State Of Washington v. Leonard Clarence Woody ( 2013 )

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STATE OF WASHING tui:
2013 JUL-8 AH 10= 30
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 68643-7-1
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LEONARD CLARENCE WOODY,
Appellant. FILED: JUL ~ 8 2013
Per Curiam—Leonard Woody was convicted of burglary and sentenced to
a standard range sentence based on an offender score ofsix points. He appeals
the inclusion of five 1993 Ohio drug trafficking convictions in his offender score,
arguing that they are not comparable to any Washington state felonies. In a pro
se statement of additional grounds for review, he also contends he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm in part and remand in part.
Classification of out-of-state convictions is a mandatory step in the
sentencing process. State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 483, 973 P.2d 452 (1999).
Out-of-state convictions are included in an offender score if the foreign crime is
comparable to a Washington felony offense. RCW 9.94A.525(3). If the elements
of a foreign offense are not identical to a Washington offense, the sentencing
court must examine factual comparability, i.e., "whether the conduct underlying
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the foreign offense would have violated the comparable Washington statute."
State v. Thiefault. 160 Wn.2d 409, 415, 158 P.3d 580 (2007) (citing State v.
Morlev. 134 Wn.2d 588, 606, 952 P.2d 167 (1998)).
In this case, Woody contends, and the State concedes, that the
Washington and Ohio drug trafficking statutes are not legally comparable. We
agree. The Ohio statute under which Woody was convicted required only that a
person "sell or offer to sell" a controlled substance. R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) (1992).
Under this statute, "the state is not required to prove that a controlled substance
was, in fact, sold, or even that a controlled substance existed; rather, the state is
merely required to prove that an offer was made to sell a controlled substance."
State v. Bazzv, 86 Ohio App.3d 546, 548, 621 N.E.2d 604 (1993). In contrast,
Washington law establishes that "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture,
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance."
RCW 69.50.401(1). This statute requires the actual existence of the controlled
substance. State v. Evans, 80 Wn. App. 806, 814, 911 P.2d 1344 (1996). The
State properly concedes that the Ohio and Washington statutes are not legally
comparable.
Turning to the question of factual comparability, Woody contends, and the
State concedes, that the record is insufficient and that the matter must be
remanded for the State to prove the classification of the disputed criminal history.
We agree. See State v. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d 913, 929-30, 205 P.3d 113 (2009).
On remand, "the parties shall have the opportunity to present and the court to
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consider all relevant evidence regarding criminal history, including criminal
history not previously presented." RCW 9.94A.530(2).
In his pro se statement of additional grounds, Woody claims he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. "A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel must show that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and
resulted in prejudice." State v. Emery. 174 Wn.2d 741, 754-55, 278 P.3d 653(2012) (citing State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251(1995)). We strongly presume that counsel was effective. Emery, 174 Wn.2d. at
755.
Woody claims that he would not have been prosecuted for burglary if his
counsel had complied with his request to file a notice to dismiss the charge under
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). But 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) is a federal statute that is not
applicable to Woody's prosecution. Moreover, Woody fails to identify any factual
basis for counsel to bring a motion to dismiss.
Woody next contends his counsel failed to interview and subpoena
witnesses who would have provided exculpatory evidence. Generally, the
decision to call witnesses is a matter of trial tactics that will not support a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Byrd, 30 Wn. App. 794, 799, 638 P.2d
601 (1981). In any event, this claim involves matters outside the record and
therefore must be raised in a personal restraint petition. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d
at 335.
Woody's remaining claims either repeat his counsel's argument,
discussed above, or fail to demonstrate any basis for relief.
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Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
For the Court: