State of Washington v. James Ray House, Jr. ( 2024 )

FILED
AUGUST 15, 2024
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 39161-2-III
Respondent, )
)
v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
JAMES RAY HOUSE, JR., )
)
Appellant. )
FEARING, J. — We struggle once again to make sense out of the concepts of “same
criminal conduct” and “same criminal intent” as expressed in RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) and
as interpreted by the Washington Supreme Court. James House pled guilty to first degree
burglary, indecent liberties, second degree assault, and unlawful imprisonment. House
committed all offenses against his former girlfriend and mother of his children during the
early morning hours of September 17, 2020. At sentencing, the trial court ruled that the
burglary and assault convictions constituted the same criminal conduct for purposes of
calculating House’s offender score. On appeal, House contends the sentencing court
should have also adjudged the indecent liberties and unlawful imprisonment offenses as
the same criminal conduct as the assault and burglary. He further contends the trial court
failed to determine whether an earlier conviction for harassment was the same course of
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State v. House
conduct as a residential burglary committed on the same date and sentenced at the same
time.
FACTS
James House incurred convictions relevant to this appeal before committing his
crimes against his girlfriend on September 17, 2020. The plea agreement signed by
James House, in the current prosecution, listed the following earlier convictions:
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 124-25. The convictions for residential burglary and harassment
on January 11, 1995 bear particular importance in this appeal.
This appeal still focuses on the crimes committed in September 2020. Although
the only issues on appeal concern sentencing, we outline the underlying facts behind the
September 2020 crimes in order to analyze James House’s challenge to his offender
score. Under House’s theory of the law, the underlying facts assist in determining same
criminal conduct.
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The prosecution against James House arose from his relationship with his
girlfriend C.M. C.M. was 19 years old, in 2013, when she met James House, then 47
years old. The couple, who never married, begot three children during their seven-year
association.
In August 2020, James House and C.M. separated, at which time House moved
from the family residence. On an unidentified day during the first week of September
2020, House returned to the home and delivered C.M. $100. During this visit, House
repeatedly asked for sex, which entreaties C.M. declined. House grabbed C.M.’s pants,
forced her down, and engaged her in oral sex without her consent.
On the evening of September 16, 2020, C.M. was home with the children. House
sent C.M. texts expressing his intent to journey to the home to give her money. C.M.
responded that he was not welcome and not to come. C.M. disclosed she was expecting a
man to visit that night. House announced he planned to come anyway.
On September 16, C.M., as a result of the earlier sexual assault, messaged her
current boyfriend, Kerry Kinnon, that House intended to visit the home uninvited. She
also attempted to contact her brother to ask that he come to the home to protect her. We
assume that C.M. failed to reach her brother, but the record does not confirm such. When
House had not appeared by 10 p.m., C.M. retired to bed in her room as her children slept
on living room couches.
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James House entered the residence at 1:37 a.m., on September 17, through use of a
key he copied without C.M.’s knowledge. C.M. awoke to House, armed with a knife,
crying inside her bedroom. House protested his love for C.M. and expressed jealousy.
House threatened to kill any man, with whom she socialized.
James House walked with C.M. to the living room, where the two spoke. We
assume the children continued to sleep in the living room. C.M. told House to leave
multiple times. House enveloped C.M. in a chokehold and dragged her to the bedroom.
The choke blocked C.M.’s airway such that she could not breathe. C.M. lost vision. She
went in and out of consciousness several times during the strangulation. C.M.’s tongue
protruded from her mouth. She bit on the tongue so hard, she thought she might have
bitten it off, but her mouth refused to respond to an internal command to stop. C.M. lost
control of her bowels and defecated. C.M. estimates House strangled her for ten minutes.
She concluded she would perish.
C.M. finally could communicate to James House that she had defecated and asked
him to release her so she could clean herself. House uttered that he did not care, and he
resumed the choking, this time for two minutes. House tearfully commented to C.M. that
he choked her because of his love for her.
James House eventually released C.M., and she entered the bathroom to wash.
From the restroom, C.M. saw House remove and unsheathe a large, fixed-blade knife.
C.M., from the bathroom, inquired from House of his intentions. A sobbing House
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announced that he had come to the home to kill her, but he had now decided not to do so.
C.M. believed that House would kill her, and she begged for her life. She told House he
could not kill the mother of his children. House responded with the familiar refrain that,
if he could not have her, nobody could.
James House directed C.M. to exit the bathroom and lie on the bed. C.M.
complied and asked House to remove his coat and inter the knife. House deposited the
knife in his coat pocket and shed his coat. He performed oral sex on C.M. without her
consent. After thirty seconds, a nervous and sweating House stood and announced that
he “could not do it.” CP at 159. House then penetrated C.M.’s vagina with a sexual
device and without her consent. C.M., in an endeavor to end the death threats, told
House to engage her in sexual intercourse. House declined. At C.M.’s suggestion, the
two entered the bedroom closet and smoked cigarettes.
After smoking, C.M. returned to the bathroom to finish cleansing herself. C.M.
heard her cell phone vibrating in the bedroom, which sound represented an incoming call.
Earlier on the morning of September 17, C.M.’s male friend, Kerry Kinnon, had retrieved
C.M.’s text message that James House intended to come to her apartment. Kinnon called
911. Kinnon called C.M.’s phone eight times between 2:19 and 2:40 a.m.
C.M. also heard a key at the front door. C.M. saw that James House also heard the
noise so she shut and locked the bathroom door. Unbeknownst to C.M. and House, Kerry
Kinnon, attempted to enter the residence. House crashed the bathroom door and, while
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holding a knife, rushed toward C.M. C.M. yelled: “‘James, don’t kill me!’” hoping the
person at the front door, who she believed was Kinnon, would hear. CP at 160. House
stood behind C.M., restrained C.M. with one hand, held the knife in the other hand at her
waist, and warned her not to “‘say shit.’” CP at 160.
James House walked C.M. to the front door and looked through the peephole.
House saw no one outside. C.M. donned boxer shorts that she retrieved from the nearby
laundry room. House walked C.M. through the children’s bedroom. He lit a lighter and
gazed through the room for anyone hiding. He remarked that people were coming for
him. House added that he faced prison for attempted murder and kidnapping. House
declared: “‘Even if I don’t kill you, I’m still going to prison.’” CP at 160.
C.M. once again attempted to calm James House, and she suggested the two lay on
the bed. House said no and expressed again a desire for sex. House performed oral sex a
second time on C.M. without her permission. He ceased the activity and asked C.M. if
she wanted him to leave or have sex. House unexpectedly announced he would leave.
C.M., hoping to hasten House’s exit, awoke the children to tell him goodbye. House then
refused to leave. C.M. directed House to return to the bedroom and lie on the bed.
C.M. pivoted to the bedroom and reclined on the bed. James House followed and
sat on the couch next to the bed. House rested his hand that gripped the knife near C.M.
She asked why he placed the knife near her. House explained: “‘I’m telling you right
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now if the cops come, I’m going to stab you in the eyes and kill you.’” CP at 160. C.M.
cried and again pleaded for her life. She insisted that no police were coming.
Minutes later, sounds emanated from the front door. The door opened and law
enforcement officers yelled: “‘Spokane Police!’” CP at 160. James House reflexively
moved the knife toward C.M.’s face. C.M. lifted her left arm up to block House’s
forearm. C.M. suffered multiple stab wounds to her face and hands. House stopped the
attack when police entered the bedroom.
Multiple Spokane police officers had arrived at C.M.’s apartment and forcibly
entered the home. Officers heard C.M. frantically screaming from a back bedroom.
Police found James House on top of C.M. on the bed. Police separated House from C.M.
C.M. spoke in a whisper as she complained of throat pain. C.M.’s tongue suffered deep
bruises along the left side of her tongue.
To repeat, C.M. noted that James House entered her home at 1:37 a.m. Reports
record that someone notified emergency dispatch at 2:19 a.m., and law enforcement
officers entered the home at 2:24 a.m.
PROCEDURE
The State of Washington charged James House with first degree burglary, first
degree kidnapping with sexual motivation, two counts of second degree rape, two counts
of second degree assault, and two counts of harassment. The State alleged that House
committed all offenses against an intimate partner. The State added that House was
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armed with a deadly weapon for purposes of sentencing enhancements attended to the
burglary charge and one assault charge.
When alleging, in the charging information, that James House committed the
crime of burglary, the State asserted that House entered C.M.’s home with the intent to
commit a crime against a person or property, but the information did not identify the
intended crime. Once inside the residence, according to the information, House assaulted
C.M. The State alleged House committed one count of second degree assault by
strangulation and the second count by use of a knife, a deadly weapon.
At the beginning of trial, the parties reached a plea deal, under which James House
would plead guilty to the one count of first degree burglary predicated on the assault
committed inside the home. The State would reduce the two rape charges to one count of
indecent liberties, to which House would plead guilty. House would plead guilty to one
count of second degree assault, while the State would dismiss the second charge. The
State would reduce the kidnapping charge to one count of unlawful imprisonment, to
which House would plead guilty, and the State would dismiss the harassment charges.
Each charge would carry a domestic violence appellation.
During the plea hearing, James House, through counsel, commented that some of
the crimes, to which House pled guilty, might entail the same criminal conduct for
purposes of sentencing. Defense counsel noted that the State, however, did not consider
any two of the convictions to form the same criminal conduct. The trial court asked
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House if he understood that the State insisted that no two crimes constituted the same
criminal conduct and that his offender score totaled nine, although the court would later
perform its own scoring. House worried about and asked the court if he could receive a
life sentence. The trial court responded that House would not receive a life sentence, but
that the court might sentence him based on an offender score of nine.
Based on James House’s plea, the trial court entered a judgment of convictions
against James House for first degree burglary, indecent liberties, second degree assault,
and unlawful imprisonment. The court designated each crime as entailing domestic
violence.
The trial court sentenced James House at a later date. During the sentencing
hearing, the State’s counsel remarked that House would argue same criminal conduct as
to some of the current convictions. The State conceded that the court should score the
first degree burglary and second degree assault as one for purposes of the offender score
because the assault constituted the predicate crime for the first degree burglary. The
State maintained that the only two convictions to form the same criminal conduct were
the burglary and assault, such that the convictions for indecent liberties and unlawful
imprisonment should be scored separately. As to the first degree burglary conviction,
which carried the highest penalty, the court, according to the State, should calculate the
offender score at nine. The State did not identify how it arrived at the score of nine.
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During the sentencing hearing, James House, through counsel, argued for an
offender score lower than nine. House did not offer a particular score. But he noted that
he could not have committed the crimes of indecent liberties and assault without first
committing burglary and unlawful imprisonment. House conceded that, because of a
break in time between the assault and indecent liberties, the two convictions might be
scored separately.
After argument by both counsel, the sentencing court resolved to score the
burglary and assault as the same criminal conduct because the assault was the predicate
crime for the burglary. The superior court determined to score the unlawful
imprisonment and indecent liberties convictions separately from one another and
separately from the burglary and assault. The court asked if, with its ruling, the offender
score remained at nine. The State answered in the affirmative. The State added that,
because of the addition of a point for a domestic violence offense and another point for a
violent offense, the offender score totaled eleven. The record contains no written
calculation by the State as to how it arrived at a score of eleven or nine plus.
The superior court sentenced James House to 116 months based on an offender
score of nine. When arriving at the score, the court added one point based on the
convictions in January 1995. The record does not disclose how the superior court arrived
at the offender score.
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, James House faults the sentencing court for failing to score the two
1996 convictions, for crimes committed in 1995, as one point because the crimes
constituted the same criminal conduct and for failing to score more than two of his
current convictions as the same criminal conduct. We address the two arguments
separately.
1996 Convictions
In 1996, the State convicted James House with burglary and harassment for
conduct occurring on January 11, 1995. In this appeal, House assigns error to the
sentencing court’s failure to consider the two 1996 convictions as constituting the same
criminal conduct such that the two convictions only count as one for his offender score.
In response, the State argues that, although the sentencing court assigned two points to
the 1996 convictions, it only did so based on the burglary conviction. Even if the prior
offenses of burglary and harassment formed the “same criminal conduct,” the harassment
conviction washed out because of the passage of time and the court assigned no score to
the harassment conviction. In short, according to the State, House bases his argument on
erroneous facts.
In his reply brief, James House conceded the State’s position, but for a wrong
reason. House erroneously wrote that the sentencing court did not consider either of his
1996 convictions in the offender score. But House again errs on the facts. The
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sentencing court scored the 1996 convictions as two but only because of the serious
nature of the burglary conviction. According to the State, the passage of time wiped out
the harassment and only the harassment conviction. The harassment conviction carried a
quicker wash out period than the burglary conviction. The State once again argues that
scoring the harassment conviction as the same criminal conduct as the burglary
conviction lacks importance since the court never considered the harassment conviction
in the score.
We agree with the State. RCW 9.94A.525(2) establishes the rules for determining
when an earlier offense can no longer be counted in the offender score. Practitioners and
court decisions label this phenomenon a “wash out.” With some exceptions, class B
prior felony convictions are not included in the offender score if, since the last date of
release from confinement, the offender had spent ten consecutive years in the community
without committing any crime that subsequently results in a conviction.
RCW 9.94A.525(2)(b). In turn, with some exceptions, class C prior felony convictions
are not included in the offender score if, since the last date of release from confinement,
the offender had spent five consecutive years in the community without committing any
crime that subsequently results in a conviction. Residential burglary constitutes a class B
felony. RCW 9A.52.025. Harassment is a class C felony. RCW 9A.46.020.
Before his July 17, 2013 sentencing for a domestic violence assault committed on
April 18, 2013, James House had spent seven years in the community without
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committing a new offense leading to conviction. Thus, the 1996 harassment conviction
washed out. House has never spent more than ten years in the community after his
release from his 1996 residential burglary conviction. Therefore, the burglary conviction
did not wash out. Because the current sentencing court convicted House with the serious
crime of first degree burglary, the court needed to count House’s 1996 conviction for
residential burglary as two, not one, points. RCW 9.94A.525(10).
Current Convictions
offender scores
To repeat, the State convicted James House with first degree burglary, indecent
liberties, second degree assault, and unlawful imprisonment. The sentencing court scored
his convictions for burglary and assault as being the same criminal conduct. All four
convictions carried a domestic violence appellation, which can double the score for some
earlier and current convictions.
On appeal, James House argues that the sentencing court should have scored other
current crimes as the same criminal conduct. He first contends that both the crimes of
unlawful imprisonment and indecent liberties constituted the same criminal conduct as
his burglary. House next contends that the crimes of assault and indecent liberties
respectively formed the same criminal conduct as the unlawful imprisonment conviction.
He emphasizes that he could not have committed either indecent liberties or unlawful
imprisonment without first committing burglary. He entered C.M.’s residence without
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permission in order to commit unlawful imprisonment and indecent liberties, thereby also
perpetrating burglary. House also argues that the crimes of assault and indecent liberties
could not have been committed without having committed unlawful imprisonment. His
restraint of C.M. enabled him to assault C.M. and perform oral sex on her. The same
overall purpose shadowed all three crimes. House, however, does not isolate or specify
that overall purpose.
Under James House’s analysis, all four current convictions collapse together. In
turn, he argues that, with this collapse, his offender score for the most serious offense of
first degree burglary is eight. We calculate the offender score to be seven, however,
assuming all four crimes to constitute the same criminal conduct. In a letter to counsel,
we asked each party to identify how he or it arrived at House’s offender score. In his
response, House did not identify a score for his earlier convictions. He also has not
designated an offender score on the assumption that no more crimes are adjudged to be
the same criminal conduct. Because of the minutiae involved in any calculation and its
unimportance to this appeal, we do not outline our calculation.
The State, like us, scores James House’s earlier convictions as seven points. In
turn, the State scores James House’s current convictions as totaling three points.
According to the State, first degree burglary offense, having the most serious level of the
current offenses, should serve as the controlling conviction for purposes of scoring.
RCW 9.94A.515, Serious Level VII. Because a domestic violence appellation attached to
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the first degree burglary conviction, other domestic violence offenses listed in RCW
9.94A.525(21)(a) count as two points. The statutory subsection lists unlawful
imprisonment, but not indecent liberties. Thus, the unlawful imprisonment current
conviction bears a score of two, and the indecent liberties carries a score of one, for a
total of three points. When adding the score of seven from the earlier convictions,
House’s score, according to the State, is ten. We agree with the State that House’s
offender score reaches ten if only the current burglary and assault convictions are scored
as same criminal conduct. House does not argue to the contrary.
Our decision requires the court to answer four discrete questions. First, do James
House’s convictions for first degree burglary and indecent liberties constitute the same
criminal conduct? Second, do House’s convictions for first degree burglary and unlawful
imprisonment constitute same criminal conduct? Third, do the convictions for indecent
liberties and unlawful imprisonment constitute same criminal conduct? Fourth, do the
convictions for second degree assault and unlawful imprisonment constitute same
criminal conduct? If we answered all questions or at least three of the questions in the
affirmative, all crimes would collapse into one current crime.
The State argues that James House’s offender score will remain nine plus unless
this court scores both unlawful imprisonment and indecent liberties as being the same
criminal conduct as first degree burglary. In other words, unless we agree with House
that all four convictions fold into the same criminal conduct, House receives no relief.
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The sentencing grid only acknowledges an offender score as high as nine, and the State
does not seek an exceptional sentence based on some convictions going unpunished.
RCW 9.94A.510; State v. France, 176 Wn. App. 463, 468, 308 P.3d 812 (2013).
Assuming we accepted House’s erroneous calculation of his earlier convictions being a
score of eight, we would agree with the State. But with the correct calculation of prior
crimes being seven, House’s offender score could now be eight. We need not resolve this
discrepancy, however, since we adjudge no other current crimes to be same criminal
conduct.
same criminal misconduct
We now undertake the task of evaluating whether more of James House’s current
convictions should be scored as enveloping same criminal conduct. When sentencing an
offender for one or more felonies, the trial court must calculate the defendant’s offender
score, which score influences the offender’s standard sentence range. The sentencing
court computes an offender’s score based on the number of current and earlier
convictions. RCW 9.94A.525, .589(1)(a); State v. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531,
535-36, 295 P.3d 219 (2013). If the court finds that some of the current offenses
encompass the same criminal conduct, the sentencing court must count those current
offenses as one crime for purposes of the score. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a); State v. Aldana
Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531, 536 (2013).
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The same criminal conduct rule provides sentencing courts an important tool to
ameliorate the harsh effect of prosecutorial overcharging. State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d
157, 169, 534 P.3d 1162 (2023) (Madsen, J. dissenting). Under the rule, crimes, when
committed with the same objective intent to further a criminal act against the same victim
at the same time should be punished as one crime. State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157, 169
(2023) (Madsen, J. dissenting). Without this protection, prosecutors may charge multiple
crimes arising from a single incident, each carrying its own punishment, and a sentencing
judge would be required to impose a sentence for each crime. State v. Westwood, 2
Wn.3d 157, 169-70 (2023) (Madsen, J. dissenting). A court may use this offender score
tool even though the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar two punishments.
RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) governs application of the same criminal conduct principle.
The statute, enacted in 1987, declares:
That if the court enters a finding that some or all of the current
offenses encompass the same criminal conduct then those current offenses
shall be counted as one crime. . . . “Same criminal conduct,” as used in this
subsection, means two or more crimes that require the same criminal intent,
are committed at the same time and place, and involve the same victim.
(Emphasis added.) The focal sentence in RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) directs the sentencing
court to concentrate on the offender’s criminal intent, the identity of the victim or
victims, and the location and timing of the crimes. State v. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d
531, 536 (2013). The defendant bears the burden of establishing all prongs of the test.
State v. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531 (2013); State v. Vike, 125 Wn.2d 407, 410, 885
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P.2d 824 (1994); State v. Wright, 183 Wn. App. 719, 733, 334 P.3d 22 (2014). If any
element is missing, the sentencing court must count the offenses separately when
calculating the offender score. State v. Westwood, Wn.3d 157, 162 (2023); State v. Vike,
125 Wn.2d 407, 410 (1994).
Deciding whether crimes involve the same intent, time, place, and victim often
involves factual determinations. State v. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531, 536 (2013).
Thus, the trial court exercises discretion. State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157, 162 (2023).
Based, in part, on the need to review and weigh facts, this reviewing court will not
disturb the sentencing court’s decision unless the sentencing court abuses its discretion or
misapplies the law, the latter which by definition is an abuse of discretion. State v.
Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531, 531 (2013); State v. French, 157 Wn.2d 593, 613, 141
P.3d 54 (2006).
We construe RCW 9.94A.589(l)(a) narrowly to disallow most assertions of same
criminal conduct. State v. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531, 540 (2013); State v.
Palmer, 95 Wn. App. 187, 190-91, 975 P.2d 1038 (1999). The default method of
calculating an offender score is to treat all current convictions as separate and distinct
criminal conduct. State v. Westwood, Wn.3d 157, 162 (2023).
In James House’s appeal, we focus only on the first element of
RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a)’s same criminal conduct test: same criminal intent, a test often
labeled as similar intents. The State and James House focus on the element of intent,
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presumably because only one victim suffered from House’s crimes and he committed the
crimes at one location within a one-hour window of time.
Neither RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) or a related statute elucidates what criteria the
sentencing court employs when assessing whether two crimes occasion the “same
criminal intent.” The statute nowhere states that the sentencing court refers to the intents
required by statute to convict the offender of the respective crimes. Nowhere does
RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) or an accompanying statute mention employment of the mens rea
of a crime. No statute instructs the sentencing court as to evaluating same criminal intent
on the offender’s subjective intent or personal goals in perpetuating the crimes or some
objective intent discerned by the court.
Last calendar year, the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Westwood, 2
Wn.3d 157 (2023), issued a seminal decision regarding same criminal intent.
Beforehand, sentencing courts faced a bewildering array of case law from the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals that announced various abstruse tests of sameness, that
occasionally adopted conflicting rules of law, and that sporadically prompted inconsistent
opinions. In State v. Westwood, the Supreme Court, despite four of its members
dissenting, protested that its jurisprudence on similar intents had always been settled and
evident.
In State v. Westwood, Dahndre Westwood entered A.B.’s house at 4:30 a.m. A.B.
saw Westwood standing in her hallway and holding a knife in his hand. A.B. yelled at
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him to leave, but Westwood pushed A.B. into the bedroom. Westwood ordered her to
undress and threatened to kill her if she did not cooperate. A.B. screamed for help and
pleaded for her life. A.B. clawed at Westwood and knocked the knife out of his hand.
Westwood choked and suffocated A.B. to muffle her screams for help and hit her
repeatedly on the head. During the struggle, Westwood nicked A.B. with the knife,
leaving a scar on her cheek. Westwood stopped his assault after car headlights passed
and shone in a window. As he exited A.B.’s residence, Westwood threatened A.B. that,
if she told anyone about the assault, he would kill her.
A jury convicted Dahndre Westwood of attempted rape in the first degree, assault
in the first degree, and burglary in the first degree. At sentencing, Westwood argued,
while relying on State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 743 P.2d 1237 (1987), that all three
convictions encompassed the same criminal conduct for offender scoring purposes. In
response, the State asked the sentencing court to apply a test announced by the Supreme
Court in State v. Chenoweth, 185 Wn.2d 218, 370 P.3d 6 (2016) and to score each crime
separately. The trial court followed Chenoweth and determined that the three convictions
did not constitute the same criminal conduct because the legislature furthered different
purposes when respectively outlawing assault, burglary, and rape.
We will eventually discuss the ruling of the state Supreme Court in State v.
Westwood, which ruling upheld the sentencing court and ruled Dahndre Westwood’s
crimes to entail separate intents. In an attempt to better understand the Washington
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Supreme Court’s decision, however, we detour and first review the high court’s decisions
in State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207 (1987) and State v. Chenoweth, 185 Wn.2d 218(2016) and our own decision in State v. Westwood, which the Supreme Court reversed.
State v. Westwood, 20 Wn. App. 2d 582, 500 P.3d 182 (2021).
The Washington Supreme Court decided State v. Dunaway in 1987 before the
legislature adopted the relevant language found in RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has since written that the legislature, when fashioning the language,
adopted the test formulated in Dunaway. In Dunaway, the Supreme Court determined
that robbery and first degree kidnapping constituted the same criminal conduct because
the accused committed the kidnapping in order to rob the victims.
At the Alderwood Mall, James Dunaway entered a car occupied by two women.
He displayed a gun and directed the driver to drive to Seattle. In the meantime, at
Dunaway’s direction, each lady handed him all cash on her person. When the trio
reached Seattle’s University District, Dunaway demanded the passenger to enter Rainier
Bank and withdraw money for him. The lady entered the bank and did not return. At
Dunaway’s command, the driver moved to the passenger seat, and Dunaway drove the
car elsewhere in Seattle, where he exited the car.
When ruling that James Dunaway bore the same criminal intents when committing
the separate crimes of first degree kidnaping and robbery, the Supreme Court highlighted
that Dunaway’s intent to commit robbery enabled the State to raise the charge of
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kidnapping from second degree to first degree. Robbery constituted the objective behind
both crimes. First degree kidnapping entailed intentionally abducting someone with the
intent to facilitate the commission of another felony. First degree kidnapping entailed a
mens rea beyond robbery since the former crime included the intent to abduct someone,
but this difference did not influence the Supreme Court.
In State v. Chenoweth, 185 Wn.2d 218 (2016), the State convicted Chad
Chenoweth with rape of a child in the third degree and incest. The victim was
Chenoweth’s daughter. The opinion spares the reader from a recitation of the facts
behind the prosecution. The Evergreen State high court ruled that incest and child rape
did not form the same criminal misconduct despite each crime being based on the
identical act.
RCW 9A.44.079 governs rape of a child in the third degree and occurs when:
the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least
fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old and not married to the
perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older than the
victim.
RCW 9A.64.020 controls incest and occurs when a person
engages in sexual intercourse with a person whom he or she knows
to be related to him or her . . . as an ancestor, descendant, brother, or sister.
Neither of the statutes demands any particular mens rea. The State does not need to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended any action or result only that
he committed specific actions. Still, the Supreme Court reasoned that the intent to
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No. 39161-2-III
State v. House
engage in sex with a child differed from the intent to have sexual intercourse with a
family member. Thus, the Supreme Court scored Chad Chenoweth’s convictions
separately.
The Supreme Court, in State v. Chenoweth, impliedly applied a double jeopardy
analysis by proffering that the legislature intended to punish the crimes of rape and incest
as separate offenses. Under double jeopardy jurisprudence, the court reviews the two
statutes creating separate crimes and assesses whether the legislature intended to
separately punish the conduct forming the crimes if the same conduct violates each
statute. State v. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d 765, 771-72, 108 P.3d 753 (2005). When holding
that the two crimes represented distinct intents, the Supreme Court in Chenoweth
emphasized that the legislature placed the crimes of rape and incest in two discrete
chapters of the criminal code. RCW 9A.44 controls sexual offenses. RCW 9A.64
controls family offenses. The former statute attacks the evil of sex with a child. The
latter statute outlaws sex with a family member.
Contrary to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in State v. Chenoweth, RCW
9.94A.589(1)(a) does not direct the sentencing court to consider the legislature’s desire to
punish crimes separately when analyzing same criminal intent. Otherwise, a sentencing
court might never hold that two or more crimes constitute same criminal conduct. Nor
does the statute suggest indexing of crimes in the criminal code holds any importance.
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No. 39161-2-III
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We note that State v. Chenoweth, like State v. Westwood, is also a 5 to 4 decision.
The minority observed that Chad Chenoweth’s objective criminal purpose for both
crimes was sexual intercourse with his daughter. The majority and the minority both
avoided an analysis of the mens rea required under the respective statutes. Their
disagreement centered around whether to focus broadly or narrowly on the accused’s
purpose of committing the crime. Although Chenoweth wanted to have sex with his
daughter, the majority tacitly deemed that this intent could be separated into two facets:
the desire for sexual gratification with a child and the longing for carnal pleasure with a
family member. The majority never asked whether Chenoweth was motivated for sex
with his daughter solely because she was his daughter or solely because she was a family
member. The majority never asked if Chenoweth engaged in sex with his daughter solely
because she was readily available or because, as her father, Chenoweth could coerce her
or force her into sexual intercourse. This lack of inquiry resulted in part from the firm
principle that the sentencing court assesses an objective intent in committing the crime,
not the accused’s subjective intent.
A reasonable lower court and legal practitioner would deem the Dunaway test to
differ from the Chenoweth analysis and that in some cases the different tests would result
in different outcomes. The Chenoweth test emphasized the evil sought to be eradicated
by the legislature. Chenoweth ignored an examination of statutory mens rea. The
Dunaway test highlighted whether one crime enabled the commission of a second crime
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No. 39161-2-III
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and whether the two crimes had an overlapping statutory mens rea. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, in State v. Westwood, insisted that these two earlier decisions established
the same test for discerning same criminal intent.
We return to State v. Westwood with a discussion first of the Court of Appeals’
decision. This court remanded the sentencing of Dahndre Westwood to the superior court
to apply the same criminal conduct test purportedly emanating from State v. Dunaway,
not from State v. Chenoweth. State v. Westwood, 20 Wn. App. 2d 582, 586 (2021). We
concluded that the Chenoweth test only applied to convictions for incest and rape. We
thought that Dunaway held that a court assesses the intent component of the same
criminal conduct analysis not by the statutory mens rea of the offenses but by whether the
defendant’s criminal intent, viewed objectively, changed from one crime to the next.
Intent, in this context, comprises the offender’s objective criminal purpose in committing
the crime, such as stealing money or killing another. The trial court may employ various
ways in determining objective criminal purpose, which methods include ascertaining the
extent of the interrelationship between the two crimes, evaluating the change in the
criminal objective from one crime to another, asking whether one crime furthered the
other, or questioning whether the offenses were part of a plan or scheme. We recognized
that different finders of fact might reach different conclusions.
This court, in State v. Westwood, noted that the Supreme Court decided State v.
Chenoweth without any mention of State v. Dunaway. We thought that, in the later
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decisions of State v. Bobenhouse, 166 Wn.2d 881, 214 P.3d 907 (2009) and State v.
Calle, 125 Wn.2d 769, 888 P.2d 155 (1995), the Supreme Court limited Chenoweth to the
narrow confines of a combination of rape and incest. We held the sentencing court not
bound by Chenoweth under the circumstances of Dahndre Westwood’s crimes. We
remanded sentencing and directed the trial court to exercise its discretion in resolving
whether, as a factual matter, Westwood’s objective criminal purpose remained the same
from one crime to the next, those crimes being attempted rape, assault, and burglary.
We now parse the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Westwood in an endeavor
to apply the recent decision to James House’s challenge to his offender score. The
Westwood court labeled the same criminal conduct test as “an objective intent analysis.”
State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157, 162 (2023). At the beginning of its opinion, the court
described the objective intent analysis as looking “at the statutory criminal intent of each
of the offenses.” State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157, 162 (2023). Therefore, the sentencing
court must look to the statutory definition of intent for each of the crimes. State v.
Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157, 163 (2023). This analysis ignores the defendant’s subjective
intent and declines to consider whether the defendant maintained a consistent intent
throughout the crimes. State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157, 162 (2023). The analysis
disregards whether the offender committed the crimes in a continuous course of conduct.
State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157, 163 (2023).
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At the beginning of its opinion when writing that the sentencing court looks “at the
statutory criminal intent of each of the offenses,” the court added: “and whether the
crimes furthered each other.” State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157, 162 (2023). The court
does not explain what the sentencing court does if the criminal intent of the two offenses
is identical but neither crime furthered the other. The court later wrote that if the intent of
the two crimes is the same, the court must then consider whether the offenses were
committed as part of the same scheme or plan and whether one crime furthered the other,
with no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. State v. Westwood, 2
Wn.3d 157, 165 (2023).
We assume that, when one crime furthers another crime, the offender typically
possesses an underlying goal that motivated the commission of both crimes. But this
observation moves the analysis of similar criminal intent away from reviewing the
statutory intent or mens rea of the crimes and into the realm of the subjective intent of the
offender. If Washington’s objective intent analysis focuses on the statutory criminal
intent of each of the offenses, whether one crime actually furthered another crime should
lack importance.
We read Westwood’s initial description of the objective intent analysis as requiring
us to identify the statutory mens rea needed to convict the accused of the respective
crimes sought to be ruled same criminal conduct. But this test raises many difficult
questions. We wonder what to do with strict liability crimes that require no intent or
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No. 39161-2-III
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whether we can compare crimes that punish negligent, reckless, or knowing conduct with
one another and with crimes of specific intent. We wonder if only crimes that require a
specific intent may be the same for purposes of same criminal conduct.
Since the jury must find, for purposes of many convictions, that the accused
possessed the subjective intent mentioned in the statute identifying the crime, we wonder
if Westwood’s professed disregard of subjective intent makes sense. Perhaps, this
wonderment led to the Westwood court writing that the test for same course of conduct
“is not dependent on the offender’s subjective intent, beyond the mental state required for
the commission of the offense.” State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157, 164 (2023) (quoting
State v. Callaway, 42 Wn. App. 420, 424, 711 P.2d 382 (1985)).
After explaining the same criminal intent analysis, the Supreme Court, in State v.
Westwood, analyzed the statutory definitions of the crimes for which the jury convicted
Dahndre Westwood: attempted rape in the first degree, first degree assault, and first
degree burglary. Attempted rape in the first degree requires the intent to commit the
crime of rape and taking a substantial step toward first degree rape. RCW 9A.28.020.
First degree rape includes forcible sexual intercourse with another person when
employing a deadly weapon, kidnapping the victim, inflicting serious injury, or
feloniously entering a building. RCW 9A.44.040. First degree assault requires an intent
to inflict great bodily harm and the infliction of that harm. RCW 9A.36.011. First degree
burglary requires an entry into a building without consent and with intent to commit a
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No. 39161-2-III
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crime against a person or property. RCW 9A.52.020. After reviewing the statutory
definitions of the crimes, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended that
the intent necessary to prove all three crimes differed. The Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals and affirmed the sentencing court’s ruling that the crimes did not
involve the same criminal conduct. We note that the assault and the burglary by
Westwood raised the attempted rape charge to first degree rape, but this phenomenon was
of no consequence.
The Supreme Court, also in State v. Westwood, claimed that its ruling in State v.
Chenoweth followed the ruling in State v. Dunaway. According to Westwood, the
Chenoweth court looked at the statutory intent of the crimes of incest and rape of a child
and found separate intents. The Westwood court did not identify the two purported
different intents of incest and child rape. The Dunaway court merely cited to the two
statutes and did not quote or analyze the statutes. We have already noted that incest and
third degree rape of a child require no particular intent.
The Westwood court announced that the sentencing court should decline to
consider whether the defendant actually maintained a consistent intent throughout the
crimes. This announcement together with other announcements conflict with State v.
Dunaway which held Dunaway’s crimes to be same criminal conduct because he engaged
in the kidnapping in order to take money from the women.
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Four justices, led by Justice Barbara Madsen, dissented in State v. Westwood. The
dissent criticized the majority for conflating the same criminal conduct test with the test
for double jeopardy. According to the dissent, the majority, instead of providing clarity,
reinvented the objective intent test by claiming the test focuses on the statutory
definitions of the crimes to determine the objective intent. The dissenting opinion
painstakingly journeyed through the numerous Supreme Court decisions and showed the
error in the majority’s proclamation that the court’s decisions had always focused on the
language of statutes that created the various crimes. The dissent, like the majority, wrote
that a sentencing court must apply an objective intent test, but the dissent declared that
the test focuses on the extent to which the criminal intent, as objectively viewed, changed
from one crime to the next, not on the statutory criminal intent, which is the focus of a
double jeopardy analysis. The dissent agreed with our decision’s observation that
statutory criminal intent of crimes is not objective. Thus, if the correct analysis relies on
the language of the statute, as posited by the Westwood majority, the inquiry, by nature, is
one of subjective intent.
In light of State v. Westwood’s instruction to inspect the statutory criminal intent
of each of the offenses, we review the statutory mens rea for the four respective crimes of
James House’s convictions. Under RCW 9A.52.020, one commits the crime of first
degree burglary when:
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No. 39161-2-III
State v. House
with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein,
he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or
while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, the actor or another
participant in the crime (a) is armed with a deadly weapon, or (b) assaults
any person.
(Emphasis added.)
One commits second degree assault when:
he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first
degree:
(a) Intentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly inflicts
substantial bodily harm; or
....
(c) Assaults another with a deadly weapon; or
....
(e) With intent to commit a felony, assaults another; or
(f) Knowingly inflicts bodily harm which by design causes such pain
or agony as to be the equivalent of that produced by torture; or
(g) Assaults another by strangulation or suffocation.
RCW 9A 36.021 (emphasis added). Under the list of alternate means by which to
commit second degree assault, an accused could commit the crime with the intent to
strike the victim, with the intent to commit any felony, with the knowledge of inflicting
bodily injury but without any specific intent, or by strangulating or suffocating the victim
without any specific intent. Only one of those mens rea aligns with the statutory mens
rea necessary to commit first degree burglary, that being the intent to commit any felony.
The State alleged, in the charging information, that James House committed second
degree assault by either strangulation or use of a deadly weapon, not with the intent to
commit another felony or with any particular specific intent.
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No. 39161-2-III
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RCW 9A.44.100, the indecent liberties statute, proscribes, in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of indecent liberties when he or she knowingly
causes another person to have sexual contact with him or her or another:
(a) By forcible compulsion;
(Emphasis added.) The succinct unlawful imprisonment statute, RCW 9A.40.040,
declares:
(1) A person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment if he or she
knowingly restrains another person.
(Emphasis added.)
We grapple, in James House’s appeal, with applying the objective intent analysis,
at least in its form as announced in State v. Westwood of referencing the statutory
criminal intent of each crime. The State concedes on appeal that second degree assault
and first degree burglary constituted the same criminal conduct because the State
employed the assault as the predicate crime for burglary. The assault raised the burglary
charge to first degree. But the objective intent analysis does not revolve around whether
one crime serves as a predicate crime for the other crime. The Supreme Court, in State v.
Westwood, held all crimes to be separate despite two of the crimes raising the burglary to
first degree burglary.
We observe that the statutory mens rea for first degree burglary and second degree
assault do not conflate. One commits first degree burglary by entering the property with
the intent to commit any crime, not with the intent to commit a predicate crime or a
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No. 39161-2-III
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particular crime charged by the State. In its charging information, the State did not allege
any particular crime that James House intended to perpetrate when he entered C.M.’s
residence.
Based on the objective intent analysis, as announced in State v. Westwood, the
State and the superior court may have erred when determining second-degree assault and
first degree burglary to be the same criminal conduct. We assign no fault to either
because of the continuing confused nature of the quest to discern same criminal conduct.
The Supreme Court issued State v. Westwood after James House’s sentencing. As far as
we know, the Supreme Court will also declare us to be wrong. Regardless, neither party
on appeal challenges the sentencing court’s consideration of the assault and burglary
being the same criminal conduct.
When employing the stated objective intent analysis to James House’s
assignments of error, we conclude that the crimes of unlawful imprisonment and indecent
liberties did not involve the same criminal conduct as House’s burglary. Also, the crimes
of assault and indecent liberties did not form the same intent as unlawful imprisonment.
The mens rea of unlawful imprisonment is knowingly restraining another, the mens rea of
burglary is entering a residence with the intent to commit a crime, the mens rea of second
degree assault is various, and the mens rea of indecent liberties is knowingly forcing
another into sexual relations.
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When committing his four crimes, James House may have possessed an
overarching goal in killing C.M., terrorizing her, or forcing sex on her. He engaged in
one scheme throughout his conduct. But we read State v. Westwood to direct us to ignore
House’s subjective desires. James House’s burglarizing C.M.’s home and restraining her
enabled him to assault C.M. Also, House’s unlawful entry into the residence and
unlawful imprisonment of C.M. permitted him to commit the crime of indecent liberties.
We read State v. Westwood, however, to direct us to address whether one crime furthers
another crime only after determining that the statutory intents of the crimes are similar.
The circumstances in this appeal mirror the circumstances in State v. Westwood
wherein the Supreme Court scored all crimes separately. Dahndre Westwood entered
A.B.’s house in the early morning hours without A.B.’s consent. James House entered
C.M.’s house without permission at 1:37 a.m. Westwood brandished a knife. House
carried a knife. Westwood choked and suffocated A.B. House strangulated C.M.
During a struggle, Westwood cut A.B. with the knife, leaving a scar on her cheek.
During the excitement of police entering the residence, House cut C.M.’s arm and face.
Westwood attempted to sexually assault A.B. House successfully forced oral sex on
C.M.
A jury convicted Dahndre Westwood of attempted rape in the first degree, assault
in the first degree, and burglary in the first degree. Despite the events occurring over a
limited space in time and despite Westwood likely committing all crimes with the one
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No. 39161-2-III
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goal of rape, the Supreme Court scored the crimes of burglary, assault, and attempted
rape as separate crimes. The fact that the burglary and assault furthered the attempted
rape was of no consequence.
Under State v. Dunaway, some of Dahndre Westwood’s crimes might have been
scored as one. Also, under State v. Dunaway, more of James House’s crimes would
probably be scored as one. After State v. Westwood, Dunaway is kaput.
Based on the teachings of State v. Westwood, we conclude the sentencing court
committed no error when calculating James House’s offender score. Assuming any error,
that error benefitted House.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s assessment of James House’s offender score and affirm
his sentence.
Fearing, J.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
Staab, J.
35