Valley Cities Counseling & Consultation, V. Ezra L. Eddines ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
VALLEY CITIES COUNSELING AND No. 84964-6-I
CONSULTATION,
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
PUBLISHED OPINION
v.
EZRA L. EDDINES,
Appellant.
FELDMAN, J. — In 2021, Washington adopted an amendment to the
Residential Landlord Tenant Act (RLTA) allowing landlords to evict a tenant who
“continues in possession of a dwelling unit in transitional housing after having
received at least 30 days’ advance written notice to vacate . . . [when] the tenant
has completed an educational or training or service program and is no longer
eligible to participate in the transitional housing program.” RCW
59.18.650(2)(j). Acting pursuant to this provision, Valley Cities Counseling and
Consultation (Valley) attempted to evict Ezra Eddines after he no longer met the
criteria for the applicable transitional housing program. In response, Eddines
argued that Auburn City Code (ACC) 5.23.070.A forbids eviction in these same
circumstances. Because the city ordinance categorically forbids what state law
permits, the superior court correctly concluded that the ordinance is preempted by
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state law. On interlocutory review, we affirm and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I
Eddines is a tenant in a transitional housing unit as part of a program run
by Valley. The program provides transitional housing to tenants who have an
income of 30 percent or below the area median income and who would otherwise
be unhoused. On February 25, 2022, Valley gave Eddines notice that his tenancy
would be terminated because his income was more than 30 percent of the area
median income and he had not accessed program services in the past year,
making him ineligible for the transitional housing program.
When Eddines refused to vacate and surrender his transitional housing unit,
Valley filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. A superior court commissioner
scheduled a show cause hearing. In support of its unlawful detainer action, Valley
argued that RCW 59.18.650(2)(j) (quoted below) permits a landlord to evict a
tenant where, as here, the tenant continues in possession of a transitional housing
unit after the tenant is no longer eligible for the transitional housing program. In
response, Eddines argued that Auburn’s just cause ordinance, ACC 5.23.070.A
(also quoted below), does not permit a landlord to evict a tenant in this
circumstance.
The commissioner ruled in favor of Valley, concluding that ACC 5.23.070 is
“pre-empted to the extent that it conflicts with RCW 59.18.650(2)(j).” Eddines
thereafter filed a motion for revision. The superior court denied the motion, stating:
Applying the rules of conflict pre-emption, this Court agrees with
Commissioner Hillman that the state law and city ordinance cannot
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be harmonized, an irreconcilable conflict exists, and that his order
below is correct. This Court DENIES Eddines’ Motion for Revision.
The superior court subsequently certified its ruling for interlocutory review under
RAP 2.3(b)(4). This court accepted the superior court’s certification and granted
discretionary review.
II
Eddines claims the superior court erred in ruling that ACC 5.23.070.A is
preempted by RCW 59.18.650. We disagree.
A
“[A] state statute preempts an ordinance on the same subject [1] if the
statute occupies the field, leaving no room for concurrent jurisdiction, or [2] if a
conflict exists such that the statute and the ordinance may not be harmonized.”
Lawson v. City of Pasco, 168 Wn.2d 675, 679, 230 P.3d 1038 (2010). The first
part of this quote describes field preemption, and the second part describes conflict
preemption. Here, Valley argues only conflict preemption, which “arises when an
ordinance permits what state law forbids or forbids what state law permits.” Id. at
682. Whether ACC 5.23.070.A is preempted by RCW 59.18.650 is a question of
law and is reviewed de novo. Rental Hous. Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 22 Wn. App.
2d 426, 437, 512 P.3d 545 (2022) (RHA).
Applying conflict preemption principles to the state statute and local
ordinance at issue here, the superior court correctly concluded that the state
statute preempts the local ordinance. The state statute at issue, RCW 59.18.650,
prohibits residential landlords from evicting a tenant, refusing to continue a
tenancy, or ending a periodic tenancy except in enumerated circumstances that
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constitute just cause. One of the enumerated circumstances is when:
The tenant continues in possession of a dwelling unit in transitional
housing after having received at least 30 days’ advance written
notice to vacate . . . [when] the tenant has completed an educational
or training or service program and is no longer eligible to participate
in the transitional housing program.
RCW 59.18.650(2)(j). Auburn’s ordinance, ACC 5.23.070.A, contains a similar just
cause restriction:
Owners of housing units shall not evict or attempt to evict any tenant,
refuse to renew or continue a tenancy after expiration of the rental
agreement, or otherwise terminate or attempt to terminate the
tenancy of any tenant unless the owner can prove in court that just
cause exists. . . . The reasons for termination of tenancy listed below,
and no others, shall constitute just cause under this section.
(Emphasis added.) The ordinance lists 14 circumstances that constitute just cause
under the provision, but lacks any transitional housing exception as provided in the
state statute. Id.Because the Auburn ordinance specifies that no reason beyond the 14
specified reasons is just cause for eviction, it forbids what state law permits, which
is eviction of tenants from transitional housing units when, as here, they are no
longer eligible to participate in the transitional housing program. Thus, as the
superior court concluded, “the state law and city ordinance cannot be harmonized”
and “an irreconcilable conflict exists.” Accordingly, the superior court correctly
ruled, by denying Eddines’ motion for revision, that the city ordinance is preempted
by RCW 59.18.650. 1
1 Valley relies heavily on our unpublished opinion in Rental Housing Association of Washington v.
City of Burien, No. 82782-1-I (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2022) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/827821.pdf. (City of Burien). “No matter how well
reasoned, unpublished opinions of this court lack precedential value, in part because they merely
restate well established principles.” State v. Nysta, 168 Wn. App. 30, 44, 275 P.3d 1162(2012). Consistent with this observation, City of Burien is in accord with our analysis and holding
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B
At oral argument in this matter, Eddines effectively conceded that ACC
5.23.070.A forbids what RCW 59.18.650(2)(j) permits. 2 He nevertheless raises
three arguments why preemption does not apply here. First, he argues that the
result here is controlled by three cases that avoid preemption by harmonizing local
and state law. Second, he claims that the state statute at issue here does not
provide an affirmative right for landlords to evict tenants. Third, he contends that
the Washington legislature did not intend to preempt local ordinances. Each of
these arguments fails.
1
Starting with Eddines’ argument that the result here is controlled by three
cases where the court was able to harmonize local and state law, the first case
cited by Eddines is Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 376, 617 P.2d 713 (1980),
which is one of the seminal cases on this topic. The plaintiffs there owned two
houseboat moorage sites in Seattle, one of which hosted the defendant’s
houseboat which the plaintiffs sought to evict. Id. at 378. Seattle had adopted an
ordinance that made it unlawful to evict a houseboat from a moorage site except
for six specified reasons, and the plaintiffs argued that the ordinance was
preempted by state statutes regarding forcible entry and forcible and unlawful
detainer actions. Id. at 379-84 (citing RCW 59.12 and RCW 59.18 (the RLTA)).
here. The city ordinance at issue in that case (Burien Municipal Code 5.63.070(1)) prohibited all
evictions at the end of a rental agreement without cause while the two state statutes at issue (RCW
59.12.030 and RCW 59.18.290) expressly allowed for termination and eviction to take place at the
end of a rental agreement. Given this categorical conflict, we held in City of Burien—similar to our
holding here—that the Burien ordinance was preempted by state law. Slip op. at 6.
2Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, Valley Cities Counseling and Consulting v. Eddines, No.
84764-6-I (June 11, 2024) 1 min., 8 sec. through 1 min., 32 sec. (on file with court).
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Although the court ultimately concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
prohibitory and confiscatory, it rejected the plaintiffs’ preemption argument, stating,
“The ordinance does not raise further procedural barriers between landlord and
tenant but simply represents another defense.” Id. at 384.
The second case Eddines claims is controlling here is Margola Associates
v. City of Seattle, 121 Wn.2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993), abrogated on other grounds
by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019), which
expands on the brief discussion of conflict preemption in Kennedy. The plaintiff in
Margola argued that state law preempted a Seattle ordinance that required owners
of buildings with multiple housing units to obtain and post each year a certificate
establishing that the building was registered with the City and created an
affirmative defense to eviction if the landlord did not register the rental unit in
accordance with the ordinance. Id. at 632. The court rejected the preemption
argument, reasoning that there was no conflict between the state statute and the
city ordinance because the city ordinance only added an additional requirement to
the eviction process established by the RLTA. Id. at 651-54.
The third case Eddines claims is controlling here is RHA. The plaintiff there
challenged both Seattle’s “winter eviction ban,” which created a defense to eviction
if the tenant would have to vacate the housing unit between December 1 and
March 1, and its six-month extension of the eviction moratorium during the COVID-
19 pandemic. 22 Wn. App. 2d at 432-36. In holding that the Seattle ordinances
were not preempted, the court emphasized that the ordinances merely provided “a
temporary defense to evictions,” noting that “a landlord can file an unlawful
detainer action, obtain an order finding the tenant to be in unlawful detainer status,
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and ask the court to schedule the issuance of a writ of restitution” once the
moratorium has passed. Id. at 441. The court emphasized, “There is nothing in
the unlawful detainer statute that requires an eviction occur within any specific
period of time.” Id.
These cases do not control the result in this case. Starting with Kennedy,
the court there did not elaborate on what constitutes a “procedural barrier,”
addressed an argument premised on field preemption as opposed to conflict
preemption, 3 and never reached the issue that is dispositive here, which is whether
a city ordinance is preempted by state law if it categorically removes a cause for
eviction that is permitted by state law. 94 Wn.2d at 384. Turning to Margola and
RHA, Eddines’ argument overlooks important differences between the Auburn
ordinance and the ordinances at issue in those two cases. The ordinance in
Margola does not preclude the landlord from ever bringing the eviction proceeding;
instead, it merely adds a requirement for landlords to be registered with the city
and, once the landlord is so registered, no longer prohibits eviction. Similarly, the
ordinance in RHA does not preclude a landlord from obtaining a writ of restitution;
it only narrows when the writ can be executed. In both Margola and RHA, the
defense provided by local law is temporary and either the passage of time or some
action by the landlord will allow the eviction to proceed. When a city merely
imposes a temporary prohibition on a landlord’s ability to evict a tenant, the
3 While the court’s analysis in Kennedy refers to conflict preemption principles, its opinion indicates
that the plaintiffs’ argument was premised solely on field preemption. See 94 Wn.2d at 384(“Plaintiffs claim RCW 59.12, dealing with forcible entry and forcible and unlawful detainer,
preempts the field.”).
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landlord can still do what state law permits, allowing “harmonization” of ordinance
and statute.
In contrast, Auburn provides no way for a landlord that owns and operates
a transitional housing unit to evict a tenant due to ineligibility, a circumstance in
which RCW 59.18.650 expressly permits eviction. The landlord’s claim of unlawful
detainer is not merely delayed like it would be under the defenses provided in
Margola and RHA; rather, the claim is categorically unavailable. In other words,
instead of the state law saying, “this is permitted,” and the local ordinance saying,
“this is permitted if…,” when RCW 59.18.650 says, “this is permitted,” the Auburn
ordinance says, “this is forbidden.” Because a categorical conflict exists here that
was not present in Kennedy, Margola, and RHA, these cases are distinguishable.
2
Eddines next claims that RCW 59.18.650 does not provide an affirmative
right for landlords to evict tenants. We reject this argument because it does not
account for the broader statutory scheme of the state’s landlord-tenant laws.
Eddines cites two cases in support of his interpretation of RCW 59.18.650,
the first of which is Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135 Wn.2d 278, 957 P.2d 621 (1998).
Rabon had previously been convicted of owning “vicious” dogs in violation of a
Seattle ordinance making it unlawful to own a vicious animal with knowledge that
the animal is vicious or with reckless disregard to the animal’s viciousness. Id. at
283. When the city notified Rabon that it intended to destroy the dogs pursuant to
the ordinance, he argued he should be able to register the dogs in accordance with
RCW 16.08.080, which provides that “it is unlawful to own a ‘dangerous’ dog
unless it is registered with local animal control authorities.” Id. Rabon claimed the
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ordinance was preempted by the statute because the latter read, “the animal
control authority . . . shall issue a certificate of registration” when certain statutory
requirements for keeping a dangerous dog were met. Id. at 289-90 (emphasis
added). The court rejected this argument because the statutory scheme as a
whole indicated that the legislature had not intended to preempt local ordinances.
Id. at 290. The court focused on RCW 16.08.090(2), which provided that only local
authorities had power to regulate “potentially dangerous” dogs. The court
reasoned that if the legislature intended to preempt local authority, it would have
stated that only state authorities can regulate “dangerous dogs.” Id. at 290-91.
Rabon further argued that the ordinance prohibited what state law allowed,
triggering conflict preemption. Id. at 292. The court also rejected this argument,
reasoning that just because an activity may be licensed under state law does not
mean it must be permitted by local law. Id. The court disagreed with Rabon’s
argument that the use of “shall” in the statute created an affirmative right,
reasoning that, in the context of the statute and in light of its purpose, “shall” was
not a command to issue licenses if the criteria were met but was instead meant to
establish minimum requirements for a lawful license under state law. Id. at 293.
Accordingly, the court concluded that a more protective city ordinance prohibiting
ownership of vicious or dangerous dogs could be harmonized with state law. Id.
at 293-94.
In the second case cited by Eddines, Emerald Enterprises, LLC v. Clark
County, 2 Wn. App. 2d 794, 800, 413 P.3d 92 (2018), the Washington legislature,
pursuant to a voter initiative to decriminalize cannabis, created a regulatory
licensing scheme for the sale of cannabis through the Washington State Liquor
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and Cannabis Board (Board). The Board established requirements for cannabis
retailer licenses, including a maximum number of stores per county and mandatory
background checks for applicants. Id. In response, Clark County passed Clark
County Code 40.260.115(B)(3), which forbade the sale of recreational cannabis in
unincorporated Clark County. Id. at 801. Emerald Enterprises challenged the
ordinance, arguing it was preempted by the state’s licensing requirements. Id.
Following Rabon, the court rejected this preemption argument because the
statute’s language that “[t]here shall be a marijuana retailer’s license” (RCW
69.50.325(3) and “retail licenses ‘may be licensed’” (RCW 69.50.354) indicated
there was no underlying, affirmative right to obtain a license or requirement that
local governments must issue licenses. Id. at 805. The fact that retailer licenses
were limited regardless of the number of qualified applicants also implies that no
such right exists. See id. at 800.
Relying on Rabon and Emerald Enterprises, Eddines argues that landlords
do not have an affirmative right to evict tenants under RCW 59.18.650 and that
Auburn may therefore provide additional protection from eviction that is not
provided by state law. But unlike the statutes at issue in Rabon and Emerald
Enterprises, the larger statutory scheme of the RLTA does provide a right for
landlords to evict tenants. RCW 59.18.290(2) provides, “[a]ny landlord so deprived
of possession of premises in violation of this section may recover possession of
the property and damages sustained by him or her.” By permitting landlords to
recover possession in specified circumstances, RCW 59.18.290(2) creates an
affirmative right to do so and thus preempts a local ordinance that categorically
forbids eviction in the exact same circumstances.
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Eddines’ argument also fails because it ignores the overall statutory scheme
of the RLTA and the other landlord-tenant statutes in chapter 59 RCW. In Rabon
and Emerald Enterprises, the relevant state law and city ordinance could be
harmonized because the state law provided what was necessary for a valid
license, but neither the dangerous dog nor the cannabis retailer licensing laws
were embedded in statutory schemes that provided affirmative rights to the activity,
leaving the question of whether to license those activities up to the local
governments. Here, in contrast, the state law entitles Valley to evict someone from
its property. Although RCW 59.18.650 imposes just cause restrictions on
residential evictions in most cases, it deliberately carves out an exception for
landlords of transitional housing units seeking to evict a tenant who is ineligible for
the transitional housing program. These carveouts do not create gaps where the
law has not spoken, but rather designate spaces where the default rules still apply.
Thus, statutes such as RCW 59.12.030 and RCW 59.18.290, which permit
landlords to recover possession, create an affirmative right that conflicts with a
local law, such as ACC 5.23.070, that categorically eliminates this right.
3
Lastly, Eddines asserts that the legislative history of RCW 59.18.650
indicates the legislature did not intend to preempt local ordinances but rather to
set a baseline protection for tenants upon which local governments could expand.
We disagree.
The goal of statutory analysis is to carry out the legislature’s intent. State
v. Gonzalez, 168 Wn.2d 256, 263, 226 P.3d 131 (2010). The first step is to
examine the statute’s plain meaning, and if that meaning is unambiguous then our
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inquiry ends. Id. Plain meaning “is to be discerned from the ordinary meaning of
the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found,
related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. (quoting State v.
Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009)).
Here, neither the text nor the surrounding context of RCW 59.18.650
suggests the legislature intended to authorize local governments to provide
additional protections for tenants that would render state law meaningless.
Although RCW 59.18.650 exists to restrict evictions without cause, it exists within
the RLTA, which aims to balance tenant and landlord rights, not merely protect
tenants. 4 To that end, RCW 59.18.650(2) deliberately carves out exceptions to its
general prohibition, including an exception for landlords of transitional housing
units seeking to evict a tenant who is ineligible for the transitional housing program.
RCW 59.18.650(2)(j). Absent such an exception, transitional housing programs
may face penalties, lose funding, and be shut down if they cannot remain compliant
with their funding grants. We decline to read Eddines’ proffered legislative intent
into the statute where there is no evidence for it in the statute’s text or broader
context. Eddines’ final argument against conflict preemption, like the others, thus
fails.
III
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal. Because this is an
interlocutory appeal and neither party has yet prevailed in the matter, we decline
4 Compare RCW 59.18.290(1) (requiring a court order before a landlord may recover possession
of a housing unit from a tenant at the end of a rental agreement) with RCW 59.18.290(2) (allowing
a landlord to recover possession of property when a tenant has unlawfully remained after the end
of a rental agreement).
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to award attorney fees on appeal at this time. See Leda v. Whisnand, 150 Wn.
App. 69, 87, 207 P.3d 468 (2009) (“Because . . . no party has yet prevailed on the
merits, any determination of the prevailing party on appeal would . . . be
premature.”). Instead, we remand this issue to the superior court to award attorney
fees to the prevailing party, including fees on appeal, if appropriate under the RLTA
and/or the parties’ rental agreement, when prevailing party status can properly be
determined.
Affirmed and remanded.
WE CONCUR:
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