State Of Washington, V. Alexander M. Emerson ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
No. 84576-4-I
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ALEXANDER M. EMERSON,
Appellant.
DWYER, J. — Alexander Emerson appeals from the judgment entered on a
jury’s verdict convicting him of one count of rape in the second degree. On
appeal, Emerson asserts that his trial counsel did not render effective assistance
because, in pursuing a theory of general denial, his counsel did not additionally
argue an affirmative defense that he had a reasonable belief that the alleged
victim was not incapable of consenting due to physical helplessness. We
conclude that defense counsel’s strategy can be objectively viewed as a
conceivable and reasonable trial tactic and that, even if such strategy was shown
to be deficient, which we do not hold, no prejudice is shown to have resulted to
Emerson from the employment of this strategy. Accordingly, we affirm.
No. 84576-4-I/2
I
The State charged Emerson with one count of rape in the second degree,
alleging that he had engaged “in sexual intercourse with another person named
L.B.,[1] under circumstances where L.B. was incapable of consenting to sexual
intercourse by reason of being physically helpless.”2 Emerson denied the
charge. A jury trial ensued.
The State, in its opening statement, told the jury that Emerson had thrust
his penis into L.B.’s vagina while she was sleeping and that the forthcoming
testimony of several witnesses (including L.B., other witnesses who she told
about the incident, and several police officers) and certain text messages would
prove that such conduct had occurred. Defense counsel stated that the alleged
rape did not occur and that the evidence presented at trial would instead create a
reasonable doubt as to the occurrence of such conduct.
The following testimony and exhibits were presented to the jury during the
parties’ cases in chief.
In March 2019, L.B. was introduced to Emerson by her mother because
he was a mutual acquaintance of L.B.’s mother, he was moving to Seattle, and
L.B. was already living there at the time.
Between March and May 2019, L.B. and Emerson met in person on at
least three different occasions. L.B. testified that, during that time, she did not
have any romantic feelings for Emerson, she did not believe her relationship with
1 We use the initials L.B. to refer to the alleged adult victim in this matter.
2 RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b).
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Emerson was flirtatious, and she repeatedly told him that she was not interested
in an intimate or exclusive relationship with him. Emerson testified that, during
that time, he and L.B. were just friends but they had flirted with each other, and
that, if L.B. wanted a sexual relationship with him, he would have reciprocated.
In late March 2019, L.B. and Emerson met in person for the first time at a
bar near where L.B. lived at the time. They sat together for drinks and chatted
and, later on, L.B. invited Emerson to her apartment to look at her living space as
well as some art that she had created. While in that apartment, they had talked
about possible career paths, including Emerson’s work as a massage therapist
and L.B.’s interest in such a career. They then demonstrated massage
techniques on one another, on the floor of her bedroom and on her bed.
Emerson testified that, on that night, he stayed overnight and that L.B. had
insisted that he sleep in her bed with her. He testified that L.B. told him “that it
was okay for me to sleep with her in the bed, that we’d have boundaries,” that he
would sleep on one side of the bed while she slept on the other side, and that
she made a divider on the bed with a blanket and pillows. He also testified that,
during the night, he got up to use the bathroom and that, when he returned to the
bed, the barrier was gone, and, after he laid down, L.B. grabbed his arm and put
it around her body so that they were “cuddling.”
L.B. testified that she recalled that Emerson had stayed overnight at that
apartment but did not recall whether it was on the first night they met in person.
She nevertheless testified that, when he first stayed overnight, they had been
“hanging out” late into the evening, and she invited him to sleep over so that he
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did not have to walk home alone late at night. L.B. testified that she invited him
to sleep in her bed with him, she asked that they both stay on their own sides of
the bed, they went to sleep in her bed, and no sexual conduct occurred between
them.
Shortly thereafter, L.B. moved into a two-bedroom apartment with a friend
of hers.
In early May 2019, L.B. invited Emerson to see her new apartment and,
while there, he met her roommate. Emerson testified that L.B. invited him to stay
over that night and sleep in her bed with her and they fell asleep “just cuddling
like [they] did the first time” in the “spooning” position. For her part, L.B. testified
that, on that occasion, Emerson did not spend the night.3
On May 4, 2019, L.B. and Emerson again met in person at L.B.’s new
apartment. They drank alcohol and ate pizza while L.B. was painting a mural on
her bedroom wall. L.B.’s roommate later joined them. L.B. testified that, during
that evening, she saw Emerson and her roommate chatting, “almost cuddling a
little bit” with each other while she was painting. Emerson testified that, while
L.B. was painting, he and L.B.’s roommate “made out a little,” and when L.B.’s
roommate went to bed, he “gave her a hug” and “a kiss on the side of her neck,”
and that he did not recall her recoiling from him.
L.B.’s former roommate testified that, on that night, she came home late
and saw L.B. and Emerson hanging out in the apartment. She testified that she
3 L.B.’s roommate testified that she did not know whether Emerson stayed overnight on
that occasion.
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No. 84576-4-I/5
noticed that L.B. had “noticeable signs that she had drinken [sic] more than she
usually would,” and that Emerson was “pretty intoxicated,” made “belligerent”
comments about women, and kept on touching his body against hers while L.B.
was painting. She testified that her impression was that Emerson had touched
her with a sexual intention. She further testified that, when she stated that she
was going to bed, Emerson hugged her, she hugged him back, and then he “kind
of latched on to my neck and started kissing my neck,” and she shoved him
away. She testified that she then went to bed and fell asleep.
L.B. testified that, after her roommate went to bed, she and Emerson
“hung out and talked for a while” and then she told him
I’m going to go to bed. Uh, you can stay if you want, uhm,
because, you know, I trusted him and, like, we were able to
platonically sleep in a bed, and I had reiterated to him that, like, you
know, these are my boundaries. And then, uhm, we went to bed.
Emerson testified that, after L.B.’s roommate went to bed, L.B. invited him
to sleep in her bed, he told her he wanted to sleep on the couch, and she insisted
that he sleep in her bed with her. He testified that he was wearing a shirt and
boxers, and they both testified that L.B. was wearing a shirt and sweatpants.
Prior to falling asleep, they were in a “cuddle” position and were
“spooning.” L.B. testified that they “maybe cuddle[d] a little bit,” and that she told
him, “I’m not interested in you like that,” but it was “normal for me to, like, cuddle
friends” because she had friends in college that she could trust “with your
boundaries after you express them.” L.B. also testified that, prior to falling asleep
in the “spooning” position, Emerson’s right arm was on her hip, and she felt
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No. 84576-4-I/6
comfortable in that position. She testified that she fell asleep pretty much right
away.
Emerson testified that, prior to falling asleep, he and L.B. chatted about
body piercings, considered watching a movie, but then went to sleep. Emerson
testified that, when they fell asleep, they were still cuddling, she was laying on his
arm, and he had his left arm over her.
L.B. testified that the next thing she remembered was awakening to the
feeling of someone on top of her and that she saw that
Emerson was on top of me, and my, uh, sweatpants were down.
And, uhm, sorry to get graphic, but, uhm, uh, there was penetration.
His—but, you know, when you’re not aroused, it’s kind of like—it’s
in, but it’s having a hard time getting fully in. So, it was erect, but
not, like, super-duper hard, I think. It was just mostly me being dry.
Uhm, and there was thrusting movement. And I froze for a second.
Then I shoved him off immediately. And then he, like, took my
shoulder, pressed me back down, and tried to, like, pull at my pants
again, and then, uh—and then, uh, I shoved him off again. And I
yelled at him, like, what the fuck are you doing? And, uhm, he kind
of just [inaudible] to himself because I made him get off the bed.
Uhm, I’m pretty sure he stumbled a little bit, and then, like, I kind of
just said—I just, like, yelled at him briefly.
She testified that it was still dark outside and that she was not sure how long she
had been asleep before she woke up.
Emerson, testified that, after falling asleep, he remembered
waking up not too long after. Uh, I felt as if she was kind of, uh,
moving her pelvic area against mine. Uhm, basically trying to get
me aroused, but I was—I was unable to. Uhm, I assumed
something, uh, was going on. Uh, then I kissed—I was just, uh,
kissing her neck. . . . Uh, she was moaning. Uhm, she was on my
right arm. So, my left arm was on her—her hip, or her waist. Uh, I
began to undress her. The—the sweatpants went down to about,
like, mid-buttocks, or upper—upper thigh. We’d say [sic], that—
that’s where that would be. She then yelled, “No. Stop.” Uhm, I
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No. 84576-4-I/7
then backed away from her. She was, like, what do you think
you’re doing? What—why do you think you can be inside of me?
Uh, I told her, no, I—I wasn’t inside of you. Uhm, I’m not
understanding, like, what—what’s going on. . . . And she said, you
need to get the fuck out of my house. Uh, you need to go right
now. Uhm, I got up—I was laying by the window side, so I had to
get—I had to go over her, or around her, uhm, to the foot of the
bed. Uhm, I told her, I—I need to find my things. Can we talk
about this? Like, what’s—like, what—why are—why are you so
upset? Like, I thought it was a mutual thing. Uhm, based on how
we woke up.
They both testified that L.B. went immediately into her roommate’s bedroom.
L.B.’s former roommate testified that she was awakened that night by L.B.
entering her bedroom and that she saw that L.B. was shaking and crying, that
her eyes were watering, and that L.B. told her that “she had fallen asleep, woken
up, and [Emerson]—when she woke up, [Emerson] was on top of her and inside
of her.” L.B. testified that, when she woke up her roommate, she told her what
happened while crying, panicking, and hyperventilating. Both L.B. and her
roommate asked Emerson to leave. He did.
A series of text messages, time-stamped around 4:00 a.m. on May 5,
2019, admitted as an exhibit at trial, reads as follows:
EMERSON: I got beat up and robbed. It was probably for
the best. I really don’t know what happened between us. Please
enjoy your life. Thanks for being a friend.
L.B.: You’re a fucking disgusting being. Never contact me
again. I hope you never put another person through what you put
me through. Blocked.
EMERSON: I am and I apologize. I should stop drinking all
together. Never meant any harm.
Regarding that text message, Emerson testified he did not, in actuality, get
“beat up and robbed,” and that he had said as much because he “needed to get
her to talk to me. Uhm, she’s the only person that I knew. I had no one else to
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No. 84576-4-I/8
talk to.” He testified that he thought that “maybe she’d feel sorry and actually
communicate with me.”
After Emerson left the apartment, L.B.’s roommate testified, she tried to
comfort L.B. and “erase as much of the interaction as possible,” washing L.B.’s
bedding and clothes, including the sweatpants that she was wearing. L.B.
testified that she had called her mother several times but that her mother did not
answer the telephone.
L.B.’s mother testified that, by the time she had located her telephone on
the morning in question, she saw that she had missed several calls from her
daughter. L.B. testified that she successfully spoke to her mother that morning.
Her mother testified that L.B. sounded very upset and was crying. She
recommended that L.B. call 911, which L.B. did.
Shortly thereafter, L.B.’s mother testified, she sent a text message to
Emerson. An exhibit of that text message exchange admitted at trial read as
follows:
[L.B.’S MOTHER:] You raped my daughter? . . .
[EMERSON:] No, no, that’s not how it went down. I’m so sorry. I
been sleeping over a couple nights, and last night we were drinking
a lot. I’m not sure what fully happened. . . . She said to stop, and
we were doing what we were doing, and I did. She told me I
needed to leave, and I did. We did not have sex.
Later that morning, two police officers interviewed L.B. and her roommate.
One officer testified that, in interviewing L.B., she appeared agitated, she
perhaps had been crying, and she was upset. The other officer testified that he
had collected the sweatpants that L.B. said that she was wearing that night. A
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No. 84576-4-I/9
forensic scientist testified that she tested and examined L.B.’s sweatpants, that
the results were negative, and that she concluded that there was no indication of
semen or saliva on the sweatpants.
After the officers submitted their report, a police detective began to
investigate L.B.’s allegations. He interviewed L.B. in person for about 90
minutes, collected text message conversations, spoke to L.B.’s roommate and
her mother, and also spoke with Emerson over the telephone for one hour.
During his interview with the detective, Emerson testified, he said that he
was sexually interested in L.B. Emerson also testified that he had lied to the
detective about getting beaten up and robbed and that he had provided the
detective with a fictional location, assault, and list of stolen items, as well as a
fictional description of the perpetrator’s height, skin color, hair color and style,
and body shape. In response to the following question posed by the State, “You
don’t think that you gave [the detective] a detailed description of a completely
false allegation over the course of this interview?”, Emerson responded, “Over
the course of time with thoughts in between, I—I did, yes.”
After both parties had rested, the court read the following instructions, in
pertinent part, to the jury:
COURT’S INSTRUCTION NO. 3
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. That plea puts in
issue every element of each crime charged. The State is the
plaintiff and has the burden of proving each element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant has no burden of
proving that a reasonable doubt exists as to these elements.
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No. 84576-4-I/10
A defendant is presumed innocent. This presumption continues
throughout the entire trial unless during your deliberations you find
it has been overcome by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists and may arise
from the evidence or lack of evidence. It is such a doubt as would
exist in the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly, and
carefully considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence. If,
from such consideration, you have an abiding belief in the truth of
the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
....
COURT’S INSTRUCTION NO. 6
A person commits the crime of Rape in the Second Degree when
he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person when
the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being
physically helpless.
COURT’S INSTRUCTION NO. 7
To convict the Defendant of the crime of Rape in the Second
Degree, each of the following three elements of the crime must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That between May 4, 2019 and May 5, 2019, the
defendant Alexander Emerson engaged in sexual
intercourse with [L.B.];
(2) That the sexual intercourse occurred when [L.B.] was
incapable of consent by reason of being physically
helpless; and
(3) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.
If you find from the evidence that elements (1), (2), and (3) have
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to
return a verdict of guilty.
On the other hand, if, after weighing all the evidence, you have a
reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be
your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
10
No. 84576-4-I/11
COURT’S INSTRUCTION NO. 8
“Sexual intercourse” means that the sexual organ of the male
entered and penetrated the sexual organ of the female and occurs
upon any penetration, however slight or any penetration of the
vagina or anus however slight, by an object, including a body part,
when committed on one person by another, whether such persons
are of the same or opposite sex.
COURT’S INSTRUCTION NO. 9
“Consent” means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse
there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement
to have sexual intercourse.
COURT’S INSTRUCTION NO. 10
A person is physically helpless when the person is unconscious or
for any other reason is physically unable to communicate
unwillingness to an act.
In closing argument, the State urged the jury to find Emerson guilty of rape
in the second degree. The State argued that each of the elements of the
charged crime were met because the evidence demonstrated that, on the night in
question, Emerson had thrust his penis into L.B.’s vagina while she was sleeping.
The State argued that L.B. was a credible witness because she had no
motivation to fabricate a rape allegation, she was not biased against Emerson,
and she had been consistent in her recounting of the events on the night in
question. The State also argued that Emerson was not a credible witness
because he had lied to not only L.B. but also a police detective about being
robbed and assaulted in the early morning after the alleged incident.
Defense counsel argued in closing that the State had failed to meet its
burden of proof as to two out of the three elements of the rape charge. Defense
counsel first argued that the jury should find that a reasonable doubt existed as
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No. 84576-4-I/12
to whether the State had established that Emerson’s penis had penetrated L.B.’s
vagina. Such a doubt existed, according to defense counsel, because
inconsistencies in L.B.’s testimony reflected that she had made up the notion that
she had been penetrated, while Emerson testified that such penetration did not
happen and testing done on the sweatpants in question revealed no DNA, body
fluid, or other evidence connected to Emerson. Defense counsel also argued
that a reasonable doubt existed as to whether L.B. was physically incapable of
consenting on the basis of her being asleep because the State’s primary
evidence in support of such incapacity was L.B.’s testimony but, according to
defense counsel, L.B. had actually fictionalized the occurrence of the rape
because she wanted the attention of others, including her roommate at the time.
The jury returned a verdict convicting Emerson as charged.
Emerson now appeals.
II
Emerson asserts that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient
because his attorney did not argue both a general denial defense and the
“reasonable belief” statutory affirmative defense to rape in the second degree.
Emerson also asserts that such purportedly deficient performance prejudiced
him. As to both assertions, Emerson’s claim fails.
In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must show that (1) the defense attorney’s performance was deficient
and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by that deficient performance. In re Det. of
Hatfield, 191 Wn. App. 378, 401, 362 P.3d 997 (2015) (quoting State v.
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No. 84576-4-I/13
Borsheim, 140 Wn. App. 357, 376, 165 P.3d 417 (2007)). “Deficient performance
is that which falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v.
Weaville, 162 Wn. App. 801, 823, 256 P.3d 426 (2011). We presume adequate
representation when there is any “‘conceivable legitimate tactic’” that explains
counsel’s performance. Hatfield, 191 Wn. App. at 402 (quoting State v.
Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004)). “Prejudice occurs
where there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance,
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Weaville, 162 Wn.
App. at 823 (citing State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251(1995)). “Competency of counsel is determined based upon the entire record
below.” McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335 (citing State v. White, 81 Wn.2d 223, 225,
500 P.2d 1242 (1972)).
Here, Emerson asserts that, based on the evidence presented at trial, his
counsel’s decision to not also argue the “reasonable belief” statutory affirmative
defense was both deficient and prejudicial.
The “reasonable belief” statutory affirmative defense reads as follows:
In any prosecution under this chapter in which lack of consent is
based solely upon the victim’s mental incapacity or upon the
victim’s being physically helpless, it is a defense which the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at
the time of the offense the defendant reasonably believed that the
victim was not mentally incapacitated and/or physically helpless.
RCW 9A.44.030(1).4 However, prior to a jury considering such an affirmative
defense, “[t]he jury would have had to find that the State had met its burden and
4 The Washington Pattern Jury Instructions for the “reasonable belief” affirmative defense
reads as follows:
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No. 84576-4-I/14
proved every element of the rape charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Powell, 150 Wn. App. 139, 157 n.12, 206 P.3d 703 (2009). This is so because
that affirmative defense does not negate an element of the crime of rape in the
second degree but, rather, only excuses the underlying conduct. See RCW
9A.44.030(1), .050(1)(b); State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 368, 869 P.2d 43 (1994)
(citing State v. Rice, 102 Wn.2d 120, 124-26, 683 P.2d 199 (1984); State v. Box,
109 Wn.2d 320, 323-30, 745 P.2d 23 (1987)). Furthermore, it is a well-
established presumption that the jury follows both the law and the court’s
instructions. State v. Ervin, 158 Wn.2d 746, 756, 147 P.3d 567 (2006) (citing
State v. Stein, 144 Wn.2d 236, 247, 27 P.3d 184 (2001)). Indeed, in a case
involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
[i]n making the determination whether the specified errors resulted
in the required prejudice, a court should presume . . . that the judge
or jury acted according to law. An assessment of the likelihood of a
result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility
of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, “nullification,” and the like. A
defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless
decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The
assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially
applying the standards that govern the decision.
It is a defense to a charge of [rape in the second degree] [indecent
liberties] that at the time of the acts the defendant reasonably believed that
(name of person) was not [mentally defective] [or] [mentally incapacitated] [or]
[physically helpless].
The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that you
must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that it is more
probably true than not true. If you find that the defendant has established this
defense, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty [as to this charge].
11 W ASHINGTON PRACTICE: W ASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 19.03 (5th ed.
2021).
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No. 84576-4-I/15
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694-95, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984).
A
Emerson asserts that his conviction must be reversed. In so doing, he
relies considerably on our decision in In re Personal Restraint of Hubert, 138 Wn.
App. 924, 158 P.3d 1282 (2007), and the decision of Division II of this court in
State v. Powell, 150 Wn. App. 139, both of which reversed the criminal
convictions appealed therein on the basis that, because the evidence presented
at those trials might have supported a defense theory predicated on the
“reasonable belief” affirmative defense and the trial counsel therein did not
pursue such a theory, the trial counsel therein rendered ineffective assistance.
150 Wn. App. at 154-58; 138 Wn. App. at 929-32.
In so relying on those decisions, Emerson argues that, because a litigation
action was deemed necessary in one case, it is necessary in all cases. But this
has always been wrong.
In Strickland itself, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court majority,
detailed the necessity of judicial deference to attorney tactics and strategy, the
imperativeness of utilizing an objective standard, and the mandate of the
presumption of competent performance. 466 U.S. at 687-91. Several of the
Justice’s many trenchant observations are particularly important herein.
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by
defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how
best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would
interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of
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No. 84576-4-I/16
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making
tactical decisions. . . .
. . . There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any
given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not
defend a particular client in the same way.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
Courts are part of the government. The Sixth Amendment does not allow
the government to control the presentation of a criminal defense. Rather, the
defendant is guaranteed an independent counsel—one free from government
control. Therefore, courts, in evaluating the claims advanced to them, must
honor this constitutionally guaranteed independence in announcing their rulings.
Here, Emerson’s defense was denial: he steadfastly denied that his penis
penetrated L.B.’s vagina. He also testified that L.B.’s movements and the
sounds she made were indicative of both her consent to his touching and her
capacity to do so.
L.B. testified differently. She asserted that penetration did occur. She
further testified that she was incapable of consent at that time.
Emerson’s defense was centered on one goal: creating a doubt as to the
State’s proof, based as it was on L.B.’s testimony. If a doubt could be raised, the
jury would acquit Emerson based on the State’s failure to prove the elements of
the charged offense.
On appeal, Emerson asserts that the Sixth Amendment declares that the
presentation of such a defense is constitutionally faulty. Instead, Emerson
alleges, the constitution mandated a single and different approach.
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No. 84576-4-I/17
According to Emerson, the Sixth Amendment required defense counsel to
defend in the alternative. Pointing out that this is allowed, Emerson contends
that it is constitutionally required.
In Emerson’s view, the only constitutionally compliant approach to
defending his case was to combine his denial defense with an assertion of the
affirmative defense that he reasonably believed that L.B. was capable of consent.
To Emerson, it was necessary for his attorney to argue his denial defense, as
was done. But it was also constitutionally required for his counsel to argue the
following: if the jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State
had proved all elements of the charge (thus plainly not crediting Emerson’s
testimony regarding the absence of penetration and not viewing his testimony as
even creating a doubt as to that or any other element), the attorney should then
have argued that Emerson nevertheless had proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that L.B., despite her testimony to the contrary, had through actions
and sounds, created in Emerson the reasonable belief that she was capable of
consent. Moreover, because the jury would only consider the affirmative defense
after it had unanimously concluded that all elements of the State’s case had been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, his counsel would then have needed to have
convinced the jury that—nonetheless—Emerson had himself proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that L.B.’s testimony concerning her incapacity
was most likely false and that his testimony on the subject was most likely true.
We disagree that the attorney had such a mandatory duty. Many competent
attorneys might consider this an unlikely result and a risk not worth taking given
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No. 84576-4-I/18
the foreseeable possibility of such an advancement of alternative defenses
undercutting the more hopeful denial defense.
Importantly, the denial defense could succeed if the jury had only a doubt
about an element of the charged crime. But Emerson would have the burden of
proof on his affirmative defense. This would highlight whether his testimony was
proved more likely true than not true and risk taking the focus off of what the
denial defense called for: a focus on whether the jury had a doubt as to the
strength of the State’s case and the accuracy of L.B.’s testimony.
In the end, it is plain that, at a minimum, a competent attorney could
conceivably choose either strategy and adopt tactics conforming with that choice.
Strickland allows the attorney to exercise this independent judgment and
commands that such judgment be presumed competent.5 On this record,
Emerson fails to show deficient performance.6
B
Emerson next asserts that his trial counsel’s decision to not pursue both a
general denial defense and the “reasonable belief” affirmative defense prejudiced
him. We disagree.
5 As Justice O’Connor instructed, “[m]ost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual
ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not
establish mechanical rules.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Indeed, “[t]he object of an
ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. . . . Courts should strive to ensure
that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal
justice system suffers as a result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
6 Emerson also relies on State v. Fisher, 185 Wn.2d 836, 374 P.3d 1185 (2016), and
State v. Buzzell, 148 Wn. App. 592, 200 P.3d 287 (2009), to support his assertion of ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, the analysis that Emerson relies on in Fisher and Buzzell did
not regard ineffective assistance of counsel but, rather, regarded a trial court’s denial of a
defendant’s request to instruct the jury on a certain affirmative defense. 185 Wn.2d at 851-52;
148 Wn. App. at 598-600. The legal standard, actors involved, and underlying principles are not
the same. Thus, Emerson’s reliance on such authority is unavailing.
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To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that “‘there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’” State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 226,
743 P.2d 816 (1987) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); see also Weaville,
162 Wn. App. at 823 (citing McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335).
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Thomas,
109 Wn.2d at 226; [State v. ]Garrett, 124 Wn.2d [504,] 519[, 881
P.2d 185 (1994)]. In assessing prejudice, “a court should presume,
absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary
insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to the law” and
must “exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice,
‘nullification’ and the like.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 34, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). In making such a
determination,
a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality
of the evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual
findings will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual
findings that were affected will have been affected in different ways.
Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to
be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture,
and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a
verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more
likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming
record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and
taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining
findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the
defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached
would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96.
As set forth above, a jury instructed on a “reasonable belief” affirmative
defense would not consider such a defense until after that jury had found “that
the State had met its burden and proved every element of the rape charge
19
No. 84576-4-I/20
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Powell, 150 Wn. App. at 157 n.12; see also Ervin,
158 Wn.2d at 756.
Here, Emerson testified that, during the night in question, he thought L.B.
was awake, that her movements and sounds suggested to him that she was
inviting sexual contact, and that no penetration had occurred. L.B. testified that
she was asleep and that she woke up to Emerson’s penis penetrating her vagina.
After hearing this evidence, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Emerson had forcefully penetrated L.B.’s vagina with his penis while she was
asleep.
Emerson neither establishes nor persuasively suggests that the jury’s
verdict would have or might have changed had his counsel’s performance not
been deficient. In finding that Emerson had committed the charged conduct, the
jury plainly credited L.B.’s testimony over his testimony. In order for his
affirmative defense to succeed, however, the jury would need to do the exact
opposite. Such a result has not been shown to be anything but extremely
unlikely. Indeed, if the jury, for the purpose of finding that Emerson had engaged
in conduct constituting rape in the second degree, did not find that Emerson’s
testimony raised a doubt as to the credibility of L.B. or the accuracy of her
testimony, it is not shown to be reasonably likely that the same jury, for the
purpose of evaluating his affirmative defense, would have changed its views.
The record does not contain evidence giving rise to such a likelihood.7
7 Indeed, a good deal of evidence corroborated L.B.’s testimony, including her former
roommate’s testimony about her perception of L.B.’s demeanor immediately after the alleged
incident and her mother’s testimony about missed telephone calls and her perception of her
daughter’s demeanor on reaching her on the morning thereafter. Furthermore, Emerson’s
20
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Thus, Emerson has not shown that his “counsel’s conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on
as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. This is required of
him to show an entitlement to appellate relief on the claim asserted. Accordingly,
Emerson’s assertion of prejudice and, therefore, his assertion of ineffective
representation fail.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
credibility before the jury was also likely diminished after testifying to having lied to both L.B. and
later to a police detective during the investigation.
21