State Of Washington v. Jamez Edward Brown ( 2016 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
November 1, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 48229-1-II
Respondent,
v.
JAMEZ EDWARD BROWN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, P.J. — Jamez Edward Brown appeals his conviction for first degree robbery
and his sentence for third degree assault. Brown argues, and the State concedes, that the trial
court erred by instructing the jury on an uncharged alternative means of committing the crime of
first degree robbery and by exceeding its sentencing authority when it imposed a sentence
beyond the statutory maximum for third degree assault.1 We accept the State’s concessions and
reverse Brown’s conviction for first degree robbery and remand for a new trial on that charge,
and we remand for resentencing or amendment of the community custody term on Brown’s third
degree assault conviction.
1
Brown also argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on each element of
first degree robbery and in not taking the first degree robbery charge from the jury for lack of a
sufficient information, and Brown argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
object to the court’s jury instructions on an uncharged alternative means of committing first
degree robbery and for proposing a first degree robbery instruction that omitted an essential
element of the offense. Because the State properly concedes that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury on an uncharged alternative means and by exceeding its sentencing authority,
we do not consider Brown’s additional arguments.
No. 48229-1-II
FACTS
On February 24, 2015, a Macy’s sales associate saw a man, later identified as Jamez
Edward Brown, run out of the store with an armful of unpaid merchandise. A bystander watched
Brown run out of the store and confronted him in the parking lot. The bystander told Brown to
return the unpaid merchandise, but Brown refused and pointed what appeared to be a handgun at
the bystander. Brown left the Macy’s parking lot, and he was later apprehended by police.
While in police custody, Brown spit on an officer’s face.
The State charged Brown with first degree robbery,2 charging only the alternative means
of “unlawfully tak[ing] personal property from a person, against such person’s will.” Clerk’s
Papers (CP) at 45. Brown was also charged with third degree assault.3
At trial, witnesses testified to the above facts. The jury instructions stated: “A person
commits the crime of robbery when he or she unlawfully . . . takes personal property from the
person or in the presence of another against that person’s will by the use or threatened use of
immediate force.” CP at 102 (emphasis added). The trial court also provided the jury with the
following first degree robbery to-convict instruction:
To convict the defendant of the crime of robbery in the first degree . . . each
of the following six elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about February 24, 2015, the defendant unlawfully took
personal property from the person or in the presence of another.
2
RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a)(ii).
3
RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g). In addition, Brown was charged with one count of attempting to elude
a pursuing police vehicle, with special allegations, and one count of third degree assault. The
jury found Brown guilty of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle and not guilty of the
additional third degree assault count, but neither charge is at issue in this appeal.
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No. 48229-1-II
CP at 107 (emphasis added).
The jury returned verdicts finding Brown guilty of first degree robbery and third degree
assault. In addition to sentencing Brown to 160 months’ incarceration for first degree robbery,
the court sentenced Brown to 60 months’ incarceration plus 12 months of community custody for
the third degree assault charge. Brown appeals his first degree robbery conviction and his third
degree assault sentence. The State concedes error on both points.
ANALYSIS
I. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Brown argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on
an uncharged alternative means of committing first degree robbery. We accept the State’s
concession, reverse Brown’s first degree robbery conviction, and remand for a new trial.
The State is required to inform an accused of the criminal charges to be met at trial, and
the State cannot try an accused for an uncharged crime. State v. Lindsey, 177 Wn. App. 233,
246-47, 311 P.3d 61 (2013). When the State charges an accused with committing one of several
alternative means to a single crime, a trial court errs by instructing the jury that it may consider
any uncharged means by which the accused could have committed that crime. State v. Bray, 52
Wn. App. 30, 34, 756 P.2d 1332 (1988). Instructing a jury on an uncharged alternative means
violates the defendant’s right to be informed of the charges against him. State v. Laramie, 141
Wn. App. 332, 343, 169 P.3d 859 (2007) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CONST. art. I, § 22). A
jury instruction that contains uncharged alternative means is presumed prejudicial, and “it is the
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No. 48229-1-II
State’s burden to prove that the error was harmless.” In re Pers. Restraint of Brockie, 178
Wn.2d 532, 536, 309 P.3d 498 (2013).
Here, the third amended information charged Brown with “unlawfully tak[ing] personal
property from a person, against such person’s will.” CP at 45. The court’s instruction to the jury
provided that in order to find Brown guilty of first degree robbery, it must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that Brown “unlawfully took personal property from the person or in the
presence of another.” CP at 107 (emphasis added).
The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict Brown of first degree robbery by
the alternative means of unlawfully taking personal property in the presence of another. The trial
court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider uncharged alternative means because the
information charged Brown with one of two alternative means of committing first degree
robbery. This instruction is presumed prejudicial, and the State concedes that this constitutes
reversible error. We accept the State’s concession, reverse Brown’s first degree robbery
conviction, and remand for a new trial.
II. SENTENCING
Brown also contends the trial court erred by imposing a sentence for third degree assault
that exceeded the statutory maximum. The State concedes error. We accept the State’s
concession, reverse Brown’s sentence for third degree assault, and remand for resentencing or
amendment of the community custody term.
A court’s sentencing authority is limited to that granted by statute. In re Postsentence
Review of Combs, 176 Wn. App. 112, 117, 308 P.3d 763 (2013). Whether a sentencing court has
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No. 48229-1-II
exceeded its statutory authority is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Mann, 146 Wn.
App. 349, 357, 189 P.3d 843 (2008). If a court exceeds its sentencing authority, it commits
reversible error. State v. Winborne, 167 Wn. App. 320, 330, 273 P.3d 454 (2012).
Under RCW 9.94A.505, a court exceeds its sentencing authority if it imposes a sentence
that exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime. Accordingly, a sentencing court is required to
reduce a community custody term “whenever an offender’s standard range term of confinement
in combination with the term of community custody exceeds the statutory maximum for the
crime.” RCW 9.94A.701(9).
Brown was sentenced to 60 months’ incarceration and 12 months of community custody
for third degree assault, a class C felony. RCW 9A.36.031(2). The maximum sentence
authorized by statute for a class C felony is 60 months. RCW 9A.20.021(1)(c). As a result, the
trial court was required to reduce Brown’s 12 month community custody term so that his
standard range term of confinement and term of community custody did not exceed 60 months.
The trial court failed to do so. The State concedes Brown’s sentence exceeded the statutory
maximum for third degree assault. We accept the State’s concession and remand for
resentencing or amendment of the community custody term.
In conclusion, we reverse Brown’s conviction for first degree robbery and remand for a
new trial, and we also remand for resentencing or amendment of the community custody term
regarding the third degree assault conviction.
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No. 48229-1-II
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, P.J.
We concur:
Lee, J.
Sutton, J.
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