State Of Washington, V. Joseph Nicholas Sliwinski ( 2022 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
March 22, 2022
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 55634-1-II
Respondent,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOSEPH NICHOLAS SLIWINSKI,
Appellant.
PRICE, J. — Joseph Sliwinski appeals his conviction for felony harassment of Megan
Kingston. Sliwinski argues that there was insufficient evidence that his threat caused Kingston to
reasonably fear that he would kill her. We disagree and affirm Sliwinski’s conviction.
FACTS
The State charged Sliwinski with felony harassment of Kingston after he threatened to
“bash” her head in. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 147. Sliwinski and Kingston were
in a relationship at the time of the incident. At trial, the State presented evidence that the two were
arguing at Sliwinski’s home and Sliwinski accused Kingston of talking to other men. Kingston
testified that Sliwinski was intoxicated and behaving aggressively toward her, including yelling,
threatening to break her phone, and preventing her from leaving.
Kingston testified that, while holding a standard-size hammer with a metal head, Sliwinski
said to Kingston, “I swear to God . . . if you don’t tell me [who you were texting], I’ll bash your
f***ing head in.” VRP at 147. Kingston said that she felt like she “needed to leave” and was
No. 55634-1-II
“[s]cared that Sliwinski was gonna hit [her] with the hammer.” VRP at 147. Kingston
subsequently grabbed Sliwinski’s phone and ran into his bedroom where she called 911.
The jury found Sliwinski guilty of felony harassment. Sliwinski appeals.
ANALYSIS
Sliwinski argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of felony
harassment. We disagree.
“In a claim of insufficient evidence, a reviewing court examines whether ‘any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,’ viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state.” State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 336, 150
P.3d 59 (2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 152, 110 P.3d 192(2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State’s
evidence, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are construed in the State’s
favor. State v. Cadenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265-66, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). We give
circumstantial evidence and direct evidence equal weight in this determination. State v. Trey M.,
186 Wn.2d 884, 905, 383 P.3d 474 (2016). We do not make or review credibility determinations.
Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 336.
Felony harassment requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant knowingly threatened to kill the victim and that, as a result, the victim reasonably feared
that the threat would be carried out. RCW 9A.46.020(2)(b)(ii); State v. C.G., 150 Wn.2d 604, 609,
80 P.3d 595 (2003). The victim must subjectively fear that the threat will be carried out, and the
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fear must be objectively reasonable. State v. E.J.Y., 113 Wn. App. 940, 952-53, 55 P.3d 673(2002).
The victim’s fear can be assessed from the context, and it is not necessary that specific
words are used. For example, in Trey M., our Supreme Court held that sufficient evidence
supported the defendant’s conviction for felony harassment where the victims testified that when
they heard they were on the defendant’s “hit list,” they were “scared.” Trey, 186 Wn.2d at 905-
06 (internal quotation marks omitted). Relying on the context of this testimony, the court
determined that there was sufficient evidence that the victims feared a threat to kill would be
carried out and that such fear was reasonable. Id. 186 Wn.2d at 906.
Here, Sliwinski argues that the State did not present evidence that Kingston was placed in
a reasonable fear that a threat to kill would be carried out because she did not explicitly testify that
she feared Sliwinski would kill her.
While it is true that Kingston did not directly say that she feared Sliwinski would kill her,
her testimony was sufficient. She testified that when Sliwinski said he was going to “bash her
f***ing head in” while holding the hammer, she was scared that he was going to hit her with the
hammer. VRP at 147. Viewing all facts and inferences in favor of the State, and considering the
context of what was occurring at the time, Kingston’s testimony was sufficient for a trier of fact
to infer that Kingston believed Sliwinski would bash her head in, which in turn is sufficient to
support her reasonable fear that a threat to kill would be carried out.
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No. 55634-1-II
Sliwinski, who stood about six inches taller than Kingston, was intoxicated, holding the
hammer, and behaving aggressively toward Kingston prior to making the threat. He was yelling
and accusing her of hiding something. It strains reason to suggest that Kingston’s statement of
fear of being hit with the hammer directly following Sliwinski’s threat, while holding a hammer,
to “bash her f***ing head in” was not a direct statement of fear of death. VRP at 147. And, again,
as explained in Trey M., proof of felony harassment does not require particular phraseology or the
use of the word “kill.” 186 Wn.2d at 906.
Moreover, Kingston’s subsequent 911 call to request law enforcement shows that she took
Sliwinski’s threats as more than just “idle talk or jests”1 and that she believed she was in danger.
Construing the facts in favor of the State, and considering the overall context in which the threat
was made, the testimony provided sufficient evidence to show that Kingston’s fear was both
subjectively felt and objectively reasonable. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence of
felony harassment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, because a rational juror could find that Kingston reasonably believed that
Sliwinski would carry out his threat to bash her head in and that this threat was a threat to kill,
there was sufficient evidence to support of finding of guilt for felony harassment. Therefore, we
affirm Sliwinski’s conviction.
1
State v. Olsen, 175 Wn. App. 269, 284, 309 P.3d 518 (2013) (in a felony harassment case, court
approves “true threat” instruction that excludes “idle talk or jests”).
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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J.
We concur:
GLASGOW, A.C.J.
WORSWICK, J.
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