Tfas Kent, Llc, V. Tu-trinh Huynh, Et Ano ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
TFAS KENT, LLC, a Washington limited
liability company, DIVISION ONE
Appellant, No. 82999-8-I
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
TU-TRINH HUYNH and MINH VAN BUI,
individuals,
Respondents.
DWYER, J. — TFAS Kent, LLC appeals from an order vacating a default
judgment providing an implied easement in its favor. The trial court erred by
vacating the default judgment, plaintiff/appellant contends, because
defendants/respondents, Tu-Trinh Huynh and Minh Van Bui, failed to submit
sufficient evidence of a prima facie defense. We disagree. The record indicates
that sufficient evidence of a prima facie defense was submitted. Accordingly, we
affirm.
I
TFAS Kent, LLC purchased real property containing a 5,000 square foot
commercial building on March 2, 2021. The property is next to a residential
property owned by Tu-Trinh Huynh and Minh Van Bui.
No. 82999-8-I/2
On April 28 and May 2, 2021, respectively, TFAS served Huynh and Bui
with a summons and a complaint for an easement across their property.1 Huynh
and Bui are Vietnamese immigrants who speak limited English. They did not
understand what they had been given and that they were required to “serve a
copy of [their] defense within 20 days,” CR 4(a)(2), or serve a written demand
that the complaint be filed. CR 3(a). The complaint was filed in King County
Superior Court on May 25, 2021, several weeks after service. TFAS obtained a
default judgment for an easement implied by prior use on June 1, 2021. TFAS’s
counsel had been in communication with Huynh and Bui through their real estate
agent about another matter, but did not inform them that TFAS was seeking a
default judgment against them.
On June 30, 2021, Huynh and Bui—now represented by an attorney—filed
a motion to vacate the default judgment. In their motion, Huynh and Bui asserted
that TFAS’s lot abuts a public right-of-way, provided conveyance documents
indicating the chain of title was other than as TFAS had represented it to be, and
explained that their failure to reply was because they did not understand what
was required of them. The trial court vacated the default judgment.
TFAS appeals.
II
TFAS contends that the trial court erred by vacating the default judgment
against Huynh and Bui. This is so, it asserts, because Huynh and Bui failed to
1 The complaint made claims for an easement implied by prior use, a prescriptive
easement, and an easement by necessity. However, the relief requested was “[t]hat the court
declares an Easement exists, having been established by implied prior use.”
2
No. 82999-8-I/3
produce prima facie evidence of a defense to TFAS’s implied easement claim.
We disagree.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to vacate a default judgment
for abuse of discretion. Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696, 702, 161 P.3d 345 (2007).
A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is manifestly
unreasonable or is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. Rush v.
Blackburn, 190 Wn. App. 945, 956, 361 P.3d 217 (2015) (citing Luckett v. Boeing
Co., 98 Wn. App. 307, 309-10, 989 P.2d 1144 (1999)).
A default judgment may be set aside in accordance with CR 60(b). CR 55
(c)(1). CR 60(b)(1) provides that
[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) Mistakes, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or
irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order.
“Default judgments are generally disfavored in Washington.” Rush, 190
Wn. App. at 956. “We prefer to give parties their day in court and have
controversies determined on their merits.” Morin v. Burris, 160 Wn.2d 745, 754,
161 P.3d 956 (2007). “But we also value an organized, responsive, and
responsible judicial system where litigants acknowledge the jurisdiction of the
court to decide their cases and comply with court rules.” Little, 160 Wn.2d at
703. “Our primary concern in reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to
vacate is whether that decision is just and equitable.” TMT Bear Creek Shopping
Ctr., Inc. v. PETCO Animal Supplies, Inc., 140 Wn. App. 191, 200, 165 P.3d
3
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1271 (2007). “‘What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each
case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the
outcome.’” Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wn.2d 576, 582, 599 P.2d 1289(1979) (quoting Widucus v. Sw. Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 102, 109, 167
N.E.2d 799 (1960)). “Abuse of discretion is less likely to be found if the default
judgment is set aside.” Griggs, 92 Wn.2d at 582.
The party seeking to vacate a default judgment pursuant to CR 60(b)(1)
must establish:
(1) That there is substantial evidence extant to support, at least
prima facie, a defense to the claim asserted by the opposing party;
(2) that the moving party’s failure to timely appear in the action, and
answer the opponent’s claim, was occasioned by mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (3) that the moving
party acted with due diligence after notice of entry of the default
judgment; and (4) that no substantial hardship will result to the
opposing party.
White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348, 352, 438 P.2d 581 (1968).
Herein, the relief awarded to TFAS by the order of default was the
establishment of an easement across Huynh and Bui’s property. In seeking a
default judgment, TFAS asserted that it was entitled to an implied easement by
prior use.
Easements implied by prior use—also known as easements by
implication— generally require that “three essential predicates must be proved:
(1) unity of title and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate, (2)
prior apparent and continuous quasi easement for the benefit of one part of the
estate to the detriment of another, and (3) the easement must be reasonably
4
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necessary for the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate.” Boyd v. Sunflower
Props. LLC, 197 Wn. App. 137, 144, 389 P.3d 626 (2016) (citing Adams v.
Cullen, 44 Wn.2d 502, 505, 268 P.2d 451 (1954); Silver v. Strohm, 39 Wn.2d 1,
5, 234 P.2d 481 (1951)).2
TFAS asserts that the trial court erred by relying on evidence that Huynh
and Bui did not understand English and that service upon them took place a
month prior to the case being filed (such that Huynh and Bui could not contact
the court and become aware of the case)3 in order to determine that there was
substantial evidence of a prima facie defense. This did not occur. Rather, the
trial court appropriately considered Huynh and Bui’s English language skills and
the manner of service, among other considerations, in determining that their
failure to timely appear and answer in the case was the result of excusable
neglect. The trial court’s reasoning was sound.
The trial court then determined that “there is a sufficient showing of a
prima facie defense,” based on evidence submitted by Huynh and Bui that (1)
contradicted the history of the conveyances as described by TFAS to the court,
(2) demonstrated that TFAS’s parcel abuts an arterial right-of-way, and (3)
illustrated that the prayed-for easement is a 25-foot wide area over a substantial
portion of their back lawn. This constituted substantial evidence to support a
prima facie defense to TFAS’s claim because it indicates that there was not prior
use as TFAS had claimed and because it indicates that the grant of an easement
2 The first of these is an absolute requirement. The second and third are aids in
determining the intent of the parties and are not necessarily conclusive. Hellberg v. Coffin Sheep
Co., 66 Wn.2d 664, 666, 404 P.2d 770 (1965).
3 The trial court described this as “pocket service.”
5
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was unnecessary.4 Concluding that this was sufficient evidence of a prima facie
defense was a proper exercise of judicial discretion because it was based on
tenable grounds and reasons. The trial court did not err in vacating the default
judgment.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
4The fact that TFAS’s property abuts a public street is sufficient to establish a prima facie
defense to any of the easement theories referenced in n.1, supra.
6