State of Washington v. Samuel Madrigal-Santana ( 2022 )

FILED
MARCH 15, 2022
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 38057-2-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
SAMUEL MADRIGAL-SANTANA, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
STAAB, J. — Samuel Madrigal-Santana assaulted his girlfriend, Ms. R., in
violation of a valid domestic violence no-contact order by physically preventing her from
leaving in her vehicle. During the confrontation, he placed a small knife on the
dashboard, saying “don’t make me do it,” and later held it to Ms. R’s throat. After a
bench trial, he was found guilty of second degree assault with a deadly weapon, felony
violation of a domestic violence no contact order, and possession of a controlled
substance. Mr. Madrigal-Santana appeals arguing that his drug possession conviction is
void. He also contends that the charging document was defective and the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he used a deadly weapon. Finally, he
contends that his offender score was miscalculated and his attorney was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to make sentencing objections.
No. 38057-2-III
State v. Madrigal-Santana
Mr. Madrigal-Santana is correct that his drug possession conviction is void and the
conviction for that charge is reversed in light of Blake.1 Otherwise, we affirm his
convictions for felony violation of a no-contact order and second degree assault, and
remand for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
On March 21, 2020, Mr. Madrigal-Santana and Ms. R. were in a dating
relationship and a valid domestic violence no-contact order prohibited him from having
any contact with her. Mr. Madrigal-Santana was aware of and had signed the order. In
violation of the order on that day, Mr. Madrigal-Santana was a passenger in Ms. R.’s car.
At some point, Ms. R. pulled over. When she tried to continue driving Mr.
Madrigal-Santana prevented her from doing so by placing the vehicle in park and placing
his leg over hers to push the brake. Ms. R. testified that Mr. Madrigal-Santana started
“flipping out,” took out a pocket knife and held it on the car’s dashboard so she could see
it. Although she testified that it was dark, she recognized the knife. She then felt him
hold it to her throat for “more than just a few seconds” and he said “Don’t make me do
it.” Report of Proceedings (RP) (Jan. 26, 2021) at 30-31.
1
State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021).
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Ms. R. used an emergency feature on her cell phone to call 911, and when Mr.
Madrigal-Santana realized it, he exited the vehicle. Ms. R. sustained scratches on her
arm from this incident caused by Mr. Madrigal-Santana.
Chelan County charged Samuel Madrigal-Santana with (Count I) assault in the
second degree–domestic violence, (Count II) felony violation of a court order–domestic
violence, (Count III) unlawful possession of a controlled substance–methamphetamine
pursuant to RCW 69.50.4013(1), and (Count IV) felony harassment–domestic violence,
and witness tampering.
Mr. Madrigal-Santana waived his right to a jury trial and the case went to bench
trial. He stipulated to the admission of the no-contact order, which prohibited him from
contacting Ms. R. Ms. R. testified that Mr. Madrigal-Santana held a knife to her throat.
Audio recording from 911 corroborated Ms. R’s testimony and fear, which the trial court
found credible.
Mr. Madrigal-Santana denied having a knife that day, and testified that they
argued so he put his leg over hers to hit the brake so he could get out of the car. Mr.
Madrigal-Santana testified that he was convicted of robbery in 2010 and lying to the
police in 2019. The court found that the “knife was readily capable of causing death or
substantial bodily harm in the circumstances in which it was used.” Clerk’s Papers (CP)
at 47. For the purposes of elevating the no-contact order violation to a felony, the court
found that Mr. Madrigal-Santana “intentionally engaged in harmful or offensive contact
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in preventing Ms. [R.] from driving away by pressing his leg on her leg to press the brake
pedal of the vehicle, thereby intentionally assaulting [Ms. R.]” CP at 48. The court
considered the leg contact to stop the vehicle fourth degree assault.
Based on these findings, the trial court found Mr. Madrigal-Santana guilty of
assault second degree–domestic violence, felony violation of a domestic violence no
contact order, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance–methamphetamine. For
Counts I and II the court made a special finding of domestic violence–intimate partner,
pursuant to RCW 26.50.110. The court imposed a sentence of 75 months custody and 30
months community custody. Mr. Madrigal-Santana timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Madrigal-Santana challenges his conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. The State concedes that the conviction is void following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Blake. We accept this concession and reverse the conviction for this charge.
Next, Mr. Madrigal-Santana argues that the charging document was
constitutionally deficient. Initially he argued that recent amendments to the fourth degree
assault statute created new elements that must be included in a charge of felony violation
of a no-contact order. In his reply brief, Mr. Madrigal-Santana concedes that common
law assault remains a viable alternative to support the charge. Nonetheless, he argues for
the first time in his reply brief that the trial court’s findings were insufficient to support
common law assault because the court did not find Mr. Madrigal-Santana’s contact was
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unlawful. We decline to address this late argument. RAP 10.3(a), (c); Cowiche Canyon
Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (issues raised for the
first time in a reply brief are too late (citing In re Marriage of Sacco, 114 Wn.2d 1, 5, 784
P.2d 1266 (1990))).
In his third issue on appeal, Mr. Madrigal-Santana challenges the sufficiency of
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Mr. Madrigal-Santana used a deadly
weapon when he assaulted Ms. R. Mr. Madrigal-Santana argues that the only description
of the knife by Ms. R was that it was small and contained a flash. She did not estimate
the length of the knife and no knife was ever found. Mr. Madrigal-Santana argues that
Ms. R’s description fails to clearly establish that the item held to her throat was a knife,
and even if it was a knife, the evidence is insufficient to show that it was a “deadly
weapon” sufficient to support a conviction for second degree assault with a deadly
weapon.
“Whether a person is armed is a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Mills,
80 Wn. App. 231, 234, 907 P.2d 316 (1995). Mr. Madrigal-Santana’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence is a question of fact. In reviewing this challenge, we consider
the facts in a light most favorable to the State to determine if “‘any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State
v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294, 311-12, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992) (quoting State v. Bingham, 105
Wn.2d 820, 719 P.2d 109 (1986). Whether the facts meet the legal definition of a
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“deadly weapon” is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Schelin, 147 Wn.2d
562, 566, 55 P.3d 632 (2002).
Mr. Madrigal-Santana was charged with second degree assault with a deadly
weapon in violation of RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). For purposes of this crime, a “deadly
weapon” includes per se deadly weapons such as firearms and explosives. RCW
9A.04.110(6); State v. Winings, 126 Wn. App. 75, 87, 107 P.3d 141 (2005). The term
also includes “any other weapon, device, instrument, article, or substance . . . as defined
in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used,
or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm.”
RCW 9A.04.110(6). Weapons that fall under this second category are not per se deadly
weapons and there must be evidence that the weapon was “readily capable of causing
death or substantial bodily harm under the circumstances in which it is used.” Winings,
126 Wn. App. at 87. “The circumstances of a weapon’s use include the intent and
present ability of the use, the degree of force, the part of the body to which it was applied,
and the physical injuries inflicted.” Id. at 88.
In finding of fact 2.8, the trial court found
The defendant was in possession of a pocket knife. The defendant placed
the blade of the knife to her throat for more than a few seconds. The
defendant held the knife on the dashboard pointed at her and said
repeatedly, “Don’t make me do it.” The knife was readily capable of
causing death or substantial bodily harm in the circumstances in which it
was used.
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CP at 47. Under these circumstances, even a small knife is readily capable of causing
death or substantial bodily harm.
Mr. Madrigal-Santana argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove he even had
a knife. He points out that Ms. R. described the knife as being small and containing a
flash, and police never found a knife. He speculates that maybe it was not a knife but
rather a penlight.
This argument fails to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the State.
Ms. R testified that Madrigal-Santana held a knife to her throat: a knife that she
recognized as Mr. Madrigal-Santana’s knife. She also testified that he placed the knife
on the car’s dashboard and pointed it in her direction. Taken in a light most favorable to
the State, a judge could find from this evidence that Madrigal-Santana used a knife on
Ms. R. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Madrigal-
Santana assaulted Ms. R with a deadly weapon.
Madrigal-Santana raises two additional arguments related to his sentencing. He
contends that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the
calculation of his offender score. Because we are remanding for a full resentencing, we
decline to address these issues.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the convictions for second degree assault and felony violation of a no-
contact order. We reverse Mr. Madrigal-Santana’s conviction for possession of a
controlled substance and remand for resentencing.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________
Staab, J.
WE CONCUR:
________________________________
Pennell, J.
_________________________________
Siddoway, C.J.
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