental state,(2)there is substantial evidence of drinking,
and (3)the defendant presents evidence that the drinking affected his or her
ability to acquire the required mental state."7 Gallegos, 65 Wash. App. at 238
(footnote omitted).
Here, Bacani was charged with murder in the second degree under two
alternative means. The State alleged that Bacani intended to (a) cause the death
of another person, or(b) assault another person and, in the course of and in
furtherance of that assault, caused the death of another person. RCW
9A.32.050(1)(a),(b). "A person acts with intent or intentionally when he or she
acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a
crime." RCW 9A.08.010(a). Thus, Bacani was entitled to a voluntary intoxication
instruction only if he produced substantial evidence that he was intoxicated at the
7 The term "intoxication" "refers to an impaired mental and bodily condition which may be
produced either by alcohol, which is a drug, or by any other drug." State v. Dana, 73 Wash. 2d 533,
535, 439 P.2d 403(1968).
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time that he strangled Harrison and that his intoxication affected his ability to
form the intent to assault Harrison or cause her death.
Bacani did not testify. Neither did he call an expert witness to testify
concerning intoxication. Rather, Bacani relied exclusively on the testimony of
three lay witnesses to establish that he was entitled to a voluntary intoxication
instruction. Although it is true that a defendant is "not required to present expert
testimony to establish that he or she was too intoxicated to form the necessary
mental state," the evidence presented must "contain[] substantial evidence of the
defendant's drinking and of the effects of the alcohol on the defendant's mind or
body." State v. Gabryschak, 83 Wash. App. 249, 253, 921 P.2d 549(1996)
(emphasis added).
Bacani first relies on the testimony of Latena Isabel, his cousin. Isabel
testified that, on the morning of February 3, 2015, she received a telephone call
from Bacani. Isabel testified that Bacani asked her to call 911 because he had
been hit by a car. Latena testified that she learned the following day that the 911
call was a ploy by Bacani to avoid undergoing a urinalysis for his community
corrections officer.
Bacani next relies on the testimony of Andrew Whitehead, an
acquaintance. Whitehead testified that he recalled an incident in which he
observed Bacani acting strangely and believed that Bacani was under the
influence of methamphetamine. Whitehead could not remember the exact day or
time, though he believed that this incident occurred in February, around the time
that Bacani had made several calls to Whitehead.
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Finally, Bacani relies on the 911 calls that he made the night that Harrison
was killed. Bacani asserted that his behavior on the 911 calls was erratic and
indicative of intoxication.
The evidence upon which Bacani relies establishes, at most, that he was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol at some point in time proximate to
Harrison's death. But evidence of drinking or drug use alone "is insufficient to
warrant the instruction; instead, there must be 'substantial evidence of the effects
of the alcohol on the defendant's mind or body." Gabryschak, 83 Wn. App. at
253(quoting Safeco Ins. Co., 63 Wash. App. at 179). Indeed, "[a] person can be
intoxicated and still be able to form the requisite mental state." Gabrvschak, 83
Wash. App. at 254.
None of the evidence presented at trial established that Bacani's
intoxication affected his ability to form the requisite intent to assault or kill another
person. Accordingly, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on voluntary
intoxication. There was no error.
V
Bacani next contends that the prosecutor committed flagrant misconduct,
thus depriving him of a fair trial. This is so, he asserts, because the prosecutor
repeatedly used "we" statements during closing and rebuttal argument.
To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must
show that the prosecutor's conduct was both improper and prejudicial in the
context of the entire record and circumstances at trial. State v. Miles, 139 Wn.
App. 879, 885, 162 P.3d 1169 (2007). A defendant must object to a prosecutor's
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improper argument at trial. "'[C]ounsel may not remain silent, speculating upon a
favorable verdict, and then, when it is adverse, use the claimed misconduct as a
life preserver on a motion for new trial or on appeal." State v. Reed, 168 Wn.
App. 553, 577-78, 278 P.3d 203(2012)(internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 93, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)). If a
defendant does not object to the alleged misconduct at trial, the defendant is
deemed to have waived any claim of error unless it is shown that "(1) ``no curative
instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect on the jury' and (2)the
misconduct resulted in prejudice that 'had a substantial likelihood of affecting the
jury verdict." State v. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d 741, 761, 278 P.3d 653(2012)(quoting
State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d 438, 455, 258 P.3d 43(2011)).
Here, during closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that,
although Bacani's reasons for strangling Harrison were unknown, the State did
not have to prove motive before the jury could convict. The prosecutor asked a
series of questions that remained unanswered concerning Bacani's motives and
then stated that "[t]hese questions can really only be answered by the killer."
Defense counsel interposed an objection, arguing that the prosecutor's statement
was a comment on Bacani's decision to not testify. The objection was sustained
and the jury was instructed to disregard the prosecutor's comment. Defense
counsel objected again moments later when the prosecutor continued his
argument by stating that "[w]e would love to be able to answer every question for
Annelise Harrison's family, but we can't." The jury was again instructed to
disregard the prosecutor's statement.
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The prosecutor continued his argument.
It is not a job that we have in this trial to answer every single
question. The job here is to determine if the defendant has
committed the crime he is charged with, which is murder in the
second degree. That is why these elements are the only ones that
need to be answered, the four listed up here.
Does that make sense? Of course it does. That's right. The
law is not a mystic thing. It is supposed to represent us as a
society. It represents our shared beliefs, our shared
understandings, our shared morals. The law is simply just a
codification of that.
That is what you have before you in the form of these jury
instructions, the law. At first blush it is pretty wordy and it might
seem a little complicated or confusing. But if you actually take the
time to sit down and read it. And if you are confused, read it again,
because you will see that it actually makes sense, it is because that
the law is rooted in our common intellectual sense and our shared
common moral sense.
Bacani again objected to the prosecutor's argument, stating simply, "Objection,
Your Honor,'our shared common moral sense?" The objection was overruled.
The prosecutor continued his closing argument. Throughout his
argument, the prosecutor made various "we" statements:"We have loads of
independent evidence," "[w]e know that. . . it matches the paint that is in that
apartment,"We still have more evidence of a violent struggle." The prosecutor
ended his closing argument using the same language.
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, we spent a lot of
time together. I thank you for your attention during these closing
remark[s]. We have met a lot of witnesses. We have heard a lot of
testimony. We have seen a lot of evidence.
Based on that evidence, we know what happened back on
February 2nd, 2015. The evidence is clear. The evidence is
overwhelming. That is that on that day, in the State of Washington,
Justin Bacani, the defendant, committed intentional murder, which
means that he acted with intent to cause the death of Annelise
Harrison and Annelise Harrison died as a result of those acts;
and/or, he committed felony murder, meaning that he . . .
committed or attempted to commit assault in the second degree,
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No. 76371-7-1/18
which again is strangulation assault, that he caused the death of
Annelise Harrison in the course of that crime and Annelise Harrison
was not a participant.
We know those things to be true. We know it beyond a
reasonable doubt. We know what has to happen next. The
defendant must be found guilty as charged of the crime of murder
in the second degree.
It is the only conclusion that makes sense. It makes sense
from the evidence. It makes sense with your intellect. It makes
sense up here.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial immediately following the
prosecutor's argument. However, counsel did not do so to object to the
prosecutor's use of "we" statements. Instead, defense counsel argued,"Well,
Your Honor, there is addressing objections we do feel compelled — I understand
that you struck what was said and you told the jury to disregard. We do think it is
our responsibility to again request a mistrial as a result of those sorts of
statements being made in closing arguments. . . . We think that being heard,
period, so prejudices things that Mr. Bacani can't get a fair trial."
The trial court disagreed that a mistrial was the only available remedy.
I instructed the jurors to disregard those comments. I
believe that is the appropriate remedy. If you would like for me to
give an instruction when they come out that the attorney's
arguments are not itself evidence, the evidence is the testimony,
the exhibits that were admitted, I can. But otherwise, I think that
that would be the only remedy that would be left. But I certainly
don't feel that a mistrial is appropriate. You haven't shown any
prejudice to your client to his ability to have a fair trial.
Defense counsel did not request a curative instruction.
On appeal, Bacani contends that the prosecutor's use of"we" statements
constituted misconduct. Bacani asserts that the use of"we" statements were
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manifestations of the prosecutor's personal opinion and were an attempt to align
the jury with the State.
A
As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether Bacani has waived
his claim of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to object to the prosecutor's use
of "we" statements during closing argument.
Bacani contends that a motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial
misconduct necessarily preserves for appeal any specific claim of misconduct.
Thus, he avers, because he moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's
references to a "shared moral sense" and statement that "we would love to be
able to answer every question," his claim of misconduct based on the
prosecutor's "we" statements was not waived. In support of this assertion,
Bacani relies on State v. Lindsay, 180 Wash. 2d 423, 326 P.3d 125 (2014).
Bacani's reliance is misplaced. Lindsay concerned prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument and a subsequent motion for a mistrial
based on that misconduct. 180 Wash. 2d at 441. Although defense counsel in
Lindsay did not interpose an objection to each and every instance of
prosecutorial misconduct throughout the course of closing argument, defense
counsel did identify a number of improper statements made by the prosecutor in
the subsequent motion fora mistrial. The judge ruled that the prosecutor's
comments were not improper and, accordingly, denied the motion. On appeal,
defense counsel relied on the same statements identified in the motion for a
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mistrial as the basis for the claim of misconduct. Lindsay, 180 Wash. 2d at 431,
441.
The Supreme Court held that the motion for a mistrial in Lindsay served
the same function as a contemporaneous objection. The trial court was given an
opportunity to rule on each asserted basis for misconduct. This gave the trial
court "a chance to correct the problem with a curative instruction." Lindsay, 180
Wash. 2d at 441. Accordingly, the court ruled that the issue was adequately
preserved for review.
Here, defense counsel never identified the prosecutor's use of"we"
statements as a basis for misconduct, either in the form of a contemporaneous
objection or as a basis for a mistrial. Defense counsel never objected to or
identified in the motion for a mistrial any statement that constituted a personal
opinion of the prosecutor or that was intended to align the jury with the State.
Thus, the trial court was never given an opportunity to rule on whether these
statements constituted misconduct, let alone issue a curative instruction.
Moreover, it also appears that defense counsel made a tactical decision to
not object to the prosecutor's use of "we" statements. First, defense counsel
waited until the end of the prosecutor's closing argument before moving for a
mistrial, despite the prosecutor's frequent use of "we" statements throughout the
lengthy argument. Had defense counsel objected to the use of"we" statements
during closing argument, the issue could have been resolved immediately
through a curative instruction. But defense counsel waited until after closing
argument before moving for a mistrial and then tacitly declined the trial court's
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No. 76371-7-1/21
offer of a curative instruction. This suggests that defense counsel was not
interested in addressing any perceived misconduct at the outset but, rather,
intended to let the wound fester until a mistrial was the only available remedy.
Second, after the trial court denied Bacani's motion for a mistrial, defense
counsel elected to use the same tactics during his closing argument. Defense
counsel repeatedly argued to the jury that "we don't know" various aspects of
what occurred the night that Harrison was killed. Defense counsel also argued
that "[w]e know" that Bacani did not hide from the police and that "[w]e can know
that he tried to say where he was. We know that."
In any event, even if Bacani has not waived his claim, we conclude that
the prosecutor's argument does not constitute misconduct.
It is improper for a prosecutor to personally vouch for the credibility of a
witness. State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 175, 892 P.2d 29(1995). "'Vouching
may occur in two ways: the prosecution may place the prestige of the
government behind the witness or may indicate that information not presented to
the jury supports the witness's testimony." State v. Robinson, 189 Wash. App.
877, 892-93, 359 P.3d 874(2015)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting
State v. Coleman, 155 Wash. App. 951, 957, 231 P.3d 212(2010)). "Prejudicial
error will not be found unless it is 'clear and unmistakable' that counsel is
expressing a personal opinion." State v. Allen, 161 Wash. App. 727, 746, 255 P.3d
784(2011)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Brett, 126 Wash. 2d at 175),
affirmed, 176 Wash. 2d 611, 294 P.3d 679 (2013).
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No. 76371-7-1/22
Courts have routinely chastised prosecutors for the use of"we"
statements. See United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1191 (9th Cir. 2005)
(a prosecutor's use of"we know" "readily blurs the line between improper
vouching and legitimate summary"); United States v. Bentley, 561 F.3d 803, 812
(8th Cir. 2009)(it is improper to use "we know"when it suggests that the
government has special knowledge of evidence not presented to the jury, carries
an implied guarantee of truthfulness, or expresses a personal opinion about
credibility"); State v. Mavhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 790(Minn. 2006)("[A]
prosecutor is not a member of the jury, so to use 'we' and 'us' is inappropriate
and may be an effort to appeal to the jury's passions."). However, a prosecutor's
use of"we" in argument is unlikely to warrant reversal. See Robinson, 189 Wn.
App. at 894-95(a prosecutor's use of"we" to marshal evidence is not
misconduct).
Here, the prosecutor's use of"we" did not constitute misconduct. Rather,
the prosecutor's argument was an attempt—though perhaps unarfful—to marshal
evidence. "The evidence is clear. The evidence is overwhelming... . We know
those things to be true." Here, as in Robinson, the prosecutor's use of"we" did
not imply any special knowledge, express a personal opinion, or attempt to
appeal to the jury's passions. 189 Wash. App. at 894-95.
There was no misconduct.
VI
Finally, Bacani contends that cumulative errors mandate the reversal of
his conviction. Bacani has not demonstrated any trial court error. There is
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nothing to accumulate. Accordingly, his contention does not warrant appellate
relief.
Affirmed.
We concur:
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