Juanita Country Club Condo Owners Assoc., App v. Phillips Real Estate Services, L.l.c., Resp ( 2019 )


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  •            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    JUANITA COUNTRY CLUB                        )     No. 77569-3-I
    CONDOMINIUM OWNERS                          )
    ASSOCIATION, a Washington                   )     DIVISION ONE
    non-profit corporation,                     )
    Appellant,)
    )
    v.                     )          UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    PHILLIPS REAL ESTATE SERVICES, )
    L.L.C., a Washington limited liability )
    corporation,                           )
    )
    Respondent.     )          FILED: March 4, 2019
    SCHINDLER,   J.   —   In 2012, Juanita Country Club Condominium Owners
    Association (Association) entered into a management agreement with Phillips Real
    Estate Services LLC (Phillips). In 2016, the Association filed a lawsuit against Phillips
    alleging breach of contract. The court granted Phillips’ motion for summary judgment
    and dismissed the claims against Phillips. Because the parties modified the standard of
    care in the management agreement in writing and there are material issues of fact
    whether Phillips breached the reasonable care standard, we reverse summary judgment
    dismissal of the claims against Phillips, vacate the award of attorney fees, and remand.
    No. 77569-3-112
    FACTS
    In June 2012, Juanita Country Club Condominium Owners Association
    (Association) entered into a “Management Agreement” with Phillips Real Estate
    Services LLC (Phillips). The agreement gives Phillips the authority and duty to
    “supervise the management and maintenance” of the Association.
    The Management Agreement defines Phillips as the “Agent.” Section 2 of the
    agreement describes the “DUTIES OF AGENT.” Section 2.1, “Management Duties,”
    states Phillips will “[m]aintain businesslike relations with members and respond in
    systematic fashion to requests for services from the” Association board of directors
    (Board); “[o]versee modernization, rehabilitation, and major construction projects”; and
    “[p]repare special reports in accordance with requests by the Board.” Section 2.2 states
    Phillips is responsible for “Fiscal and Accounting,” specifically:
    a.     Preparation of an annual budget at least 60 days prior to the end of
    the fiscal accounting year, subject to final approval by the Board.
    b.     Receipt and posting of individual Association member dues to
    individual account records.
    c.     Collection of assessments as provided in the Declaration and follow
    upon all delinquencies to effectuate collection of all amounts owed.
    d.     Preparation and mailing of delinquency notice(s) as directed by the
    Board.
    e.     Timely preparation of payroll checks and accurate record keeping
    of payroll time sheets for Association personnel.
    f.      Make payment on invoices, utility bills and other common expenses
    as approved by the Board and consistent with section 2.1.
    g.      Monthly preparation and distribution of Statement of Cash Receipts
    and Disbursements as directed by the Board.
    h.     Preparation and distribution of annual financial reports as directed
    by the Board.
    Preparation of correspondence and reports regarding finances as
    requested by the Board.
    j.      Assist in performance of audits in cooperation with auditors
    appointed by the Association.
    2
    No. 77569-3-1/3
    Section 2.5 states Phillips shall “[m]aintain all financial records of the Association and its
    members” and “[m]aintain complete files for all major repairs and expenditures made to
    common areas.”
    In early 2013, the Association obtained a construction loan to repair the roof of
    the condominiums. The Association planned to repay the loan with a “special
    assessment” against each condominium owner. The Board resolution for the special
    assessment states, ‘In the event of a surplus in special assessment payments
    collected, whether due to Project cost savings, high collection rates, or any other
    reason, those funds shall be committed to the Association’s reserve accounts.”
    The Board agreed condominium owners could pay the assessment with monthly
    payments for 15 years and had the option to pay the assessment early. The monthly
    payments included principal and interest. The interest rate on the installment payments
    was the same as the interest rate on the construction loan. Because the loan required
    interest-only payments for the first year, those payments were not applied toward
    principal in the first year. Some condominium owners exercised the option to pay the
    special assessment early. As a result, the Association initially collected more than it
    was required to pay on the loan.
    On September 23, 2013, Association Board president Frank Sloan sent an e-mail
    to Phillips president Timothy Pfohl and manager Terry Hughes about a “number of
    issues.” The e-mail states that “it appears that items are being forgotten and or not
    being followed through on” and identifies “Monthly Financials not being posted for
    3
    No. 77569-3-1/4
    HOA,”1 “Loan monthly accounting,” and “Penalties, Rental accounting and letters to
    offenders.” Hughes responded to the e-mail the next day on September 24:
    You have not received your August financials yet as they were incorrect. I
    have our financial lead correcting them now and will have them to you as
    soon as I can.
    The warning letters all went out when directed and there has been some
    response from them. I have not received any updates on them. I am
    working on the rental list (I sent you my most recent copies) and getting all
    the leases, etc. That is taking some time, but I am getting some response
    from those investor owners.
    On October 31, Phillips finance director William Holguin sent an e-mail to Sloan
    about the need to correct the accounts for dues and the special assessment:
    I wanted to provide you an update on status of the adjustments and
    review. We have been working diligently on the Juanita Country Club
    financial information and making a tremendous amount of progress.
    Tomorrow, I will be able to forward you a report outlining up to date history
    on the special assessment accounts and regular dues accounts. We do
    have one owner’s ledger that may need to be adjusted, but everything
    else has been carefully reviewed. All items that sho[we]d up in the regular
    ledger that should have been in the Special Assessment ledger have been
    moved to their correct spot. You should be receiving an email from
    [Hughes] or me sometime tomorrow containing an update of all the tenant
    ledgers balances.
    On November 5, Sloan sent an e-mail to Hughes, Pfohl, and Holguin pointing out
    accounting errors:
    [Y]our numbers are not correct.. .1 don’t about [sic] anyone else but our unit
    1-102 accounting states we have paid no monies toward the roof’? I want
    a letter to each owner regarding their unit and the current accounting you
    have and allow them to audit their account both the DUES and SPECIAL
    ASSESSMENT.
    If my accounting via the email from [Holguin] is supposed to be update[d]
    and correct then there are issues. I have spen[t] the weekend retrieving
    all payments to the HOA is B[ank] of A[merica]. .and both my dues which
    . .
    should be reduced is at ($176) monthly....wrong but I will check with the
    1   Homeowner association.
    4
    No. 77569-3-1/5
    others and see what their reduction is currently at  Special Assessment
    ($76) monthly9 we will pay [$]4k this month.. .and reduce that amount....
    This is just my account [I] am afraid to hear from othersj2]
    On November 19, Sloan sent an e-mail to Pfohl concerning Hughes’ “lack of
    accounting knowledge” and problems with “co-mingling the Dues and Assessment.”
    Pfohl responded:
    On the accounting dep[artmen]t     I saw the shortcomings and made a
    —
    key hire about 6 months ago    Mary J0 Bennett. Knows condo[3]
    —
    bookkeeping in and out.    .She is oversight of all our condo bookkeepers
    .   .
    now so will see vast improvement there. That’s a promise.
    Very disappointed on the accounting items. Accounting has to be one of
    the foundations upon which we build our relationships and reputation. No
    ifs, ands, or buts about it. There has been and will continue to be vast
    improvement. I guarantee it.
    On November 28, 2014, Sloan sent a letter to Pfohl about the “continuous
    accounting issues regarding our Monthly Dues/Assessment Loan” and the intent to
    terminate the Management Agreement with Phillips. But after assurances from Pfohl,
    Sloan agreed to “try to work it out.” After the Board meeting on July 27, 2015, Phillips
    decided to terminate the Management Agreement with the Association effective
    September 1, 2015.
    The Association retained accountant Andrew McAlister and Emerald City
    Management & Consulting LLC to reconcile the “many discrepancies” in the accounting.
    In 2016, the bank rejected the Association’s application for a loan “because of
    the state of the accounting.” The Association hired consultant and loan broker Rebekah
    Baze to manage the accounting and help obtain the loan.
    2 Ellipses in original.
    ~ Condominium.
    5
    No. 77569-3-1/6
    On May 12, 2016, the Association filed a lawsuit against Phillips. The complaint
    alleged (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) breach of implied
    duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Association alleged Phillips breached the
    Management Agreement by failing to properly manage the special assessments,
    conduct audits, manage rental restrictions, record an amended declaration, and
    charging the Association for services it did not perform.
    Phillips propounded interrogatories, asking the Association to “[i]temize the
    damages claimed by you against defendant in this litigation, and describe how you
    calculated each category of damages.” In answer to the interrogatory, the Association
    identified (1) the failure of Hughes “to pass along increase in loan adjustable rate to
    owners” and “to transfer approximately $1 50,000[.00] in funds from Mutual of Omaha
    Bank to Alliance Bank,” (2) the failure of Phillips “to conduct audits for 2013 and 2014
    and to timely forward to accountant 2010-12 audits,” (3) the failure of Hughes and
    property manager Vickie Tolson to “manage rental restrictions” and identify delinquent
    renters, and (4) the failure of Tolson to record the amended declaration for
    approximately two to three months. The Association claimed $32,092.50 in damages
    plus attorney fees.
    The case was transferred to mandatory arbitration on February 7, 2017. The
    arbitrator filed an award on June 16, 2017. On June 22, the Association filed a request
    for a trial de novo, a jury demand, and a request to seal the award. The superior court
    sealed the award and issued the case schedule order on June 26.
    The Association filed supplemental interrogatory responses claiming additional
    damages of $34,897.50 for a total of $66,990.00 plus attorney fees.
    6
    No. 77569-3-1/7
    The Association filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the standard of
    care under the terms of the Management Agreement. The Association argued section
    10 of the Management Agreement that limits the responsibility of Phillips to willful
    misconduct and gross negligence violated the law that regulates the actions of real
    estate agents and brokers, chapter 18.86 RCW.
    Phillips filed a motion for summary judgment dismissal of the lawsuit. Phillips
    argued the provision of the agreement that limits its responsibility to willful misconduct
    and gross negligence did not violate chapter 18.86 RCW and the evidence did not
    support the breach of that duty.
    The court denied the Association’s motion for partial summary judgment. The
    court ruled the willful misconduct and gross negligence standard in the Management
    Agreement did not violate chapter 18.86 RCW. The court dismissed the claims for
    failure to record the amended declaration and “failure to manage rentals” but did not
    dismiss the accounting claims. The order states:
    (1)    Section 10 of the Management Agreement is enforceable and plaintiff
    will   be required to prove gross negligence or willful misconduct at trial;
    (2)    Plaintiff[’]s claims for failure to record, and failure to manage rentals
    are    dismissed;
    (3)    Only plaintiff[’]s accounting failure claims remain.
    On reconsideration, the court concluded the Association did not present evidence to
    show willful misconduct or gross negligence to support the accounting claims. The
    court entered an order dismissing the lawsuit. The court awarded Phillips attorney fees
    and costs in the amount of $79,837 plus interest.
    7
    No. 77569-3-1/8
    ANALYSIS
    Chapter 18.86 RCW
    The Association contends the court erred by concluding section 10 of the
    Management Agreement did not violate chapter 18.86 RCW. Section 10 limits Phillips’
    duty under the Management Agreement to “willful misconduct or gross negligence.”
    The Association asserts section 10 violates RCW 18.86.030(1). RCW
    18.86.030(1)(a) states an agent who “renders real estate brokerage services” cannot
    waive the duty to exercise reasonable care. Phillips contends the statutory duty of
    reasonable care under RCW 18.86.030(1)(a) does not apply to “common interest
    community managers” that provide only management and financial services under
    chapter 18.85 RCW.
    “Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Williams v.
    Tilaye, 
    174 Wash. 2d 57
    , 61, 
    272 P.3d 235
    (2012). We look first to the text of a statute to
    determine its meaning. Griffin v. Thurston County Bd. of Health, 
    165 Wash. 2d 50
    , 55, 
    196 P.3d 141
    (2008). If a statute is plain and unambiguous, the meaning of the statute must
    be determined from the wording of the statute itself. W. Telepaqe, Inc. v. City of
    Tacoma Dept of Fin., 
    140 Wash. 2d 599
    , 608-09, 
    998 P.2d 884
    (2000). Statutes are read
    together to achieve a harmonious statutory scheme that maintains the integrity of the
    respective statutes. Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 
    117 Wash. 2d 606
    , 614,
    
    817 P.2d 1373
    (1991).
    Chapter 18.85 RCW and chapter 18.86 RCW regulate and govern the activities
    of real estate agents and brokers. Under RCW 18.86.030(1)(a), the duty to use
    “reasonable skill and care” applies only to a broker or agent who renders “real estate
    8
    No. 77569-3-1/9
    brokerage services under chapter 18.85 RCW.” ROW 18.86.010(11) defines “real
    estate brokerage services” as “the rendering of services for which a real estate license
    is required.” RCW 18.85.151(12) exempts “[c]ommon interest community managers
    who   .   .   .   provide management or financial services” from obtaining a broker’s license “if
    they do not promote the purchase, listing, sale, exchange, optioning, leasing, or renting
    of a specific real property interest.”
    Because the Management Agreement and the record establishes Phillips was
    acting as a common interest community manager for the Association, not as a provider
    of real estate brokerage services, section 10 of the Management Agreement does not
    violate ROW 18.86.030(1).
    Written Modification of the Management Agreement
    In the alternative, the Association contends the parties modified the terms of the
    Management Agreement in writing to adopt reasonable care and not willful misconduct
    or gross negligence.
    Contract interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. Dave Johnson
    Ins., Inc. v. Wright, 
    167 Wash. App. 758
    , 769, 
    275 P.3d 339
    (2012). Washington courts
    follow the objective manifestation theory of contracts. Berg v. Hudesman, 
    115 Wash. 2d 657
    , 663, 
    801 P.2d 222
    (1990); Hearst Oommc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 
    154 Wash. 2d 493
    , 503, 
    115 P.3d 262
    (2005). “[W]e attempt to determine the parties’ intent by
    focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement, rather than on the
    unexpressed subjective intent of the parties.” 
    Hearst, 154 Wash. 2d at 503
    . We “impute
    an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of the words used.” 
    Hearst, 154 Wash. 2d at 503
    . We give words in a contract their ordinary and usual meaning “unless
    9
    No. 77569-3-1/10
    the entirety of the agreement clearly demonstrates a contrary intent.” 
    Hearst, 154 Wash. 2d at 504
    . ‘Interpretations giving lawful effect to all the provisions in a contract are
    favored over those that render some of the language meaningless or ineffective.” Grey
    v. Leach, 
    158 Wash. App. 837
    , 850, 
    244 P.3d 970
    (2010).
    The plain and unambiguous language of section 9 of the Management
    Agreement, “AGREEMENT TO BE CHANGED IN WRITING ONLY,” states, “This
    Agreement shall constitute the entire Agreement between the contracting parties, and
    no variance or modification thereof shall be valid and enforceable, except by an
    agreement in writing.”4
    Section 8, “REAL ESTATE AGENCY LAW,” states, “Association acknowledges
    the receipt from Agent of a pamphlet on the law of real estate agency as required by
    RCW 18.86.030(1).” A Phillips representative and an Association representative
    inserted the following handwritten language, “Honesty, Good Faith, Reasonable Care,
    Material Facts.”
    Section 10, “RESPONSIBILITY,” states:
    Agent shall be responsible for willful misconduct or gross negligence but
    shall not be held responsible for any matters relating to error of judgment,
    or for any mistakes of fact or law, or for anything, which it may do or
    refrain from doing which does not include any willful misconduct or gross
    negligence. Agent shall not be responsible for acts or omissions of
    independent contractors engaged by Agent on behalf of the Association.
    The Management Agreement establishes the parties modified the terms of the
    agreement in writing. Both parties initialed and acknowledged the handwritten change
    “Emphasis added.
    10
    No. 77569-3-Ill 1
    to the standard of care.
    8.0      REAL ESTATE AGENCY LAW
    Association acknowledges the receipt from Agent of a pam        on the law of real estate agency s required by RCW 18.86.030(1.
    9.0      AGREEMENT TO BE CHANGED IN WRITiNG ONL                  7
    ~ ~ b1f~/
    /
    f
    This Agreement shall constitute the entire Agreement between the contracting parties and no variance or modification thereof chall
    be valid and enforceable, except by an agreement in writIng.
    10.0      RESPONSIBILI1Y
    Agent shall be responsible for willful misconduct or gross negligence but shall not be held responsible for any matters relating to
    error ofjudgment or for any mistakes of fact or law or for anything~ which it may do or refrain from doing which does not include any
    willful miscondi.~ct or gross negligence. Agent shall not be responsible for the acts or emissions of Independent contractors engaged
    by Agent on behalf of the Association,
    Because the handwritten modification prevails over the conflicting printed willful
    misconduct or gross negligence provision in section 10, the handwritten reasonable
    care standard controls. Green River Valley Found., Inc. v. Foster, 
    78 Wash. 2d 245
    , 249,
    
    473 P.2d 844
    (1970).
    Summary Judgment Dismissal of Claims
    The Association contends the court erred by dismissing its breach of contract
    claims for failure to present evidence of gross negligence or willful misconduct. Philips
    contends that even if a reasonable care standard applies, the Association did not
    present evidence to establish breach or damages to support its claims.
    We review summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial
    court. Kruse v. Hemp, 
    121 Wash. 2d 715
    , 722, 
    853 P.2d 1373
    (1993). Summary judgment
    is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show there is no genuine
    issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law. CR 56(c); Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 
    129 Wash. 2d 43
    , 48, 
    914 P.2d 728
    (1996).
    The defendant on summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of
    evidence to support the plaintiff’s case. Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 
    112 Wash. 2d 216
    ,
    11
    No. 77569-3-l112
    225, 
    770 P.2d 182
    (1989). If the moving party shows an absence of a genuine issue of
    material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. 
    Youncj, 112 Wash. 2d at 225
    .
    Only when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion on the evidence
    should the court grant summary judgment. Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co., 
    150 Wash. 2d 478
    ,
    485, 
    78 P.3d 1274
    (2003). In conducting this inquiry, the court must view all facts and
    reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Keck v.
    Collins, 
    184 Wash. 2d 358
    , 370, 
    357 P.3d 1080
    (2015). Where different competing
    inferences may be drawn from the evidence, the issue must be resolved by the trier of
    fact. Hudesman v. Foley, 
    73 Wash. 2d 880
    , 889, 
    441 P.2d 532
    (1968); Kuyper v. Dep’t of
    Wildlife, 
    79 Wash. App. 732
    , 739, 
    904 P.2d 793
    (1995).
    The Association contends material issues of fact preclude summary judgment
    dismissal of its claim that Phillips breached a reasonable care standard in providing
    fiscal and accounting services.
    Section 2.2 of the Management Agreement addresses the “[f]iscal and
    accounting services” Phillips is responsible for providing. The fiscal and accounting
    services include “[r]eceipt and posting of individual Association member dues to
    individual account records” and “[c]ollection of assessments.”
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Association, there are
    material issues of fact as to whether Phillips breached the standard of reasonable care
    in performing fiscal and accounting duties. In September 2013, Phillips reported to the
    Association, ‘You have not received your August financials yet as they were incorrect.”
    On October 31, Phillips assured the Association, “All items that sho[we]d up in the
    regular ledger that should have been in the Special Assessment ledger have been
    12
    No. 77569-3-1/13
    moved to their correct spot.” On November 5, the Association informed Phillips, “[Yjour
    numbers are not correct.    .   .   .   I want a letter to each owner regarding their unit and the
    current accounting you have and allow them to audit their account both the DUES and
    SPECIAL ASSESSMENT.” On November 19, Phillips admitted there were continuing
    ‘shortcomings” in its accounting, stating, “Very disappointed on the accounting items.
    Accounting has to be one of the foundations upon which we build our relationships and
    reputation. No ifs, ands, or buts about it. There has been and will continue to be vast
    improvement.” The Association also presented evidence that it was unable to obtain a
    loan from its lender “because of the state of the accounting” and could obtain the loan
    only after hiring consultant and loan broker Rebekah Baze.
    The Association contends there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether
    Phillips breached the Management Agreement by failing to collect delinquent fees and
    manage rental restrictions. Phillips argues it had no duty to collect delinquent fees or
    manage rental restrictions. The Management Agreement does not support Phillips’
    argument. The Management Agreement defines Phillips’ duties broadly. The
    agreement states Phillips has the duty to “follow up on all delinquencies to effectuate
    collection of all amounts owed.”
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Association, the record
    shows manager Hughes assured the Association she was addressing past-due
    amounts owed. In a September 24, 2013 e-mail, Hughes states the “warning letters all
    went out when directed” and she was “working on the rental list.” On November 5,
    Sloan sent an e-mail asking Hughes, “Did you send out [t]he letter regarding renting this
    unit’?   I have not seen it and as I stated many times.. .please contact the owner of 1105
    13
    No. 77569-3-1/14
    and let him know he owes [$1500 move in fee.”5 We conclude there are material issues
    of fact as to whether Phillips breached the standard of reasonable care in failing to
    facilitate and manage delinquent fees.
    The Association contends there are material issues of fact as to whether Phillips
    breached the standard of reasonable care by delaying the approval and filing of the
    amended declaration. Phillips argues the Association did not present any evidence of
    delay or damages.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Association, there are
    material issues of fact related to the delay between December 2014 and May 2015 and
    whether the delay was the proximate cause of the Association’s damages. In
    December 2014, the Association decided to amend the declaration to make an owner
    responsible for water damage to the condominium unit. The Association attorney
    drafted and e-mailed the final documents for the amended declaration to property
    manager Tolson with instructions to begin the owner approval process by early
    December. The e-mail provides directions on providing notice to each condominium
    owner and states the documents “are designed to allow owners to consent by mail,
    without a meeting.” Tolson did not record the amended declaration until late May. The
    undisputed record shows Phillips did not record the amended declaration until May 29,
    2015. In the interim, there was water damage to a condominium unit in April. An April
    15 e-mail states that because the amended declaration “is not recorded yet,” the
    Association is liable for the repairs.
    ~ Ellipses in original.
    14
    No. 77569-3-1/15
    We reverse summary judgment dismissal of the lawsuit against Phillips, vacate
    the award of attorney fees, and remand.
    ~ h``!’              ~
    WE CONCUR:
    2~wf\4
    f
    /(
    15