Friends Of Clark County And Futurewise, V Clark County ( 2019 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
August 20, 2019
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
CLARK COUNTY, No. 50847-8-II
Petitioner/Cross Respondent, (Consolidated)
FRIENDS OF CLARK COUNTY;
FUTUREWISE,
Respondents/Cross Petitioners,
and
CITY OF RIDGEFIELD; CITY OF LA
CENTER; RDGB ROYAL ESTATE FARMS
LLC; RDGK REST VIEW ESTATES LLC;
RDGM RAWHIDE ESTATES LLC, RDGF
RIVER VIEW ESTATES LLC, RDGS
REAL VIEW LLC, and 3B NORTHWEST
LLC,
Petitioners,
and
CLARK COUNTY CITIZENS UNITED,
INC.,
Petitioners,
v.
GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS
BOARD,
Respondent.
No. 50847-8-II;
Cons. 51745-1-II
CLARK COUNTY, No. 51745-1-II
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,
FRIENDS OF CLARK COUNTY;
FUTUREWISE,
Respondents/Cross Petitioners,
and
CITY OF RIDGEFIELD; CITY OF LA
CENTER; RDGB ROYAL ESTATE FARMS
LLC; RDGK REST VIEW ESTATES LLC;
RDGM RAWHIDE ESTATES LLC, RDGF
RIVER VIEW ESTATES LLC, RDGS
REAL VIEW LLC, and 3B NORTHWEST
LLC,
Petitioners,
and
CLARK COUNTY CITIZENS UNITED,
INC.,
Petitioners,
v. PART PUBLISHED OPINION
GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS
BOARD,
Respondent.
WORSWICK, J. — The Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, requires
Clark County to periodically update its comprehensive land use and zoning plan. Clark County
updated its plan in 2016 (2016 Plan Update), making several changes to the County’s
comprehensive plan.
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The Friends of Clark County and Futurewise (FOCC), as well as Clark County Citizens
United (CCCU), petitioned the Growth Management Hearings Board (Board) to review the 2016
Plan Update for compliance with the GMA. The City of Ridgefield, City of La Center, 3B
Northwest LLC (3B), and five other individual LLCs1 intervened in that action.
The Board issued its Final Decision and Order (FDO), which concluded, in part, that the
County did not comply with the GMA when it (1) dedesignated three areas of agricultural land
and designated these lands as urban growth areas (UGA), (2) dedesignated agricultural land and
designated this area as a rural industrial land bank (RILB), (3) reduced agricultural and
forestland parcel sizes, and (4) adjusted rural densities. However, the Board concluded that the
County complied with the procedural requirements of the GMA.
The County took some efforts to come into compliance, after which the Board issued a
compliance order. The Board concluded that the County remained noncompliant regarding
dedesignating agricultural land for two UGAs and the RILB but that it had complied regarding
one UGA, the agricultural and forestland parcel sizes, and rural densities.
The parties appeal both the FDO and the compliance order. Additionally, FOCC moves
to dismiss the County’s and 3B’s petitions for judicial review of the FDO for lack of appellate
jurisdiction because they did not properly and timely serve their petitions for judicial review.
The County, La Center, Ridgefield, and the LLCs argue that the Board’s finding of the
County’s noncompliance regarding the County’s UGA designations are moot and that the Board
acted arbitrarily and capriciously by requiring the County to take further action regarding these
1
RDGB Royal Estate Farms LLC, RDGK Rest View Estates LLC, RDGM Rawhide Estates
LLC, RDGF River View Estates LLC, and RDGS Real View LLC.
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UGAs. The County also argues that the Board erroneously interpreted a rule regarding
agricultural lands and erred when it concluded that the County violated the GMA by
dedesignating agricultural lands for the RILB.
CCCU argues that the Board erred by concluding that the County complied with the
GMA’s procedural requirements regarding public participation, an issue paper, and source
documents, and that the County complied with the GMA regarding designations of agricultural
and forestlands, population projections, and private property considerations. CCCU further
argues that the Board erred by concluding the County violated the GMA when the County
reduced parcel sizes of agricultural and forestland.
FOCC argues that the compliance order erroneously declared issues to be moot regarding
readopted forestland and rural density provision from the County’s prior comprehensive plan.
We grant FOCC’s motion to dismiss the County’s and 3B’s petitions for judicial review
of the FDO, for lack of appellate jurisdiction. In the published portion of our opinion, we hold
that issues regarding the annexed lands are moot. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we
hold that the Board did not err regarding the remaining issues raised by CCCU and FOCC, and
remand to the Board for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
FACTS
The County adopted the 2016 Plan Update by Amended Ordinance No. 2016-06-12 on
June 28, 2016. In this update, the County dedesignated three areas of agricultural land and
designated these lands as UGAs, dedesignated an area of agricultural land and designated this
land as RILB, reduced agricultural and forestland parcel sizes, and adjusted rural densities.
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Two of the newly designated UGAs were adjacent to the cities of La Center and
Ridgefield. Immediately following the 2016 Plan Update’s passage, La Center and Ridgefield
began the process of annexing these adjacent UGAs into their respective cities.
FOCC and CCCU petitioned the Board regarding the 2016 Plan Update. The Board
consolidated these appeals. La Center, Ridgefield, 3B, and the LLCs intervened. Prior to the
Board’s decision, La Center passed an ordinance annexing its adjacent UGA, effective on
August 29, 2016. Ridgefield passed an ordinance annexing its adjacent UGA, effective on
October 14, 2016.
The Board issued its FDO on March 23, 2017. The Board determined some provisions
invalid and found other provisions noncompliant. 2 The Board concluded, in part, that the
County did not comply with the GMA when it (1) dedesignated agricultural land and designated
the UGAs, (2) dedesignated agricultural land and designated the RILB, (3) reduced agricultural
and forestland parcel sizes, and (4) adjusted rural densities. Further, the Board made
determinations of invalidity regarding the County’s UGA designations. The Board remanded the
2016 Plan Update to the County for the County to come into compliance with the GMA.
The County, Ridgefield, La Center, the LLCs, and CCCU filed petitions for review of the
Board’s FDO in superior court. Those petitions were consolidated by stipulation of the parties.
FOCC sought direct review of the Board’s FDO, and we granted review.
After the Board remanded the 2016 Plan Update, and while appeal of the FDO was
pending, the County adopted new amendments to its comprehensive plan that returned the parcel
2
The Board did not make separate findings of fact and conclusions of law for each issue it
addressed. Rather, the Board conducted its analysis, citing evidence, and then usually stated,
“The Board finds and concludes . . . .” See, e.g.¸ AR at 10499.
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sizes and rural densities to their previous designations before the 2016 Plan Update amendments.
The County also reversed one UGA designation during this period; however, the County did not
take remedial action regarding the UGAs annexed by Ridgefield and La Center, arguing that it
could not change the designation of land no longer within its control.
The Board issued a compliance order on January 10, 2018, concluding that the parcel
sizes and rural density issues were moot and compliant because the County had adopted
previously GMA-compliant provisions. The Board also concluded that the County was not in
compliance regarding the UGAs annexed by La Center and Ridgefield.
Subsequently, Ridgefield, La Center, the County, the LLCs, 3B, and FOCC sought direct
review of the Board’s compliance order and consolidation with the review of the FDO. We
accepted direct review of the compliance order and consolidated the appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. MOTION TO DISMISS
As an initial matter, we address FOCC’s motion to dismiss the County’s and 3B’s
petitions for judicial review of the Board’s FDO. FOCC argues that this court lacks subject
matter, or appellate, jurisdiction because the County and 3B failed to timely serve the Board with
their respective petitions for judicial review as required by RCW 34.05.542, due to their failure
to deliver their petitions for judicial review to the Board within 30 days. Thus, FOCC argues
that the County’s and 3B’s failure to properly serve the Board deprives us of appellate
jurisdiction.
We hold that service of the petition for judicial review by e-mail does not satisfy the
service requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 34.05 RCW, and that
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service on the agency is complete when the petition for review is delivered to the agency. As a
result, we hold that the County’s and 3B’s petitions are untimely, and we grant FOCC’s motion
to dismiss Clark County’s and 3B’s petitions for judicial review of the FDO.
A. Facts Pertaining to the Motion To Dismiss
The Board issued its final decision to the parties on March 23, 2017. The deadline for
filing petitions for judicial review was April 24. The County e-mailed its petition for judicial
review to the Board and mailed its petition to both the Board and the attorney general’s office
using the United States Postal Service on April 24.3 3B sent its petition to the Board through
FedEx overnight delivery on April 24. 3B concedes that its petition was received by the Board
on April 25. The attorney general’s office filed a notice of appearance, representing the Board,
on May 11.
B. Standard of Review
We review de novo questions of a court’s jurisdiction. Ricketts v. Bd. of Accountancy,
111 Wash. App. 113, 116, 43 P.3d 548 (2002). A party may raise a question of appellate, or
subject matter, jurisdiction for the first time at any point in a proceeding. Skagit Surveyors &
Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wash. 2d 542, 556, 958 P.2d 962 (1998).
We also review the meaning of a statute de novo. Ricketts, 111 Wash. App. at 116. Our
fundamental objective in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Dep’t
of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). If a statute’s
meaning is plain on its face, then we give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of
legislative intent. Pac. Marine Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Revenue, 181 Wash. App. 730,
3
The County does not contend that the physical copy arrived on or before April 24.
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737, 329 P.3d 101 (2014). “Absent ambiguity, a statute’s meaning must be derived from the
wording of the statute itself without judicial construction or interpretation.” Fray v. Spokane
County, 134 Wash. 2d 637, 649, 952 P.2d 601 (1998).
C. Appeals From Decisions of the Board
The APA governs appeals from decisions of the growth management hearings board.
Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash. 2d at 555. A court does not obtain jurisdiction over an appeal from an
agency decision unless the appealing party timely files and serves the petition for judicial review
on the agency and all parties. Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash. 2d at 555. A petition for judicial review
must be dismissed if the APA’s service requirements are not met. Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Dep’t
of Revenue, 156 Wash. App. 949, 961, 235 P.3d 849 (2010). “Substantial compliance with the
service requirements of the APA is not sufficient to invoke . . . appellate, or subject matter,
jurisdiction.”4 Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash. 2d at 556.
Under the APA, a petition for judicial review of an agency order must be served on all
parties of record within 30 days after service of the final order. RCW 34.05.542(2). The APA
provides:
“Service,” except as otherwise provided in this chapter, means posting in the
United States mail, properly addressed, postage prepaid, or personal or electronic
service. Service by mail is complete upon deposit in the United States mail.
Agencies may, by rule, authorize service by electronic transmission, or by
commercial parcel delivery company.
RCW 34.05.010(19) (emphasis added).
4
Like here, the agency appeal in Skagit Surveyors was initially heard by the court of appeals and
not the superior court. Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash. 2d at 556 n.9.
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But RCW 34.05.542(4) contains an exception to this definition. Ricketts, 111 Wash. App.
at 117-18; Stewart v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 191 Wash. 2d 42, 47, 419 P.3d 838 (2018). Under
that statute, the petitioner must serve the agency that issued the order by delivery to the director’s
office, the agency’s principal office, or by serving the agency’s attorney of record. RCW
34.05.542(4); Stewart, 191 Wash. 2d at 47.
Service on the agency requires delivering the petition for judicial review to the agency
within 30 days of the final order. RCW 34.05.542 (2), (3), (4). Here, the Board issued its final
decision to the parties on March 23. Thirty days from March 23 was April 22, which was a
Saturday. Therefore, the petition for judicial review was due April 24, the next business day.
1. The County’s Petition Was Untimely Served
In response to FOCC’s motion, the County argues that its petition for judicial review was
timely served because it e-mailed the petition to the Board. The County does not argue that it
timely served the Board by mailing the petition on April 24, but instead states that FOCC’s
challenge is “limited to the question of whether email service on an agency satisfies delivery
pursuant to RCW 34.05.542(4).” Reply Br. of Clark County at 13. The County argues that
service by e-mail satisfies the “delivery” requirement of RCW 34.05.542(4) because the Board
has authorized service by electronic transmission in WAC 242-03-240(1). We hold that service
by e-mail is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of RCW 34.05.542(4).
The Board is allowed to authorize service by electronic transmission. RCW
34.05.010(19). But it has not done so. The County relies on WAC 242-03-240. WAC 242-03-
240 is titled, “Filing and service of all other papers,” and provides that parties shall electronically
file pleadings and briefs to the board, and electronically complete service to other parties. But
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this rule is not applicable to appeals from the board’s decision. WAC 242-03-240, and Title 242
of the Washington Administrative Code generally addresses practices and procedures for matters
in front of the growth management hearings board. WAC 242-03-035. Appeals from the
Board’s final decision are governed by RCW 34.05.514 and RCW 34.05.542. RCW
36.70A.300; WAC 242-03-970.
Moreover, WAC 242-03-240 does not authorize service of any type of petition for
judicial review by e-mail. WAC 242-03-240 refers to the “[f]iling and service of all other
papers,” meaning other than a petition for review to the Board. WAC 242-03-230 specifically
addresses filing and service of the petition for review for cases appealed to the Board. Thus, the
“all other papers” referred to in WAC 242-03-240 describes all papers except a petition for
review. And the only petition for review addressed in WAC 240-03-230 is a petition filed at the
board, not a petition for judicial review filed in superior court after the Board has made its
decision.
Here, the County was required to serve the agency by “delivering” the petition for
judicial review to the agency’s office by April 24.5 RCW 34.05.542(4).6 Unless authorized by
5
The County also mailed the petition to the attorney general’s office using the United States mail
on April 24. FOCC argues that mailing the petition to the attorney general does not adequately
serve the Board because the attorney general had not appeared as the Board’s attorney of record
until May 11. The County does not argue that mailing the petition constitutes service on the
Board, thus, we do not address this issue.
6
“Service of the petition on the agency shall be by delivery of a copy of the petition to the office
of the director, or other chief administrative officer or chairperson of the agency, at the principal
office of the agency. Service of a copy by mail upon the other parties of record and the office of
the attorney general shall be deemed complete upon deposit in the United States mail, as
evidenced by the postmark.” RCW 34.05.542(4).
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the agency, electronic transmission, such as e-mail, is not a proper form of service. RCW
34.05.010(19). Although service on other parties of record is complete when the petition is
deposited in the United States mail, service on the agency is complete only when it is “delivered”
to the Board. RCW 34.05.542(4).
Here, the Board did not authorize service by electronic transmission. Because e-mail is
not an authorized form of service, the County did not deliver its petition for review to the
Board’s office by April 24, 2017. The County did not timely serve its petition for judicial
review, and we do not have appellate jurisdiction over its petition for review appealing the FDO.
We grant FOCC’s motion to dismiss the County’s petition from the Board’s FDO.7
2. 3B’s Petition Was Untimely Served
In response to FOCC’s motion to dismiss, 3B argues that it properly served the Board by
sending its petition for judicial review to the Board through FedEx and that its service of the
petition was complete on April 24 when it delivered its petition to FedEx. We disagree.
As discussed above, RCW 34.05.542(4) provides an exception to the general rule that
service is complete upon deposit in the United States mail. RCW 34.05.010(19); Stewart, 191
Wash. 2d at 47; Ricketts, 111 Wash. App. at 117-18. Under the exception, service on the agency is
not complete until the petition is actually delivered to the agency’s office. RCW 34.05.542(4);
see Ricketts, 111 Wash. App. at 118. Even assuming service through a commercial parcel delivery
company like FedEx was proper, 3B did not timely serve the petition because the Board did not
7
FOCC does not argue that the County’s appeal from the Board’s compliance order was
untimely. Accordingly, we consider the County’s arguments regarding the Board’s compliance
order below.
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receive the petition until April 25. Because 3B’s petition was due to the Board by April 24, 3B
did not timely serve its petition for review and we do not have appellate jurisdiction over its
petition for review appealing the FDO.8 Thus, we grant FOCC’s motion to dismiss 3B’s petition
for judicial review from the Board’s FDO.9
II. BOARD DECISIONS — LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Washington’s APA governs our review of the Board’s decisions. RCW 34.05.570(3);
Whatcom County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 186 Wash. 2d 648, 666, 381 P.3d 1 (2016).
Under the APA, we review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo, but we give “substantial
weight to the Board’s interpretation of the GMA.” Whatcom County, 186 Wash. 2d at 667. RCW
34.05.570(3) provides nine enumerated ways to challenge an agency action through judicial
review. The parties here challenge the Board’s actions under five statutory sections: (1) the
Board’s order is outside its statutory authority or jurisdiction; (2) the Board erroneously
interpreted or applied the law; (3) the Board engaged in unlawful procedure or decision making,
or has failed to follow proscribed procedures; (4) the Board’s actions are not support by
substantial evidence; and (5) the Board’s actions are arbitrary and capricious. RCW
8
3B also asserts that FedEx is a proper method of service because RCW 34.05.010(19)
“acknowledges the potential for service by commercial parcel delivery company, such as
FedEx.” Reply Br. of 3B at 3 (footnote omitted). 3B is correct that agencies may, by rule,
authorize service by commercial parcel delivery company. RCW 34.05.010(19). However 3B
does not provide authority establishing that the Board authorized service of petitions for judicial
review by commercial parcel delivery company. Moreover, 3B concedes that the Board did not
receive its petition until April 25. We do not determine whether the Board authorized service by
commercial parcel delivery company because 3B’s service was untimely.
9
In light of our holding that the dedesignation and designation of the annexed UGAs issue is
moot, our decision to grant FOCC’s motion to dismiss 3B’s appeal from the FDO has no
practical bearing on this case.
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34.05.570(3)(b)-(e), (i). Here, the party challenging the Board’s decision bears the burden of
establishing that the decision is improper. RCW 34.05.570(1)(a), (3)(d); Whatcom County, 186
Wash. 2d at 667.
On review from initial challenges and on review following a Board’s remand for
compliance, the Board determines whether a county’s plan is compliant with the GMA. RCW
36.70A.300(3). The Board must find compliance with the GMA “unless it determines that the
action by the . . . county . . . is clearly erroneous in view of the entire record before the board and
in light of the goals and requirements of [the GMA].” RCW 36.70A.320(1), (3). To find a
county’s action clearly erroneous, the Board must be “‘left with the firm and definite conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’” Whatcom County, 186 Wash. 2d at 667 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 543,
561, 14 P.3d 133 (2000)).
Counties have discretion to make many choices about accommodating growth in their
comprehensive plans and amendments. RCW 36.70A.110(2). County actions are presumed
compliant and Boards must defer to local planning decisions. Kittitas County v. E. Wash.
Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 172 Wash. 2d 144, 154-55, 256 P.3d 1193 (2011). However, we do not
afford counties deference in their interpretations of the GMA, and counties must comply with the
requirements of the GMA. Whatcom County, 186 Wash. 2d at 667; King County, 142 Wash. 2d at
561. Deference to a county’s planning decisions supersedes the general deference we give to the
Board under the APA. Quadrant Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 154
Wash. 2d 224, 238, 110 P.3d 1132 (2005). It is under these guidelines that we review the
correctness of the Board’s determination regarding whether the County’s actions were clearly
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erroneous. Concerned Friends of Ferry County v. Ferry County, 191 Wash. App. 803, 813, 365
P.3d 207 (2015).
We review the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Kittitas County, 172
Wash. 2d at 155. Evidence is substantial if “when viewed in light of the whole record,” RCW
34.05.570(3)(e), there is “‘a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of
the truth or correctness’” of the finding. Kittitas County, 172 Wash. 2d at 155 (quoting Thurston
County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 164 Wash. 2d 329, 341, 190 P.3d 38 (2008)). When
reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, we determine the law independently and apply the
law to the facts found by the Board. Thurston County, 164 Wash. 2d at 341. We consider whether
the Board’s factual findings support its conclusions. Kittitas County v. Kittitas County Conserv.
Coal., 176 Wash. App. 38, 55 n.3, 308 P.3d 745 (2013).
We determine whether a Board’s order is arbitrary and capricious by reviewing “whether
the order represents ‘willful and unreasoning action, taken without regard to or consideration of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the action.’” Kittitas County, 172 Wash. 2d at 155
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth
Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38, 46-47, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998)). “Issues not raised before [the
Board] may not be raised on appeal.” RCW 34.05.554(1). An exception exists if “[t]he interests
of justice would be served by resolution of an issue arising from . . . [a]gency action occurring
after the person exhausted the last feasible opportunity for seeking relief from the agency.”
RCW 34.05.554(1)(d)(ii).
We conduct statutory interpretation to determine and give effect to legislative intent.
Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 180 Wash. 2d 165, 173, 322 P.3d 1219 (2014).
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Legislative intent is primarily deprived from statutory language. Town of Woodway, 180 Wash. 2d
at 173-74. When the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of the
statute. Town of Woodway, 180 Wash. 2d at 174. In the absence of legislative definitions, we give
statutory terms their plain and ordinary meanings as defined in the dictionary. Lockner v. Pierce
County, 190 Wash. 2d 526, 537, 415 P.3d 246 (2018). When analyzing a statute’s plain language,
we consider the specific text of the relevant provision, the context of the entire statute, related
provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wash. 2d 769, 779,
280 P.3d 1078 (2012). We do not liberally construe the GMA. Woods v. Kittitas County, 162
Wash. 2d 597, 614, 174 P.3d 25 (2007).
III. MOOTNESS OF UGA DESIGNATIONS RESULTING FROM ANNEXATIONS
La Center, Ridgefield, and the LLCs argue that the Board’s finding of the County’s
noncompliance regarding the County’s UGA designations is moot. Specifically, they argue that
the Board (1) erroneously failed to acknowledge that the County’s action regarding the UGAs
was rendered moot by the annexations and (2) arbitrarily and capriciously required the County to
take action regarding land no longer within its control. We hold that arguments regarding the
annexed lands are moot.
A. Facts Pertaining to the Mootness of UGA Designations Resulting from Annexations
In the County’s 2016 Plan Update, the County dedesignated areas of agricultural land
adjacent to the cities of La Center and Ridgefield and designated these lands as UGAs. Both La
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Center and Ridgefield annexed these adjacent UGAs into their respective cities long before the
Board’s hearing in February 2017.10
The Board concluded, in part, that the County did not comply with the GMA when it
dedesignated agricultural land and designated the UGAs. Further, the Board made
determinations of invalidity regarding the County’s UGA designations. The Board remanded the
2016 Plan Update to the County for the County to come into compliance with the GMA.
The County did not take remedial action regarding the UGAs relevant here, arguing that
it could not change the designation of the annexed land no longer within its control. The Board
concluded that the County was not in compliance regarding these UGAs.
B. GMA Compliance Legal Principles
The Board may review comprehensive plans and their amendments for compliance with
the GMA. RCW 36.70A.280. However, the Board lacks the authority to determine many types
of land-related disputes. Relevant here, the Board does not have authority to review cities’ land
annexations. See RCW 36.70A.280.
The Board determines whether a county’s plan is in compliance with the GMA. RCW
36.70A.300(3). When the Board determines that a plan or its amendments are flawed, it may
enter a finding of noncompliance or a determination of invalidity. RCW 36.70A.300, .302.
When the Board finds that the plan or its amendments are noncompliant, the Board remands the
matter back to the county with instructions to comply with the GMA. RCW 36.70A.300(3)(b).
10
Futurewise challenged the Ridgefield annexation. We affirmed the superior court’s dismissal
of the challenge. Futurewise v. City of Ridgefield, No. 50406-5-II, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 2019) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2050406-5-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf.
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A plan or its amendments remain valid during the remand period following the Board’s
noncompliance finding. RCW 36.70A.300(4); Town of Woodway, 180 Wash. 2d at 174.
When the Board finds that the plan or its amendments are invalid, the Board must (1) find
noncompliance and remand the plan back to the county and (2) enter a determination of
invalidity supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law. RCW 36.70A.302(1)(a), (b).
This invalidity determination must conclude that the flawed provision of the plan or its
amendments substantially interfere with the goals of the GMA. RCW 36.70A.302(1)(b). “Upon
a finding of invalidity, the underlying provision would be rendered void.” King County v. Cent.
Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 138 Wash. 2d 161, 181, 979 P.2d 374 (1999).
Significantly, an updated plan is presumed to be valid upon adoption. RCW
36.70A.320(1). In addition, a finding of invalidity is “prospective in effect and does not
extinguish rights that vested under state or local law before receipt of the board’s order by the
city or county.” RCW 36.70A.302(2). A finding of invalidity does not apply to certain vested
rights, namely development permit applications. RCW 36.70A.302(2)-(3).
C. The Board’s Final Decision Order Is Prospective
Here, the Board made a determination of invalidity regarding the UGAs. The Board
made related findings of fact and conclusions of law that the County’s 2016 Plan Update did not
comply with the GMA and determined that the UGAs for La Center, Ridgefield, and Battle
Ground were invalid. This determination rendered the UGA provisions void. King County, 138
Wash. 2d at 181.
The parties disagree as to the retroactivity of the determination of invalidity regarding the
UGA provisions. FOCC argues that the UGA provisions are essentially “void ab initio,” or “null
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from the beginning,” and thus, we should unwind Ridgefield’s and La Center’s annexations of
the UGAs to return the lands to their prior designations and jurisdiction under the County. Br. of
FOCC at 12. Conversely, the cities and the LLCs argue that the UGAs are void beginning from
the date of the Board’s order. We hold that the Board’s order is prospective from the date of the
order.
RCW 36.70A.302(2) plainly states that “[a] determination of invalidity is prospective in
effect.” Prospective means “concerned with or relating to the future: effective in the future.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1821 (2002). Here, the language of RCW
36.70A.302(2) is clear and unequivocal. A determination of invalidity is effective going forward
from the date of the order. A determination of invalidity cannot alter whatever occurred prior to
the Board’s rendering of its decision.
D. The County Lacks Authority Over the Annexed UGAs
The cities and LLCs argue that given that a determination of invalidity is prospective
only, the UGA issues are moot because the UGAs were annexed by the respective cities before
the Board’s determination of invalidity. Thus, the annexations deprived the Board and the
County of authority to act, and consequently, the determination cannot have any legal effect. We
agree.
1. Mootness Following Annexation Legal Principles
An issue is moot if the court can no longer provide effective relief. SEIU Healthcare
775NW v. Gregoire, 168 Wash. 2d 593, 602, 229 P.3d 774 (2010). “The central question of all
mootness problems is whether changes in the circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of
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litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.” SEIU Healthcare 775NW, 168
Wash. 2d at 602 (internal marks omitted).
After land contiguous to a city has been designated UGA, that city may annex that
contiguous land. RCW 35.13.005, .010. Article XI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution
states, “Any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local
police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” RCW 35.63.080
authorizes a city council, board, or commissioners to prepare, adopt, and enforce plans for the
physical development of the municipality.
All three regions of the growth management hearings board have examined this question
and have held that after a city annexes land, that land is no longer within the county’s
jurisdiction. For example, in Panesko v. Lewis County, Lewis County expanded a UGA to
include certain rural lands. No. 08-2-0007c, 2009 WL 2981888, at *5 (W. Wash. Growth Mgmt.
Hr’gs Bd. July 27, 2009). The City of Toledo successfully annexed this UGA land four months
before the Board issued its FDO regarding Lewis County’s compliance with the GMA. Panesko,
at *1, *5-6. In reviewing Lewis County’s compliance with the GMA following a remand period,
the Board stated:
It is unfortunate that the [UGA] was annexed in the midst of a proceeding to
consider its designation as agricultural land of long term commercial significance.
Nevertheless, the Board finds nothing egregious in the County’s conduct. . . . The
Board has no jurisdiction in the realm of municipal annexations. Further, now that
the [UGA] has been annexed by the City of Toledo, the issue of whether this
property should be included as part of the UGA is moot.
Conclusion: The City of Toledo having annexed the [UGA], the land is no longer
subject to the County’s jurisdiction. The County having no ability to consider or
alter the designation of this property as agricultural land of long term commercial
significance, it need not take any further action in that regard.
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Panesko, at *6 (footnotes omitted).
In 1000 Friends of Washington v. Snohomish County, Snohomish County dedesignated
an area called Island Crossing as agricultural and instead designated it as UGA. No. 03-3-0019c,
2009 WL 795934, at *1 (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. Feb. 19, 2009). The
Board found these designations noncompliant with the GMA. 1000 Friends of Washington at
*1. After our Supreme Court reversed the Board’s determination, the City of Arlington annexed
the Island Crossing UGA. 1000 Friends of Washington, at *2. On remand, the Board
determined that “the sole question for the Board was whether the County had already taken steps
to adjust its future land-use map and zoning designations in the Island Crossing area.” 1000
Friends of Washington, at *2. The Board concluded, “Given that the Island Crossing area has
been annexed by the City of Arlington and is no longer within the jurisdiction of Snohomish
County, the Board concludes that a remand back to the County would be an empty act. The
‘urban’ land in question is now the City of Arlington’s to govern.” 1000 Friends of Washington,
at *3.
In Futurewise v. Benton County, Futurewise argued that the Board should impose a
determination of invalidity regarding Benton County’s dedesignation of agricultural land that the
County redesignated as UGA near the City of Kennewick. No. 14-1-0003, 2015 WL 999266, at
*1-2 (E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. Jan. 15, 2015). In its FDO, the Board determined that
these designations were not compliant with the GMA but did not issue a determination of
invalidity. Futurewise, at *1. Futurewise argued that without a determination of invalidity, the
UGA “could be quickly annexed to the City of Kennewick mooting the Board’s Final Decision
and Order.” Futurewise, at *2. The Board stated that annexing the land would indeed
20
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“effectively moot the Board’s Final Decision and Order.” Futurewise, at *3. In granting
Futurewise’s request for a determination of invalidity, the Board stated that it “heard concerns
expressed at the hearing that a landowner-initiated annexation petition action might circumvent
the GMA compliance process and render compliance actions moot. The Board notes that in the
absence of an invalidity order, petitioners have little remedy if an annexation of this property was
accomplished.” Futurewise, at *4.
This is not the first time Clark County has created this circumstance. In 2007, Clark
County dedesignated agricultural lands and redesignated these lands as UGA, including lands
near the cities of Camas and Ridgefield. Clark County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,
161 Wash. App. 204, 214, 254 P.3d 862 (2011) vacated in part by Clark County v. W. Wash.
Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 177 Wash. 2d 136, 142-43, 148, 298 P.3d 704 (2013). Challengers,
including Futurewise, petitioned the Board to review the County’s compliance with the GMA.
Clark County, 161 Wash. App. at 214. Before the Board issued its FDO, Camas and Ridgefield
passed ordinances annexing UGA lands. Clark County, 161 Wash. App. at 214. Without notice of
the annexations, the Board determined that the County’s designations of the annexed lands were
noncompliant with the GMA and invalid. Clark County, 161 Wash. App. at 215. However, after
learning of the annexations, the Board issued an order stating that it lacked jurisdiction over the
annexed lands. Clark County, 161 Wash. App. at 220.
We held that because the County’s comprehensive plan amendments were pending
review, the amendments were not final and parties could not act in reliance on them. Clark
County, 161 Wash. App. at 224-25. We further held that the legislature did not intend to allow a
county to evade review of their planning decisions by making a UGA designation followed by an
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immediate annexation. Clark County, 161 Wash. App. at 225. Accordingly, we held that the
annexations did not preclude the Board’s jurisdiction to review the validity of the County’s
actions regarding the annexed lands. Clark County, 161 Wash. App. at 225-26.
Our Supreme Court vacated our decision regarding the annexed lands. Clark County,
177 Wash. 2d at 148. The Supreme Court held that because the parties had not appealed issues
regarding the annexed lands and because the annexed lands had no bearing on the resolution of
claims on appeal, it was error to address issues relating to the annexed lands. Clark County, 177
Wash. 2d at 148. Moreover, Justice Stephens concurred in reversing our opinion, joined by Justice
Wiggins, stating:
I would dismiss the claims challenging the annexation as moot in the context of this
proceeding. The claims in question originated in a petition to the [Board]
challenging Clark County’s designation of certain lands under the [GMA]. The
cities of Camas and Ridgefield have annexed the lands in question, and those
annexations cannot be challenged in these proceedings. As a result, the question of
whether the Board properly reviewed Clark County’s prior designation of the
annexed lands is moot. Dismissal should follow. See Seguin v. Barei, 163 Wash.
702, 703, 299 P. 655 (1931) (dismissing appeal where underlying interest in
disputed property was dissolved in separate proceeding).
Clark County, 177 Wash. 2d at 149 (Stephens, J. concurring).
2. Issues Regarding La Center’s and Ridgefield’s Annexed Lands Are Moot
Issues regarding the annexed lands are moot because the Board can provide no effective
relief. The Board’s role is to determine whether the County is in compliance with the GMA.
RCW 36.70A.300(1). However, after land contiguous to a city has been designated UGA, that
city may annex that contiguous land. RCW 35.13.005, .010. Once that land has been annexed, it
is within the city’s sole jurisdiction. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11; RCW 35.63.080. As a result,
when La Center and Ridgefield annexed previously unincorporated land into their municipalities,
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the County lost its ability to plan for that land. RCW 35.63.080; 35A.11.020. The Board cannot
compel the County to take action to come into compliance regarding land the County does not
control. Such compulsion is beyond the quasijudicial powers of the Board. See RCW
36.70A.300(1).
FOCC compares this case to Miotke v. Spokane County, 181 Wash. App. 369, 325 P.3d 434
(2014). However, Miotke is distinguishable. In Miotke, Spokane County designated a UGA that
was not subsequently annexed. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at 373-75. While the Board reviewed the
designation, development rights of property owners vested in the new UGA. Miotke, 181 Wn.
App. at 373. The Board found the UGA designation noncompliant with the GMA. Miotke, 181
Wash. App. at 373. In an attempt to comply, Spokane County repealed the UGA designation and
reverted the land to its prior designation. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at 374.
On appeal, Spokane County argued that the vested urban development rights of the
landowners in the former UGA prevented it from complying with the GMA. Miotke, 181 Wn.
App. at 379. We held that the vested rights of property owners did not relieve Spokane County
from its planning obligations under the GMA. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at 379. Rather, it was
Spokane County’s designation of the UGA that created the opportunity for vested rights, and
Spokane County was responsible for GMA compliance in its planning decisions. Miotke, 181
Wash. App. at 379-80.
Miotke is distinguishable because the disputed land always remained within the
jurisdiction of Spokane County’s comprehensive plan. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at 373-75.
Because of this, the Board retained the power to determine the county’s compliance with the
GMA. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at 379-80.
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Here, because of the prospective nature of the Board’s determination of invalidity, the
County cannot exercise authority over annexed land no longer within its control. As a result,
issues regarding the annexed lands are moot.11,12
In this published portion of our opinion, we grant FOCC’s motion to dismiss the
County’s and 3B’s petitions for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Further, we hold that issues
regarding the annexed lands are moot. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we hold that
the Board did not err regarding the remaining issues raised by CCCU and FOCC. We remand
back to the Board for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion
will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for
public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
11
We note that the County and cities have previously engaged in a pattern of UGA designation
followed by swift annexation. Clark County, 161 Wash. App. at 225. Moreover, at oral argument,
FOCC showed us a map of the UGA annexed by La Center. Wash. Court of Appeals oral
argument, Friends of Clark County and Futurewise v. Clark County, et al, No. 50847-8-II (July
3, 2019), at 21 min., 53 sec. (on file with court). The UGA had irregular borders that followed
specific property lines. Additionally, in its compliance order, the Board noted the County’s
repeated evasion of GMA compliance review in previous instances where cities had rapidly
annexed UGAs. Regardless of the validity of any questionable behavior, this is an issue for the
legislature.
12
FOCC argues that the prospectivity of RCW 36.70A.302(2) is confined to only vested rights.
However, the plain language of RCW 36.70A.302(2) does not confine the prospective of a
determination of invalidity to vested rights. Further, RCW 36.70A.302 provides guidance
regarding the effects of determinations of invalidity on savings clauses, interim ordinances, as
well as property rights. We reject FOCC’s attempt to construe RCW 36.70A.302(2) more
narrowly than the language provides.
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No. 50847-8-II;
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IV. AGRICULTURAL DEDESIGNATION RESULTING FROM RILB DESIGNATION
The County argues that the Board misinterpreted and misapplied the law, and made
decisions unsupported by substantial evidence, when it found the County’s dedesignation of
agricultural land to establish a RILB violated the GMA. The Board concluded that the County
failed to comply with the GMA by not conducting a countywide or area-wide analysis of the
economic viability of the agricultural industry of the county. The Board further determined that
the RILB site met the agricultural resource land requirements.
The County is the only party that appeals these provisions of the FDO. As stated above,
we grant FOCC’s motion to dismiss the County’s petition for judicial review of the FDO. Thus
we do not address this argument.13
V. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
CCCU argues14 that the Board erred by dismissing its arguments that the County violated
its public participation program when it (1) finalized Issue Paper 9, a document used to support
the 2016 Plan Update, after voting to approve the plan amendment; (2) began the amendment
process before adopting a public participation program by using reports adopted years before the
13
Even if we were to consider this argument, our review of the record here reveals that the Board
did not err.
14
CCCU’s approach to assigning error is challenged by other parties. CCCU acknowledges that
it does not assign error to any of the Board’s findings of fact, stating that, “the Board did
conclude most of its analyses of the various issues as the ‘Board finds and concludes . . .’ CCCU
does not believe these are findings of fact, but are legal conclusions that do not require a separate
assignment of error.” Br. of CCCU at 1-2 n.2 (citation omitted). We agree and consider
CCCU’s arguments because there are no clear findings of fact contained in the FDO regarding
the portions of the FDO that CCCU challenges.
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No. 50847-8-II;
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amendment process; (3) did not adequately respond to public comments; and (4) excluded rural
landowners from participating in the amendment process.15 We hold that Board did not err when
it dismissed CCCU’s public participation arguments.
A. Facts Pertaining to the County’s Public Participation Efforts
A county planning under the GMA must establish a “public participation program
identifying procedures providing for early and continuous public participation in the
development and amendment of comprehensive land use plans.” RCW 36.70A.140.
In response to this GMA mandate, the County enacted an ordinance codifying its general
PPP for GMA actions requiring notice and public hearings for planning related actions. CLARK
COUNTY CODE 40.510.040. At the time of this litigation, the general PPP provisions were last
amended in 2007.
In 2014, the Clark County Council passed an additional ordinance detailing its 2016 Plan
Update (Plan Update PPP). The Plan Update PPP detailed the steps the County intended to take
to ensure public participation. The Plan Update PPP facilitated public participation through the
use of public meetings and workshops, a notification system for planning meetings and events,
utilization of a “robust website” containing planning documents and schedules, and strategies for
contacting interested parties and stakeholders, neighborhood associations, and news outlets. AR
at 4593. This “robust website” provided the public access to potential plan amendments and
15
CCCU’s briefing argues that the County violated the GMA regarding public participation, not
that the Board erred when determining that the County complied with the GMA regarding public
participation. See, e.g., Br. of CCCU at 18, 24 (“The County violated the GMA.” “The County
completely failed to respond to public comments.”) Here, CCCU has the obligation to argue
how and why the Board erred. Where applicable, we reframe CCCU’s arguments to correctly
reflect CCCU’s burden.
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supporting documents, past and future meeting information, and surveys to solicit citizen
responses.
During the 2016 Plan Update process, the County held over thirty public hearings
regarding the 2016 Plan Update. The County also held ten open houses and public meetings
throughout the county. Further, the County provided opportunity for public comment through
multiple countywide online surveys. The County communicated with its citizens in person and
through newspaper, e-mail, mail, and television. This communication included sessions with a
CCCU member actively participating in conversations with the County. The County received
more than 3,000 public responses during the 2016 Plan Update process, of which over 1,100
were from individuals or groups with interests in rural or resource lands.
One of CCCU’s claims in its petition for review to the Board was that the County failed
to adhere to its Plan Update PPP and the public participation requirements of the GMA. The
Board dismissed all of CCCU’s public participation arguments, and concluded that the County
complied the GMA in this respect.
B. Issue Paper 9
CCCU argues that the County violated the GMA because Issue Paper 916 was finalized
after the 2016 Plan Update was approved. Specifically, CCCU argues that Issue Paper 9 was
completed on June 23, 2016, two days after the County adopted the 2016 Plan Update. CCCU
contends that the June 21, 2016 adoption of the 2016 Plan Update precluded public participation
16
Issue Paper 9 is “Clark County Agricultural and Forest Land Supplemental Mapping and Data
Analysis.” AR at 6916. Issue Paper 9 updated a 2012 rural lands study based on new
information and reviewed literature regarding agricultural trends.
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No. 50847-8-II;
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regarding Issue Paper 9. Because substantial evidence supports that the County did not adopt the
2016 Plan Update until June 28, 2016, we hold that the Board did not err when it dismissed these
arguments.
We review the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Kittitas County, 172
Wash. 2d at 155. Evidence is substantial if a quantity of evidence is sufficient to persuade a fair-
minded person of the truth of the finding. Kittitas County, 172 Wash. 2d at 155. The challenging
party has the burden of showing that the Board’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence. RCW 34.05.570(1)(a).
When CCCU raised this argument below, the Board found that the County adopted the
2016 Plan Update (Amended Ordinance No. 2016-06-12) on June 28, 2016. Although the Board
located an ordinance from June 21 in the administrative record, that ordinance was never signed
into law. Rather, the record shows that the County adopted Amended Ordinance No. 2016-06-12
on June 28, 2016. The Board’s finding that the County adopted the 2016 Plan Update on June
28, 2016, after Issue Paper 9 had been finalized, is supported by substantial evidence. Further,
CCCU fails to show that the Board erred regarding the public’s opportunity to comment on Issue
Paper 9. Citizens had the opportunity to comment on Issue Paper 9 at a June 21, 2016 meeting,
and at least one citizen commented on Issue Paper 9 by e-mail. We hold that the Board did not
err in dismissing CCCU’s argument that the County violated the GMA regarding Issue Paper 9.
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C. County’s Use of Source Documents
CCCU argues that the County violated the GMA when it began the 2016 Plan Update
process by using source documents from 2009 to 2012 to support the 2016 Plan Update.17
Specifically, CCCU argues that because these source documents precede the County’s adoption
of the Plan Update PPP in 2014, the use of the older reports violated the GMA’s public
participation requirements. We hold that the Board did not err when it dismissed these
arguments.
As discussed above, county or city planning under the GMA must establish a public
participation program. RCW 36.70A.140. The procedures identified in the PPP must provide
for broad dissemination of proposals, opportunity for written comments, public meetings after
effective notice, open discussion, communication programs, information services, and
consideration of and response to public comments. RCW 36.70A.140. However, inexact
compliance with the established public participation program and procedures does not invalidate
a comprehensive plan “if the spirit of the program and procedures is observed.” RCW
36.70A.140.
WAC 365-196-600 expands on the GMA’s public participation requirements, and offers
suggestions to cities and counties to best allow for public participation. Relevant here, this rule
recommends, “Whenever a provision of the comprehensive plan . . . is based on factual data, a
clear reference to its source should be made part of the adoption record.” WAC 365-196-
600(2)(a).
17
CCCU cites the following documents: (1) Agriculture Preservation Strategies Report, (2)
Clark County Bicycle and Pedestrian Plan, (3) Aging Readiness Plan, and (4) Growing Healthier
Report.
29
No. 50847-8-II;
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The Board found that the County had not violated RCW 36.70A.140, because the County
complied with the statute by adopting the Plan Update PPP. CCCU argues that the use of older
source documents violates the GMA under RCW 36.70A.140 and the general principles that the
GMA require public participation. The County argues that the use of these underlying source
documents is based on WAC 365-196-600(2)’s citation for factual data suggestion, and that these
older source documents were publicly reviewed and considered previously.
Although the GMA mandates that a county must make a public participation program,
CCCU does not identify, and we could not find, any GMA provision that mandates the
underlying source documents to be subject to a county’s PPP. “‘Where no authorities are cited
in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume
that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.’” Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC v.
Goldmark, 195 Wash. App. 284, 296-97, 381 P.3d 95 (2016) (quoting DeHeer v. Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, 60 Wash. 2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962)).
Moreover, the public was provided with opportunity to comment on the source
documents when commenting on the 2016 Plan Update. We hold that the Board did not err
when dismissing CCCU’s argument regarding source documents supporting the 2016 Plan
Update.
D. Record of and Response to Public Comments
CCCU argues that the County “failed to respond to public comments and maintained an
incomplete public record” during and after the planning process. Br. of CCCU at 24. We hold
that the Board did not err in dismissing these arguments.
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No. 50847-8-II;
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The public participation “procedures shall provide for . . . consideration of and response
to public comments.” RCW 36.70A.140. WAC 365-196-600(8) provides further guidance. The
rule, in part, states:
Consideration of and response to public comments. All public comments should
be reviewed. Adequate time should be provided between the public hearing and
the date of adoption for all or any part of the comprehensive plan to evaluate and
respond to public comments. The county or city should provide a written summary
of all public comments with a specific response and explanation for any subsequent
action taken based on the public comments. This written summary should be
included in the record of adoption for the plan.
WAC 365-196-600(8)(a).
Although chapter 365-196 WAC provides some procedural guidelines, compliance with
these procedures “is not a prerequisite for compliance with the act.” WAC 365-196-030(2). The
Board’s compliance determination must be based on a violation of the GMA itself. WAC 365-
196-030(3). Chapter 365-196 WAC does not create a minimum list of criteria for procedural
compliance with the GMA. Rather, counties “can achieve compliance . . . by adopting other
approaches.” WAC 365-196-030(2).
As used in chapter 365-196 WAC, “shall” means “a requirement for compliance with the
act” and has the same meaning as “must.” WAC 365-196-210(29). Conversely, “should” is “the
advice of the department, but does not indicate a requirement for compliance with the act.”
WAC 365-196-210(30).
CCCU cites Larson Beach Neighbors v. Stevens County, No. 03-1-0003, 2004 WL
3404211, at *9 (E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. Feb. 10, 2004), and Loon Lake Property
Owners Ass’n v. Stevens County, No. 03-1-0006c, 2004 WL 2624883 at *5 (E. Wash. Growth
Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. Oct. 15, 2004), for the proposition that in the GMA context, “should” conveys
31
No. 50847-8-II;
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a mandatory duty. CCCU misconstrues these Board decisions. Larson addresses language in a
county’s PPP that required review of all public comments but that the county “may” respond to
comments in writing or verbally. Larson, at *8. The Board concluded that the county’s PPP
created a mandatory requirement to respond with an option of how to fulfill that requirement.
Larson, at *9. Here, the County’s lack of mandatory language in its 2016 Update PPP
distinguishes Larson.
In Loon Lake, the Board found that the county failed to respond to public comments. At
*5. After a compliance remand, a challenger wanted the Board to interpret its FDO to force the
county to reopen the record to respond to public comments. Loon Lake, at *5. The Board stated
that there was no reason to reopen to record, and that the county had created a “summary of
public comments and the County’s response thereto in accordance with the requirements of
WAC 365-195-600.” Loon Lake, at *6. Procedurally, Loon Lake addressed a Board’s remedies
during the period for remand and compliance. The Board referenced the county’s previous
actions regarding public comments to hold that the challenger did not show that reopening the
record was necessary. Loon Lake, at *6. Loon Lake is distinguishable because here, CCCU’s
arguments are based on the FDO, not the compliance order. Neither of these Board decisions
conflict with the explicit permissive language in chapter 365-196 WAC.
The Plan Update PPP provides a variety of methods and mediums the County was to use
to provide the public with information and an opportunity to participate. The plain language of
RCW 36.70A.140 states that a county’s PPP shall provide for the response to public comment.
Although the 2016 Plan Update PPP mentions public review and response to comments, it does
not require the County to respond to all comments. Moreover, inexact compliance with the
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established public participation program and procedures does not invalidate a comprehensive
plan “if the spirit of the program and procedures is observed.” RCW 36.70A.140.
The record shows that the County considered and responded to a large number of public
comments. The County heard citizens at meetings and open houses, received e-mails, collected
responses from surveys, and held meetings with various interested parties. The GMA does not
require the County to formally consider and respond to all public comments.
CCCU also argues that the County maintained an incomplete record of the public
comments it received during the 2016 Plan Update. Similarly, CCCU’s argument is based on the
permissive WAC 365-196-600(8)(a) rather than mandatory GMA provisions. The plain
language of RCW 36.70A.140 does not require a county to index and maintain a record with
every single comment offered during the planning process. We hold that the Board did not err
when it dismissed CCCU’s arguments that the County failed to respond to public comments and
maintained an incomplete public record during and after the planning process.
E. County’s Use of Internet
CCCU argues that the County’s 2016 Plan Update PPP’s reliance on internet
communication excluded rural citizens, thus violating the GMA. The Board dismissed CCCU’s
argument. We hold that the Board did not err.
RCW 36.70A.035(1) mandates public participation requirements that are “reasonably
calculated to provide notice to property owners and other affected and interested individuals.”
RCW 36.70A.035(1) lists specific examples of “reasonable notice provisions,” including
“[p]ublishing notice in a newspaper, [n]otifying public or private groups with known interest in a
33
No. 50847-8-II;
Cons. 51745-1-II
certain proposal, and [p]ublishing notice in agency newsletters or sending notice to agency
mailing lists.” In addition, WAC 365-196-600(4)-(5) states:
(4) Each county or city should try to involve a broad cross-section of the
community, so groups not previously involved in planning become involved.
(5) Counties and cities should take a broad view of public participation. The act
contains no requirements or qualifications that an individual must meet in order to
participate in the public process. If an individual or organization chooses to
participate, it is an interested party for purposes of public participation.
CCCU argues that the County violated WAC 365-196-600(4)-(5) by failing to use
noninternet based communication to include rural citizens in the 2016 Plan Update process.
CCCU argues that rural citizens would be less likely to use the County’s online portal that
provided the public access to potential plan amendments and supporting documents, past and
future meeting information, and surveys to solicit citizen responses.
In addition to the County’s plan update website, the County disseminated information to
its citizens through a number of mediums. The County communicated through e-mail, mail,
newspaper, television. CCCU fails to show how the County’s use of multiple mediums failed to
include rural citizens. We hold that the Board did not err when it dismissed CCCU’s argument
that the County’s Plan Update PPP’s reliance on internet communication excluded rural citizens.
VI. DESIGNATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTLANDS CAPABLE OF LONG TERM COMMERCIAL
PRODUCTION
CCCU argues that the County violated the GMA regarding its designation of agricultural
and forestlands capable of long term commercial production. Specifically, CCCU argues that the
County incorrectly relied on Issue Paper 9, which used “data layers” in addition to United States
Department of Agriculture Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) standards. CCCU
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argues that the Board’s acceptance of the County’s Issue Paper 9 was arbitrary and capricious.
We hold that Board did not err by dismissing this argument.18
In its comprehensive plan, a county designates eligible land as agricultural or forestlands
capable of long term commercial production. RCW 36.70A.070(1). One factor counties
consider when designating lands for these purposes is soil composition. WAC 365-190-
050(3)(b)(ii). Counties are to use soil data from NRCS. WAC 365-190-050(3)(b)(ii).
In the designation process here, the County used soil data from NRCS as well as other
data. The Board found and concluded, “The County used the NRCS layer and other data;
nothing in the WAC precludes them from using other data, as long as they use NRCS data as
well. CCCU’s claim about data layers is dismissed.” AR at 10510.
When considering land for designation as agricultural resource land, counties consider
three factors, including the land’s capability of use for agricultural production. WAC 365-190-
050(3)(b). This includes using data from NRCS. WAC 365-190-050(3)(b)(ii) states:
In determining whether lands are used or capable of being used for agricultural
production, counties and cities shall use the land-capability classification system of
[NRCS] as defined in relevant Field Office Technical Guides. These eight classes
are incorporated by the United States Department of Agriculture into map units
described in published soil surveys, and are based on the growing capacity,
productivity and soil composition of the land.
18
Preliminarily, the County argues that this issue is not before the court because the County did
not amend any part of the comprehensive plan to designate any agricultural or forest lands.
Further, the County argues that any designations of agricultural or forest lands occurred in prior
plan amendments, more than 60 days before CCCU filed its petition to the Board. In reply,
CCCU cites to a different portion of the Board’s FDO that analyzes the dedesignation of
agricultural lands to support its contention that the County made agricultural and forest land
designations. Although the County raised this argument to the Board, the Board did not address
it; instead it reached the merits of CCCU’s data layers argument. We address the merits of
CCCU’s argument in the interest of fairness.
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Here, CCCU is not arguing that the County did not use the NRCS data. Rather, CCCU
argues that the County’s use of data in addition to the NRCS data violated the GMA and the
rule.19 But the rule does not prohibit a county’s use of additional data to determine the
agricultural capability of lands; the rule merely requires counties to use the NRCS data. CCCU
acknowledges that the County indeed used the NRCS data. We hold that the Board did not err
when concluding that WAC 365-190-050(3)(b)(ii) does not preclude the use of data in addition
to the NRCS data.
VII. REDUCING MINIMAL PARCEL SIZES FOR AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY LANDS
CCCU argues that the Board erred in concluding the reduction of agricultural and
forestland parcel sizes violated the GMA. Specifically, CCCU argues that the Board applied the
incorrect legal standard. Further, CCCU argues that even if the Board applied the correct legal
standard, its decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
During the 2016 Plan Update, the County reduced agricultural land parcel sizes from 20
acres to 10 acres and forestry land from 40 acres to 20 acres. FOCC argued to the Board that
these parcel size reductions violated the GMA. FOCC placed multiple peer-reviewed articles in
the record. These articles conclude that the minimum parcel size necessary to conserve
agricultural and forestlands must be at least 20 to 40 acre parcels. Further, the County’s Issue
19
CCCU references an e-mail where a County planner used the term “data layers” to argue that
the NRCS classification system did not produce the result the County wanted, so the County
used some unspecified “data layers” to come to a better result. However, CCCU does not cite to
anything in the record to support its allegation that the County was using extra data sources to
skew land designations, nor does CCCU show us how the alleged use of these “data layers” gave
a result different than NRCS data.
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Paper 9 stated that very small and small farms produce little income and are mostly supported by
nonfarm income. The Board examined minimum parcel sizes in other regions of Washington
and other states to conclude that allowing 20 acre parcels in Clark County would not preserve the
agricultural industry. The Board found the County noncompliant regarding these parcel size
reductions.
After a county designates land as agricultural or forestland, the GMA requires the
adoption of regulations to assure the conservation of these lands. RCW 36.70A.060(1)(a).
Specifically, a county shall adopt regulations “to assure the conservation of agricultural, forest,
and mineral resource lands.” RCW 36.70A.060(1)(a). These regulations shall “assure that the
use of lands adjacent to agricultural, forest, or mineral resource lands shall not interfere with the
continued use . . . of these designated lands for the production of food, agricultural products, or
timber.” RCW 36.70A.060(1)(a). Counties have a duty to designate and conserve these
agricultural and forestlands to assure the preservation and development of these industries. King
County, 142 Wash. 2d at 558.
CCCU argues that the Board used the “assure” language to improperly shift the burden to
the County to prove it was conserving agricultural and forestlands. Instead, CCCU argues, the
burden belonged to the challenger, FOCC, when FOCC contested the County’s GMA
compliance regarding parcel sizes.
CCCU’s statement of the burden is correct. RCW 34.05.570(1)(a). However, the Board
did not improperly shift the burden to the County to prove the 2016 Plan Update conserved
agricultural and forestlands. Rather, the Board held that FOCC bore and met its burden of
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showing that that the reduction of parcel sizes was clearly erroneous. We hold that the Board did
not err in this regard.
Further, CCCU argues that the Board should have deferred to the County when it reduced
the parcel sizes. Although we defer to a county for planning decisions, this deference must
remain within the bounds of the GMA. King County, 142 Wash. 2d at 561. FOCC’s evidence
overcame the deference to the County.
Alternatively, CCCU argues that the Board’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. CCCU bears the burden of showing that the Board’s decision is unsupported. RCW
34.05.570(1)(a). In the 2016 Plan Update, the County reduced agricultural land parcel sizes from
20 acres to 10 acres and forestry land from 40 acres to 20 acres. FOCC argued to the Board that
these parcel size reductions violated the GMA. The Board agreed and found the County
noncompliant regarding these parcel size reductions. The Board examined the County’s Issue
Paper 9 as well as articles and studies submitted by FOCC. After reviewing the articles and
Issue Paper 9, the Board found that FOCC carried its burden to prove that reducing parcel sizes
was clearly erroneous.
We hold that there is sufficient evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded person
that the Board did not err when concluding that of the County’s attempt to reduce agricultural
and forestland parcel sizes was clearly erroneous under the GMA. The Board relied on multiple
peer-reviewed articles to conclude that the minimum parcel size necessary to conserve
agricultural and forestlands was at least 20 to 40 acre parcels. Further, the Board relied on the
County’s Issue Paper 9 that very small and small farms produce little income and are mostly
supported by nonfarm income. The Board examined minimum parcel sizes in other regions to
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conclude that reduced parcel sizes would not preserve the agricultural industry. Substantial
evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that reducing the parcel sizes for agricultural and
forestry lands was clearly erroneous and violated the GMA. We hold that the Board did not err
when it ruled that the reduction of parcel sizes was clearly erroneous.
VIII. OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT POPULATION PROJECTION
CCCU argues that the “the County failed to plan for the likely population growth, by
choosing a metric that is historically too low, when another [Office of Financial Management
(OFM)] projection was readily available.” Br. of CCCU at 34. We hold that the Board did not
err when it dismissed this argument.
The GMA requires counties to use population projections from the OFM for their
comprehensive plans and amendments. RCW 36.70A.110(2). For the 2016 Plan Update, the
OFM offered three population projections: high (681,135), medium (562,207), and low
(459,617). The County chose the medium population projection. In 2015 and during the update
process, OFM released its annual population and growth rate for the County, estimating the
County’s 2014 population to be approximately 451,000 and growing at a rate higher than the
2016 Plan Update projected.
Counties are required to use twenty-year population projections from the OFM for their
growth management comprehensive plans and amendments. RCW 36.70A.110(2). The
legislature requires OFM to prepare the population projections and entrusts counties to plan
based on these OFM projections. Spokane County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 188
Wash. App. 467, 485, 353 P.3d 680 (2015). The OFM is required to provide counties with a high,
middle, and low population projection number for their planning processes. RCW 43.62.035.
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The middle projection represents the most likely population projection. RCW 43.62.035.
Counties have discretion to make many choices about accommodating growth in their
comprehensive plans and amendments. RCW 36.70A.110(2). Separately, the OFM is also
required to provide counties with their annual population numbers and their growth rates for the
preceding ten years. RCW 43.62.035.
Here, CCCU does not articulate specifically how it is challenging the Board’s decision.
Assuming that CCCU is arguing the Board erred in approving the County’s selection because the
middle projection was clearly erroneous, we disagree. The OFM offered three population
projections: high (681,135), medium (562,207), and low (459,617). The County chose the
medium population projection. Choosing any of the three offered OFM population projections
was within the County’s discretion under RCW 36.70A.110(2). See Spokane County, 188 Wn.
App. at 485. As a result, the Board did not err when it concluded that the County did not violate
the GMA when choosing a population projection.
Additionally, CCCU argues that the County failed to revise population projections when
the OFM updated the County’s annual population number in 2015. However, the annual
population number is separate from the OFM’s required twenty-year growth management
projections. RCW 43.62.035. Because the County used the required population projections in
its 2016 Plan Update, we hold that the Board did not err regarding the OFM population
projections.
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IX. RURAL GROWTH PROJECTIONS
CCCU argues that the County violated the GMA by using arbitrary and capricious
population projections that impermissibly capped rural growth. The Board dismissed CCCU’s
arguments. We hold that the Board did not err.
To plan for rural growth in the 2016 Plan Update, the County made planning assumptions
derived from a rural vacant buildable lands model. CCCU argued that this model “capped” rural
growth or, stated another way, planned in a way that limited growth in rural lands. AR at 10515.
The Board held that nothing prevented the County from using urban models to project rural
growth.
RCW 36.70A.110(2) states, in part, “Based upon the growth management population
projection made for the county by the office of financial management, the county . . . shall
include areas and densities sufficient to permit the urban growth that is projected to occur in the
county or city for the succeeding twenty-year period.” (Emphasis added.)
CCCU cites extensively to Clark County Citizens United, Inc. v. Clark County Natural
Resource Council, 94 Wash. App. 670, 972 P.2d 941 (1999) for the proposition that the GMA
prohibits the use of population projection techniques developed for urban areas in rural areas.
That case did not so hold. In Clark County Citizens United, we considered whether a county
must use OFM’s population projections as a cap on rural growth. 94 Wash. App. at 675. We held
that, “nothing in the GMA provides that a county must use OFM’s population projections as a
cap or ceiling when planning for non-urban growth.” Clark County Citizens United, 94 Wn.
App. at 676. We noted, “Without so holding, we assume that the GMA permits a county to use
OFM’s population projections when planning for lands outside its urban growth areas. That
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question is not presented by this appeal.” Clark County Citizens United, 94 Wash. App. at 676
n.23.
CCCU argues that “it has been decisively settled that the use of population projections
developed for urban area planning cannot lawfully be employed to project or plan for rural
growth.” Br. of CCCU at 37. As shown above, CCCU is incorrect.
In fact, CCCU does not identify any authority that prevents the use of OFM population
projections for rural growth. Further, RCW 36.70A.110(2) regulates urban population
projections, not rural. We hold that CCCU fails to show how the Board erred when determining
that the County did not violate the GMA regarding its rural growth projections.
For the first time in its reply brief, CCCU contests the County’s actions under RCW
36.70A.115. RCW 36.70A.115 requires counties to ensure there is sufficient land capacity for
development. However, CCCU neither raised this issue to the Board nor in its opening brief.
Because we do not address issues not raised to the Board, RCW 34.05.554(1), we decline to
address this argument.
X. RURAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH PROJECTION
CCCU argues that the Board erred when it dismissed CCCU’s argument that the County
violated the GMA when it failed to define rural character and also when it used a 90 percent
urban, 10 percent rural population projection for the 2016 Plan Update. Specifically, CCCU
argues that the County failed to define “rural character” in the 2016 Plan Update and that
because the County did not define “rural character” it cannot justify the 90/10 population
distribution. Br. of CCCU at 43. Below, the Board dismissed CCCU’s argument. We hold that
the Board did not err.
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Counties should adopt a definition of rural character. WAC 365-196-425(2)(c). The
2016 Plan Update states:
In Clark County, the rural area represents a lifestyle based on historical
development patterns and resource-based industries such as commercial forestry,
Christmas trees, dairies, berry farming, orchards and mining. Today much of the
county’s rural lands include a mix of resource, small commercial, recreational and
residential uses.
No single attribute describes the rural landscape. Instead combinations of
characteristics which are found in rural settings impart the sense of what we
commonly describe as rural. These factors are cumulative in nature and the more
of these factors that are present influence feelings of whether a particular area is
rural. In many cases these characteristics are subjective and frequently not all of
them are found in each area. When describing rural conditions the public will often
describe these areas in terms of a certain lifestyle. The factors listed below are
those that usually describe “rural character.”
 the presence of large lots;
 limited public services present (water, sewer, police, fire, roads, etc.);
 different expectations of levels of services provided;
 small scale resource activity;
 undeveloped nature of the landscape;
 wildlife and natural conditions predominate;
 closer relationship between nature and residents;
 personal open space;
 a sense of separation from intense human activity;
 a sense of self sufficiency; and
 rural commercial supporting rural area population.
AR at 1411. The County also adopted a 90/10 urban to rural population distribution. The Board
dismissed CCCU’s arguments noting that the requirements of chapter 265-196 WAC are
permissive and that the County has broad discretion to meet the GMA goals of encouraging
development in urban areas and reducing sprawl.
Counties have broad discretion in how they plan for growth. RCW 36.70A.110(2).
Among other goals, counties should encourage development in urban areas and reduce sprawl.
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RCW 36.70A.020(1), (2). WAC 365-196-425 states that counties should include a rural element
in their comprehensive plans. But the rule but does not mandate counties to define this term,
stating, “Counties should adopt a locally appropriate definition of rural character.” WAC 365-
196-425(2)(c) (emphasis added). Further, the counties’ “rural element should provide for a
variety of densities that are consistent with the pattern of development established in its
definition of rural character.” WAC 365-196-425(3)(a).
Although chapter 365-196 WAC provides some procedural guidelines, compliance with
these procedures “is not a prerequisite for compliance with the act.” WAC 365-196-030(2). The
Board’s compliance determination must be based on a violation of the GMA itself. WAC 365-
196-030(3). As stated above, chapter 365-196 WAC does not create a minimum list of criteria
for procedural compliance with the GMA. Rather, counties “can achieve compliance . . . by
adopting other approaches.” WAC 365-196-030(2).
CCCU argues that the County failed to define “rural character.” Br. of CCCU at 43.
Although not strictly required, the County generally defined “rural character” in its 2016 Plan
Update. The County detailed factors that it determined described “rural character,” including
large lots, different expectations for community services, and a sense of self-sufficiency. We
hold that the Board did not err when dismissing CCCU’s argument insofar as it is based on the
County’s failure to define rural character.
CCCU also argues that the 90/10 population distribution did not align with the actual
86/14 population distribution in the County. CCCU argues that this “90/10 distribution does not
comply with the County’s planning obligations under WAC 365-196-425(3)(a).” Br. of CCCU
at 45. CCCU seems to argue that because the 90/10 goal distribution is not the same as the 86/14
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current population distribution, the goal distribution is not consistent with the true rural character
of the County. However, CCCU does not show how the goal distribution violates the GMA.
First, chapter 365-196 WAC does not add procedural requirements for GMA compliance. WAC
365-196-030(2)-(3). CCCU’s alleged violation of chapter 365-196 procedures alone does not
support a GMA violation. Second, the County has broad discretion to plan for growth. RCW
36.70A.110(2). Here, CCCU fails to meet its burden to show that the Board erred. We hold that
the Board did not err when dismissing CCCU’s population distribution arguments.
XI. GMA PRIVATE PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS
CCCU argues that the Board erred when it dismissed CCCU’s argument that the County
violated the GMA goal of adequately considering the impacts of the 2016 Plan Update on private
property rights. We hold that CCCU’s argument fails.
Protection of private property rights is enumerated at goal 6 in the GMA. RCW
36.70A.020(6). In the 2016 Plan Update, the County recited this goal, stating that it gave private
property rights due consideration during the planning process. Further, the County had extensive
contacts with private property owners, stated views regarding the impacts of the 2016 Plan
Update on private property rights, and heard from landowners regarding their concerns about
private property rights. Further, as exhibited by the County’s 2016 Plan Update PPP, it heard
from citizens and considered private property rights.
One of the GMA’s 13 enumerated goals “used exclusively for the purpose of guiding the
development of comprehensive plans” states: “Property rights. Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation having been made. The property rights of
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landowners shall be protected from arbitrary and discriminatory actions.” RCW 36.70A.020(6).
WAC 365-196-725 further details:
(1) Comprehensive plans and development regulations adopted under the act are
subject to the supremacy principle of Article VI, United States Constitution and of
Article XI, Section 11, Washington [S]tate Constitution.
(2) Counties and cities planning under the act are required to use a process
established by the state attorney general to assure that proposed regulatory or
administrative actions do not unconstitutionally infringe upon private property
rights. . . .
A party may challenge land use regulations as unconstitutional regulatory takings under
article I, section 16 of the Washington Constitution. Thun v. City of Bonney Lake, 3 Wash. App.
2d 453, 459, 416 P.3d 743 (2018).
CCCU’s argument is difficult to discern. CCCU argues broadly that the County made
determinations about property that were contrary to facts, and that the County failed to
implement the goal of protecting private property rights. However, CCCU does not explain
anything further in its argument.
Specifically, CCCU argues, “Determining the development potential of property based on
a population projection standard that has never been accurate is in disregard of all the facts and
circumstances. Similarly, the County’s decision to reject rezoning to smaller parcel sizes in the
rural area is contrary to the actual facts and circumstances in Clark County.” Br. of CCCU at 49.
It appears that CCCU is rearguing that the population projection and the parcel sizing were
arbitrary and capricious, an argument we rejected above. Further, CCCU argues that “the Board
errs in concluding that [RCW 36.70A.020(6)] is actually implemented because there is a
recitation in the ordinance that the County has given some rights ‘due consideration.’” Br. of
CCCU at 49-50 (quoting AR at 10472).
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RCW 34.05.570(3) provides nine enumerated ways to challenge an agency action
through judicial review. However, CCCU does not sufficiently explain to this court how it is
challenging the Board’s decision under that statute. Nor does CCCU invoke RCW
34.05.570(3)(a), which would have allowed us to review the Board’s orders for constitutional
violations. Rather, CCCU contends only that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously
regarding the GMA private property goal. CCCU has failed to sufficiently explain to us how the
Board erred and, thus, fails to carry its burden.
XII. BOARD’S COMPLIANCE ORDER
FOCC argues that the Board erred in its compliance order when it declared issues moot
and found the County’s readoption of prior provisions was compliant with the GMA. We hold
that the Board did not err.
A. Facts Regarding the Board’s Compliance Order
In its FDO, the Board found some provisions noncompliant and determined other
provisions invalid. FOCC raises arguments for two County decisions the Board found
noncompliant, Issues 11 and 13.
For Issue 11, the Board considered the County’s creation of AG-10 and FR-20 districts,
replacing AG-20 and FR-40 districts. In its FDO, the Board found and concluded that “reducing
parcel sizes for agricultural and forestry lands will not meet requirements in RCW 36.70A.060 or
.070 nor does it meet the standards established in King County.” AR at 10552. To come into
compliance, the County amended its 2016 Plan Update by passing Ordinance 2017-07-04, which
changed back the AG-10 to AG-20 and FR-20 to FR-40.
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For Issue 13, the Board considered the County’s single rural density designation,
replacing its varied rural densities provisions. In its FDO, the Board found and concluded that
“the County did not comply with RCW 36.70A.070(5) regarding a variety of rural densities.”
AR at 10552. To come into compliance, the County adopted Ordinance 2017-07-04 which
amended the single plan designation for rural lands and reestablished the prior varied rural
densities.
In its compliance order, the Board noted that both provisions readopted by the County
had previously been found GMA compliant. Issue 11’s parcel sizes had been determined
compliant in the County’s 2007 Comprehensive Plan. CAR at 1573 (citing Karpinski v. Clark
County, No. 07-2-0027 (W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. Sept. 4, 2014)). In the compliance
order, the Board stated:
Here, Clark County repealed the ordinance amendments challenged in Issue 11, the
Issue 11 challenge is moot, and the County’s action addressing the Issue 11
provisions must be found compliant. With the County amendments in Ordinance
2017-07-04 regarding agricultural and forest lands, the Board finds and concludes
that the County is now in compliance with RCW 36.70A.060 and RCW 36.70A.070
in regards to Issue 11.
CAR at 1574 (emphasis omitted).
Further, the Board stated, “The challenge to Issue 13 is now moot because the County
readopted a previously GMA-compliant variety of rural densities. With the County amendments
in Ordinance 2017-07-04 for Issue 13, the Board finds the County’s action regarding a variety of
rural densities, achieves compliance with RCW 36.70A.070(5).” CAR at 1575 (emphasis
omitted).
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B. Compliance Legal Principles
Following a remand period to address noncompliant comprehensive plan provisions, the
Board determines whether a county has achieved GMA compliance. RCW 36.70A.330(1)-(3).
Parties may challenge the legislation enacted in response to the Board’s final order. RCW
36.70A.330(2).
Although parties are not entitled to challenge any and all aspects of a county’s
comprehensive plan, a party may challenge amendments made in an updated comprehensive
plan. Thurston County, 164 Wash. 2d at 344, 347. When the Board finds noncompliance on an
issue, the county’s new comprehensive plan provisions are presumed valid, and the challenger
bears the burden to establish that the new provisions are clearly erroneous under the GMA in
view of the entire record before the Board. RCW 36.70A.320(1)-(2).
In Hazen v. Yakima County, challengers petitioned the Board regarding the compliance of
certain plan provisions. No. 08-1-0008c, at 14 (E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. April 5,
2010). During the pendency of the Board’s review, Yakima County amended some provisions,
removing one provision outright and adjusting others. Hazen, at 14-15. The Board found that
consideration of the repealed provision was moot, but that the amended provisions remained
under the Board’s compliance review. Hazen, at 15.
C. The Board Did Not Err by Finding Compliance
FOCC argues that the County did more than merely repeal noncompliant provisions and
reinstate former plan provisions. We disagree.
Following the Board’s noncompliance findings on Issues 11 and 13, the County
reenacted the pre-2016 Plan Update plan provisions. The Board previously found these
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provisions compliant with the GMA. Because of this, the Board determined that the issues
regarding the now-repealed provisions were moot and found the County compliant regarding the
reenacted provisions.
FOCC argues that this court’s opinion in Miotke supports the proposition that even if the
previous provisions had been determined compliant, their current compliance based on land use
is subject to renewed scrutiny. Because Miotke is distinguishable, we disagree.
In Miotke, while the Board reviewed the county’s updated UGA designation,
development rights of property owners vested in the new UGA. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at 373.
The Board found this UGA designation noncompliant with the GMA and made a determination
of invalidity. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at 373. In an attempt to comply, Spokane County repealed
the UGA designation and reverted the land to its prior designation. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at
374. This court held that the vested rights of property owners did not relieve the county of its
planning obligations under the GMA. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at 379. Rather, because the UGA
was subject to a determination of invalidity, the county was responsible for showing GMA
compliance in its new planning decision. Miotke, 181 Wash. App. at 379-80.
In Miotke, the Board made a determination of invalidity, shifting the burden to the county
to prove compliance. 181 Wash. App. at 379-80. Here, however, the Board found the County
merely noncompliant regarding Issues 11 and 13. Without a determination of invalidity, the
burden remains with the challenger, FOCC, to show the Board erred. Here, FOCC has not met
its burden to show that the Board acted in a clearly erroneous manner when finding the County
compliant for Issues 11 and 13 after it repealed the challenged provisions and readopted
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previously compliant provisions. Accordingly, we hold the Board did not err when concluding
that the County achieved compliance regarding Issues 11 and 13.
XIII. CONCLUSION
We grant FOCC’s motion to dismiss the County’s and 3B’s petitions for judicial review
of the FDO for lack of appellate jurisdiction. We hold that the Board’s finding of the County’s
noncompliance regarding the County’s UGAs designations are moot. Further, we hold that the
Board did not err when rejecting all of CCCU’s arguments. Finally, we hold that the Board did
not err when it determined that the County was compliant regarding Issues 11 and 13. We
remand to the Board for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Worswick, J.
We concur:
Maxa, C.J.
Glasgow, J.
51